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Abstract 
This dissertation presents an analysis of the Somers mutiny of 1842 
that goes beyond the simple narratives offered by previous studies of the 
cruise. The mutiny is examined within the context of contemporary 
American politics and social reform, particularly as they related to naval 
affairs. These emphases clarify the rationale behind the cruise of the 
Somers, and shed light upon the nature of her crew. 
The immediate physical environment of the brig is described in 
order to reveal the difficulties in its operation, and the destabilising effect 
that this had on both the functional and social worlds of the vessel. The 
social environment on board is further defined by examining the daily 
progress of the cruise with reference to ante1>ellum naval life and practice. 
; 
When so combined, these factors clarify the c5fficers' perception of the 
mutiny threat, and go far to explain their actions throughout the crisis. 
Finally, the dissertation examines the controversy that arose after 
the Somers returned to the United States. In particular, the military 
courts convened to investigate the mutiny are subjected to critical analysis 
since they are fully part of the events that they purported to explain, and 
because their proceedings remain the primary source material for 
reconstructing the cruise it is necessary to identify their biases. To 
conclude, the societal lessons of the Somers mutiny are explored, and an 
alternative reading of the event is posed. 
This work is dedicated to my parents, who have always supported me in my 
endeavours, and indulged me in my pursuits. 
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Introduction 
On December 1, 1842, three men were hanged for the crime of 
mutiny on board the U.S. Brig-of-War Somers. The brig itself was a 
school-ship, sailed almost entirely by apprentices between the ages of 
thirteen and twenty-one. At the time of the executions, the vessel was 
returning to the United States from the African coast. Among the hanged 
was a midshipman named Philip Spencer. He is remembered as the only 
officer in the history of the United States Navy to have been executed for 
mutiny. The others executed were both senior members of the crew. 
Samuel Cromwell was the boatswain's mate, and Elisha Small had been 
until recently, the quartennaster. 
The three men had been imprisoned for much of the week prior to 
their executions. Over the course of four days, the brig's officers became 
increasingly convinced that both their command of the vessel and their 
very lives were in danger. Certain of imminent revolt, the commander, 
Alexander Slidell MacKenzie, convened an emergency council of officers 
to determine a course of action. After two days' deliberation, it was 
decided that the safety of the vessel required the executions. Once the 
decision was reached it was carried out without delay. The condemned 
men were infonned of their fate just ten minutes before they were to die. 
At no time had they been made aware of the councilor been allowed to 
speak before it. 
The executions were carried out, and the brig continued its 
homeward journey. After a brief stop at St. Thomas in the Danish West 
Indies, the Somers returned to New York City. Upon her arrival, the 
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officers were called to justify their actions before a court of inquiry, which 
in turn was followed by the commander's court-martial. Throughout these 
trials, the officers faced the implacable hostility of Spencer's father, who 
was serving in the cabinet of President John Tyler. This bitter controversy 
in the courts of law and public opinion came to be known as the Somers 
Mutiny Affair. 
Although the Somers transfixed the nation for a brief time, it was 
quickly forgotten. Indeed, the only sustained tradition of interest in it has 
been maintained by Chi Psi fraternity, a secret society founded by Philip 
Spencer the year before he was entered in the Navy. Academic 
scholarship, however, did not address the Somers for some fifty years. 
Then, between 1879 and 1890 various articles, recollections, and memoirs 
addressed the mutiny, largely in the context of the affair that followed. It 
is possible that this surge of interest accounted for Herman Melville's 
decision to begin writing his last work, Billy Budd. Certainly, there was a 
connection. Melville's first cousin, Guert Gansevoort, had been first 
lieutenant on board the Somers, and the author made explicit reference to 
the mutiny in his book, comparing the officers of the Bellipotent to those 
of the Somers.l At any rate, from this revival developed a sustained 
1 Modern scholarship has emphasised the impact of the Somers on 
Melville's familial relationships, especially with Gansevoort. At the same 
time, it has explored the impact of the mutiny on Melville's contemporary 
writing (White Jacket, and Omoo), and his return to the subject in Billy 
Budd. Although the relationship between Melville and the Somers has 
been explored with great sophistication in the most recent studies on the 
author, errors still occur. For instance, Michael Rogin's excellent work 
misidentifies the rush aft as a rush forward. M. Rogin, Subversive 
Genealogy: The Politics and Art oj Herman Melville (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1983), p. 83. Other modern studies include 
H. Parker, Reading Billy Budd, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 1990), pp. 73, 141-142; H. Parker, Herman Melville: A Biography, 
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interest in the Somers. Unfortunately, most of the literature on the mutiny 
has only served to increase our misunderstanding of it. 
Much of it has simply been inaccurate. For instance, the following 
account, published in 1946 as part of a naval training program for enlisted 
men: 
Summoning a drumhead court, [MacKenzie] had the three lads 
grilled to a turn. Cromwell denied any knowledge of a mutiny. Seaman 
Small said he'd heard Spencer talk a lot about pirates, but so far as he 
knew there was no mutinous conspiracy. Spencer, himself, declared it 
had been only a prank. He liked to read pirate stories. He'd written the 
lists in Greek just to practice the Greek alphabet. He talked of dead 
men to Wales just to tease him. With upraised hand he swore he'd 
never meant to start a mutiny. 2 
In this rather egregious example, statements extrapolated from other 
conversations have been fashioned into a set of depositions that never took 
place. Indeed, some of these statements are complete fabrications. Yet, 
more often than not, misrepresentation of the events on board the Somers 
has not been so severe. Often, names and relationships are confused. 
Thus, Philip Spencer becomes his father's only son.3 MacKenzie's 
relatives are misrepresented.4 The chronology of events after the mutiny'S 
'discovery' is incorrect.5 
Volume I, 1819-1851 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 
pp.241-243,266-267,295-298,314; 
2 Anon., Your Navy (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1949), pp. 231-232. 
3 W. Armstong, Mutiny Afloat - A Dramatized Record of Some 
Famous Sea Mutinies (London: Frederick Muller, 1956), p. 110. 
4 I. Anthony, Revolt at Sea - A Narration of Many Mutinies (New 
York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1937), p. 171. 
5 E. Haine, Mutiny on the High Seas (New York: Cornwall Books, 
1992), p. 65. 
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Recent scholarship, however, is largely factually correct. Charles 
Van de Water's The Captain Called It Mutiny (1954) was the first major 
history of the Somers to be written from a 'modern' perspective. 
Nevertheless, it was essentially a popular history. It was soon followed by 
Harrison Hayford's The Somers Mutiny Affair (1959), a source book of 
primary and secondary documents including the author's own 
commentary. The only recent monograph has been Phil McFarland's Sea 
Dangers (1985), which focuses upon the subsequent affair rather than the 
mutiny itself. Besides these, there are a small number of scholarly 
articles, the best of which are those by Hugh Egan.6 
Modern scholars have generally been more sympathetic to the 
executed men than to the brig's officers. The one great exception has been 
Samuel Eliot Morison. In Morison's biography of Commodore Matthew 
Calbraith Perry (who was closely associated with the brig's commander), 
he devoted a chapter to the Somers, in which he energetically defended 
MacKenzie's conduct.7 This account, while interesting for its perspective, 
is not nearly critical enough to justify Morison's conclusions. 
Our understanding of the event, therefore, remains incomplete. 
Contrary to the conclusion of Vaile that "the case has been analyzed so 
6 H. Egan, "Introduction," Proceedings of the Naval Court Martial in the 
Case of Alexander Slidell MacKenzie (Delmar, NY: Scholars' Facsimiles 
& Reprints, 1992), pp. 3-43; H. Egan, "The MacKenzie Court-Martial 
Trial: Cooper's Secret Correspondence with William H. Norris," Studies 
in the American Renaissance (1990). 
7 S. Morison, "Old Bruin" Commodore Matthew Calbraith 
Perry (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), pp. 144-162. 
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thoroughly that it is unlikely that any new information will surface," a 
great amount of documentary evidence relating to mutiny has never been 
consulted, especially that pertaining to the crew and cruise itself.8 
For instance, the journal of the brig's senior midshipman, Henry 
Rodgers, has been ignored by previous historians. Yet it is crucial to 
understanding the progress of the cruise, since it daily recapitulated the 
brig's log, which is now lost. At the same time, the brig's payroll 
provides information on the experience of the crew, including promotions, 
demotions, and transfers to and from the Somers. The 'saltiness' of the 
crew is also illuminated by enlistment papers for the apprentices, and 
seaman protection certificates. Moreover, these provide data on the social 
profile of the brig's complement. 
Furthermore, the cruise needs to be examined against the backdrop 
of the antebellum United States Navy, and the nation that it served. 
Although the brig was unique, it did not exist in a vacuum. Thus, 
contemporary descriptions of daily life on board other vessels of war fill 
out the portrait of the Somers. 
In order to make sense of commissioning of the Somers as a 
school-ship, and particularly the public response on her return from 
Africa, Chapter One will focus on civil-naval relations through a detailed 
reading of the Navy Secretary's annual report for 1841, and its reception 
in the Congress. In this report, Navy Secretary Abel Parker Upshur 
8 J. Valle, Rocks and Shoals: Order and Discipline in the Old 
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presented his vision of a modem navy that entailed extensive expansion 
and reform. The Somers was but one part of this programme, and will be 
better seen in light of it. Indeed, it will be shown that the Somers was a 
constituent element in a crucial part of Upshur's vision, without which, the 
remainder of his expansionist plan was jeopardised. 
Since the Somers was intended to remedy problems that were 
shaped in part by the service's various internal tensions, the professional 
. 
state of the Navy must also be assessed. The Navy of 1842 was in 
transition, afflicted by long-standing concerns detrimental to all its ranks. 
At the same time, civilian antimilitarism hindered efforts to increase the 
service's professionalism. Naval reformers had to compete and cooperate 
with various civilian organisations that were part of the larger movement 
of reform surging in the United States at the onset of the 1840s. These 
factors all contributed to the Congressional debate over the Navy's role, 
and have particular importance for the cruise of the Somers. Thus, 
Chapter Two incorporates a description of the influence of civilian and 
naval reformers upon the service, and ultimately the Somers itself. 
Of all the various reforms that affected the Navy, educational 
reform had the most pronounced impact upon the cruise of the Somers, for 
the brig's very raison d'etre was the education of her crew. Thus, the 
second chapter concentrates on the state of naval education at the onset of 
the cruise, particularly the programme of apprenticeship that the Navy 
Navy, 1800-1861 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980), p. 108. 
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instituted in 1837. Apart from placing the Somers in an operational 
context, this will illustrate the nature of the brig's crew, and give a greater 
understanding of the cruise, and the officers' response to the allegations of 
mutiny. At the same time, the relationship between apprenticeship and 
midshipmancy will be explored, since most of the officers on board the 
Somers were midshipmen, including Philip Spencer. Finally, the chapter 
will focus upon the failings of apprenticeship, and the attempt to remedy 
them with an independent school-ship. 
Having understood the nature of the brig's fundamental mission, it 
is necessary to assess in tum the Somers, and her crew. Analysing the 
physical character of the brig will help explain the course of events on 
board. Apart from providing a context for the alleged mutiny, this ensures 
that the vessel's 'silent' part in it is revealed. Too often, the Somers has 
been seen merely as the stage on which the human drama was played out. 
However, it is clear that the brig's design and operation were crucial in 
determining the eventual outcome of the cruise. 
It is not enough, however, simply to describe the Somers. 
Whatever the characteristics of a ship, it is the crew that brings her to life. 
Between ship and crew is a reciprocal relationship manifested in the 
vessel'S operation. On board the Somers, this relationship was fraught 
with difficulties, revealed in the daily operation of the vessel. Thus, 
Chapter Three focuses upon the brig, her crew, the means by which she 
was sailed, and how life on board was organised. 
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The remaining chapters conceptualise the alleged mutiny in terms 
of its origins, the act itself, and its aftermath.9 In examining potential 
origins, Chapter Four describes the progress of the cruise prior to the 
mutiny itself, beginning with a consideration of why a school-ship was 
sent to one of the Navy's most perilous stations. Any discussion of the 
African coast must also include the contemporary trade in slaves, 
especially relevant to the Somers' cruise, since the putative motivation 
behind the mutiny was the conversion of the brig to a slave ship or pirate. 
This is also the most appropriate moment to discuss the character and 
background of Midshipman Spencer. 
Chapter Five details the mutiny itself. Beginning with the 
discovery of Spencer's 'plot,' the mutiny is seen to unfold over the 
following week with the analysis focusing upon the officers' perception of 
their situation. While the truth of the mutiny has never been properly 
established, it is certain that the officers believed in its immediate danger. 
Thus, throughout the text, I have chosen always to refer to the alleged 
mutiny as an actual mutiny, since this was what the officers believed to be 
the case. At any rate, the chapter explores the factors that triggered this 
certainty. It also examines the process of "looping," by which events on 
board were seen as confirmation of the officers' worst fears.1O Indeed, by 
9 E. Rose, "Anatomy of a Mutiny," Armed Forces and Society (Vol. 8, 
No.4, Summer 1982), p. 565. 
10 E. Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental 
Patients and Other Inmates (London: Penguin Books, 1971), p. 41. 
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their own actions, the officers fomented an actual crisis that they resolved 
only with executions. 
The chapter then follows the mutiny to its denouement, 
the execution of the three 'ringleaders.' These executions adhered to 
established rituals of capital punishment, and carried social messages 
shaping their conduct and reception. Therefore, the fifth chapter describes 
the executions with reference to modern scholarship on the functions of an 
execution ritual. The remainder of the chapter then discusses the final leg 
of the brig's voyage to the United States, and the environment on board 
subsequent to the week of crisis. 
The final chapter examines the Somers Mutiny Affair. While the 
Affair touched many different lives and locales, the focus here is upon the 
various tribunals that followed the brig's return. Apart from providing 
closure to the narrative, such an evaluation is crucial to any responsible 
study of the Somers. Much of their content reflects opinion rather than 
fact. Furthermore, the opinions expressed demonstrate considerable bias 
in favour of the officers' conduct. The portraits produced of the mutineers 
are akin to the plaster casts of Pompeii's dead inhabitants. What remains 
to posterity is an image of the individual left by the cause of his death. A 
critical analysis of the Somers, therefore, must accept and explore the 
limitations of this documentary evidence. Thus, Chapter Six details the 
progress of the Affair in terms of its legal development, emphasising the 
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conflict over civil-military jurisdiction, and the progress of the courts-
martial themselves. 
While it is known that the affair had a profound impact on the 
American public, the nature of that impact is less understood. The 
analysis closes, therefore, with reference to wider societal concerns about 
American antimilitarism and fears of social unrest, together with the 
professional lessons of the mutiny. In closing, the chapter briefly 
discusses the ultimate fate of the brig, as well as the principal actors in the 
affair. 
The conclusion seeks to answer the fundamental question of 
whether or not there was a mutiny on board. In doing so, it presents a 
necessarily speculative case based largely upon the proceedings of the 
court-martial. A critical review of the evidence suggests that there was no 
mutiny as alleged by the officers. While Spencer and Cromwell were 
certainly guilty of resistance to military authority, they were more 
properly insubordinate than mutinous. The final argument, therefore, 
seeks to refute the accusation of mutiny, and offers an alternative reading 
of what might actually have been occurring on board the Somers at the 
time that the first allegations of mutiny were made. 
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Chapter One 
The Upshur Vision: Naval Expansion and Reform 
On December 4, 1841, Abel Parker Upshur, the Secretary of the 
Navy, presented his first annual report to the United States Congress. 
Composed after a month spent consulting with various naval officers and 
his advisory board of naval commissioners, the twenty-two page report 
was more comprehensive and insightful than any that had preceded it for 
some time. I That Upshur's predecessors had not paid greater care to their 
reports is not surprising. Defeated by the Whig party in the 1840 
presidential election, the Democratic party had nonetheless commanded 
the presidency and cabinet secretaryships for the previous sixteen years. 
Democrats were suspicious of professional armed forces, and under their 
administration, the United States had become a largely nonmilitary 
country, indifferent to its military institutions, and hostile to military 
professionalism.2 Although President Andrew Jackson had endorsed naval 
expansion upon his retirement, the Navy did not benefit.3 His successor, 
Martin Van Buren, was less concerned with increasing the Navy than he 
I C.H. Hall, Abel Parker Upshur - Conservative Virginian 1790-
1844 (Madison, WI: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1963), p. 125. 
2 R.F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (London: B.T. 
Batsford, 1968), p. 157. 
3 H. Sprout, and M. Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-
1918 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939), p. 110. 
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was with compensating for the diminished revenue and deficits that 
followed the financial panic of 1837.4 
At its best, Jacksonian naval policy could be summarised as one of 
benign neglect. While the service was valued for its successes in the War 
of 1812, figuring prominently in nationalistic mythology, a large navy was 
deemed superfluous. Thus, the immediate post-war expansion of the 
service had been curtailed in favour of a small and inexpensive navy.5 
4 Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power, p. 113. The Panic of 1837 
triggered a six year depression in the United States. The failure had its 
origins in the previous decade's economic expansion, which had been 
fuelled by widespread financial speculation on public lands. When 
Jackson removed federal deposits from the Bank of the United States in 
1836, he placed them in selected "pet" banks. The Bank of the United 
States had been an important instrument of credit restraint, however, and 
the "pet" banks unfortunately launched an inflationary lending spree. 
Furthermore, they made poor loans. At the same time, Jacksonian policy 
was not wholly responsible for the inflationary surge and subsequent 
crash. The increased opium trade to China, French payment of war 
indemnities, and an unexpected increase in the silver output of Mexican 
mines all contributed to an increase in the money stock circulating 
throughout the country. Land values plummeted the following year, 
however, affecting speculators and banks alike. At the same time, crop 
failures caused a drop in agricultural exports. The decline in exports 
reduced the amount of specie entering the country, and when British 
banking policy led foreign creditors to call in their debts, businesses found 
themselves unable to pay, leading to a series of bank failures and the 
Panic. T. Brown, Politics and Statesmanship: Essays on the American 
Whig Party (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), pp. 34-35; B. 
Hammond, Banks and Politics in America from the Revolution to the Civil 
War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 451-499; G.R. 
Taylor, Jackson vs. Biddle's Bank: The Struggle Over the Second Bank of 
the United States (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1972), pp. 1-7; P. Temin, 
"Economic Consequences of the Bank War," P. Temin, ed., New 
Economic History - Selected Readings (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 
1973), pp. 293-310; J. Atack, and P. Passell, A New Economic View of 
American History from Colonial Times to the Present (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1984), pp. 100-102. 
5 L.D. White, The Jacksonians: A Study in Administrative History, 1829-
1861 (New York: MacMillan Company, 1954), p. 216. Ironically, the 
Navy's decline in size and professionalism was grounded in its 1816 
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After more or less suppressing West Indian piracy by 1829, the Navy's 
mission had largely been limited to the protection of American commerce 
and citizens abroad, the suppression of the African slave trade, and the 
conduct of scientific expeditions and surveys.6 
While these were important responsibilities, they did not attract the 
public's attention, and the Navy lost the prestige it had earlier enjoyed.7 
Pushed to the margins of public attention, the Navy seemed to many an 
unnecessary, even dangerous, expense. By 1841, this small navy policy 
had caused a sharp decline in the service>s professionalism and morale. 
Indeed, that year, Democratic administration of the Navy came under 
Congressional attack for "allowing our ships of war to rot, [and] to sink 
into a state of dilapidation."s Notwithstanding the partisan basis for this 
attack, when Upshur assumed control of the Navy Department, he had 
found it in dismal condition. His report said as much: "I have had but a 
short experience in this Department; but a short experience is enough to 
display its defects, even to the most superficial observation. It is, in truth, 
not organized at all."9 
expansion. This building programme called for ships that were not 
commensurate with the service's peacetime role. High operational costs 
and lack of a mission had doomed these vessels to ordinary. By 1842, 
they were rotting on the blocks or used as receiving vessels. R.W. Love, 
History of the United States Navy, Vol. 1 (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole 
Books, 1992), p. 134; Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power, pp. 97-
98; e.O. Paullin, "Naval Administration 1842-1861," United States Naval 
Institute Proceedings (Vol. 33, No. 124, 1907), p. 1449. 
6 Paullin, "Naval Administration 1842-1861," pp. 624-625. 
7 White, The Jacksonians, p. 217. 
S Congressional Globe, 27th Congress, 1 st Session, p. 140. 
9 Upshur, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy 1841 (hereafter 
SNR), p. 378. 
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In order to restore the Navy's professionalism, Upshur's report 
proposed five fundamental reforms. The first of these called for the 
abolition of the Navy Board of Commissioners whose very members had 
earlier advised him. The Board had run the administrative bureaucracy of 
the service since 1815, when the exigencies of war revealed the 
deficiencies of the Navy Department. 1O Besides relieving the Secretary of 
routine administrative duties, the Board was intended to provide him with 
a body of professional advisors. I I By 1842, however, it had outlived its 
usefulness, something that its members had acknowledged to a certain 
extent as early as 1829, when they had partially concurred with a 
Congressional call for its dissolution. No action was taken then, however, 
and the Board remained in place. 12 The Commissioners did provide a 
useful service, however, offering the Secretary considered professional 
advice. Unfortunately, the Board became increasingly conservative over 
the course of its existence. This is not surprising given the age of 
commissioners, who were all officers of command rank during the War of 
1812. At any rate, they tended to oppose innovation and invention, 
especially those that threatened the pre-eminence of sail. The Board's 
conservatism owed much to a single man, Commodore John Rodgers, who 
had presided over the Board since its inception almost without 
interruption, and used his authority to impede technological 
development. 13 
10 e.o. Paullin, Commodore John Rodgers (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark, 
1910), p. 30l. 
II White, The Jacksonians, p. 218. 
12 White, The Jacksonians, p. 217. 
13 Paullin, Commodore John Rodgers, pp. 301, 394. Rodgers commanded 
the Mediterranean Squadron between 1824 and 1827, but returned to the 
15 
Upshur proposed replacing the Board with several naval bureaus 
similar to those recommended by Secretary of the Navy James Kirke 
Paulding in 1839. 14 Under this system, the Navy Secretary would be 
assisted by his own cabinet of administrative officers, each of whom had a 
portfolio governing a particular aspect of the department, such as 
ordnance, provisions, naval architecture, or hydrography. While these 
officers would answer to the Secretary, they were individually responsible 
for the efficient operation of their departments, freeing their superior for 
his other duties. Thus, the collective, advisory capacity of the Board 
would be abandoned in favour of greater individual autonomy and 
efficiency. Furthermore, the subordinate status of the bureau chiefs 
ensured that real departmental authority reverted to the Secretary. 
Upshur's second proposal requested a new set of naval rules and 
regulations. The current regulations had been in place since 1832, and 
were, in fact, based upon the charter regulations of 1800, with an 1815 
revision and addendum. 15 Upshur acknowledged that these had been 
sufficient for the Navy in its "then infant state," but criticised their 
continued use: "they are too few in number, and enter into too little 
details, to answer their purpose at the present day.,,16 Given the changed 
circumstances of the Navy and developments in naval technology, these 
were legitimate grievances. 
Board in 1828, and did not resign again until 1837, only a year before his 
death. 
14 Upshur, SNR 1841, p. 378. 
15 Upshur, SNR 1841, p. 375. 
16 Ibid. 
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Upshur also sought to improve the officer corps. Of immediate 
concern was the introduction of higher grades of rank. 17 From its 
inception, the United States Navy had possessed no ranks above captain. 
Upshur noted several reasons why this was detrimental to the service. In 
the first place, it precluded any increase in naval strength because a 
captain's navy was by necessity a small navy. Sophisticated fleet 
operations required a well-defined chain of command and subordination if 
they were to be conducted with any degree of success. The existing 
system, by which a senior captain was accorded the honorific title of 
Commodore did not sufficiently address this issue. 
In fact, discipline actually suffered in consequence of there being 
so many officers of equal rank, since this state of affairs encouraged 
rivalries amongst them. IS Only by creating a longer chain of command, 
and easing the congestion of the senior ranks could further status conflicts 
be averted: "The respect and deference, so necessary to discipline, are 
rarely felt, except where there is a difference of rank; and they are most 
strongly felt where that difference is greatest.,,19 Furthermore, higher 
ranks would create vacancies in the promotional ladder. The existing 
seniority system allowed promotion only after the death of a superior 
officer. Consequently, the promotional ladder had become literally 
moribund. In fact, every serving captain was a veteran of 1812, and only 
one held a commission that did not predate it. 20 For the younger officers, 
promotion was painfully slow. The future of the Navy, therefore, was in 
the hands of men who better represented its past. Indeed, the conservatism 
17 Upshur, SNR 1841, p. 383. 
IS White, The Jacksonians, p. 233. 
19 Upshur, SNR 1841, p. 384. 
20 1842 Navy Register, pp. 2-4. 
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of the Board of Commissioners merely reflected that of the Navy's senior 
officers.21 The younger officers better fit to usher in the transition to 
steam were prevented from achieving command rank before they too, 
were too 01d.22 
Finally, American captains suffered in comparison to their 
European counterparts. Foreign admirals refused to admit that an 
American captain was anything but a subordinate officer. Seniority within 
the American system was of no consequence. Apart from the sensibilities 
of the officers themselves, this discrepancy had diplomatic repercussions. 
The Navy had always been an instrument of American foreign policy, and 
its officers performed various diplomatic functions when on foreign 
station.23 Yet captains and commodores acting as the representatives of 
the United States abroad were forced to defer in their social and 
diplomatic relations when these involved officers of higher rank, as they 
often did.24 Upshur maintained that this "anomalous position" led to 
inconveniences prejudicial to the Navy's capabilities in these 
circumstances.25 
Upshur's remarks touched a popular nerve. As the Navy's officers 
were representatives of the nation, any slight directed towards them 
extended to the government of the United States. Republican pride was at 
stake. Various newspapers that supported higher ranks made this point 
21 Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power, p. 113. 
22 Upshur, SNR 1841, p. 385. 
23 R.G. Albion, Makers of Naval Policy, 1798-1947 (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 1980), p. 27. 
24 Anon., "American Admirals," New Orleans Commercial Bulletin, 
quoted in The Anny and Navy Chronicle (Vol. 10, No. 20, 1840), p. 310; 
Anon., "The Wants of the Navy," Boston Morning Post, quoted in The 
Anny and Navy Chronicle (Vol. 11, No. 25, 1840), p. 398. 
25 Upshur, SNR 1841, p. 384. 
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explicitly, drawing attention to the intolerable position of the heroes of the 
War of 1812 who languished in captaincies whilst their former antagonists 
had been promoted above them.26 Thus, the victors of that conflict 
received less consideration abroad then the men whom they had earlier 
defeated. Since the republican credentials of the senior officers were 
impeccable, it was only just that they be permitted their due accolades. 
Upshur's fourth reform focused upon the officers at the opposite 
end of the promotional ladder, the midshipmen. In particular, he drew 
attention to the propriety of a naval academy.27 Although Upshur provided 
the sensible rationale that the transition from sail to steam demanded a 
new approach to naval education, this proposal faced a hard passage. 
Almost every Secretary of the Navy since 1814 had recommended, 
without success, a naval academy in his annual report.28 Perhaps 
recognising this, Upshur mentioned it only in passing. 
Upshur's fifth proposal was not so much a reform as it was a call 
for a rapid and extensive expansion of the service. This was actually the 
dominant theme of his report. It was Upshur's understanding that naval 
expansion was the settled policy of the national govemment.29 In fact, the 
Congress had overwhelmingly authorised a moderate expansion in a 
special session that summer. Upshur hoped to build on this success, in the 
light of which he had already issued orders for the construction of several 
new vessels, including three steam frigates, a first-class sloop, and three 
26 Anon., "The Navy," The Anny and Navy Chronicle (Vol. 9, No.2, 
1839), p. 168; Anon., "Admirals in Our Navy," Richmond Courier, quoted 
in The Anny and Navy Chronicle (Vol. 9, No.4, 1839), p. 55. 
27 Upshur, SNR, 1841, p. 386. 
28 Albion, Makers of Naval Policy, p. 193. 
29 Upshur, SNR 1841, p. 381. 
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smaller vessels of war.30 Additionally, he had ordered the completion of 
four frigates already under construction.3! Furthermore, he suggested that 
at least ten sloops of war, brigs, and schooners be built immediately, and 
that more should follow. 32 
Upshur also drew attention to the growing disparity between 
European and American naval architecture, calling for American frigates 
to match their European counterparts in quality of construction and 
design.33 This demonstrated the importance he placed on modernising the 
Navy's vessels as well as increasing their number. Thus, he emphasised 
the Navy's need for steam-ships, suggesting that the Navy supplement its 
steam squadrons by assisting the private construction of packet-ships so 
that they might be converted to military purposes.34 At the same time, he 
proposed that at least one medium-sized steam-ship ought to be 
constructed entirely of iron, if only for experimental purposes.35 Besides 
expanding the numbers of steam vessels, Upshur suggested that these 
should increasingly replace the larger wind-driven line-of-battle ships. He 
asserted, at least, that no more of the latter needed to be constructed, and 
that several of those already in commission should be cut down to first-
rate frigates.36 
30 Upshur, SNR 1841, p. 372. 
3! Ibid. The frigates to be completed, Columbia, Savannah, Raritan, and 
St. Lawrence, were part of the original naval expansion of 1816. The St. 
Lawrence, had been under construction since 1826, the others since 1820 
and 1825. K.J. Bauer, and S.S. Roberts. Register of Ships of the U.S. 
Navy, Major Combatants (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 14. 
32 Upshur, SNR 1841, p. 382 
33 Upshur, SNR 1841, p. 383. 
34 Upshur, SNR 1841, p. 382. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
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Finally, Upshur also asked for the establishment of two new naval 
stations in the Pacific, including one at the Sandwich Islands.37 Moreover, 
the Navy's existing yards were to be improved and expanded, and the 
Marine Corps increased.38 All of these proposals, however, merely 
embodied the first steps towards Upshur's ultimate goal, "half the naval 
force of the strongest maritime power in the world.,,39 As this was Great 
Britain, he was asking for the United States Navy to be trebled in size, an 
unprecedented expansion.40 Such an increase would also require 
additional naval yards, depots, and personnel to maintain the service's 
operational readiness. 
Upshur, therefore, envisioned a larger, modernised, more 
professional, and more efficient Navy. In order to transform the service a 
great deal of money was required, and the Secretary did not shy away 
from requesting exceptionally large increases in naval appropriations. 
Thus, his annual report for 1842 sought appropriations totalling 
$8,213,287.23, against $5,735,450.59 from the previous year.41 
Although Upshur's vision of a reformed United States Navy was 
motivated by a genuine desire to increase the service's professionalism 
and efficiency, his report was primarily intended to make the Navy a far 
more formidable instrument of American power than it ever had been 
before. Indeed, more than anything else, he was driven by fundamental 
issues of foreign policy, notably commercial expansion, territorial 
37 Upshur, SNR 1841, p. 369. 
38 Upshur, SNR 1841, pp. 397,385. 
39 Upshur, SNR 1841, p. 381. 
40 c.J. Bartlett, Great Britain and Sea Power 1815-1853 (Clarendon 
Press: Oxford, 1963), p. 72. 
41 Upshur, Warrington, and Crane, SNR 1841, Senate Doc. 1, 27th 
Congress, 2nd Session, p. 397. 
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aggrandisement, and national defence. These emphases were explicit in 
his report, and marked another departure from his predecessors, who had 
generally been silent on the Navy's diplomatic role. More to the point, 
Upshur's naval expansion was directed by, and demonstrated his hostility 
towards, Great Britain. 
Upshur's anglophobia was based upon several factors, not least of 
which was his personal belief that Great Britain sought to limit the 
expansion of, if not actually to destroy, the United States.42 The Secretary 
was particularly anxious about British designs on Texas, which had been 
an independent republic since 1837. In this matter, his views reflected 
those of other politicians who desired Texas' annexation by the United 
States. Pro-annexationists argued that Britain sought to draw Texas into 
her sphere of influence, and thereby destabilise the social order of the 
Deep South, as well as the economic and political institutions of the 
United States.43 Upshur said as much two years later, whilst serving as 
Secretary of State: "[Britain's object is] to destroy, as far as possible, the 
rivalry and manufactures of the United States.,,44 On another occasion, he 
42 In 1843, while Secretary of State, Upshur certainly expressed his fear 
that Britain intended to destabilise the American South, and American 
commerce in general by intervening in Texas. Upshur to William S. 
Murphy (U.S. charge d'affaires in Texas), August 8, 1843, quoted in W.R. 
Manning, ed., Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, 1831-
1860: Inter-American Affairs, Venezuela and Texas, Vol. 12 (Washington, 
D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1939), pp. 44-49. 
43 S.W. Haynes, "Anglophobia and the Annexation of Texas," S.W. 
Haynes, and C. Morris, eds., Manifest Destiny and Empire -
American Antebellum Expansion (College Station, TX: Texas A & M 
Press, 1997), p. 116. 
44 Upshur to Edward Everett (U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain), 
September 38, 1843, quoted in T.R. Hietala, Manifest Design: 
Anxious Aggrandizement in Late Jacksonian America (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1985), p. 22. 
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wrote, "the abolition of domestic slavery throughout the continent and 
islands of America is a leading object in the present policy of England." 
Pro-annexationists believed that in exchange for financial compensation, 
favourable trade agreements, and British-secured Mexican recognition of 
Texan independence, Texas would accept the abolition of slavery within 
its borders.45 At the same time it would agree to reject union with the 
United States.46 
If Britain succeeded in this object, the outcome would be 
disastrous. An independent Texas, especially one economically dependent 
on Great Britain, posed a major obstacle to further westward expansion by 
the United States.47 Meanwhile, Texan emancipation would de stabilise 
slavery across the border, and if abolitionism succeeded there as well, 
enable British colonies in the West Indies to recover from the adverse 
effects of the Emancipation Act of 1833.48 Furthermore, it would break 
the American monopoly on cotton exports to Europe. As over half of 
American exports consisted of raw cotton, this would undoubtedly have an 
adverse effect on the national economy.49 Besides this, it would end 
Britain's dependence on American cotton, leaving her better able to 
pursue aggressive commercial policies against the United States.50 
45 Hietala, Manifest Design, p. 17; Haynes, "Anglophobia and the 
Annexation of Texas," p. 119. 
46 Hietala, Manifest Design, p. 17. 
47 P. Varg, United States Foreign Relations, 1820-1850 (Lansing, MI: 
Michigan State University Press, 1979), p. 125. 
48 K. Brauer, "1821-1860: Economics and the Development of 
American Expansionism," W.H. Becker, ed., Economics and World 
Power, An Assessment of American Diplomacy Since 1789 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1984), p. 71; Hietala, Manifest Design, p. 22. 
49 Brauer, "1821-1860: Economics and the Development of American 
Expansionism," p. 81. 
50 Haynes, "Anglophobia and the Annexation of Texas," p. 125. 
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More dangerously, if Britain were to wage war against the United 
States, the loss of Texas would leave the South dangerously exposed. 
Control of Texan seaports would ensure British naval supremacy in the 
Gulf of Mexico. 51 This would, in turn, open the southern and western 
states to a two-pronged attack. A free-soil Texas would have already 
provided a haven for escaped slaves and free blacks, but in wartime would 
also become the staging ground for military actions along the frontier with 
the express purpose of instigating a slave revolt. 52 Meanwhile, British 
forces in the West Indies could be landed on the southern coast with the 
same results.53 That this would be the mode of a future war, Upshur was 
certain: 
A war between the United States and any considerable 
maritime Power, would not be conducted at this day as it would have 
been even twenty years ago. It would be a war of incursions, aiming at 
revolution. The first blow would be struck at us through our 
institutions. No nation, it is presumed, would expect to be successful 
over us, for any length of time, in a fair contest of arms upon our own 
soil; and no wise nation would attempt it. A more promising expedient 
would be sought, in arraying what are supposed to be the hostile 
elements of our social system against one another. .. The effect of these 
incursions would be terrible everywhere; but in the southern portions of 
our country they might, and probably would be disastrous in the 
extreme.54 
51 Haynes, "Anglophobia and the Annexation of Texas," p. 126. At the 
same time, American control of Texas would deliver this supremacy to the 
United States' navy and merchant marine. 
52 Haynes, "Anglophobia and the Annexation of Texas," pp. 119, 127. 
53 Great Britain's ability to strike from the West Indies was limited by the 
insignificant number of troops actually stationed in the Bahamas and 
Jamaica. Bermuda and Halifax, however, were both formidable naval 
bases close to the United States. In fact, anticipating defeat along the 
Canadian border, British war planners intended to use the stations for 
attacks on America's Atlantic cities and merchant marine. K. Bourne, 
Britain and the Balance of Power in North America 1815-1908 (London: 
Longmans, 1967), pp. 47, 51,88. 
54 Upshur, SNR 1841, p. 380. 
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Although anti-slavery forces opposed to annexation derided such 
fears, they had some substance. Both Great Britain and France preferred 
friendly relations with the United States, but also saw the nation as a rival, 
and preferred an independent Texas.55 Nor did Britain disguise its 
commitment to worldwide abolition. Notwithstanding this fact, Britain's 
commitment to a free-soil Texas was neither as strong nor as fundamental 
to its foreign policy as the pro-annexationists believed it to be.56 
Upshur's fears were not limited to Texas, however, which he 
simply regarded as the linch-pin of a larger British policy designed to 
encircle the United States. Indeed, he made it clear that the threat of 
invasion extended to all sections of the country, and not only the South: 
Steamboats of light draught, and which may be easily 
transported across the ocean in vessels of a larger class, may invade us 
at almost any point of our extended coast, may penetrate the interior 
through our shaIlow rivers, and thus expose half our country to hostile 
attacks. The celerity with which such movements could be made, the 
facility with which such vessels could escape, and the promptness with 
which they could change the point of attack, would enable an enemy, 
with a comparatively inconsiderable force, to harass our whole 
seaboard, and to carry the horrors of war into the securest retreats of 
our people.57 
Apart from the brewing storm over the Oregon territory, recent 
crises along the Canadian border appeared to justify Upshur's fears. 
Anglo-American tensions had risen earlier during Van Buren's presidency 
when American citizens joined a Canadian rebellion against Crown 
authority. The situation might not have escalated further, except for a raid 
made in late 1837 by several naval officers and Canadian militiamen on 
the steamship Caroline, which had been ferrying supplies to American 
55 Varg, United States Foreign Relations, p. 120; Bourne, Britain 
and the Balance of Power in North America, p. 77. 
56 Haynes, "Anglophobia and the Annexation of Texas," p. 119. 
57 Upshur, SNR 1841, p. 380. 
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"Patriot" rebels ensconced on Navy Island, just across the border. The 
raid, which was successful, unfortunately took place on American 
territory, and inflamed public opinion there.58 The American government 
quickly proclaimed its non-involvement, but the population along the 
frontier strongly supported continued action against Canada. The threat of 
war only emerged in 1841, however, following the arrest of a Canadian 
sheriff, Alexander McLeod, for his alleged part in the Caroline Raid. 
Britain made it clear that McLeod's conviction would constitute a causus 
belli, and as the United States was ill prepared for war, the newly elected 
Whig government wisely chose a conciliatory path. After extensive legal 
manoeuvring, the Canadian was finally acquitted of all charges in 
September 1841. At the same time as the New York disturbances, another 
more serious dispute arose along the borders of Maine and New 
Brunswick.59 The Maine boundary controversy centred upon the 
Aroostook Valley, the status of which had been left unresolved by the 
peace treaty of 1783. Renewed contention over ownership of the valley 
region in 1837 and 1838, led Maine to occupy the area with 10,000 armed 
men backed by $800,000 appropriated for defensive measures.6O Not 
58 During the raid, at least one American was killed. In response, secret 
societies calling themselves 'Sons of Liberty,' or 'Hunters' Lodges,' 
spread throughout New York and the frontier states with the intention of 
fomenting revolt in Canada. Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in 
North America, p. 76; E.E. Mahant, and G.S. Mount, An Introduction to 
Canadian-American Relations (Toronto: Metheun, 1984), pp. 34-37. For 
a detailed monograph on the subsequent McLeod Affair, see K. Stevens, 
Border Diplomacy: The Caroline and McLeod affairs in Anglo-American-
Canadian Relations, 1837-1842 (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama 
Press, 1989). 
59 P. Varg, New England and Foreign Relations, 1782-1850 
(Hannover, NJ: University Press of New England, 1983), p. 134. 
60 Varg, New England and Foreign Relations, p. 137. 
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surprisingly, New Brunswick responded in kind. Relations between Great 
Britain and the United States were precarious enough already, and the two 
nations decided to resolve the issue as best they could through arbitration 
and negotiation. Despite a truce, neither side showed a willingness to 
compromise, and accusations of ill intent were made by all parties. When 
Upshur made his report, the issue remained unresolved. 
War appeared to have been averted, but the crises had shown the 
precarious state of the United States' military establishment. Throughout 
the crises, both nations had prepared for the worst. As British dockyards 
and arsenals were put on a war footing, the United States Navy's 
Mediterranean Squadron was ordered to take a position outside of the 
British-controlled Strait of Gibraltar.61 Meanwhile, the British minister to 
the United States, Henry S. Fox, advised the commander of naval forces in 
North America to position his squadron "as to render it most available in 
the event of war breaking out suddenly ... ,,62 The British consul at 
Norfolk, Virginia was also ordered to prepare confidential reports on the 
status of American naval vessels there.63 Furthermore, four British 
warships were ordered to Bermuda in preparation for any conflict.64 In 
fact, between January and November 1838, the squadron in Bermuda was 
increased from 27 warships to 41, before returning to 28 by the beginning 
of 1840.65 Finally, in violation of previous treaty agreements, British 
naval forces remilitarised the Great Lakes.66 
61 Stevens, Border Diplomacy, p. 98. 
62 Stevens, Border Diplomacy, p. 50. 
63 Stevens, Border Diplomacy, p. 51. 
64 Varg, New England and Foreign Relations, p. 134. 
65 Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 
pp. 79, 88. 
66 Stevens, Border Diplomacy, p. 51. 
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The gravity of the perceived threat was echoed in President Tyler's 
statement to the Congress in support of Upshur's proposals, which 
declared that "inducements of the weightiest character exist for adoption 
of this course of policy.,,67 In light of these events, Upshur's proposed 
expansion was designed primarily to improve the nation's defensive 
capability. "Our policy is peace, and we do not propose to ourselves a war 
of aggression in any case, except so far as may be necessary as a measure 
of defence.,,68 Notwithstanding this pacific assurance, Upshur's 
programme was unmistakably anglophobic, and while this would have 
appealed to Southerners and Democrats, it would have worried 
Northeasterners and Whigs. 
After the 1820s, the economies of North, South, and West had 
become increasingly distinctive, and since internal commerce varied 
between the sections, each evaluated foreign policies primarily in terms of 
sectional advantage.69 Whereas the Southern economy was increasingly 
dominated by cotton exports, the 1830s and 1840s was the golden age of 
the American shipping industry. Since the United States' merchant 
marine sailed for the most part, out of New England, Northeasterners 
sought to cultivate amicable relations with Great Britain. There was good 
reasOn for them to do so. America's reliance on overseas markets and 
foreign manufactured goods, as well as its dependence on foreign sources 
of credit made its commerce vulnerable to external forces.7o Thus, a war 
67 Congressional Globe, 27th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 7. 
68 Upshur, SNR 1841, p. 381. 
69 Brauer, "1821-1860: Economics and the Development of American 
Expansionism," p. 60. 
70 Brauer, "1821-1860: Economics and the Development of American 
Expansionism," p. 65. 
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would be catastrophic for New England since her shipping would be 
attacked on the high seas, her financiers would be the enemy, and her 
ports subjected to blockade.7l 
This reluctance to aggressively engage, or even consider engaging, 
Great Britain, was shared by the Whig party, which not surprisingly, 
dominated New England's mercantile communities. The Whigs' foreign 
policy reflected the ideological divide that separated them from the 
Democrats. Whereas the latter advocated an aggressive foreign policy and 
a passive domestic stance, Whigs sought an assertive national government 
with a diminished role in international affairs.72 Moreover, most Whigs 
and New Englanders strongly opposed the annexation of Texas since this 
would assure the continued growth of slavery and make them morally 
responsible for its extension.73 Thus, if Upshur's vision was to have any 
hopes of passage through the Congress, he had to present it in terms that 
were palatable to all sections and poLitical parties. In order to reconcile 
the Northeast and the Whigs to expansion, Upshur chose, therefore, to 
emphasise the commercial benefits of a powerful navy. 
This was a thoughtful approach. Commercial rivalry with Great 
Britain appealed to all parties and sections. The Democrats had long 
pursued an aggressive commercial diplomacy, demanding the acquisition 
of strategic ports and trade routes.74 The Whigs, although they admired 
Britain, also envied her successes, and sought to replace the parent country 
7l Varg, American Foreign Relations, p. 122. 
72 Hietala, Manifest Design, p. 56. 
73 Varg, New England and Foreign Relations, p. 169. Notwithstanding this 
fact, there were also "cotton Whigs" who tolerated slavery on account of 
its economic benefits. 
74 Brauer, "1821-1860: Economics and the Development of American 
Expansionism," p. 83. 
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as a commercial hegemon.75 In fact, widening old markets and promoting 
industry was a central concern of American diplomats and statesmen 
regardless of party affiliation.76 
Upshur began by reiterating the ways in which the navy had been 
able to assist American mercantile interests abroad. Besides successfully 
negotiating trading agreements with the principal chiefs of the Fiji Islands, 
the Wilkes exploring expedition had charted various reefs and harbours in 
the islands, which Upshur declared would "be of great value to our 
citizens trading with that group, and particularly to whalers."77 At the 
same time, surveys had been conducted of the southern coast of the United 
States, and the south shoals of Nantucket, the results of which would 
certainly assist coastal traffic.78 
Upshur drew particular attention to the Pacific, where he estimated 
there was at least forty million dollars worth of shipping in the whaling 
trade alone, most of it American.79 Additionally, American merchants 
were established along the entire continental coast, and there was an 
increasing American presence in Upper California. Notwithstanding these 
interests, the United States naval presence there was insufficient. 
Protection cannot be afforded in a proper degree, and with 
suitable promptness, by so small a squadron ... To cruise along so 
extensive a coast, calling at all necessary points, and at the same time to 
visit those parts of the Pacific in which the presence of our ships is 
necessary for the protection of and assistance of our whale-fisheries, 
requires twice the number of vessels now employed in that service.81l 
75 D.W. Howe, The Political Culture of the American Whigs 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 223. 
76 Brauer, "1821-1860: Economics and the Development of American 
Expansionism," p. 59. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Upshur, SNR 1841, p. 369. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
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Apart from doubling the squadron, Upshur recommended the 
establishment of naval depots along the continental coast as well as in the 
Sandwich Islands. The stations would allow the squadron to remain in the 
Pacific for extended cruises, and would be of "incalculable value as a 
place of refuge and refreshment to our commercial marine."sl The naval 
depots would also promote American expansion into the region. A 
Californian station would have obvious benefits in any disputes with 
Mexico over California, or with Great Britain over Oregon. Furthermore, 
the station in the Sandwich Islands was required in order to maintain 
American influence in the mid-Pacific. In fact, the islands were crucial to 
American commerce there. Hawaii served as the base for the American 
Pacific whaling fleet, and besides its own lucrative sandalwood trade, 
provided a stopping point for fur traders en route to China from Oregon.S2 
British interest in the island group, and the temporary seizure of Honolulu 
by the French navy two years earlier, highlighted the need for a sustained 
American naval presence.83 
81 Ibid. 
82 Varg, American Foreign Relations, 1820-1860, p. 257. 
83 B. Gough, The Royal Navy and the North West Coast of North 
America 1810-1914 - A Study of British Maritime Ascendancy 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1971), pp. 39-40; 
Varg, American Foreign Relations, 1820-1860, p. 259. Moreover, 
American aspirations for the China trade demanded an increased Pacific 
flotilla. Of all the foreign markets, none excited the American 
imagination more than this one. Although imports from China were not 
nearly as substantial as those from Great Britain and France, it was an 
article of faith amongst American merchants that trade across the Pacific 
would eventually surpass all others. The outbreak of the Opium War, 
however, foreshadowed another market closed by British warships, and 
dominated by British merchants. It was necessary, therefore, that the 
United States maintain a naval commitment along the Chinese coast. In 
fact, an American fleet was despatched to Canton in March 1842, where it 
secured for American traders many of the concessions granted to the 
British through the Treaty of Nanking, excepting the establishment of a 
31 
Upshur also referred to the developing trade along the African 
coast. In doing so, he differentiated between the legitimate trade in 
palmwood, and the illegal traffic in slaves. The United States had a treaty 
obligation to interdict the latter, which according to Upshur, it was doing 
"actively and efficiently."s4 Although the nation's efforts to meet its treaty 
obligations were considerably less pronounced than Upshur reported, he 
did not call for an increase in the squadron on these grounds. Rather, the 
Africa station demanded more cruisers in order to protect lawful 
commerce: "The presence of national vessels is absolutely necessary to 
protect [merchants] in their just rights, and to prevent those outrages, 
unfriendly to the harmony of nations, to which men are often driven by the 
thirst of gain."S5 
Finally, Upshur evoked once more the spectre of war and the 
consequences for an American commerce afforded only the dubious 
protection of a minuscule navy. A navy barely able to protect itself would 
do even less for American commerce, which would be effectively 
"surrendered to the enemy.,,86 In any circumstance, trade was never secure 
without an effective navy to prevent its abuse, and both Great Britain and 
France had navies much larger in proportion to their merchant marine than 
did the United States.87 In fact, the relationship between trade, rivalry and 
war was such that an effective navy actually helped maintain peace: "The 
colonial enclave. Brauer," 1821-1860: Economics and the Development 
of American Expansionism," p. 85; Varg, New England and Foreign 
Relations, pp. 154-155; J. Goldstein, Philadelphia and the China Trade, 
1682-1846, Commercial, Cultural, and Attitudinal Effects (University 
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1976), p. 65. 
84 Upshur, SNR 1841, p. 371. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Upshur, SNR 1841, p. 381. 
87 Upshur, SNR 1841, p. 379. 
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presence of an adequate naval force, to protect commerce .. .is one of the 
best means of preventing those disputes and collisions which are so apt to 
interrupt the peace and harmony of nations.,,88 
This then was the Upshur Vision: a navy that would promote 
American commerce, and by its very size, maintain international peace. 
Dominance "in the Western Hemisphere would allow the United State to 
uphold the Monroe Doctrine, preventing further European interference. 
Meanwhile, this regional dominance would allow the United States to 
pursue its own expansionist policies in North America. In the event of 
war, the nation would be shielded from foreign invasion, and its 
commerce abroad protected and sustained. Aware of the costs, Upshur 
closed the report with a demand for action that broadly expressed his 
strategic beliefs: 
The saving which exposes the country, in a defenceless 
condition, to hostile attacks, will not be recommended by me ... An 
efficient navy cannot be built and supported without very great 
expense; but this expense is more than repaid, even in time of peace, by 
the services which such a navy can render. In war, it will be worth to 
us all the value which we place on the safety of our exposed seacoast, 
on the security of our people, and on the well-earned glory of our naval 
flag. It is enough that a necessity for this expenditure can be shown; 
the amount of it will be a secondary consideration with a people who 
truly love their country and properly value its institutions.89 
Despite Upshur's attempt to achieve balance between commercial 
expansion and territorial defence, when the Navy Appropriations Bill first 
reached the House of Representatives on May 2, 1842, its reception was 
certain to be controversial. There were several reasons for this, including 
the character of the Secretary himself and the administration in which he 
served. Upshur, a state judge from Virginia, had only recently replaced 
88 Ibid. 
89 Upshur, SNR 1841, pp. 388-389. 
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George E. Badger, who had resigned on September 11, 1841 after serving 
for only seven months.90 Badger's resignation was in protest over the 
policies, indeed, the entire Presidency, of John Tyler. 
Tyler, after all, had been elected as Vice-President, and had 
assumed the Presidency only after the death of William Henry Harrison. 
Tyler's ascendancy had created a schism in the Whig party, since the new 
President was really a former Democrat who had joined the party less out 
of sympathy with its principles than from his own opposition to Andrew 
Jackson.91 A Virginian, he had been included on the ticket in the interest 
of sectional balance.92 Among other things, his support of states' rights, 
and dubious Whig credentials soon brought him into conflict with Henry 
Clay, the party leader in the Senate. The Senator from Kentucky saw 
himself as the natural successor to Harrison, and aspired to control Tyler's 
Presidency. 
Most critically, the two men disagreed on fundamental issues of 
financial policy. The Whigs had been elected on the promise that they 
would bring renewed prosperity to the country in the aftermath of two 
recent depressions. Central to their recovery plan was the determination to 
re-charter a national bank. The subject of bitter disputes during Jackson's 
presidency, there had been no Bank of the United States since the charter 
of the second Bank of the United States had been allowed to expire in 
1836. 
90 P.E. Coletta, "George E. Badger," P.E. Coletta, ed., American 
Secretaries of the Navy, Vol. I 1775-1913 (Annapolis: Naval Institute 
Press, 1980), p. 175. 
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The battle over a national bank had dominated the politics of the 
1830s, and was actually the catalyst for the emergence of both the Whig 
Party and the "second party system.,,93 With their electoral success, the 
Whigs expected to restore the institution, but Tyler did not want to force 
the issue without adequate consideration.94 Clay had staked his leadership 
on the issue, however, and would brook no delay.95 At a special session of 
Congress, various bills and amendments were presented that sought to 
create some form of national bank. When one was finally passed, Tyler 
exercised his veto. 
The Whig platform, indeed their electoral victory, was threatened 
by Tyler's intransigence. Clay accused the President of executive 
usurpation, and suggested he resign. Despite calls for restraint from his 
congressional colleagues, Clay refused to postpone a second bank bil1.96 
On September 3, 1841, the Senate approved a bill calling for a national 
bank. Less than a week later, it was also vetoed. On September 11, two 
93 Brown, Politics and Statesmanship, pp. 29-31; R.P. Formisano, The 
Birth of Mass Political Parties: Michigan, 1827-1861 (Princeton: 
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American Political Parties (New York: MacMillan Company, 1967), p. 
337; R.V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American 
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pp.58-59. 
95 Peterson, The Presidencies of William Henry Harrison and John Tyler, 
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days after the veto, and two days before the session adjourned, Tyler's 
cabinet, which he had inherited from Harrison, resigned en masse. Only 
Daniel Webster remained at his post. As Secretary of State, he could not 
afford to disrupt the ongoing negotiations over the Canadian border. 
Looking for a new Secretary of the Navy, Tyler turned first to 
Commodore Robert F. Stockton.97 When Stockton declined, he asked 
Upshur, who was an old friend. 98 Upshur was already one of Tyler>s 
closest advisors, and according to the national press, the actual power 
behind the President. The selection was a good one, both professionally 
and politically. Upshur was obviously close to the President, and his 
brother, George P. Upshur, was a lieutenant with twenty four years service 
in the Navy. Through him, Upshur was familiar with its problems.99 
Nevertheless, Upshur remained deeply unpopular with Congress. 
His close association with the President made him intolerable to the Clay 
Whigs, with whom his own political beliefs set him even more at odds. 
Upshur advocated states-rights, and was a slave-owner. 100 He had openly 
supported nullification, and even advocated secession as a last resort.IOI 
Thus, when the appropriations bill was debated in the House, Upshur was 
clearly identified with Southern interests, and the pro-annexationist fold. 
This political hostility cannot be overestimated. The Congress that 
met in deliberation of his appropriations request was overwhelmingly 
partisan. Party loyalty was fundamental to political life. More than any 
97 l.H. Schroeder, Shaping a Maritime Empire: The Commercial and 
Diplomatic Role of the American Navy, 1829-1861 (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1985), p. 59. 
98 Hall, Abel Parker Upshur, p. 117. 
99 Schroeder, Shaping a Maritime Empire, p. 59. 
100 Hall, Abel Parker Upshur, p. 135. 
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other factor, it affected the way legislatures acted. I02 The disciple of an 
apostate president, Upshur was a committed heretic whose hawkish 
anglophobia was contrary to his party's agenda, besides which, his own 
sectional beliefs alienated the New England shipping interests that stood to 
gain the most from his expansionism. This was all especially unfortunate 
for the Navy since the Whig party was considerably more comfortable 
with the service than were the Democrats. Under normal circumstances it 
would have been the party more likely to support his increases. 
At issue were the fundamental ways in which the two parties viewed 
society. Indeed, the divide went to the core of their respective ideologies. 
Democrats firmly believed in the equality of all men, and opposed barriers 
of class. I03 The Navy, on the other hand, reinforced its command 
hierarchy with a traditional system of deference. 104 Critics of the service, 
therefore, demanded that the service better represent the mores and 
institutions of the entire nation: 
The dependence of any country upon military establishments 
and consequently, the importance of their existence, are governed by 
the external relations, and internal political and social character of that 
country, and therefore, each particular military system, should be 
adapted to the circumstances of the nation, for whose benefit is it 
established. 105 
102 Silbey, The American Political Nation, p. 187. 
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The Navy's defenders were well aware of these concerns, but 
maintained the necessity of military hierarchy. On the one hand, they 
argued that the environment of a cruising ship-of-war was not analogous 
to that of terrestrial society, and that its crew could not be governed 
according to the values of that society.l06 At the same time, they asserted 
that deference within a military context was not incompatible with 
republicanism: 
Unlike the seafaring man of any country is the American 
sailor. He never forgets the proud circumstance of his right birth. He 
is never a fawning, cringing sycophantic creature, but always is a man! 
True, he takes off his hat and smoothes down his forelock, when he 
addresses a superior officer upon any important occasion - but this is 
the custom of discipline, and like a sensible man, knowing the necessity 
of military authority, he merges so much of his republicanism as would 
interfere with; but by so doing [does] no violence on his feelings as a 
freeman. 107 
The Whigs, for their part, repudiated Jacksonian egalitarianism, promoting 
instead a natural aristocracy. According to this belief, talent and virtue 
were not evenly distributed amongst men.108 Thus, it was only appropriate 
106 W. Bryan, A Plea in Favor of Maintaining Flogging in the 
Navy (n.p., n.d.), p. 5. 
107 Anon., "The Boatswain's Mate," The Sailor's Magazine 
(Vol. 8, No. 10, November 1836), p. 519 
108 Ashworth, Agrarians and Aristocrats, p. 53. This statement has 
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indeed their purpose, was the national struggle for the Presidency. It has 
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clearly identified themselves as the party of "regulated liberty," believing 
that men needed to practice thrift, moderation, and self-discipline. More 
explicitly, they considered themselves the heirs of traditional Jeffersonian 
leadership. Thus, they believed that talent should rule, and that national 
politics was the business of gentlemen. McCormick, The Second American 
Party System, pp. 329, 356; Silbey, The American Political Nation, pp. 
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that there be a division in the navy between the officers and the men they 
led. 
The Whigs were also largely unconcerned by the occasional charge 
that the Navy maintained inappropriately close ties with Great Britain, the 
nation most closely associated with deference and the bete noir of 
American society. In truth, the two navies were most familiar, even 
cordial. In the first twenty years of its existence, the U.S. Navy had 
absorbed much of the culture and professionalism of the Royal Navy.l09 
Indeed, the U.S. Navy's Articles of War were actually based upon their 
pre-Revolutionary British equivalent, the Articles for the Government of 
the British Navy. ItO While the two services enjoyed a healthy rivalry, they 
balanced it with shared respect. As one British officer wrote: 
.. .It must be confessed, that these republicans have carried 
with them their full share of "Old Albion's Spirit of the sea ... " I must 
say, that in an officer of the United States' Navy, I have uniformly 
found, not only a well-informed gentleman, but a person on whose 
kindness and good offices to a stranger I might with confidence reply. 
They betray nothing of that silly spirit of bluster and bravado so 
prevalent among other classes of their countrymen ... !!! 
In light of such back-handed conviviality, it was feared that besides 
British professionalism, the U.S Navy had become infected with un-
American traditions and sensibilities: "and like most imitators, we have 
succeeded in imitating the defects, rather than the merits of our 
model...,,112 
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Central to Democratic concerns was the perceived social status of 
the officer corps, and their attachment to personal honour, both of which 
were antithetical to egalitarianism. The officers considered theirs to be an 
honourable and gentlemanly profession with a place in society's upper 
echelons. As they understood it, they belonged to that class of men who 
did not engage in labour, and whose conduct was governed by a code of 
behaviour peculiar to their status. I 13 
This code of behaviour reflected the inter-relationship between 
personal and professional honour. The one was dependent on the other, 
and failures in either opened an officer to condemnation. The importance 
of honour to these officers cannot be underestimated. To many, it 
represented the principal award of national service. "[The naval 
profession] is not a calling in which to earn money, but honor.,,114 
Furthermore, the stagnant promotional ladder and a long period of peace 
had heightened this importance. Officers in peacetime had limited 
opportunities to win honour through combat, and so made it a function of 
rank: and behaviour. 
Within their own company, officers were quick to take insult at 
any perceived slight. Apart from damaging morale and service efficiency, 
these rivalries were accompanied by a long history of duelling. By 1842, 
however, it largely persisted only in the ranks of the midshipmen. These, 
who had the least status of any line officer, guarded what they had with 
the most ferocity. Of eighty-two duels recorded between 1798 and 1850, 
midshipmen participated in fifty-two. The practice was nonetheless in 
113 McKee, A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession, p. 34. 
114 Anon., "Character and Duties of the Naval Profession," The 
Naval Magazine (Vol. 2, No.3, March 1837), p. 242. 
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decline. Despite a resurgence in 1842, when three duels were fought, 
there were no fatal encounters after 1836. 115 
Although it was indicative of their wider concerns with the Navy, 
the lacksonians did not attack duelling. Indeed, Jackson himself had been 
an accomplished duellist. The only effort that he had made to curtail the 
practice was in 1830, when he forbade duels between officers and civilians 
on the grounds that they were acceptable only between members of the 
martial professions. II6 This is not to say that the Democrats condoned 
duelling, as it was deplored across a broad spectrum of society. Rather, 
the practice lent credence to their other ideological attacks. 
In fact, these attacks proved effective, and the two proposed 
reforms that were most closely associated with them - the creation of 
admirals' ranks and the establishment of a naval academy - went 
unrealised. The latter did not even survive long enough to be debated, and 
was rejected out of hand. II7 As for the former, it failed without much 
controversy and not much more debate. 
It was felt that an institution whose sole purpose was naval 
education introduced too great a measure of professionalism into the 
service. The military academy at West Point had been under constant 
attack for the past decade for precisely this reason. I IS Professionalism, in 
115 e.O. Paullin, "Dueling in the Old Navy," United States Naval Institute 
Proceedings (Vol. 35, No.4, 1909), pp. 1192-1196. 
116 Paullin, "Dueling in the Old Navy," p. 1155-1156. 
117 Congressional Globe, 27th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 250. These 
measures were debated separately from the larger appropriations bill. The 
admirals' bill was defeated on February 18, 1842, and the proposed 
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118 Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 193. In fact, West Point 
aroused further Democratic concerns since many of its graduates, either 
officially or as civilians, were involved with internal improvements 
programmes directly contrary to Jacksonian constitutional scruples. For 
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this context was taken to mean elitism as well. Military institutions 
inculcated anti-Republican, European values in the cadets, and fostered an 
exclusive self-perpetuating military aristocracy. Thus, the academy was 
attacked as a means of political patronage where "the sons of the rich, and 
those able to educate them, would obtain commissions, instead of those of 
humbler, but equally worthy parentage.,,119 Although the challenges to 
West Point were too weak to pose a threat to the survival of that already-
established school, they were more than enough to prevent another one 
like it from being founded. 120 Besides this, conventional wisdom held that 
the only place to teach a midshipman was on board a sea-going vessel. 121 
"The deck of the vesseL .. was the best school-house or academy to begin 
with, and there to mingle explanations and reading with actual 
experiment." 122 
At the same time, Upshur's administrative reforms were passed 
with comparative ease. 123 Economy and efficiency appealed to everyone 
alike, so Upshur had stressed the savings that these would bring to the 
this and other Democratic objections to the Academy, see M. Cunliffe, 
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Navy Department.124 What debate there was on the subject discussed the 
propriety of naval officers drafting the regulations by which their conduct 
was governed. 125 In the end, it was decided that authority lay with the 
Secretary of the Navy and the attorney general, and permission was 
granted for the preparation of a new naval code.126 The bill also called for 
five naval bureaus to replace the Navy Board of Commissioners. 
It was on May 13, when the House of Representatives began 
debating the appropriations bill for Upshur's proposed expansion that 
partisan and sectional controversy arose. In fact, the bill was quickly 
attacked through an amendment offered by James Meriwether, a Whig 
from Georgia. He proposed that the most substantial increase in the bill, 
. $3,195,342.25 for the pay of officers and men, be reduced to 
$2,335,000. 127 Since an expanded navy demanded more personnel, this 
amendment provided the focus for the larger debate on the necessity of 
naval expansion. As such, it provided the legislators with an opportunity 
to pursue their own sectional and ideological interests in relation to the 
Navy's larger societal role. 
Thus, Northern legislators immediately attacked what they saw as 
sectional imbalances in the officer corps. Horace Everett of Vermont 
announced that 101 of 223 appointees in 1841 were residents of Mary land, 
the District, and Virginia. 128 While Charles Brown of Massachusetts 
provided figures for 164 appointments from the previous year, 
124 Upshur, SNR 1841, p. 378. 
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demonstrating that just under half of them came from these three places. 129 
This brought a counter-charge from Isaac Holmes of South Carolina that 
they were reducing a matter of national interest to a "question of party 
spoils," and that abolitionists sought control of the Navy for themselves. 13o 
For twenty years Southern Secretaries had controlled the Navy 
Department. l3l Northern legislators feared that these Secretaries had 
abused their patronage authority and issued an overwhelming number of 
midshipmans' warrants to applicants from Southern states, especially 
Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia. It was feared that 
nullifying officers intent on pursuing Southern policies, notably war with 
Mexico and the annexation of Texas, would eventually control the 
Navy.I32 The great size of the previous year's class of midshipmen, and 
his own sectional politics made Upshur's appointments particularly 
suspect. That Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia were 
singled out reflects the strength of their maritime heritage. Only the mid-
Atlantic states, and more latterly, Louisiana, could claim anything like the 
maritime traditions of New England. 133 
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In fact, Virginia's 31 appointees gave it the largest representation 
in the 1841 c1ass.134 New York, which had traditionally dominated the 
commissioned ranks, came second with 30 appointees. Pennsylvania, with 
twenty-one new midshipmen had also been supplanted by twenty-seven 
Marylanders. Washington, D.C. came fifth with nineteen appointees. 
Altogether, 105 new midshipmen came from Southern states, and another 
sixteen came from Western slave-states. 86 appointees came from 
Northern states, and fifteen more from Western free-states. Thus, the 
South enjoyed an advantage of 121 new midshipmen against 101 from the 
North.135 The class of 1841, however, was hardly a threat to the sectional 
balance of the Navy. Besides the most recent appointees, there were 236 
other midshipmen, bringing the total to 459. Here, as in all other levels of 
commissioned rank, the North held a slight advantage. 136 235 midshipmen 
came from free states, while 219 came from the South. Even had the 
midshipmen posed a threat to the Navy's integrity, it would be decades 
before they could exert any real influence over the conduct of the service. 
Far more reasonable were the objections raised by the Western 
states. The interior could not expect to gain from the proposed expansion, 
and had no reason to support it. Crucial to sectional balance, there were 
precious few naval officers from the Western states. Ohio, Kentucky and 
134 This and all other references to the sectional balance of the Navy come 
from the 1842 Navy Register. 
135 The missing midshipman is Robert B. Storer, a midshipman at-large, 
whose place of birth and state of residence is unlisted. 
136 There were 56 Northern passed midshipman against 47 Southerners; 
170 Northern lieutenants against 156 Southerners; 54 Northern 
commanders against 42 Southerners, and 38 Northern captains against 27 
Southerners. For the sake of clarity, officers from Western states have 
been deemed Northern or Southern according to the status of slavery 
therein. 
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Tennessee each had moderate contingents, but together, Illinois, Arkansas, 
Iowa, Michigan, Missouri, Wisconsin, and Indiana contributed only thirty-
six officers, none ranked higher than lieutenant. 137 
More importantly, the Western states were burdened with 
enormous debts, the legacy of the canal and road-building programmes of 
the previous decade. Since 1841, nine of them had halted interest 
payments, while Michigan and Indiana had actually repudiated portions of 
their debt.l3S Western representatives asserted that money spent on the 
Navy would be better spent on internal improvements and state assistance. 
Samson Mason of Ohio objected to the vast amount to be spent on the 
Navy "while Western commerce was languishing for want of the fostering 
care of the Government.,,139 John Reynolds of Illinois actually 
characterised the expansion as an improvement designed to benefit the 
coastal states at the expense of the interior. l40 
These arguments appealed as well to fiscal conservatives from 
both parties who were more intent on rebuilding the post-1837 economy 
137 1842 Navy Register. Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee contributed 
eighty-five officers, a number that likely reflected their shared maritime 
heritage along the Mississippi and Missouri rivers. Notwithstanding 
Kentucky's exceptionally large contingent of midshipmen (22), Ohio had 
the largest number of officers (25), and with two commanders and thirteen 
lieutenants, the greatest achievement. 
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than increasing military spending.141 Not surprisingly, therefore, 
numerous legislators opposed the appropriations on fiscal grounds: 
[Mr. McClellan] asked from what source these disbursements 
were to come, when there was not a single dollar in the treasury? The 
public finances were bankrupt almost beyond remedy ... And yet when 
bankruptcy and ruin stared them in the face, they were called upon ... to 
swell the public expenses, and to add to the burdens of the people. 142 
Likewise, other representatives said that they could not vote for any 
appropriations until they knew where the government would find the 
money for the expansion. 143 
At the same time, economic conservatism gave rise to partisanship. 
James Sprigg of Kentucky wanted to curtail appropriations in order to 
limit executive authority.l44 John Reynolds, on the other hand, accused the 
Whigs of duplicity since they had condemned Van Buren's administration 
for its profligate naval spending, but now proposed even greater 
expenditures. 145 Questions of economy also led to attacks on the Navy's 
officers, particularly those on furlough or otherwise waiting orders. 
According to Congressional opponents these men provided no benefit to 
the service, clogged the promotional ladder, and wastefully increased the 
required appropriations. l46 It was also alleged that were appropriations 
drastically increased, the result would be a public backlash against the 
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service. 147 This concern evoked the expressed belief that republican 
simplicity would not tolerate a large navy.148 Underlying such 
declarations was the long-standing suspicion of professional armed forces, 
a point made explicitly by Joseph Fornance of Pennsylvania: "Liberty 
cannot live where bayonets bristle in time of peace.,,149 
Finally, the very basis for the expansion was questioned and even 
denied. There had been a change in government in Britain, and the 
ministry of Lord Aberdeen promised to be more conciliatory in its 
relations with the United States. In fact, a special envoy, Lord Ashburton, 
had been despatched to America in January 1842 with the express intent of 
negotiating a settlement of the two nations' foreign policy disputes. These 
negotiations were taking place even as the Congress debated the 
appropriations bill. Thus, it was argued that the threat of war had 
passed. 150 
The expansion programme had its defenders, however, who raised 
counter-arguments against each of these claims. In the first place, they 
denied that the nation could not afford a large navy. Indeed, Whig plans 
for a protective tariff would make the investment possible: 
It was true, the country was in debt, and its Treasury exhausted, 
but what was that to a young and vibrant nation like ours? The 
147 Parmenter, William (Dem. - MA), Congressional Globe, 27 th Congress, 
2nd Session, p. 522. 
148 Cooper, Mark (States' Rights Whig - GA), Congressional Globe, 27th 
Congress, 2nd Session, p. 501. 
149 Fornance, Joseph (Dem. - PA), Congressional Globe, 27th Congress, 2nd 
Session, p. 498. 
150 Johnson, Cave (Dem. - TN), Congressional Globe, 27th Congress, 2nd 
Session, p. 505; Cooper, Mark (States' Rights Whig - GA), Reynolds, 
John (Dem. - IL), and Wood, Fernando (Dem. - NY), Congressional 
Globe, 27th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 501,508,519. 
energies of the people would soon replenish the Treasury. They would 
willingly submit to a tariff, in order to have their country protected. lSI 
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Furthermore, expansion would actually increase the economic 
responsibility of the navy since it cost more to keep ships on the blocks 
than on active service. 152 Besides this, an expanded navy would give 
officers awaiting orders the opportunity for active service that they 
certainly desired. 153 
Democratic anti-militarism was rejected out of hand. The Navy's 
nature precluded its use as a tool of domestic oppression. As it served 
only on the ocean, the service was purely an instrument of defence, "and 
could not be employed in purging a refractory legislature, or shooting 
down assemblages of the people.,,154 Indeed, history had shown that 
republics such as Athens, Carthage, and Venice had maintained strong 
navies as a check on the army's power. Furthermore, the Navy's national 
lSI Gamble, Rodger (Whig - GA), Congressional Globe, 27m Congress, 
2nd Session, p. 513; Cushing, Caleb (Whig - MA), Congressional Globe, 
27m Congress, 2nd Session, p. 507. Caleb Cushing was a brilliant politician 
whose renegade support of Tyler cost him his seat in the following 
elections. Throughout his career he was an ardent expansionist and arch 
anglophobe, sentiments more or less apparent in his defence of Upshur's 
expansion. J.M. Behlohlavek, "Race, Progress, and Destiny: Caleb 
Cushing and the Quest for American Empire," Haynes and Morris, eds., 
Manifest Destiny and Empire, pp. 21-47. 
152 Wise, Henry (Whig - VA), Congressional Globe, 27m Congress, 2nd 
Session, p. 500. Henry Wise was the chairman of the House Committee 
on Naval Affairs, and a personal friend of both Upshur and Tyler. As 
such, he was the leader of the President's "corporal's guard" of allies in 
the Congress. With Cushing, he was the most ardent supporter of 
Upshur's programme. A powerful man, he would eventually serve as 
governor of Virginia from 1856-1860. 
153 Cushing, Caleb (Whig - MA), Congressional Globe, 27th Congress, 2nd 
Session, p. 508. 
154 Cushing, Caleb (Whig - MA), Congressional Globe, 27th Congress, 2nd 
Session, p. 522. 
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character made it the "best safety - the common property and the common 
glory of [the] country.,,155 
Finally, expansionists argued that the threat of war had not yet 
receded. The negotiations between Webster and Ashburton were not 
resolved, and until they were, it was necessary to prepare for the worst. 156 
Other representatives deplored the exposed state of America's coast, 
especially along the South. Thus, Richard Habersham of Georgia declared 
that "it was all important to [the Southern] section of country, since it 
lacked stationary forts, that it should have moving defences."157 William 
Johnson of Maryland combined these arguments, drawing attention to the 
British naval depot at Bermuda, which was a "perfect Gibraltar, within 
forty-eight hours' run of our principal Southern Atlantic cities."158 
Moreover, the exposed circumstances of American commerce demanded 
that the Navy be strengthened. 159 
Despite the cogency of these arguments, the expansionists were 
clearly losing the debate over appropriations, which were further 
threatened by a proviso introduced by Philip Triplett of Kentucky. Triplett 
was resolutely opposed to naval expansion, and had reiterated all of the 
arguments against it. 16O His proviso essentially froze any further increase 
155 Wise, Henry (Whig - VA), Congressional Globe, 27th Congress, 2nd 
Session, p. 500. 
156 Gamble, Richard (Whig - GA), Congressional Globe, 27th Congress, 
2nd Session, p. 513. 
157 Habersham, Richard (States' Rights Dem. - GA), Congressional 
Globe, 27th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 505. 
158 Johnson, William (Whig - MD), Congressional Globe, 27th Congress, 
2nd Session, p. 500. 
159 Wise, Henry (Whig - VA), Congressional Globe, 27th Congress, 2nd 
Session, p. 500. 
160 Triplett, Philip (Whig - KY), Congressional Globe, 27th Congress, 
2nd Session, p. 516. 
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in the Navy's officer corps by denying salaries to any appointments 
beyond the number serving in January 1841, ensuring that the excessive 
number of officers already present would be reduced through the natural 
processes of death and resignation. 161 
The political forces at work against Upshur's programme were 
enough to frustrate it. On June 13, Meriwether's amendment, and the 
Triplett proviso were passed by votes of 113-89, and 100-94 
respectively.162 The vote had been largely upon party lines, but there were 
significant defections on either side. Fifteen Democrats opposed the 
Meriwether Amendment, while thirty-eight Whigs had voted in its favour. 
The vote reflected the sectional divide between the interior and the 
seaboard. Thus, the fifteen Democrats were mostly from the Northeast, 
and almost all of the thirty-eight Whigs came from the West. 163 Sectional 
alignments had also prevailed in the vote on the Triplett proviso. 
Although enough Democrats defected to ensure a closer vote, none of the 
thirty-eight Whigs gave way, ensuring its passage. Several other, more 
limited amendments were subsequently passed in rapid order. 
Upshur was not to be thwarted so easily, however, and retaliated 
by reducing the operations of the principal navy yards at New York, 
Philadelphia, Boston, and Norfolk, as well as at many smaller yards, 
leading them to discharge over half of their work force. l64 The Secretary 
maintained that without sufficient appropriations to support ships after 
their construction, he could not justify the work. This placed enormous 
161 Congressional Globe, 27 th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 525. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Hall, Abel Parker Upshur, p. 140. 
164 Hall, Abel Parker Upshur, p. 141. Upshur's move was directed against 
those eastern representatives who had voted against him. 
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pressure on the representatives from these districts, who were roundly 
denounced in the popular press as enemies of the Navy and the 
workingman. 165 
Meanwhile, the Senate had begun debate over the amended 
appropriations bill. Less volatile and more conservative than the 
representatives, Whig senators immediately sought to overturn the Triplett 
proviso and Meriwether's amendment. The proviso was deemed 
inappropriate for an appropriations bill since it proposed legislation that 
belonged in an independent bill. 166 It was, in fact, an effort to supersede 
the wishes of the Senate, and to usurp the President's control over the 
armed forces. 167 Democrats attempted to justify the actions of the lower 
house, but could not muster majority support on their behalf. The debate 
centred upon the necessity of naval expansion, and while the arguments 
were essentially the same as those in the House, the supporters of 
expansion prevailed.168 
Nevertheless, when the vote was held on June 15, the proviso was 
removed from the appropriations bill only by the narrowest of margins: 23 
votes in favour and 22 opposed. 169 Again, the vote had largely followed 
party lines, with only three Whigs voting against the motion, and one 
Democrat voting in its favour. 17o The next day, Upshur's expansion 
165 Ibid. 
166 Evans, George (Whig - ME), Congressional Globe, 27th Congress, 2nd 
Session, p. 624. 
167 Bayard, Richard (Whig - DE), Congressional Globe, 27th 
Congress, 2nd Session, p. 625. 
168 The arguments focused upon questions of economy, republican 
liberty, and anti-aristocracy. The Congressional Globe, 27th Congress:; 2~d 
Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 631-635, 638-642, 644-648, 777-783. 
169 Congressional Globe, 27th COQgress, 2nd Session, p. 639. 
170 The one dissenting Democrat was Nathaniel Tallmadge of New York, 
an ally of the President. 
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programme continued to recover its momentum with the passage of a 
second amendment restoring $445,000 to the Navy's payrolls, providing it 
with a total of $2,800,000. Once again, partisanship governed the vote. 
23 senators had favoured the amendment against 19 opposed; only one, 
Nathaniel Tallmadge, who once more voted with the Whigs in support of 
the amendment, crossed party lines. At the same time, the Senate offered 
the lower house a compromise by attaching a rider to the bill that would 
freeze the number of officers by the end of the year. 171 
The House was in no mood for compromise however. Upshur's 
opponents delayed consideration of the bill by placing it as far down the 
calendar as possible, allowing the partisan press time to launch a vigorous 
counter-attack against the Secretary and his programme.172 Nevertheless, 
when they began debate once more in July, the representatives were 
clearly sensitive to the fact that they had also been excoriated in the 
press. 173 Notwithstanding this fact, they rejected the Senate's deletions of 
the proviso and Meriwether's amendment as well as other appropriations 
increases. 174 
Once again, the Senate was presented with an unacceptable 
appropriations bill. Although it retreated from increasing appropriations 
for the Navy's payrolls, the upper house refused to accept the limitation on 
officers' appointments. 175 This issue threatened to derail the entire 
appropriations bill since the House also refused to abandon its position. 
Fearful of a public backlash and anxious to resolve the stalemate, 
171 Congressional Globe, 27th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 648. 
172 Hall, Abel Parker Upshur, pp. 143, 144. 
173 Brown, Congressional Globe, 27m Congress, 2nd Session, p. 681. 
174 Congressional Globe, 27th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 780. 
175 Congressional Globe, 27m Congress, 2nd Session, p. 797. 
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congressional leaders convened a conference committee of the House and 
Senate to draw up a compromise bill. 176 The bill that they reported upheld 
Meriwether's amendment, but abandoned Triplett's proviso. I77 Thus, 
while Upshur was allowed to appoint and promote more officers, he was 
ultimately forced to limit their numbers. 
Despite this mixed result, when the appropriations bill was finally 
passed on August 4, 1842, Upshur had actually succeeded in achieving 
most of his aims. 178 Some of his reforms had been rejected out of hand, 
but on the whole, the Congress treated him with considerable generosity. 
Naval appropriations were increased to $6,588,894, of which $2,000,000 
was reserved for the increase and repair of warships. I79 Additionally, 
special appropriations of $250,000 and the previous year's surplus made 
Upshur's budget the largest ever spent in peacetime, a total of $8,397,000 
in fiscal 1842, about one third of total federal expenditures for the year. I80 
In fact, Upshur actually had more money at his disposal than he had 
originally requested. 
Upshur's expansion had money to fuel it, but any increase in its 
squadrons would have exposed another crucial failing of the Navy: it had 
not adequately met its recruiting mission for twenty years. 181 Upshur 
mentioned this in his report, but could not offer any explanation for the 
cause, and declined to suggest a remedy. 182 It was crucial that men be had, 
176 Congressional Globe, 27m Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 803-804. 
177 Congressional Globe, 27m Congress, 2nd Session, p. 816. 
178 Albion, Makers of Naval Policy, p. 123. 
179 Schroeder, Shaping a Maritime Empire, p. 64. 
180 Historical Statistics of the United States; Colonial Times to 1970, Vol. 
II, p. 1115, quoted in Schroeder, Shaping a Maritime Empire, p. 64. 
181 H. Langley, Social Reform in the United States Navy, 1798-1862 
(Urbana, IL: University ofIllinois Press~ 1967), pp. 71-72. 
182 Upshur, SNR 1841, p. 373. 
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however, since the expansion would be wasted if there were no crews for 
the new vessels. As it was, the Navy had trouble manning the ships it 
already possessed. At one point, the Constitution had been held up in 
New York for want of fifty men, while the Concord was left in Charleston 
with a full hold, but no crew; meanwhile, several of the Navy's schooners 
went unmanned. IS3 
In 1840, the Navy Department was forced to issue a circular order 
compensating for the depressed enlistment returns. l84 The circular did 
four things. First, it allowed lower ranked grades of enlisted men to be 
substituted for one third of the crew of the next higher rank. Thus, one 
third of the seamen might actually be ordinary seaman, or one third of the 
landsmen, 1st class apprentices. Warships were also allowed to depart 
with only nine tenths of their required complement. In exceptional cases 
"if the Department [found] necessary," a vessel ready for sea could 
disregard its established minimum complement if there were not already 
enough men on board. Finally, officers were allowed to recruit crew 
members at any port of call. 
These measures were desperately needed. Two years later the 
Navy was still running at half its operational strength. There were a total 
of sixty-five vessels in the service, ranging from a single 120-gun ship-of-
the line to five small schooners. ISS According to the established 
183 Anon., "Scarcity of Seamen," uncited newspaper, quoted in T. Goin, 
Remarks on the Home Squadron and Naval School, New York: 
J.P. Wright (1840), p. 20. 
184 Navy Department Circular Order, October 12, 1840. 
IS5 Upshur, SNR 1841, p. 367. Their composition was as follows: Eleven 
Ships-of-the-line, fifteen 1st class frigates, two 2nd class frigates, eleven 
1st class sloops, two 2nd class sloops, five 3rd class sloops, two brigs, four 
schooners, four steamers, three store-ships, three receiving ships, and five 
small schooners. 
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complements for these vessels, 20,299 men were required to man them. 186 
Additionally, Upshur's immediate expansion programme would 
necessitate another 12,477 sailors. Yet in 1842, there were only 9,867 
men, not including marines, on board U.S. warships.I87 
The situation was further complicated by the need to recruit not 
only more men, but also more 'native American' men. The Navy had 
always been heavily dependent on European sailors. During the War of 
1812, it had been stung by British taunts that the celebrated American 
victories at sea owed more to the British crews of their vessels than to 
their American officers. 188 Since then, the service had failed to attract 
Americans, maintaining its reliance on foreign-born sailors. 
Reports varied on how many foreign-born sailors were in the 
Navy, but by all estimates they amounted to at least half the service, with 
many estimates ranging as high as seven men out of eight. 189 Since most 
of these sailors came from the United Kingdom or its dominions, their 
loyalty had been called into question, particularly following the recent war 
scare. 19O Issues of national pride and security demanded that the United 
States Navy become more properly a navy of Americans. 
186 1842 Naval Rules and Regulations, pp. 63-65. The figure of 20,299 
was reached by applying the approved complements from the 1842 
Regulations to the vessels listed in Upshur's annual report. Line and staff 
officers were not included, nor were marines of any rank. Furthermore, no 
effort was made to calculate the crews of the store-ships, steamers, or 
small schooners. 
187 Upshur, SNR 1841, p. 412. 
188 Goin, Remarks on the Home Squadron and Naval School, p. vi. 
189 Goin, Remarks on the Home Squadron and Naval School, p. vii, et al.; 
"Report of the Committee on Naval Affairs Regarding Enlistments in the 
Navy," Senate Doc. No. 497, 26th Congress, 1st Session, May 27, 1840. 
190 Anon., "Thomas Goin," New York Sunday Morning News, quoted in 
Goin, Remarks on the Home Squadron and Naval School, p. 16. 
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Driven to ascertain how severe the problem had become, Upshur 
ordered a census of the Navy's enlisted men, focusing upon their places of 
birth, naturalisation, and places of citizenship. Although the document 
was not comprehensive, it was thorough, including information on 5,780 
enlisted men, over half of the Navy's strength. 191 
Out of that number, 975 admitted to being foreign born, with 297 
having become naturalised citizens. This latter figure seems reliable since 
naturalised citizens had no reason to conceal their national origins. The 
former amount, however, cannot reflect the actual numbers of foreign-
born sailors. If it were the case, around one in six sailors would have been 
foreign-born, as opposed to the contemporary belief that only one in eight 
actually were American! More likely, the document confirms a 
contemporary claim that foreign-born sailors simply lied about their 
nationality: 
If he is a Frenchman, he will say that he belongs to Louisiana; 
if he is a Spaniard, that he belongs to Florida; If a Dutchman, that he 
was born in Pennsylvania, or somewhere about Albany; - and there is 
so little a difference between the dialect of an American and an 
Englishman, that it is difficult to perceive the difference. 192 
Nonetheless, if the sailors who admitted to being foreign-born are 
representative of the greater whole, than the census makes it possible to 
analyse their proportional representation. British sailors were deemed the 
greatest threat, and in fact, they did account for the majority of foreign-
born sailors. England, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales together contributed 
191 "Letter from the Secretary of the Navy Regarding Petty Officers, 
Seamen, &c., in the National Service," House Document No. 132,27m 
Congress, 3rd Session, February 9, 1843. 
192 W. McNally, Evils and Abuses in the Naval and Merchant Service 
Exposed; with Proposals for their Remedy and Redress (Boston: Cassady 
and March, 1839), p. 44. 
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526 men. 193 Another 66 came from such places as Canada, Barbados, 
New Zealand, and Jamaica. Out of that total, 189 were naturalised 
Americans. If the census was proportionally accurate, than it is safe to 
estimate that the actual number of British sailors in the Navy was around 
3,000 men, of whom at least 500 would have been naturalised citizens. 
The British sailors were obviously not all English, however, and 
the better part of them actually came from Ireland. A total of 264 
Irishmen were listed, 93 of whom were naturalised. The number of Irish 
is not surprising. Immigration had been growing continuously over the 
past twenty years, and there had been two major surges since 1837.194 
Although the Panic temporarily affected immigration, between 1838 and 
1844 approximately 130,000 Irish arrived in the United States. 195 
Moreover, the immigrants were primarily young men, concentrated in the 
major ports of entry where the Navy had its largest rendezvous. l96 While 
they might have been targeted by racists, their loyalty to the crown should 
not have been a major concern. The Scottish contribution was substantial, 
but not great. There were fifty-five Scots enlisted, but only 11 were 
naturalised. Wales was hardly represented at all, with only five sailors, 
193 This figure includes one man from Shetland, three from the Western 
Isles, and one from the Isle of Man. 
194 D. Fitzpatrick, Irish Immigration, 1801-1921 (Dublin: Dundalgan 
Press, 1984), p. 27. 
195 K.A. Miller, Emigrants and Exiles: Ireland and the Irish Exodus to 
North America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 197, 199. 
These figures must be used carefully since estimates of immigration 
numbers are necessarily inaccurate due to inefficient recording methods, 
clandestine immigration, and unrecorded return immigration. D. Baines, 
Emigration from Europe 1815-1836 (London: MacMillan, 1991), pp. 17-
20. 
196 Fitzpatrick, Irish Immigration, p. 33. The "rendezvous" was a 
recruiting station. 
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and one naturalised citizen. England's contribution, however, at 197 men 
was not much less than Ireland. Never mind that 51 of them were 
naturalised, the issue of divided loyalties remained. Assuming that the 
figure of 3,000 Britons is accurate, than around 1,500 of them were 
English, some fifteen percent of the N avy"S total strength. 
It was one thing to identify and admit that problems of recruitment 
existed, and another thing entirely to actually solve them. If naval service 
was not popular with Americans, there were good reasons for it. In the 
first place, it had to compete with the interior, which drew away 
considerable numbers of men who might otherwise have followed a career 
at sea. Furthermore, it had to contend with the merchant marine for the 
sailors who remained. Commercial vessels offered powerful incentives: 
better pay, shorter cruises, a personal profit motive, and perhaps most 
importantly of all, easier discipline. 
Upshur's Report had not commented on any of these personnel 
issues, except to say that he could not explain them. 197 Instead of taking a 
proactive stance, he simply accepted a policy instituted by a predecessor, 
Mahlon Dickerson (Secretary of the Navy, 1834-1838). This was a 
programme of naval apprenticeship that was intended to remedy the 
Navy.'s internal and external problems in one deft swoop. Besides 
addressing the crisis of recruitment, apprenticeship had the exceptional 
result of changing the character of midshipmancy, which it ostensibly 
made somewhat more egalitanan. If midshipmancy could be made more 
popular, it might make naval education, that is, a naval academy, 
acceptable as well. More to the point, with no suggestions of his own for 
197 SNR 1841, p. 373. 
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increasing the numbers of the Navy's enlisted men, Upshur's expansion 
was largely dependent on the future corps of sailors that apprenticeship 
sought to provide. This raises the question of how Upshur proposed to 
man for the time being his expanded Navy. Apprenticeship was designed 
to produce long-term results, while the Secretary's concerns were 
immediate. Simply put, the apprentices were intended to establish support 
for the service and its growth until such time as they could effectively 
remedy its personnel shortage. If the Navy's expansion was to be 
sustained, it would take years not months. As the threat of war receded, so 
too would support for military spending. It was necessary, therefore, to 
give the nation an alternative reason to support the Navy. Furthermore, 
the problems encountered in the Congress made it clear that the Navy 
would have to change its image if its growth was to be assured. The 
apprentices gave cause for continued support, while providing very 
favourable public relations. Ideally, the boy sailors made the service more 
representative of the nation it served. Since these sailors of the future 
represented the service of the future, the Navy would be transformed as 
they grew into adulthood. Through their success, Upshur might still 
realise his vision. 
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Chapter Two 
Naval Education: Apprentices and Midshipmen 
On March 2, 1837, the United States Congress had passed a bill 
designated, "An Act to provide for the enlistment of boys for the naval 
service, and to extend the term of enlistment for seamen." That portion 
which related to the enlistment of minors read: 
1. Boys may be enlisted. Other persons may be enlisted for five 
years ... 
SEC. 1. That it shall be lawful to enlist (a) boys for the navy, with 
the consent of their parents or guardians, not being under thirteen nor 
over eighteen years of age, to serve until they shall arrive at the age of 
twenty-one years; and it shall be lawful to enlist other persons for the 
navy to serve a period not exceeding five years. I 
The new law was not the Navy's first attempt to enlist minors for service 
on board its vessels. Indeed, there had been boys in the English Navy 
since at least the fourteenth century, and boys had served in the United 
States Navy since its inception.2 This was, however, the first occasion on 
which they had done so with the express sanction of the Congress, and for 
the specific purpose of remedying the Navy's particular recruiting 
problems. 
Jackson's first Secretary of the Navy, Samuel Southard, had 
initially proposed the current apprenticeship programme in his report of 
1828. In 1834, when no longer Secretary but a Whig Senator from New 
Jersey, Southard introduced a bill to provide for the enlistment of minors 
1 J.P. Callan, and A.W. Russell, "Regulations for the Enlistment of Boys 
who may be entered to serve in the Navy until they arrive at the age of 
twenty-one years," Laws of the United States, Relating to the Navy and 
Marine Corps from the Formation of the Government to 1859 (Baltimore: 
John Murphy & Company, 1859), p. 301. 
2 N.A.M. Rodger, The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain 
660-1649 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1998), p. 141. 
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in the naval service.3 Although it languished for three years in Congress, 
the eventual passage of this bill began the apprenticeship programme that 
Upshur had inherited. 
By the close of 1840, the apprenticeship program was well under 
way, and Secretary of the Navy James Kirke Paulding had drawn 
particular attention to it in his annual reports for the past two years, 
remarking that it was "a source of great and lasting benefit to the navy.'>'! 
Indeed, the programme was designed to do more than reverse the 
manpower shortage. It was the means by which the Navy would 
safeguard its future. The apprentices ensured that there would not be 
another recruiting deficit in the corning decade. Moreover, many of them 
would assume crucial positions in the service. It took many years to 
acquire the skills needed to fill the ranks of the Navy's petty and forward 
officers. Their early enlistments meant that the apprentices would have 
acquired these skills by the time they reached adulthood. Already, it was 
claimed that captains preferred older apprentices to adult sailors.5 
Furthermore, inculcated with the values of the service, their patriotism 
would be unquestionable.6 
Something of this optimism IS reflected in Jacob Hazen's 
assessment of popular attitudes towards apprenticeship. A veteran of the 
Navy, he had experienced apprenticeship first-hand, and concluded that it 
was unworkable. It was with some derision, therefore, that he wrote: 
... Everybody believed it was a grand scheme, and tried to persuade 
everybody else to believe so too. It was the general impression that the 
world was about beginning its regeneration, and that contrary to the 
3 Langley, Social Reform in the United States Navy, p. 103. 
4 Paulding, SNR 1839, p. 537. 
5 Paulding, SNR 1840, p. 406. 
6 Paulding, SNR 1839, p. 537. 
usual origin of reformations, the first movement had started up at sea. It 
was wonderful to hear what talking there was - to see the running and 
visiting of ships - to witness the bowing, scrapping, cutting, shuffling, 
and smiling of citizens in their congratulations of lieutenants and 
captains, on the supposed approach of the happy millennium. An 
entirely new order of men were to be ushered into existence; the 
character of the navy was to be elevated to an unprecedented standard 
of respectability; the old order of discipline was all to be knocked into a 
cocked hat, while superannuated old salts were to be turned over to a 
life pension in the hospital of oblivion, and their places occupied by the 
hopeful progeny of the apprentice system.7 
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Hazen's references to millenialism reflect the fact that 
apprenticeship was not only a professional reform, but also an epitome of 
social reformist thinking. In the years preceding the establishment of the 
Navy's apprenticeship program, the service's enlisted men had become the 
object of a social campaign dedicated to their moral improvement. Behind 
this movement was the American Seaman's Friend Society, which was in 
tum, part of a larger and more diverse spirit of reform that had grown for 
thirty years in the United States. Reform was concentrated in the 
Northeast, but whatever their section, most reformers belonged to a 
common background, and shared the same influences and motives.8 
Indeed, reform had assumed a national character and vision, reflected in 
the names of such organisations as the American Society for the 
Promotion of Temperance, the American Anti-Slavery Society, the 
American Colonization Society, and the American Peace Society.9 
The reformers were profoundly influenced by evangelicalism, 
which had surged most recently during the "Second Great Awakening," a 
sustained religious revival lasting broadly from the mid-1790s to the late 
7 Hazen, Five Years Before the Mast, pp. 228-229. 
8 R.G. Walters, American Reformers 1815-1860 (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1978), p. 30. 
9 C. Griffin, The Ferment of Reform 1830-1860 (New York: Thomas Y. 
Crowell Company, 1967), p. 33. 
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1830s.1O Evangelicalism encouraged missionary behaviour, and instilled a 
desire to change the conditions of the present. This had much to do with 
the millennial tendencies of the evangelicals. The imminence of the 
Kingdom of God mandated that first, the kingdoms (and republics) of man 
be worthy of His arrival. I I The desire to reform reflected another 
evangelical belief, the perfectibility of mankind. Reformers rejected the 
Calvinist belief in pre-determination, believing instead that it was possible 
to become sanctified while on earth. 12 
Reformers were also reacting against the broad and radical 
transformations that were occurring in the United States. 13 In fact, they 
sought through moral suasion and uplift, to maintain a social order which 
privileged their own position. The urban population had surged, and 
increasing immigration swelled the cities even further. As the population 
grew, so too did the numbers of the poor, which were bolstered by the 
Panic of 1837. At the same time, mob violence swept the nation. Early 
nineteenth century reformers feared further social upheaval resulting from 
the perceived crime, disease, and intemperance of the slum dwellers. 
Furthermore, they identified a wide range of degenerative practices, and 
uncorrected evils that beset society. In response, the reformers formed 
voluntary organisations whose purpose was to combat the various ills that 
threatened the nation. 
10 Walters, American Reformers, p. 21. 
II Walters, American Reformers, pp.25-26. 
12 Walters, American Reformers, p. 28. 
13 RJ. Carwadine, Evangelicals and Politics in Antebellum America (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), pp. 109-111; R. Mennel, Thoms and 
Thistles: Juvenile Delinquents in the United States 1825-1940 (Hanover: 
University of New Hampshire Press, 1973), p. 6. 
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One such organisation was the American Seaman's Friend Society. 
Founded on January 11, 1826, its antecedents can be traced back to 1819, 
and the Bethel Union Society.14 The Bethel Union was a multi-
denominational movement that encouraged church service on board of 
ships, and the establishment of chapels in port cities. The American 
Seaman's Friend Society was itself an offshoot of the Bethel Union of 
New York and the Society for Promoting the Gospel Among Seaman.IS 
Like other voluntary organisations, the Society had its own 
propaganda machine. A periodical, The Sailor's Magazine, which was 
dedicated to expressing the reformers' views, began publication in 1828.16 
At the same time, like-minded periodicals were issued by other 
organisations of reform's 'Benevolent Empire.' Finally, there were a 
considerable number of sailor-authors whose accounts of naval life 
described many of the problems that the Society sought to remedy. Not all 
of these authors were friendly, however, and at least two of them criticised 
directly the Society and the Sailor's Magazine. 17 
Sailors were a likely object for the reformers. They were 
notoriously irreligious. IS Indeed, their blasphemies and cursing were 
legendary, triggering the missionary impulse of the reformers. 
Furthermore, the social profile of the service contributed to the reformers' 
14 Langley, Social Reform in the United States Navy, p. 49,54. 
15 Langley, Social Reform in the United States Navy, p. 53. 
16 Langley, Social Reform in the United States Navy, p. 56. 
17 M. Glenn, Campaigns Against Corporal Punishment: Prisoners, 
Sailors, Women, and Children in Antebellum America (Albany, NY: State 
University Press of New York, 1984), p. 90. 
IS " ... There is one reflection associated with this proud banner (the Stars 
and Stripes) painful to the pious heart; the thought that flag waves over so 
many unchristian hearts." Anon., "Our Navy," The Sailor's Magazine, 
(Vol. 15, No. 10, July 1843), p. 341. 
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concerns. Dominated by foreign-born sailors, especially Irishmen, it 
aroused nativist concerns about the degeneration of the country, especially 
since sailors were already seen as a hapless and degraded portion of 
society. In fact, the civilian reformers' opposition to such well-established 
naval practices as flogging and grog was grounded in these concerns for 
the sailors' general well-being. Flogging was just part of a wider range of 
practices that contributed to sailors' low moral standing. It debased its 
victims, stunting their moral development. 19 According to the reformers, it 
was better to prevent sin than to punish it. Flogging only attacked the 
symptoms of immorality, and not its causes.20 Besides this, it contributed 
to anti-social behaviour, and was condemned for being barbaric.21 The 
practice also had strong connotations of slavery, and was considered 
wholly inappropriate for a free republic.22 
While a wide range of disciplinary measures were available to 
naval officers, including stoppage of leave, curtailment of rations, 'shame 
badges,' and confinement, these appeared rarely, and most often on board 
ships commanded by officers opposed to flogging. Of them, there were 
precious few. 23 Sanguinary punishments, remained, therefore, the primary 
means of naval discipline. 
19 Glenn, Campaigns Against Corporal Punishment, p. 91. 
20 Glenn, Campaigns Against Corporal Punishment, p. 58. 
21 Glenn, Campaigns Against Corporal Punishment, pp. 39-40. 
22 Glenn, Campaigns Against Corporal Punishment, pp. 54-57. This is not 
to imply there was any great alliance between the reformers and the 
Jacksonians. Had there been, it would not have been a comfortable one. 
Jacksonian Democrats had earlier condemned the repressive tendencies of 
evangelicalism, and temperance reformers attacked Jacksonian 
demagoguery, notably its appeals to "the people" and attacks on the 
"aristocracy." In fact, most of the reformers were themselves Whigs. 
Walters, American Reformers, pp. 34, 137. 
23 On January 29, 1850, Secretary of the Navy William Ballard solicited 
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Two instruments were used for administering corporal punishment, 
the cat-of-nine-tails, and the colt. The cat-of-nine-tails consisted of nine 
hard-twisted pieces of cotton or flax cord, with three twists in each, fixed 
on a short, thick rope handle.24 There was no set standard, but they were 
usually eighteen inches in length.25 The colt was a small, hard twisted 
rope about the diameter of a man's forefinger, and up to three feet in 
length.26 The 'cats' were officially sanctioned by the Articles of War, 
which in Article I limited the severity of their use; "No commanding 
officer shall... inflict punishments on any private beyond twelve lashes 
with a cat-of-nine-tails.,,27 While this made the colt technically illegal, its 
use was widespread, justified "according to the usage of the sea service.,,28 
their views on corporal punishment. Only seven out of eighty-eight 
replies favoured its abolition. Langley, Social Reform in the United States 
Navy, p. 18I. 
24 Paullin, Naval Administration 1841-1861, p. 1462. 
25 L.F.S. Horan, "Flogging in the United States Navy: Unfamiliar Facts 
Regarding Its Origin and Abolition," United States Naval Institute 
Proceedings (Vol. 76, No.4, September 1950), pp. 969-970. 
26 Langley, Social Reform in the United States Navy, p. 140. 
27 Although the Articles of War forbade more than twelve strikes of the 
cats without court-martial, charging an individual with multiple offences, 
and punishing them each in tum easily circumvented this. Furthermore, 
courts-martial could order up to three hundred blows with the cats, 
although this severity was reserved for the most serious offences. By way 
of example, ordinary seaman Clark Bums received this sentence and a 
dishonourable discharge in February 1840 for the combined offences of 
drunkenness, fighting, and mutiny. The United States Army, on the other 
hand, had abolished flogging during the War of 1812, and had maintained 
the prohibition until 1833. In that year, it had reinstated corporal 
punishment, if only for the crime of desertion. "Index to the Naval 
Courts-Martial, 1798-1860," National Archives Record Group 273 
(hereafter NA RG), Records of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy; 
Coffman, The Old Army, pp. 196-197. 
28 Articles of War, Rules and Regulations of the Government of the United 
States Navy - An Act for the Better Government of the Navy of the United 
States (1800), Article I, reprinted in Valle, Rocks and Shoals, pp. 285-296. 
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An elaborate ritual designed to illustrate the legitimacy of the act 
accompanied any flogging with the cats. First, the charges were read at a 
'captain's mast hearing,' whereupon the captain rendered his verdict and 
pronounced any punishment. This would often be carried out 
immediately, once the crew had been assembled on the gangways or by 
the mainmast to bear witness. The charges would then be read, 
accompanied by an appropriate recitation from the Articles of War, and the 
number of strikes to be delivered. The prisoner was then tied to a grating, 
and the boatswain's mate, whose duty it was, would begin flogging him. 
Throughout, the officers would stand together - in dress uniform if time 
allowed - behind a cordon of armed marines. 
Most accounts describe flogging as a torture for both the victim 
and the assembled spectators. Each strike of the cats was really nine 
blows across the back: 
As the boatswain's mates cannot always strike in one place, 
[the victim's] whole back is cut with the lash, including under his arms 
and upon the ribs, etc., which is extremely painful, as any seaman can 
testify who has ever been flogged.29 
One account of a flogging described the pain as "more excruciating than if 
molten metal had been poured upon me, seething and scorching my flesh 
to the very marrow.,,30 
Colting, or starting, was more commonplace than flogging with the 
cats. It was used as a spontaneous, ad hoc measure intended as much to 
increase efficiency as to enforce discipline. As such, it was used 
constantly: 
29 McNally, Evils and Abuses in the Naval and Merchant Service, p. 106. 
30 J. Hazen, Five Years BeJore the Mast, or Life in the Forecastle 
aboard a Whaler and Man-oj-War (Philadelphia: Willis P. Hazard, 1854), 
p.223. 
I do not believe that a single day elapsed that punishment by 
flogging, did not take place - at least for the nine months that I was on 
board [the Delaware] ... This was not punishment with the cat, which 
the law directs to be their instrument of punishment, but with what is 
termed a colt>l 
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That the colt was used to promote efficiency is demonstrated by its 
informal nature. Indeed, it was often kept by boatswain's mates in the 
brims of their hats for rapid use.32 Less terrible than the cats, the colt 
remained a powerfully violent instrument. Most often used on a clothed 
back, it could still inflict such trauma that "often left the flesh black for 
two or three weeks, and then yellow for many more, before it healed 
properly.,,33 
Apart from their opposition to such institutionalised violence, 
reformers believed that in the last resort, most sailors were not always 
responsible for their own actions. Indeed, the ultimate blame for this lay 
with the officers who flogged the seamen, for at issue here was the Navy's 
dispensation of a daily spirit ration. Since the Navy encouraged drinking, 
it should be prepared for drunkenness. For officers to punish their men for 
crimes relating to drunkenness was disingenuous, even hypocritical. 
Flogging closed a circle of degradation that began with sanctioned liquor. 
The Navy had issued a spirit ration since 1794, and before this, the 
Continental Navy had made it a custom.34 Grog had been inherited from 
31 McNally, Evils and Abuses in the Naval and Merchant Service Exposed, 
pp.87-88. 
32 H. Melville, White Jacket, or the World in a Man-of-War (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1990) p. 141. In White Jacket, first published in 
1850, Melville lent his voice to the anti-flogging campaign, which by that 
time, had amassed considerable strength. 
33 W.M. Murrell, Cruise of the Frigate Columbia Around the World 
Under the Command of Commodore George C. Read, in 1838, 1839, and 
1840 (Boston: Benjamin B. Mussey, 1840), p. 88. 
34 C. Lathrop, "Grog: Its Origin and Usage in the United States 
Navy," United States Naval Institute Proceedings (Vol. 61, No.3, March 
1935), p. 378. 
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Great Britain, and originally consisted of rum mixed with water, but after 
1806 the Navy substituted diluted whiskey.35 It was distributed twice a 
day, a half pint at a time, and by all accounts, was revered by the ratings. 
Indeed, many considered it a fundamental part of naval life and tradition. 
Yet the reformers were right. There certainly was a connection 
between flogging and grog. Many of the offences for which sailors were 
flogged were explicitly related to alcohol. This fact was not lost on the 
Navy's officers, and many of them supported the abolition of the spirit 
ration. At the same time, very few of them supported any effort to reform 
corporal punishment. The latter was deemed necessary for the effective 
operation of a ship-of-war. Whilst the spirit ration was certainly 
responsible for disciplinary problems, it did not follow that its abolition 
would do away with the need for sanguinary punishments. Besides this, 
the peculiar circumstances of a warship demanded strong measures. 
The ship of war, with her crew composed of the most 
discordant material, banded together in a highly unnatural state of 
association not very much inclined to habits of docility, and possessing 
a physical majority sufficient to throw off and defy all control, with her 
position often isolated upon a treacherous element, entirely cut off from 
any appeal to other human aid, and always remote from the protecting 
influences which surround more happily balanced communities on 
shore - must inevitably be governed on principles peculiar to her 
anomalous condition.36 
Additionally, the low quality of the Navy's enlisted men demanded that 
the officers have recourse to flogging. The public perception of sailors did 
not contradict the officers' assessment of their crews. Although the 
reformers had no basis for ascertaining the character of a sailor at sea they 
had decided views on his conduct ashore. One rather long-winded 
35 Langley, Social Reform in the United States Navy, pp. 210-211. 
36 Bryan, A Plea in Favor of Maintaining Flogging in the Navy, p. 5. 
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editorial reprinted in The Sailor's Magazine managed to incorporate 
almost every stereotype of the enlisted man: 
[Sailors] seem to have no thought beyond the present moment 
- and they often seek pleasure in the indulgence of the sensual 
appetites, at the expense of all that is moral or intellectual. 
The sailor too frequently divides his time between his 
boarding house, which is often kept by a sharper or pickpocket, a grog 
shop, and a brothel. He associates with the vilest of the vile, and 
sacrifices alternatively at the shrine of intemperance and licentiousness, 
until the landlord, and other kindred spirits, have possessed themselves 
of his last dollar, when a ship is provided for him, and with hardly a 
suit of clothes upon his back - with little in his chest, save a bottle of 
rum, which his compassionate landlord had given him in lieu of a 
wardrobe and other necessaries - with nerves unstrung, and a frame 
debilitated with debauchery, he is conveyed in a carriage or a handcart, 
unable to walk, on board the ship - and not infrequently by violent 
hands up the gangway. 37 
In short, sailors were profligate, drunken wretches who consorted with 
prostitutes and other intemperates, whilst being preyed upon by 
unscrupulous harbour-side characters. The reformers had not only to save 
the sailor from himself and the officers that abused him, but also from his 
erstwhile friends. 
Apprenticeship was intended to eliminate forever the stereotypical 
sailor, and the cycles of degradation that produced him. While the 
reformers would continue to evangelise towards older seamen, they also 
anticipated an imminent generation of boy-sailors raised free from vice. 
Devout, temperate, obedient and able, the apprentices would ultimately 
make grog and the lash redundant. At the same time, apprenticeship 
provided a solution for another problem, the perceived delinquency of the 
young, urban, poor. 
The first organised treatment of juvenile delinquency as a distinct 
social problem entailed the founding and development of houses of refuge 
37 Anon., "Sailors on Shore," Boston Mercantile Journal, quoted in The 
Sailor's Magazine (Vol. 10, No.3, November 1837), p. 35. 
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in New York, Boston and Philadelphia in the 1820s.38 These houses of 
refuge were total institutions whose purpose was to compensate for the 
supposed break-down of the urban family.39 The houses of refuges were 
"prisons for juvenile offenders ... [that] should [also] be schools for 
instruction rather than places of punishment ... "4O Notwithstanding the 
presence of some juvenile criminals, most of their inmates were 
pauperised children and orphans 
There was already an established connection between these houses 
of refuge and traditional apprenticeship. In the first place, the houses 
sought to replace the failed old system of familial apprenticeship as a form 
of disciplinary control; and furthermore, they maintained their own system 
of apprenticeship which occasionally sent older inmates to work in the 
whaling trade or merchant marine on the condition that the voyages last at 
least a couple of years.41 Indeed, in 1827, Thomas Goin arranged for 
about 150 boys and young men, from ten to twenty years old, to be taken 
from the New York House of Refuge, and shipped out of Nantucket on 
whaling voyages.42 
38 Mennel, Thoms and Thistles, p. 3. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Anon., "Report on the Penitentiary System in the United States," Society 
for the Prevention of Pauperism (New York, n.p., 1822), quoted in 
Mennel, Thoms and Thistles, p. 11. 
41 Mennel, Thoms and Thistles, pp. xxvii, 21. 
42 Gain, Remarks on the Home Squadron and Naval School, p. 1. Gain was 
in civilian life, a notary and shipping broker with the firm of Gain, Poole, 
and Pentz of New York, who had long been engaged in the hiring of 
seamen. It also seems likely that he was the same Thomas Gain who 
appeared in the 1842 Navy Register as one of seven unwarranted masters 
in the service. Langley, Social Refonn in the United States Navy, p. 112; 
1842 Navy Register, p. 52. 
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The creators of the Navy's apprenticeship program had these 
precedents in mind. Theirs was to be an adjunct to the houses of refuge, 
and would serve as an avenue through which delinquents could be sent 
from the houses into the Navy, or more immediately, from the streets 
themselves to men-of-war. In effect, the service was incorporated into the 
larger 'kingdom of reform.' 
As the Navy Secretary reported in 1839: 
If, instead of permitting them to live in idleness, exposed 
to every temptation, and plunging prematurely into every vice, 
[delinquents] were apprenticed to their country, they could 
receive such an education as befits their station, and acquire 
these habits of sobriety, honesty, order, and industry, which 
would go far to render those who are so apt to become the bane 
of society, efficient supporters of the honor and interests of 
their country.43 
Interestingly enough, this statement directly contradicted the 
regulations for the recruitment of apprentices which emphasised that "no 
boy is to be entered who shall have been convicted of any criminal or 
disgraceful offence, or who shall have been sent to any house of correction 
or refuge, or other place of punishment.,,44 Charles Rockwell described 
the boys serving on board the man-of-war in which he had his chaplaincy 
as being the "sweepings of the street," many of whom were taken from the 
houses of refuge.45 Moreover, the Sailor's Magazine, in its description of 
the anniversary meeting of the Sabbath School on board of the U.S.S. 
43 Paulding, SNR 1839, p. 537. 
44 Callan and Russelll "Regulations for the Enlistment of Boys who may 
be entered to serve in the Navy until they arrive at the age of twenty-one 
years," Laws of the United States, Relating to the Navy and Marine Corps, 
p.301. 
45 C. Rockwell, Sketches of Foreign Travel and Life at Sea; Including a 
Cruise on Board a Man-of- War ... ,vol. 1 (Boston: Tappan and Dennet, 
1842), p. 384. 
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North Carolina referred to half-a-dozen orphan boys, four of whom had 
recently been taken from the Asylum at Bloomingdale.46 
Not all of the apprentices were taken from the houses of refuge. 
Some came from good families, while many more were the children of 
impoverished parents.47 Several of the surviving certificates of consent for 
minors to enter the naval service demonstrate the relationship between 
poverty and apprenticeship. Four such cases are explicit, and many others 
are implied. The four notable documents read similarly: "We the 
selectmen of the town of Bremen, and overseers of the poor of said 
Bremen in the State of Maine do hereby consent and agree that John 
Martin who has been under our care several years be duly enlisted ... "; 
"Henry Edward Cloutiman, enlisted by I.e. Phillips, Mayor, on behalf of 
the overseers of the poor of the city of Salem (Massachusetts);" "William 
Blodgett, enlisted by the overseers of the poor of the city of Lexington, 
Massachusetts;" and "William Wright, 'a town pauper' of Fairfield, 
Connecticut. ,,48 
These families were casualties of the Panic of 1837. Many of the 
middle-class, under economic pressure, withdrew their support from 
charitable organisations just when the ranks of the paupers swelled.49 Into 
this vacuum stepped the United States Navy. Besides accepting children 
from the houses of refuge, apprenticeship was seen as the means by which 
impoverished children might be saved from such a fate in the first place. 
46 Anon., "The Naval Apprentices," The Sailor's Magazine (Vol. 14, No. 
8, April 1842), p. 243. 
47 Rockwell, Sketches of Foreign Travel, p. 384. 
48 "Certificates of Consent for Minors to Enter the Naval Service," Vol. 1, 
1838-1840, NA RG 24. 
49 Walters, American Reformers, p. 177. 
[Naval apprenticeship is] not only the means of furnishing 
our navy with excellent and capable seamen, but it takes many 
boys from a course of idleness and crime, and places them in a 
situation of interest and respectability. There are thousands of 
boys in this city alone who spend their days and nights around 
the wharves in petty thieving, or become the hangers-on of 
some favorite engine, and who, after generally a brief career in 
this initiatory step, become the occupants of the House of 
Refuge, or a prison.so 
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Goin cited numerous other newspaper editorials that made similar 
remarks, and himself wrote that children "now in want and destitution, 
would spring forward with warm hearts and able hands ... ,,51 Another 
advocate spoke of 300 apprentices at the Brooklyn Navy Yard, who 
otherwise would be "running the streets, ragged and noisy, dragging fire 
engines, or stealing at every turn.,,52 
Crucial to the salvation of the apprentices was the education that 
they would receive. Enlistment would get them off the streets, but it was 
through learning that they would become useful members of society. Such 
sentiments echoed the concerns of the Society for the Prevention of 
Pauperism, which had already asserted that "thousands of children are 
growing up in this city (New York), destitute of that superintendence over 
their minds and morals, so indispensable to render them a valuable 
acquisition to society.,,53 Thus, the Navy established a comprehensive 
educational programme to accompany the apprentices' professional 
50 Anon., "Naval Apprentices," New York Transcript, n.d., quoted in Goin, 
Remarks on the Home Squadron and Naval School, p. 19. 
51 Goin, Remarks on the Home Squadron and Naval School, p. 2. 
52 Anon., "The Naval School," New York Herald, January 14, 1840, quoted 
in Goin, Remarks on the Home Squadron and Naval School, pp. 35-36; 
Anon., New York Courier and Enquirer, January 4, 1840; Anon., "The 
Home Squadron! Where is it? The American Boys' Naval School! How 
does it progress?", New York Herald, n.d., both quoted in Goin, Remarks 
on the Home Squadron and Naval School, pp. 25, 38-39. 
53 4th Annual Report of the Society for the Prevention of Pauperism, p. 11, 
quoted in Mennel, Thoms and Thistles, p. 11. 
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training. This system was designed to offer scholastic, professional, and 
moral teaching. In doing so, it adhered to the tripartite programme of 
intellectual, physical, and moral instruction that contemporary educational 
reformers considered the bulwark of state-sponsored education.54 
The Navy, therefore, instituted a system of school-ships for its 
apprentices. The core of the system was the U.S.S. Hudson, stationed at 
the Brooklyn Navy Yard. This was designated as a receiving ship for 
apprentices, of whom there were approximately one hundred on board at 
any given time. Besides the students, only the officers and a select group 
of petty officers were allowed on board. The boys attended classes in 
reading, writing, and arithmetic, and were also taught the rudiments of 
seamanship. When another vessel was ready for sea service, as many 
apprentices as were necessary would then be transferred to her.55 The 
constant movement of the apprentices is reflected in the varying estimates 
of their numbers. 
The Hudson had been selected because its small size made it more 
practical as a school. A sloop-of-war, it was lightly fitted with masts, 
spars, and sails, which the apprentices were able to handle themselves.56 
The skills that they learned there were also applied to certain other vessels 
54 M.B. Katz, The Irony of Early School Reform - Educational Innovation 
in Mid-Nineteenth Century Massachusetts (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1968), p. 124. 
55 Anon., "Home Squadron and Naval School," New York Evening Post, 
June 29, 1839, quoted in Goin, Remarks on the Home Squadron and Naval 
School, p. 6. 
56 Anon., "Naval Apprentices," New York American, quoted in Goin 
Remarks on the Home Squadron and Naval School, p. 26. 
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in the Yard. On one occasion, they fully rigged the sloop-of-war St. 
Louis.57 
Besides the Hudson, schools were established on board the 
primary receiving ships at the major navy yards in Charleston, New York, 
and Norfolk.58 These were, respectively, the Columbus, the North 
Carolina, and the Java. The Secretary of the Navy optimistically planned 
to man the North Carolina with 2,000 apprentices and to eventually give 
her over entirely to their training.59 The crew of the Columbus, 
approximately four hundred men and some two hundred apprentices, gives 
a better idea of the number of apprentices on board these vessels, the 
crews of which usually numbered three hundred officers and men. 60 
The apprentices on each were treated in much the same way as 
those on board the Hudson. The primary difference between them was 
that the three larger receiving ships were also used as clearing-houses for 
adult sailors. On board these ships, the apprentices messed by themselves, 
in groups of ten. Each mess was presided over by a petty officer, who was 
also responsible for looking after their clothing and personal hygiene. 
Probably, the petty officer was also meant to act as a mentor for the mess-
mates. 
A number of smaller vessels were also incorporated into the 
school system. Matthew Calbraith Perry had ordered fifteen to twenty 
57 Anon., "Home Squadron and Naval School," New York Evening Post, 
June 29, 1839, quoted in Goin, Remarks on the Home Squadron and Naval 
School, p. 10. 
58 Anon., "Naval School Ships," Anny and Navy Chronicle (Vol. 10, No. 
22, 1840), p. 346. 
59 Goin, Remarks on the Home Squadron and Naval School, p. 7. The 
North Carolina would normally have had a crew of 260. 
60 Hazen, Five Years Before the Mast, p. 209. 
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apprentices to the steam-ship Fulton, where they were instructed in 
engineering as well as seamanship.61 A clipper, the Paulding, was rigged 
as a brig and sailed along the Mid-Atlantic coast by a crew of 
apprentices.62 Finally, the revenue cutter Washington, also manned largely 
by apprentices, was sailed along the coast of Massachusetts and New York 
where it provided valuable service aiding vessels in distress.63 
Furthermore, all sea-going vessels were assigned a complement 
of apprentices. By way of example, the Ohio, attached to the 
Mediterranean Squadron, had on board 54 apprentices out of a crew of 
820 men.64 At sea, the routine of the apprentices changed to accommodate 
their watch responsibilities. Whilst one group of apprentices was on duty, 
the other was to be in class.65 Attendance was mandatory and regular. 
The lessons were missed only in case of emergency. When on watch, the 
apprentices were stationed aloft, under the care of the captains of the top. 
Those who could not actually assist in the heavier work would at least be 
learning the work of topmen. They were also organised into their own gun 
crews, and exercised when the "metal of the vessel [rendered] it 
practicable." All of this was supervised by the first lieutenant, who was 
61 Anon., "Home Squadron and Naval School," New York Evening Post, 
June 29,1839, quoted in Goin, Remarks on the Home Squadron and Naval 
School, p. 10. 
62 Anon., "The Delaware 74 - The Clipper Paulding - The Naval 
Apprentices," Army and Navy Chronicle (Vol. 11, No.5, 1840), p. 76. 
63 New York Herald, "Our Revenue Cutters," February 8, 1839, quoted 
in Goin, Remarks on the Home Squadron and Naval School, pp.20-21. 
64 Anon., "Home Squadron and Naval School," New York Evening Post, 
June 29, 1839, quoted in Goin, Remarks on the Home Squadron and 
Naval School, p. 6; Bauer, and Roberts, Register of Ships of the U.S. 
Navy, p.4. 
65 Regulations for Apprentice Boys in the Navy - At Sea, NA RG 45, 
Navy Subject file 1770-1910, NE 0-1837. This document provides the 
basis for the following four paragraphs. 
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assigned to examine the apprentices once a day, and "to consider them 
entitled to his particular attention." 
Great care was taken in the professional training of the boys. 
While apprenticeship had many aims, the Navy's first priority was the 
creation of experienced sailors. On board the receiving ships, apprentices 
were taught to reef and furl sails, as well as to send a yard up or down. On 
board larger vessels, a topgallant mast, light enough for the apprentices to 
handle, was rigged athwart the mizzen mast and below the cross-jack yard. 
The apprentices were also divided into boat-crews and exercised at their 
oars. Lessons in gunnery were to be given regularly on light guns or 
carronades. 
Furthermore, the apprentices were divided into three separate 
divisions which were to meet "alternatively and daily after dinner." Each 
division was supervised by warrant officer, either the gunner, the 
sailmaker, or the boatswain. The first taught how to quill grape shot, 
make musket cartridges, wads and tubes, and the "other mechanical 
branches of a gunner's duty." The second taught how to sew a seam, rope 
a sail, and stick a cringle. The last gave instruction on how to knot, splice, 
fit rigging, and use a marlinspike. 
At the end of the day, the apprentices were encouraged to 
exercise aloft, and "indulged in such sports and amusements as are not 
incompatible with discipline and subordination." Anyone overstepping 
these boundaries was punished, as transgressors were subject to corporal 
punishment "in moderation." A.dditionally, the weekly progress and 
behaviour of the apprentices was registered and reviewed by the captain. 
Their scholastic standing was also reported to the captain. 
According to the Regulations, the apprentices were to be "well-instructed 
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in reading, writing, and arithmetic by some person to be selected from 
[their] vessel, and to be employed on all such duties which they may be 
competent to perform ... ,,66 Apprentices were required to attend class 
"according to their several acquirements and capacities," from nine in the 
morning until the crew was piped down to dinner. Their curriculum 
consisted of reading, writing, arithmetic, and navigation, "when it did not 
interfere with their other duties (these being their lessons in seamanship 
and gunnery)." At the same time, the class room was used to convey 
particular moral lessons. 
The general purpose of the reformers was to save children from 
delinquency by indoctrinating them with middle-class values -
temperance, neatness, diligence, punctuality, and thrift.67 In this aim, they 
had the support of the Navy. "[The apprentices will] receive such an 
education as befits their station, and acquire these habits of sobriety, 
honesty, order, and industry ... ,,68 
These moral lessons were reinforced with divine services or 
Sunday school. Attendance at the Sabbath School on board the North 
Carolina was mandatory, and given that attendance at divine services was 
also mandatory for enlisted men, this was certainly the case for the 
apprentices.69 The Sabbath School on board the North Carolina included 
a Bible class, which was also attended by adult members of the ship's 
66 Callan and Russell, "Regulations for the Enlistment of Boys who may 
be entered to serve in the Navy until they arrive at the age of twenty-one 
years," Laws of the United States, Relating to the Navy and Marine Corps, 
p.30l. 
67 Mennel, Thoms and Thistles, p. 18. 
68 Paulding, SNR 1839, p. 537. 
69 Finch to Goin, November 11, 1842, quoted in Goin, Remarks on the 
Home Squadron and Naval School, p. 16. 
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crew.70 Furthermore, every apprentice who was transferred from the 
North Carolina was provided with his own copy of the Bible.71 
That the function of their moral education was also social control is 
implicit in the values that were being taught to the apprentices. From The 
Sailor's Magazine: 
In [their] course of preparation, nothing is of minor 
importance. Minute cleanliness; untiring industry; the most undeviating 
fulfillment of orders (author's italics), undaunted courage, and a jealous 
regard for [their] own flag: these virtues - for with [them] they become 
such - adorn the character of the true seaman.72 
The purpose of the apprenticeship program was to create enlisted 
men for the Navy, and as such, the apprentices were taught to obey the 
commands of their officers. Subordination, above all else, was to be the 
focus of their education. The naval hierarchy of command provided the 
perfect basis for imposing restraints upon the apprentices, which would 
then extend to their civilian lives. In achieving this, the officers had 
recourse to the Bible, the tendency of which, "thus used in common 
schools, upon those who should afterwards follow the sea, would be to 
promote and secure, subordination, sobriety, and good morals, both in our 
merchant and naval service ... ,,73 
The social restraint intended by the program is also demonstrated 
by the limitation of opportunities presented to the apprentices for 
promotion to higher rank. According to the regulations governing the 
recruitment of apprentices they were not to be promoted beyond the ranks 
70 Anon., "Naval Apprentices," The Sailor's Magazine (Vol. 14, No.8, 
April 1842), p. 244. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 J. Haslett, C. Tunis, and W. Hudson, "Report of the U.S. Naval 
Lyceum," Naval Magazine (VoLl, No.4, July 1836), p. 392. 
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of the petty officers.74 Although clearly stipulated, it is apparent that many 
parents were unaware of this, and were angry to discover that their 
children had been entered into a program to create sailors, and not 
midshipmen.75 Nevertheless, a select few among the apprentices were in 
fact annually promoted to midshipmancy. 76 Such upward mobility must 
be regarded as particularly rare in the Navy. There seem to have been only 
ten examples of such promotions occurring between 1794 and 1815, and 
of these ten, only two might have come from truly humble origins.77 But 
however small their numbers were, the promoted apprentices were 
exceptionally important for the Navy. 
At first glance, apprenticeship seemed to make the Navy more 
acceptable to Jacksonian egalitarianism. Prior to this the Army, although 
plagued by many of the Navy's problems, could at least claim to be 
somewhat more representative of American institutions on the basis of its 
partial abolition of flogging. The opportunity for enlisted apprentices to 
become officers, however, had little equivalent in the Army. Between 
1815 and 1860, the Mexican-American War notwithstanding, only 19 out 
of 2,930 commissioned army officers had been promoted from the ranks.78 
74 Callan and Russell, "Regulations for the Enlistment and Employment of 
Boys who may be entered to serve in the Navy until they arrive at the age 
of twenty-one years ," Laws of the United States, Relating to the Navy and 
Marine Corps, p. 301. 
75 Langley, Social Reform in the United States Navy, pp. 106-107. 
76 Hazen, Five Years Before the Mast, p.287. Charles Rockwell 
mentioned that one of the boys on board his vessel had been so promoted, 
and that several others were studying intently with the hopes of becoming 
officers on board of merchant vessels. Rockwell, Sketches of Foreign 
Travel, p. 385. 
77 McKee, A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession, p. 102. 
78 Coffman, The Old Army, p. 202. During the Mexican-American War, 
69 officers were promoted from the ranks. 
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At no time in the past fourteen years had any effort been made to realise 
Secretary of War John H. Eaton's suggestion that lieutenancies be made 
available to noncommissioned officers.79 
Thus, naval education seemed to become more acceptable: 
"Unlike candidates for admission to that rank, aristocratic, and anti-
republican military seminary at West Point, the applicants to [the 
apprentice schools] are received without reference to rank in society, or 
the influence of politicians."so Another, unattributed newspaper article 
commented that the apprenticeship program would lead eventually to a 
more egalitarian corps of officers in the Navy: "It is proposed that the 
Government guarantee to them such an education as will render. .. [them] 
with the prospect of rising by their merit from this naval seminary ... to the 
highest command and rank in their profession.,,81 That some observers 
considered the Navy to be the more egalitarian of the two services is seen 
in these comparisons. 
Notwithstanding these claims, Democratic legislators expressed 
profound dissatisfaction with apprenticeship during the congressional 
debates over the 1842 navy appropriations bill. In fact, rarely did the 
legislators' rhetoric so clearly express the ideological divide between the 
parties as it did in this matter. Democrats saw apprenticeship as the means 
by which the Navy could best represent the nation's egalitarian values. 
They preferred that officers "should come through the hawse-hole rather 
79 Coffman, The Old Army, p. 203. Eaton was Secretary under Jackson. 
so Anon., "The Naval School," New York Herald, n.d., quoted in 
Goin, Remarks on the Home Squadron and Naval School, pp. 19-20. 
SI Un attributed newspaper article, quoted in Goin, Remarks on the Home 
Squadron and Naval School, p. 21. "The omission to preserve the 
name of the paper from which this article was taken, was unintentional." 
Goin, p. 22. 
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than the cabin window ... The best men in the service were those who had 
served before the mast, and who had risen from thence without anybody's 
recommendation.,,82 As it was operated, however, apprenticeship merely 
perpetuated class inequalities. The few apprentices that managed to earn 
midshipman's warrants only drew attention to the vast majority who were 
denied them. 
Furthermore, the schooling of midshipmen and apprentices "drew 
a distinction between poor and rich" in which midshipmen were instructed 
in foreign language, mathematics, and diplomacy, while apprentices learnt 
splicing ropes and obedience.83 Complementary to these allegations was 
the charge that the Navy's officers had created their own military 
aristocracy. Critics maintained that the de Jacto rule of the Navy 
Department was to give preferential consideration to midshipman's 
applications from the sons and relations of navy officers, and the 
"descendants of patriots who had rendered patriotic service to their 
country in military or civillife.,,84 
Such unmerited distinction and assistance evoked a classic 
Democratic definition of aristocracy: "any body of men raised above their 
fellows by the possession of privileges which others do not enjoy ... ,,85 In 
this context, the Navy was considered the bastion of influential families, 
who sought to control it for themselves: 
82 Brown, Charles (Dem. - P A), Congressional Globe, 27th Congress, 2nd 
Session, p. 499. 
83 Brown, Charles (Dem. - P A), Congressional Globe, 27th Congress, 2nd 
Session, p. 652. 
84 Brown, Charles (Dem. - PA), Congressional Globe, 27th Congress, 2nd 
Session, p. 520. 
85 The Globe, September 20, 1839, quoted in Ashworth, Agrarians and 
Aristocrats, pp. 128-129. 
All the institutions of an aristocratic government are made to 
contribute to the benefit of the privileged classes, more than to that of 
the people, and thus the navy, like the church, becomes the refuge of 
the portion less younger branches of noble families; and to adapt it to 
their social rank, the station of command is surrounded by a monopoly 
of privilege, luxury, and display, corresponding to that of the other 
privileged institutions of the nation ... 86 
84 
Especially galling were the claims that a midshipman's warrant 
was the means by which prominent citizens controlled their wayward 
sons. "While some scions of respectable families were made officers, as a 
choice between the navy and the penitentiary; it was too often a last resort 
for the worthless, while humble merit languished in obscurity.,,87 Thus, 
appointees with no personal credit were accorded the prerogatives of naval 
rank on account of their father's achievements, while the more deserving 
sons of common men were denied positions reserved for these scape-
graces. The quality of these midshipmen was actually an acute concern 
for the Navy, and Upshur criticised this practice in his second annual 
report.88 Moreover, it brought the preferential treatment of naval legacies 
into disrepute, which was unfortunate since this policy made some sense. 
In an age when officers had to begin their training in their early teens, 
naval families provided better-prepared applicants. If naval service were 
dynastic, these young boys would have come to the service more familiar 
86 Murphy, An Inquiry into the Necessity ... , p. 9. 
87 Brown, Charles (Dem. - PA), Congressional Globe, 27th Congress, 2nd 
Session, p. 68l. 
88 Upshur, SNR 1842, p. 545. "Hence it is of the utmost importance that 
none should be appointed [midshipmen], who are not duly qualified, and 
suited in all respects to that peculiar service. And yet, to this great and 
fundamental truth, no attention had hitherto been paid ... 1t is a notorious 
fact, that wayward and incorrigible boys, whom even parental authority 
cannot control, are often sent into the navy as a mere school of discipline, 
or to save them the reproach to which their conduct exposes them on 
shore." These remarks were made just a week before the return of the 
Somers from Africa. 
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with sail and the sea than someone whose father practiced a civilian 
occupation. 
Thus, particular names did appear repeatedly throughout the Navy 
Register. Bainbridges, Decaturs, BiddIes, Barrons, and Warringtons were 
all to be found on the navy list, although there were rarely more than two 
of each serving at any time. One such family, or combination of families, 
that represented this naval aristocracy was the Rodgers-Perry-Slidell clan. 
The Rodgers family had been led by the late Commodore John 
Rodgers who first entered the Navy as a lieutenant in 1798. Since then, 
several other Rodgers' had also served. One of his sons, Frederick, had 
been appointed a midshipman, but been drowned in a boating accident in 
1828.89 Two of Rodgers' surviving sons still served in the Navy. One, 
John Rodgers, Jr., was a lieutenant, and the other, Henry Rodgers, was a 
midshipman. The Commodore's youngest brother, George Washington 
Rodgers had also served throughout the War of 1812, and remained in the 
service until his death in 1832.90 George Washington Rodgers' sons had 
also entered the Navy. The elder son, Christopher Raymond Perry 
Rodgers was a passed midshipman, and the younger, George Washington 
Rodgers, had been warranted in 1839.91 What is more, their mother was 
Anna Maria Perry, one of Christopher Raymond Perry's eight children. 
The first naval Perry, Christopher Raymond Perry, had served on 
privateers during the Revolution, and commanded the U.S.S. General 
~ 
89 Paullin, Commodore John Rodgers, p. 382-384. Drowned with Rodgers 
was a midshipmen named Slidell, who mayor may not have been a 
relation of the Slidells discussed later in the text. 
90 E.H. Callahan, List of Officers of the Navy of the United States and of 
the Marine Corps from 1775 to 1900 (New York: Haskell House, 1969), 
p.469. 
91 Ibid. 
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Greene during the Quasi-War with France.92 Retired from naval service in 
1801, he later encouraged his sons to follow his example. In 1813, four 
Perrys held commissions or warrants.93 It was the eldest son, Oliver 
Hazard Perry, who belonged to the national pantheon of heroes, and 
whose service in the War of 1812 had given the family name its great 
prominence.94 
Perry's incorporation into Republican mythology was not 
surprising. Apart from being crucial to the American cause, his victory 
was the first of the war. The battle itself was steeped in symbolism. 
Perry's flagship took its name from James Lawrence, another naval hero, 
who had been killed whilst commanding the u.S.S. Chesapeake earlier 
that same year. Furthermore, the Lawrence had flown a flag on which was 
written Lawrence's final command, "Don't give up the ship." If Perry's 
transfer of his flag to the Niagara did not entirely honour that injunction, it 
demonstrated, at least, his determination not to surrender. Moreover, in 
his message to his own commander, "We have met the enemy and they are 
ours," Perry had given the Navy a watchword to rival Lawrence's 
92 Morison, Old Bruin, pp. 8-25. 
93 Morison, Old Bruin, p. 41. 
94 On September 10, 1813, whilst still a Master Commandant, he had led 
the victorious American flotilla at the Battle of Lake Erie. During the 
course of the battle, Perry's own flagship Lawrence was closely engaged 
on all sides by three British vessels, while Perry's second-in-command, 
Jesse D. Elliott, remained out of cannon shot on board the Niagara. By 
the time Elliott moved to engage, almost every officer on board the 
Lawrence had been wounded, including Perry. Unable to sustain the fight 
any longer, Perry transferred his command to the Niagara, which he 
reached following a hazardous crossing in an uncovered cutter. Under 
Perry's command, the Niagara split the British line and in conjunction 
with the remaining American schooners, delivered several devastating 
broadsides, and won the day. D. Haws, and A.A. Hurst, The Maritime 
History of the World, Vol. 1 (Brighton: Teredo Books, 1985), p. 471. 
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command. Finally, he was a fallen hero, having succumbed to yellow 
fever in 1819. The nation's enduring affection for Perry was manifest in 
the various histories of the War written between 1815 and 1842, in which 
his courage and qualities of character were almost always commented 
upon.95 
In 1842, three Perrys remained in the Navy. The senior was 
Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry, Oliver Hazard Perry's younger 
brother. Forty-eight years old, he commanded the Brooklyn Navy Yard. 
Next in rank was Oliver Hazard Perry's son, Lieutenant Oliver Hazard 
Perry, assigned to the Wilkes Exploring Expedition, then in its fourth year. 
Finally, Matthew Calbraith Perry's own son, Matthew Calbraith Perry, Jr., 
was a passed midshipman on board the U.S.S. Missouri, one of the two 
new steam-frigates launched in 1842. 
Commodore Perry was married to Jane Slidell, the sister of 
Lieutenant Commander Alexander Slidell MacKenzie (Figures 1 and 2).96 
MacKenzie's remaining sister, Julia, would later marry Christopher 
Raymond Perry Rodgers, completing the family connections. The Slidells 
had no naval tradition, however, as their father, John Slidell, was a New 
York merchant.97 MacKenzie's two brothers were to become prominent 
men in political life. One older brother, John (Figure 3), had moved from 
95 A. Bowen, The Naval Monument ... (Boston: George Clark, 1840), p. 
Vlll. 
96 Morison, Old Bruin, p. 50. Perry and Slidell were married December 
24, 1818. Alexander Slidell MacKenzie did not take the name 
"MacKenzie" until his late thirties when he did so on behalf of an uncle 
who was dying without heirs. 
97 W. Barnett, The Old Merchants of New York City (Second Series) 
(New York: Carleton, 1864), pp. 257-260. 
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New York to Louisiana following a due1. 98 He succeeded there as a 
maritime lawyer, and was elected to the House of Representatives as a 
Democrat in 1842. The remaining brother, Thomas, also moved south, 
and by 1847 was a Justice of the State Supreme Court of Louisiana.99 
Alexander Slidell MacKenzie was exceptionally close to the Perrys 
in his own right, however. As an eleven-year old, he had served as a 
midshipman under Oliver Hazard Perry, of whom he later wrote an 
adoring biography.loo Whilst waiting for sea duty, he had stayed with 
Perry's parents and younger siblings, who had done their best to "amuse 
[the] homesick child.,,101 
The Whigs, as opposed to the Democrats, were perfectly 
comfortable with such naval clans, which reinforced their ideas of natural 
hierarchies. Indeed, the same was true of apprenticeship, which they 
freely admitted was not to create officers, but sailors, "the bone and the 
sinew of war." 102 The provision that enabled a few apprentices to become 
midshipmen was intended to encourage the elite amongst them, since 
"intelligence and daring would rise, place it where you will.,,103 This 
declaration reflected the meritocratic perceptions of the Whigs, who 
argued that individual progress reflected innate talents, ability, and 
98 A.L. Diket, Senator Slidell and the Community he Represented in 
Washington 1853-1861 (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 
1982), p. 5. Slidell was later elected to the Senate, but his name is forever 
associated with Charles Wilkes, James Mason, and the Trent Affair. 
99 Barnett, The Old Merchants of New York City, p. 279. 
100 A.S. MacKenzie, Oliver Hazard Perry: His Life and Achievements 
(Akron, Ohio: J.K. Richard & Sons, 1910, originally published 1840), p. 
315. 
101 MacKenzie, Oliver Hazard Perry, p. 316. 
102 Wise, Henry (Whig - V A), Congressional Globe, 27th Congress, 2nd 
Session, p. 500. 
103 Ibid. 
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intelligence. I04 Besides which, in a moment of partisan triumph Henry 
Wise had reminded the Democrats that the apprenticeship programme they 
attacked with such fervor had been implemented during Jackson's 
administration. 105 
Notwithstanding this criticism, the Democratic arguments had a 
basis in fact. That midshipmancy and apprenticeship perpetuated class 
inequalities is demonstrated by the case of James Matthew Turner, a 
midshipman appointed from the ranks of the apprentices. An orphan 
sailor on board the North Carolina, Turner's "surpassing scholarship and 
behavior had secured him this mark of distinction from the general 
government."I06 Unfortunately, his change in fortune was accompanied by 
peculiar difficulties. 
His midshipman's warrant, which had at first awakened such 
pleasing anticipations in his fancy, was now in reality become a source 
of torment to him. It had given him an additional importance in the 
estimation of the officers, while at the same time it cut him off from the 
society of his former associates. Discipline had interposed a bar 
between him and the other boys of the ship's company, beyond which it 
became him not to pass. His only chance, then, for social converse, was 
among those of his own messmates of the steerage; and these ... were in 
open hostility against him. He was, therefore, a lone boy among a 
ship's crew of over two hundred souls. 107 
Turner encountered a violent class reaction from the other steerage 
officers that ultimately led to his dismissal from the service. Whilst the 
F aiifzeld was at Port Mahon, Minorca, he was sent ashore with a party of 
men to load provisions from the naval stores house. As they were waiting 
104 Ashworth, Agrarians and Aristocrats, p. 68. 
105 Wise, Henry (Whig - V A), Congressional Globe, 27th Congress, 2nd 
Session, p. 775. 
106 Hazen, Five Years Before the Mast, p. 287. 
107 Hazen, Five Years Before the Mast, pp. 287-289. Turner appeared in 
the Navy Register of 1842, which noted that he was from New Jersey, and 
a resident of New York who had entered the service on February 18, 1841, 
and was then stationed on board of the U.S.S. Faiifzeld. 
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to complete the assignment, another midshipman, John Murphy McLeod, 
prevailed upon Turner to allow two members of the boat crew an 
unauthorised liberty. When the two men drank themselves into a stupor, 
McLeod turned upon his companion. In fact, his testimony was crucial to 
the case against Turner, who was cashiered. lOS Without any connections to 
protect him, Turner was forced from the service. This perhaps isolated 
injustice still demonstrated that the ranks of the midshipmen continued to 
foster the social prejudices with which naval education was most closely 
associated. 
These midshipmen were the future leaders of the Navy. On the 
lowest rung of the promotion ladder, their warrants nevertheless made 
them officers and gentlemen. Turner's presence in the steerage was 
considered an affront to its collective dignity. When he was promoted to 
midshipmancy, he cheapened their position as gentleman. The 
midshipmen were already very jealous of their status, and these feelings 
were exaggerated by certain fundamental similarities between themselves 
and the apprentices. Although the former were taught to lead, and the 
latter were taught to be led, all were wards of the Navy, and their 
educational programmes shared much in common. Furthermore, and 
perhaps most importantly, they were more or less the same age. 
In order to command a naval vessel - to be an officer - it was 
necessary for any aspirant to begin his career while young. Navigation, 
108 Hazen, Five Years Before the Mast, p. 391. The court martial's report 
makes no mention of McLeod having persuaded Turner to grant the short 
liberty. There is good reason to believe Hazen's assertion that this was the 
case, however, since he was a member of the boat crew. McLeod, John 
Murphy. Signed affidavit, November 18, 1841, "Turner Court-Martial 
Proceedings," NA RG 273, Records of the Judge Advocate General of the 
Navy. 
91 
seamanship, and command required years to master. In 1841, a 
midshipman's career had to begin between the ages of fourteen and 
seventeen years of age. 109 This early start usually made formal education 
considerably more difficult and created an additional problem since the 
officers had to learn more than just their profession. They were to be 
trained as gentlemen, worthy of representing the United States. Any loss 
of schooling made it harder for an officer to comport himself as such when 
he had achieved command rank. 
[Naval officers] are taken from the poor who have not the 
means of a good education, as well as the rich who have. They enter 
from the nature of the duties at so early an age that they cannot be 
accomplished, or even moderately accurate scholars. They are 
constantly employed on shipboard or in our navy yards where much 
advancement in learning cannot be expected. Their pay will afford 
them a support, but no means of literary improvement. The 
consequence necessarily is, and such is well known to be the fact, that 
very many advance in age and rise in grade much less cultivated and 
informed than their own reputation and that of the country require. 11D 
Professional concerns came first, and the midshipmen's studies 
reflected their priorities. Apart from keeping regular journals, they were 
to study naval tactics, navigation, mathematics, and seamanship.111 The 
importance of study was re-affirmed in the 1842 Regulations, which 
further defined the responsibilities of the midshipmen. Among other 
109 Rules and Regulations for the Governance of the United States Navy 
(1842), p. 12, quoted in H. Bury, Education in the Old Navy (Unpublished 
Dissertation, Temple University, 1939), p. 46. 
110 Southard, January 1, 1825, American State Papers, Naval Affairs, 
Volume 4, p. 44, quoted in J.R. Soley, Historical Sketch of the United 
States Naval Academy (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1876), pp. 15-16. 
III Rules and Regulations for the Better Governance of the Navy of the 
Navy of the United States, quoted in Bury, Education in the Old Navy, p. 
81. 
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duties they were to "attend regularly to the means of instruction which 
may be provided for them." II2 
It was universally held that the best place to acquire an officer's 
skills was where they were exercised in the first place, the man-of-war.1I3 
This view.did not fail with the passing of time, as seen in Upshur's annual 
report: 
It is to be borne in mind, that, although we can build a good ship in 
a few weeks, it requires twenty years of arduous service, of active 
instruction, and of strict discipline, to qualify an officer to command 
her ... There is no school for the sea-officer but the ship itself... 114 
While the midshipmen were expected to learn their way by 
following the example of their superior officers, and by watching the more 
experienced seamen, they were also entrusted to the care of schoolmasters 
assigned to naval vessels with the specific task of conducting a school on 
board. The naval law of March 2, 1799 gave implicit recognition to these 
teachers by assigning them a share in prize money. I 15 For most of the 
nineteenth century, these teachers had been the Navy's chaplains, but by 
1835, they had been replaced. 116 Even so, they continued to provide 
additional instruction to the young officers: 
As the scientific knowledge necessary for promotion in the navy 
is much less than is commonly acquired in college, and as, in foreign 
countries, questions connected with the natural sciences and ancient 
history often arise on ship board, a well-educated chaplain, if not vain, 
forward, and obtrusive, may secure much respect for himself, his 
office, and his religious efforts, by rightly using his superior 
112 Bury, Education in the Old Navy, pp. 82-83. 
113 McKee, A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession, p. 155. 
114 Upshur, SNR 1841, p. 385. 
115 Bury, Education in the Old Navy, p. 113. 
116 C.M. Drury, The History of the Chaplain Corps, United States Navy, 
Volume I: 1778-1939 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Naval Personnel, 
1984), p. 49. 
attainments. He may also do much in wisely guiding the reading and 
personal researches of the younger officers ... 117 
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Although the chaplains had been replaced by formal school-
teachers in order to increase the professionalism of naval education, the 
system remained a rather haphazard affair. It was the prerogative of the 
captain to select a school-teacher, who could be a needy relative or family 
acquaintance. This is not altogether surprising. Naval education on board 
a vessel was largely determined by the feelings of the captain on the 
subject, and the comprehensiveness of any such program was subject to 
their discretion. 
At the same time, the Navy Department's policy after the War of 
1812 mandated the presence of teachers on board most vessels. By 1831, 
all ships larger than a sloop-of-war were required to sail with a school-
master on board, assuming that one could be found. 118 Even so, it was not 
until four years later that the school-teachers were considered significant 
enough for inclusion in the annual Naval Register, and then only as 
"teachers," and not with the more formal title of Professor of Mathematics 
or Language. 119 
117 Rockwell, Sketches of Foreign Travel, p. 428. 
118 1832 Naval Regulations, p. 58, quoted in Bury, Education in the Old 
Navy, p. 118. 
119 Bury, Education in the Old Navy, p. 116. Analysis of the registers is 
difficult, however, as they do not appear to be entirely accurate. They do 
provide the names of many of the teachers, but it is clear that there were 
many more in the temporary employment of the Navy whose names are 
not recorded. This exclusion is probably the consequence of the ad hoc 
nature of their employment. When a teacher was needed, one would be 
hired for the duration of the cruise, and at its conclusion, be paid off and 
released. Only those teachers who were continuously employed by the 
Navy would have received mention in the Register, and it is notable that 
many of these were actually not on active service. Bury, Education in the 
Old Navy, p. 116-122. 
94 
In practice, a teacher's responsibilities varied from ship to ship, 
but the 1841 Regulations described them as follows: 
379. He is to give attendance regularly, at such times as shall be directed by 
his commanding officer, and to instruct the midshipmen and others, who may 
be directed to attend; and report weekly to the commanding officer the 
attendance which they may give, and the proficiency they may make. 
380. He shall also make and present to his commanding officer, similar 
reports, made up to the last day of March, June, September, and December, for 
transmission to the Secretary of the Navy. 120 
At sea, the school-teachers conducted classes in algebra, 
geometry, trigonometry, and when they were able, history and 
languages. 121 Education on board, however, met with only mixed results, 
and attracted a number of criticisms. The most serious was that the ship, 
so indispensable in training an officer, was no place to offer him 
schooling. In the first place, the ship was rife with distractions, and the 
duties of the midshipman often conflicted with their obligation to study.122 
What is more, the midshipmen themselves were often loathe to spend their 
time in a classroom, considering it unmanly. 123 Indeed, these lessons were 
occasionally the cause of tension between the midshipmen and apprentices 
since the former objected to being taught in the company of their 
subordinates. 124 
By 1842, it was clear that the on board educational programme, 
which had provided an effective basis for the apprentice schools, was 
failing the midshipmen for whom it was originally intended. Part of this 
120 1841 Naval Regulations, pp. 132-133, quoted in Bury, Education in 
the Old Navy, p. 55. 
121 Bury, Education in the Old Navy, p. 131. 
122 Bury, Education in the Old Navy, p. 135. 
123 Jones, Sketches of Naval Life, Vol. I, pp. 93-94, quoted in Bury, 
Education in the Old Navy, p. 136. 
124 Anon., "School Room On Board Ship," The Army and Navy Chronicle 
(Vol. 11, No. 20, 1840), p. 308. 
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failure lay in the poor quality of the teachers. While they were more than 
good enough for the wants of the apprentices, who were often taught by a 
literate seaman, the teachers seemed inadequate for the task of preparing 
leaders. In truth, the teacher's position was not enviable. Only "an 
inferior class of men could be obtained for the service," because in 1842 
their wages remained pitifully small, just $480 per annum, making them 
the worst paid officers in the Navy.125 The difficulty created by low wages 
is described in the Secretary of the Navy's Annual Report of 1841: 
It is to be presumed that men, whose talents and attainments 
qualify them to be teachers in the navy, are equally justified to be 
teachers on land; and, as the latter is the less precarious position, the 
best qualified will be the most apt to seek it. 126 
Furthermore, the school-masters were handicapped by their ill-
defined, but decidedly low position in the Navy's hierarchy of staff 
officers. 127 Indeed, they were forced to mess and quarter with their 
students, the midshipmen, and this created serious disciplinary 
problems.I28 This situation was not remedied until August 31, 1842, when 
Congress passed a law declaring "that professors of mathematics in the 
navy of the United States shall be entitled to live and mess with the 
lieutenants of sea-going and receiving vessels, and shall receive such 
rations as lieutenants of the same ship or station shall receive.,,129 
Even before this, the professors of mathematics remained the 
mainstays of naval education. Nor were their efforts confined to 
classrooms at sea, as midshipmen were to continue their studies when they 
125 1842 Navy Register, p. ii. 
126 Upshur, SNR 1841, p. 386. 
127 Soley, Historical Sketch of the United States Naval Academy, pp. lO-
11. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Callan, Laws of the United States, p. 322. 
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were not on active service aboard a vessel. The midshipmen's educational 
responsibilities took on additional weight when on shore. Here, they had 
none of the distractions of active service, and probably studied with 
greater fervour since their classes were likely to be in final preparation for 
the Naval Examining Board. 
The examining boards had been established in 1802, and consisted 
of at least two officers of captain's rank, whose purpose was to test the 
readiness and aptitude of the midshipmen for higher rank. 130 Only those 
midshipmen over the age of twenty who had served for five years, three of 
which had to have been at sea, were eligible for examination. 131 The most 
important subject was obviously seamanship, although the examinations 
included sections on naval gunnery and navigation. 132 Interestingly, it 
seems that there were no questions on the subject of command and 
leadership. 
At any rate, the formality of the examination was belied by the 
dearth of official support for shore-based education. These schools did not 
reflect a concerted naval policy so much as the individual initiative of 
educationally-minded officers in the Navy. As such, they sprang up 
without much regard for one another, and it was not until the late 1830s 
that they began to resemble a concerted or cohesive educational system. 
The first effort to provide formal instruction ashore occurred in 
1803 when Chaplain Robert Thomas established a school of navigation 
130 Bury, Education in the Old Navy, p. 180. The examinations were 
individual and oral, and included only occasional blackboard work, with 
questions being put to the midshipmen by every officer of the board. 
131 1832 Naval Regulations, p. 42. 
132 P. Benjamin, The United States Naval Academy (New York: G.P. 
Putnam's Sons, 1900), p. 115. 
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and mathematics at the Washington Navy Yard.133 There is no other 
mention of the Washington school after its foundation, and it appears to 
have been short-lived. 
It was not until 1814 that another rose in its place. This was the 
school founded by Captain Isaac Chauncy at Sackett's Harbor, New York 
in 1814. 134 Other schools followed; at Boston in 1815,135 Norfolk in 
1821,136 New York City in 1825,137 a second school at Boston to replace its 
predecessor in 1833,138 and finally a school attached to the Naval Asylum 
at Philadelphia in 1839.139 Finally, a short-lived school was established at 
Fortress Monroe, New Y ork.l40 
Even as schools afloat were subjected to criticism, so too were the 
naval schools on shore. While naval officers generally felt that the schools 
were acceptable, they also vigorously maintained the supremacy of 
education afloat. "The best school for the instruction of youth in the 
[naval] profession is the deck of a ship ... The pride of command, the 
sensitiveness of rank, and the high bearing so essential to a gallant officer 
must necessarily become impaired by employment on shore ... ,,141 
133 J. Crane, and J.F. Kieley, The United States Naval Academy: 
The First Hundred Years (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
1945), p. 6. 
134 McKee, A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession, p. 207. 
135 Bury, Education in the Old Navy, p. 15I. 
136 Park, The United States Naval Academy, p. 108. 
137 Bury, Education in the Old Navy, p. 153. 
138 Bury, Education in the Old Navy, p. 152. 
139 Bury, Education in the Old Navy, p. 156. 
140 Soley, Historical Sketch of the United States Naval Academy, p. 34. 
141 Unattributed Officer, NA RG 45, "Captain's Letters," quoted in 
W.D. Puleston, Annapolis: Gangway to the Quarterdeck (New York: D. 
Appleton-Century Company, 1942), pp. 32-33. 
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The existing schools had no set curriculum and varied according to 
the whims of their founders and appointed instructors. A letter written by 
Commodore John Rodgers about the second Boston Naval School is worth 
quoting in full to show the course of studies, and the value placed on them 
by the Navy's officers . 
... When any unusual or important work is to be performed, all the 
Midshipmen should be required to attend, such as docking or 
undocking vessels, preparing others for heaving down and righting 
them; hauling up or launching them, getting masts out or in &c., &c., 
and some person should be directed to explain to them the object and 
reason for the respective operations, and subsequently to examine them, 
to ascertain the degree of attention, they may have paid to them. When 
the Midshipmen shall not be thus employed, they should be required to 
attend regularly for a certain number of hour each day, Sundays 
excepted, to study. 
Upon the presumption that every Midshipman will be prepared to 
enter upon the study of the subjects in Bowditch's Navigation, it is 
recommended that they should first make themselves thoroughly 
acquainted with them, as comprising a minimum mathematical course, 
with which every officer should be familiar. With these studies should 
be combined daily observations of the sun, by the moon and polar star; 
the longitude by lunar distances and chronometer, variations of the 
compass, and the effect of local attention upon it, and the best means of 
connecting it. 
Whenever a proper knowledge shall have been obtained upon the 
foregoing and indispensable subjects, they might then divide the hours 
of study between the French and Spanish languages, other and higher 
mathematical studies, Natural philosophy and mechanics, giving a 
preference to those branches connected with their profession, Gunnery, 
Naval Tactics, and descriptions of Naval battles, the construction and 
management of steam engines and vessels, Maritime and Naval Law, 
History and general reading. 
During the hours when they are not engaged in study or upon 
social duty, they should be thoroughly, minutely and practically 
instructed in the exercise of the cannon and cannonades, and of lower 
gun deck ports, the proper mode of wading and pointing the guns for 
objects at different distances, and under various circumstances of 
mounting and dismantling them, and of shifting carriages when 
disabled in action, of housing or otherwise securing them in bad 
weather. They should also be well acquainted with the exercise of the 
musquet [sic], pistol and cutless [sic]. 
They should be encouraged, and if necessary required to visit 
vessels building or under repairs, to ascertain the names and use of the 
different parts of the hull, the manner in which they are combined and 
inform themselves of the mode of making masts, spars, sails, cordage 
and other objects belonging to or used in Vessels, and of the manner in 
which they are filled for service, for such information is always useful 
and frequently necessary .142 
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Notwithstanding the attacks made against a naval academy, it is 
clear that by 1842, a number of similar institutions were in operation, 
though because of professional uninterest and egalitarian criticisms of 
martial education, these were ill-funded, unorganised, and under-utilised. 
Until the Naval Academy was realised, the service had to rely on what 
programmes it could afford, and the willingness of its own officers to 
support them. 
One such independent program, more successful than most, was 
the Naval Lyceum. 143 Founded by Matthew Calbraith Perry at the 
Brooklyn Navy Yard in 1833, the Naval Lyceum was an offshoot of the 
civilian lyceum movement initiated by Josiah Holbrook of Massachusetts 
eight years earlier. 144 Essentially, it was a professional society for naval 
officers intended "to promote the diffusion of useful knowledge, to foster 
a spirit of harmony and a community of interest in the service; and to 
cement the lines which unite us as professional brethren.,,145 
The Naval Lyceum encouraged the recruitment of members from 
within and without the service, with particular emphasis on those resident 
in the vicinity of New York City.l46 Furthermore, a library and a museum 
were established which contained the donations of members, and for two 
142 G. Preble, History ojthe Boston Navy Yard in Charlestown, 
Mass.,jrom 1797 to 1875, Manuscript in the Navy Department, quoted 
in Bury, Education in the Old Navy, pp. 151-152. 
143 S. De Christofaro, "The Naval Lyceum," United States Naval Institute 
Proceedings (Vol. 77, No.8, July 1951), p. 869. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Anon., "Naval Lyceum Constitution," Naval Magazine, (VoL 1, No.1, 
January 1836), p. i. 
146 Ibid. 
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years, from 1836, the Naval Lyceum published its own periodical, The 
Naval Magazine. 147 
Although the founders of the Naval Lyceum hoped that its 
holdings would be of benefit to all men of science, they were particularly 
interested in the aid which it could render to junior officers: 
We would impress upon the younger officers of the Navy, 
especially, the advantages they may derive from a diligent cultivation 
of the means of advancement in professional and general information, 
presented by the Naval Lyceum. They can render important aid in the 
promotion of its plans, and by an active interest in its progress, will 
insensibly confirm in themselves a taste for pursuits and studies of the 
most satisfactory and profitable character; and which will not only give 
them protection from the seductions of pleasure, and from dissipation, 
too often the profligate companion of the indolent and the 
uninformed. 148 
In furtherance of this policy, they granted all midshipmen who had not yet 
passed their examination board special access to the "rooms, Cabinet, and 
Library" of the Naval Lyceum. 149 
Perry's involvement with the Lyceum reflected his wider interest 
in reform. He was, with his brother-in-law, Alexander Slidell MacKenzie, 
part of an informal group of reformers within the Navy. The movement 
was spear-headed by Lieutenant Matthew F. Maury who wrote a series of 
widely-publicised articles on the Navy's deficiencies in the Southern 
Literary Messenger, which subsequently became a "recognized [sic], but 
unofficial organ for naval officers and personnel.,,150 Other officers, such 
147 De Christofaro, "The Naval Lyceum," p. 870. 
148 Anon., "The Naval Lyceum," Naval Magazine ( ! _ I'" 
1836), p. 15. 
149 Ibid. 
150 F.L. Mott, A History of American Magazines, 1741-1850 (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1939), p. 643. The relationship between 
the Navy's reformers and this periodical might have aroused the suspicions 
of Northern legislators. The Southern Literary Review was associated 
with slavery and sectionalism, and had been the vehicle for an article on 
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as Robert F. Stockton, and Uriah P. Levy were also associated with 
reform. 151 
The success of the Lyceum had established Perry's credentials as 
an educational reformer. His brother-in-law MacKenzie was also 
identified with the institution, being one of the seven officers comprising 
its advisory board. 152 Perhaps buoyed by their recent success, on April 
30, 1842, MacKenzie proposed to Navy Secretary Upshur a unique 
educational programme for the apprentices: a free-sailing school ship 
whose crew learned their trade as they went. This would be naval 
education in its purest sense. 
I respectfully submit that one of the new brigs, the Somers, for 
instance, now fitting at New York or the one which has succeeded her 
on the stocks should be selected for the purpose [of a school-ship] and 
manned with... 100 apprentices. The brig thus equipped might be 
employed in running along our whole coast, visiting our rivers and 
minor ports, and if in higher order so as to be attractive to visitors at 
points where our Navy is now comparatively unknown ... 153 
The idea of a school-ship was not new, but had hitherto received 
little attention from the Navy. The first official school-ship appears to 
states' rights by Upshur which was the cause of a dispute between him and 
representative John Minor Botts of Virginia (Whig -VA). 
151 Stockton and Levy were each experienced officers known for their 
dedication to reforming the Navy's disciplinary practices. Levy, it should 
be noted, also had to combat anti-Semitism in his efforts, and fought 
several duels in defence of his name. Neither officer has been the subject 
of an adequate bibliography, but for an idea of their ideas on reform, see 
S. Bayard, A Sketch of the Life of Com. Robert Stockton; with an 
Appendix, Comprising His Correspondence with the Navy Department 
Respecting His Conquest of California; and Extracts from the Defence of 
Co. J.e. Fremont, in Relation to the Same Subject; Together with his 
Speeches in the Senate of the United States, and His Political Letters 
(New York: Derby and Jackson, 1856); U.P. Levy, Manual of Rules for 
Men-of-War (New York: Appleton & Companies, 1850). 
152 Anon., "Additional Bylaws," The Naval Magazine, (Vol. 1, No.!, 
January 1836), p. 39. 
153 MacKenzie to Upshur, April 30, 1842, NA RG 45. 
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have been the U.S.S. Prometheus, which was manned principally by 
midshipmen during a summer cruise along the Atlantic coast of the United 
States in 1817. 154 Between the cruise of the Prometheus and the 
development of the apprentice program the only school-ships to appear 
were the Guerriere, which was the site of the naval school at Norfolk,155 
and on board the Alert, at Portsmouth, Virginia, some five years later in 
1826. 156 Excepting the Prometheus, however, these schools were really 
classrooms maintained on board a working naval vessel, and as such 
constitute school-ships only in a loose sense. Closer to MacKenzie's 
vision was a programme described in the Sailor's Magazine: 
The vessel on which they were aboard, would, of course, 
occasionally make a short cruise along the coast, with the view of 
practicing the boys in seamanship, and giving them a practical 
knowledge of their business. The school and ship should be placed 
under the charge of some judicious officer of the navy who would take 
pride in training these juvenile sailors, and in making them worthy 
defenders of their country ... 157 
MacKenzie's proposal accomplished two things. In the first place, 
it expanded the apprentices' educational opportunities. Such a course of 
action could only increase the programme's popularity with the general 
public. At the same time, it addressed a critical failure of apprenticeship 
as it then stood. Excepting the Hudson, all of the apprentice-schools were 
held on board regularly ordered naval vessels. Thus, the apprentices were 
in daily contact with the crew, and exposed to their worst habits, as Jacob 
Hazen wrote: 
154 Benjamin, The United States Naval Academy, p. 39. 
155 Bury, Education in the Old Navy, p. 161. 
156 Langley, Social Refonn in the United States Navy, p. 101. It is worth 
noting that the school on board the Alert was established for the use of 
apprentice seamen. 
157 Anon., "Naval Apprentices," The Sailor's Magazine (Vol. 14, No.7, 
March 1842), p. 228. 
I have already hinted that the Columbus was a school-ship. That is, 
if a den where some two hundred boys are collected together, exposed 
to every kind of sinful vice - where swearing, gambling, cheating, 
lying, and stealing, are the continual order of the day; where 
drunkenness, obscenity, and self-pollution, stalk unrestrained; and 
where crimes abound of even so deep and black a dye that it fires the 
cheek with shame to name them, and which yet escape the just 
punishment their heinousness deserves, [sic] if, I say, such a place 
constitutes a school-ship, then was the Columbus, like the North 
Carolina, emphatically a school-ship. 158 
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Far from improving the morality and character of the boys, apprenticeship 
threatened to increase their incorrigibility! In light of these unwholesome 
developments, it was believed that the only way to salvage the programme 
was to sequester the apprentices from the older sailors, just as it was 
thought necessary to separate juvenile delinquents from adult offenders in 
state prisons, characterised by John Pintard as "the present place of 
promiscuous intercourse where little Devils are instructed to become great 
ones and at the expiration of their terms turn out accomplished 
Villains." 159 The same was held true of the apprentices. Succinctly put, 
the need to sequester them from the sailors was not merely on account of 
the boys' endangered innocence. Rather, the reformers were concerned 
that the apprentices were themselves already pre-disposed towards vice in 
consequence of their own delinquency, and that it was necessary to 
maintain complete control of their upbringing in order to save them from 
their own natures: 
... for surely, a boy must be a dull scholar, who, in such a place, 
would not learn far more evil than good. These boys were from ten to 
sixteen or seventeen years of age, and some of them having been 
familiar, from the earliest years, with vice and crime, in almost every 
form, were among the most hardened, hopeless, vagabonds in the 
world ... 161l 
158 Hazen, Five Years Before the Mast, p. 227. 
159 "Letters of John Pintard" II, p. 338, quoted in Mennel, Thorns and 
Thistles, p. 8. 
160 Rockwell, Sketches of Foreign Travel, p. 384. 
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Concerns for the future of apprenticeship were certainly on 
Upshur's mind when he received MacKenzie's proposal. He had already 
expressed doubts over the number of enlisted apprentices, and suggested 
that the programme be extended inland. 161 If enlistments were faltering, 
than it was crucial to resolve the problems of interaction between the 
Navy's enlisted men and boys. After all, what parents would willingly 
expose their child to an education in vice? "It may be doubted whether 
parents and guardians could be induced to place their children and wards 
in such a situation, and whether a sufficient number of boys could be 
obtained to warrant the expense of keeping up the [naval] school.,,)62 
Furthermore, MacKenzie seemed an excellent choice for command 
of a school ship. He had an established reputation as one of the nation's 
foremost naval historians and travel writers, and what better candidate 
could there be to inculcate a crew of boys with the values of naval 
service?163 Moreover, MacKenzie's transfer would free a valuable 
assignment, since he had just been made the first lieutenant on board the 
u.s.s. Missouri. Upshur quickly approved MacKenzie's plan. On May 7, 
1842, just eight days after MacKenzie wrote his proposal, the Navy 
Secretary wrote back to the Commander: 
Sir, your letter of the 30th instant has been received. - Your 
suggestion that one of the new brigs now fitting, be manned with 
apprentices, and employed as a school ship and a cruizer [sic], falls in 
with a design long since entertained and expressed, and which the 
Department intended to execute, as soon as a vessel could be had. - The 
161 Upshur, SNR 1842, p. 412. 
162 Anon., "School Ships, Philadelphia Herald, n.d., quoted in The 
Sailor's Magazine (Vol. 10, No.5, January 1838), p. 153. 
163 MacKenzie's books included: A Year in Spain (1831), Popular Essays 
on Naval Subjects (1833), The American in England (1835), Spain 
Revisited (1836), Oliver Hazard Perry (1840), and John Paul Jones. 
(1841). 
necessary orders will be immediately given to prepare the Somers for 
this purpose, and you will be ordered to the command of her. 1M 
Within the week, MacKenzie began preparing his new command for sea. 
164 Upshur to MacKenzie, May 7, 1842, NA RG 45. 
105 
106 
Chapter Three 
The Brig-of-War Somers: The Vessel and Her Crew 
The Somers was one of two new brigs, never before sailed. The 
new class took its name from the Bainbridge, built at the Boston Navy 
Yard. l The Somers, her sistership, came off the blocks at the Yard in 
Brooklyn, New York, also in 1842.2 She was named for Richard Somers, 
who had sacrificed his own life while preventing Barbary corsairs from 
seizing possession of his command. The brigs were among the last solely 
wind driven American warships,3 and their construction reflected 
refinement rather than innovation. 
The brig's physical characteristics were fundamental to her 
operation, and to the establishment of the daily routine of duty on board. 
The Somers was, in the best of circumstances, a difficult vessel to sail. 
MacKenzie's crew was largely inexperienced, and the commander had to 
assume a regimen on board that would enable them to handle the brig. The 
means by which he did so complicated his command, and ultimately 
affected the social dynamics on board. Furthermore, the characteristics of 
the brig would have a direct impact on the officers' perception of the 
mutiny threat, and their reactions to specific events during the week of 
crisis. 
The Somers was not large: her spar deck ran 103 feet, and was just 
25 feet at the beam. Unburdened, the brig displaced 266 tons. By all 
1 H. Chapelle, The American Sailing Navy: The Ships and Their 
Development (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1949), p. 430. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Morison, Old Bruin, p. 144. 
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accounts she had a fine hul1.4 Her designer, Samuel Humphreys, 
modelled her on his brigantines of 1834, Dolphin and Porpoise. s Her lines 
resembled the Baltimore clippers, with a wineglass cross-section, and 
sharp ends, both signs that she was built for speed.6 She had no gundeck 
as such, her upper bulwarks being pierced with fourteen gunports, though 
there were only ten pieces of ordnance on board. These were 32-pounder 
carronades, capable of throwing their shot around 150 yards.7 Not actually 
cannon, these were still large weapons, each gun and carriage extending 
five feet from its station onto the spardeck. The shot for the guns was 
stowed in lockers situated about the masts.8 
The bulwarks, apart from offering protection to the crew, provided 
storage for hammocks and small arms. It was standard practice in the 
United States Navy that on top of the bulwarks would be placed square 
casings, known as "hammock nettings," which held the seamen's and 
midshipmen's hammocks.9 Such a system provided additional 
rudimentary protection in battle, and was an effective space-saving 
4 [Testimony of] Joshua Sands, Somers Mutiny Court oj Inquiry (hereafter 
COl), p. 44; Morison, Old Bruin, p. 181. All citations from the court of 
inquiry and court-martial include the full name of the witness if their 
testimony has not been cited before. Thereafter, however, only the last 
name is recorded unless it is shared with another member of the crew, in 
which case the full name is always used. 
5 Chapelle, History oj the American Sailing Navy, p. 430. 
6 Morison, Old Bruin, p. 145. For reference to her speed, Sands, COl, p. 
44; [Testimony of] Guert Gansevoort, Court-Martial Proceedings oj 
Alexander Slidell MacKenzie (hereafter CMP), p. 56. 
7 Chapelle, Old Bruin, p. 433; Melville, White Jacket, p. 67. 
8 Sands, COl, p. 43. 
9 C. Nordhoff, Man-oj-War Life: A Boy's Experience in the United States 
Navy (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1895), p. 46. Charles 
Nordhoff was a prominent nineteenth century journalist who enlisted in 
the Navy as an apprentice during Upshur's expansion. His account of 
naval life, written some time afterwards, is considered a classic of its kind. 
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measure. Battle-axes for use in boarding actions were kept in racks 
running along the sides of the quarter-deck, apparently between the aft 
arms chests and the rearmost guns. IO 
Additional small arms were kept in two arms chests port and 
starboard just forward of the vessel's roundhouse. The starboard chest 
contained cutlasses, and the port chest, muskets, pistols, and cartridges. 11 
Between the two arms chests was the ship's wheel. 
Forward of the wheel was the trunk-house, beneath which were the 
officers' quarters, accessed by two hatches. One led to the captain's cabin 
and opened to the aft, directly before the wheel. The second faced 
forward and led through the steerage with its ladder terminating at the 
entrance to the wardroom. Skylights above the wardroom and captain's 
cabin provided additional light and ventilation. The trunk-house itself was 
eight feet in length, tapering from eight feet in width over the steerage 
hatch to four feet in width nearer to the stem. 12 Between the steerage 
hatch and the mainmast were the pumps. 
Amidships, at least one of the two cutters and launch were stacked 
atop one another on the boat-skids. Just beneath the launch's stem, a 
scuttle was bored in the deck to provide light and ventilation for the after-
part of the berth deck. The launch was large relative to the size of the 
Somers: 24 feet in length, 3 feet in depth, and 6 feet and 10 inches in 
10 Gansevoort, CMP, p. 57; Matthew C. Perry, Jf., CMP, p. 64; Michael 
Garty, CMP, p. 124. 
II Garty, CMP, pp. 120 & 124. This testimony gives the number of pistols 
as 23, and muskets as 28. 
12 Joseph Sears, COl, p. 43. 
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beam. 13 The cutters were slightly smaller at 22 feet in length, 2 feet and 
six inches in depth, and 6 feet in beam. 14 
As usual, the first cutter was placed within the launch (the inboard 
profile of the Somers depicts the cutter stowed this way. See Figure 4). It 
is most likely that the second cutter was placed within the other cutter and 
launch while the Somers was out at sea. IS In harbour or near land, it would 
probably have been hung from two boat-hooks on the star board aft. The 
1843 Currier & Ives print, "The U.S. Brig-Of-War Somers," depicts them 
there (Figure 5). 
The top deck itself was crowded and constricted along the booms, 
where the spare spars were stowed. 16 Sails and other stores were also 
placed here.17 Just forward of the booms, a spare anchor was stowed by 
the mainmast. ls All of these cluttered the area. What is more, the passage 
here was only one foot across on either side: 
When the launch and the booms are in there will be about 6 
feet between them and the sides of the vessel on each side. The guns 
and gun carriages will occupy about 5 feet of that space.19 
This divided the Somers' spar deck amidships. Visibility and 
contact from bow to aft would have been reduced, and movement 
inhibited: "I don't know that [men in the forescuttle] can be observed 
from the quarter-deck very well, on account of the booms.,,20 This 
13 Chapelle, History of the United States Sailing Navy, p. 507. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Henry King, CMP, p. 140. 
16 B.J. Totten, The Naval Text-Book. Letters to the Midshipmen of the 
United States Navy on Masting, Rigging, and Managing Vessels of War 
(Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1841), p. 297. 
17 Sands, COl, p. 45. 
18 King, CMP, p. 141. 
19 Sands, COl, p. 44. 
20 Edward English, CMP, p. 85. 
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obstruction can be seen in the diagram of the spar deck found in the 
published account of the Court of Inquiry (Figure 6). 
Primary access to the berth deck below was from the main-hatch 
located just forward of the launch and cutters. There were two scuttles 
immediately in front of this hatch, one on either side of the foremast. The 
one nearest the hatch was designated for the use of the galley stove, which 
lay directly beneath it. The second scuttle provided secondary access to 
the berth deck, and was equipped with a ladder.21 The forecastle beyond 
held the step of the bowsprit, and access to the ship's head. It also 
contained a hencoop, and probably, any other livestock kept on board.22 
The berth deck was approximately seventy-five feet in length 
including, from bow to stem: the storerooms, galley, crewmen's quarters, 
and officers' quarters. A bulkhead separating it from the rest of the deck 
defined the first store. The second was open to the deck, but the large 
galley stove provided some degree of separation from the main living 
space. This was the probable location of the additional anchor and stores 
that could not be stowed within the hold.23 Space here was further limited 
by the foremast, which passed through the deck at this point. 
The greater portion of the deck where the crew bunked and 
messed followed the galley. The enlisted men and petty officers kept their 
chests and seaman's bags here, and swung their hammocks along both 
sides of the deck. It was not spacious with only 4 feet and 10 inches of 
headroom beneath the beams.24 The berth deck's floor consisted of 
21 William Neville, CMP, p. 82 
22 Neville, CMP, p. 79; William Conger, CMP, p. 127. 
23 MacKenzie, COl, p. 43. 
24 Sands, CMP, p. 150. 
111 
moveable hatches designed to facilitate access to the hold.25 Several 
stanchions were situated at points along the length of the deck in support 
of the spar deck. Two permanent scuttles led below to the hold; one 
immediately aft of the galley, the other, just forward of where the main 
mast passed through the deck. The berth-deck ran around 50 feet before 
ending in the bulkhead which separated the officers from their men. 
The bulkheads themselves were around an inch and a quarter in 
depth, and while not fragile, were hardly substantia1.26 Those surrounding 
the steerage were made of common white pine, and had been grooved and 
tongued so they could be dismantled when required. A door on the 
starboard side forward bulkhead led to the berth deck beyond. 
The steerage itself was cramped, just nine feet long, and never 
more than fourteen feet in width. Additionally, the ship's pumps took up 
around three feet of space, and the dining table and deck-ladder further 
reduced the available room. Hammocks swung across the steerage further 
constricted the available space. Lockers took up the forward bulkhead, 
while the starboard and port sides of the steerage were given over to the 
sail-room and the bread-room. The deck ladder, which broached the spar 
deck from the steerage hatch, crossed the entirety of the steerage, and 
landed at the entrance to the wardroom from the junior officers' quarters. 
This ladder was five feet in length from top to bottom. 
The bulkheads around the wardroom were also made of white pine, 
but were less secure than those of the steerage. In the floor of the 
wardroom floor was a scuttle that provided the only immediate access to 
the ship's magazine. Along the bulkhead closest to the stem was the 
25 Ibid. 
26 Sands, COl, p. 44. The next two paragraphs follow Sands' testimony. 
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wardroom mess 10cker?7 There were bunks and beds on either side of the 
cabin for the use of the senior line and staff officers on board, whereas 
their more junior associates had to swing hammocks. Sternmost was the 
captain's cabin, which was tapered towards the stern where his personal 
hatch and pantry were 10cated.28 
Beneath the berth deck was the ship's hold, which was eleven feet 
in depth.29 Its capacity was 137 and 1/35 tons, but the brig usually carried 
only 120 tons of ballast and stores.30 When the Somers set sail, "[it] was 
filled to its utmost capacity by ballast, water tanks, ammunition, stores, 
and other necessaries of a vessel in actual service.,,31 
The remaining structures of note were the vessel's 'top hamper,' 
the rigging, masts, and sails.32 The Somers was a brig, with two masts, 
and a square-rig.33 MacKenzie had overseen her rigging, which was his 
responsibility as her commander, but his rigging was somewhat 
unorthodox, his own first lieutenant remarking that the shrouds were 
"fitted differently than any I have ever known.,,34 The Somers' masts were 
steeply raked, something seen in all depictions of the ship, and according 
to some of her crew, "rather too much for their fancy ... ,,35 The sharp rake 
increased the masts' resistance to the forward pressure exerted by the wind 
caught in the sails. Thus, a more sharply raked mast drove the ship to 
27 Morison, Old Bruin, p. 152. 
28 Morison, Old Bruin, p. 15l. 
29 Sands, COl, p. 44. 
30 MacKenzie, COl, p. 43. 
31 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 232. 
32 Nordhoff, Man-oj-War Life, p. 49. 
33 K. Weibust, Deep Sea Sailors: A Study in Maritime Ethnology 
(Stockholm: Nordiska Museet, 1969), p. 14. 
34 Gansevoort, COl, p. 20. 
35 Peter Tyson, CMP, p. 113. 
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higher speeds. Such masts were a feature of slaving vessels, and the 
Somers' were so sharply raked they resembled those of a slaver or pirate.36 
The resemblance is worth noting, since like the Somers, slaver-brigs were 
based on the Baltimore clipper-ships.37 
Each of the masts was constructed of four separate pieces of 
timber: the lower-mast, top-mast, top-gallant-mast, royal-top-gallant mast, 
and pole.38 Each section of mast was supported by its own shrouds and 
stays, which together formed a cohesive unit.39 On the Somers, the 
mainmast rose a total of 130 feet and 6 inches above the deck, and the 
foremast, 120 feet and 9 inches.40 Furthermore, each mast incorporated a 
large platform, called the foretop and maintop respectively. These were 
"securely fixed to wooden braces or trustle-trees, and [were] used ... as a 
place where a portion of the watch [remained] in readiness to cast loose or 
take in the lighter sails ... ,,41 
Each mast was crossed by four yards: "The yards are long pieces 
of timber, suspended by the centre, or slings to the masts, [designed] to 
spread the heads of the square sails upon.,,42 The names of the yards 
related to their respective sails and the portion of the mast to which they 
were affixed. On the Somers, therefore, were lower-yards, top-sail yards, 
top-gallant yards, and royal yards. Above the royal sails, sky sails could 
also be set upon the pole. In addition to this press of sail, the Somers 
could set studdingsails, which were set beyond the outer leeches (borders) 
36 Billinger Scott, CMP, p. 91; Neville, CMP, p. 109; Sears, CMP, p. 116. 
37 Chapelle, History of the United States Sailing Navy, p. 164. 
38 Sands, COl, p. 44. 
39 Totten, Naval Text Book, p. 361. 
40 Sands, COl, p. 44. 
41 Nordhoff, Man-of-War Life, p. 50. 
42 Totten, Naval Text Book, p. 48. 
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of the square sails in order to catch more wind in both light and fair 
weather. Additionally, the vessel was equipped with a spencer and a 
spanker sail, both of which were rigged fore-and-aft. The spanker was the 
aft sail, and the spencer was set abaft the fore and main masts. 
Finally, the Somers had what has been characterised as a 
"monstrous long bowsprit.,"'3 Although three separate elements actually 
comprised the bowsprit, such a description is accurate. The bowsprit 
consisted of the bowsprit outboard, the jib-boom, and the flying jib.44 Its 
total length was 48 feet and 9 inches, or just under a third of the Somers' 
deck. The great size of the bowsprit is well-illustrated in the Currier & 
Ives print of the vessel. Up to four jibs could be set upon it, greatly 
increasing the ship's maneuverability under sail. 
Yet the Somers was a difficult vessel to sail. Quick and 
maneuverable she might have been, but she was also over-rigged and 
unstable.45 Indeed, later commanders found the Somers and her sistership 
problematic to command, and ultimately each vessel would be lost at sea. 
The Somers was lost first, off Vera Cruz during the Mexican-American 
War, and the Bainbridge in 1863, when she was lost off Cape Hatteras 
with all hands save one. The lighter spars on the Somers might have been 
more manageable for the smaller boys to handle, but the brig was ill-suited 
to an untrained crew. 
This then was MacKenzie's command. It was his responsibility to 
draw her complement from the sailors on board the U.S.S. North Carolina. 
In doing so, he was faced with conflicting demands: he had to manage her 
43 Morison, Old Bruin, p. 144. 
44 Sands, COl, p. 44. 
45 Chapelle, History of the United States Sailing Navy, p. 430. 
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as a functional vessel-of-war, which demanded a competent crew, but she 
was designated a school-ship, which required the selection of 
inexperienced naval apprentices. The problem this created for MacKenzie 
was one of balance. He had to have on board boys whose purpose was to 
learn seamanship, but not so many that he could not sail the brig. At the 
same time, he had to have enough seamen on board to sail, but not so 
many as to defeat the educational basis for his command. 
In his original proposal to the Secretary of the Navy, MacKenzie 
had suggested that the Somers' crew consist exclusively of a core group of 
officers and petty officers, and a larger mass of apprentices. 
[The Somers should be] manned with the following 
complement: 1 Commander, 1 lieutenant, 1 master, 1 assistant surgeon, 
3 passed midshipmen, 3 midshipmen, 1 school master, 1 purser's 
steward, 2 boatswainsmates, [sic] 2 gunners mates, 1 carpenters mate, I 
sailmakers [sic] mate, 2 quartermasters, 2 captains of the forecastle, and 
100 apprentices; the petty officers to be selected as far as possible from 
the older apprentices, of which a sufficient number of competent ones 
could be found, or from young native seamen chosen with great care as 
to character, so as to avoid all mixture of the degraded class of man of 
war sailors.46 
The officers and petty officers would be initially responsible for the greater 
part of the Somers' operation, and as the apprentices' expertise increased, 
so too would their share of the vessel's handling. In this proposal, 
MacKenzie made no allowance for the presence of enlisted men such as 
landsmen, ordinary seamen, and able seamen. 
On July 7, 1842, the Somers departed on her first cruise.47 It was a 
straight run to Puerto Rico, and then back to New York. Twenty days after 
setting sail, the brig arrived at St. John, where the American consul came 
46 MacKenzie to Upshur, April 30, 1842, NA RG 45 "Commander's 
Letters." 
47 Logbook of the Brig of War Somers, July 7, 1842, NA RG 24, 
"Ship's Logs." 
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on board.48 After two days spent at the island, the Somers weighed anchor, 
and began her homeward voyage. On August 10, 1842, she arrived at New 
York. The cruise had been with one exception, uneventfuL On July 23, 
one of the apprentices, John Farmer, fell overboard while acting as look-
OUt.49 Another apprentice, Daniel McKinley jumped overboard in an effort 
to save him, a life buoy was thrown, and the second cutter was lowered as 
quickly as possible to assist in the rescue.50 Unfortunately, Farmer was 
drowned, and the cutter was only able to retrieve McKinley. Accordingly, 
when MacKenzie submitted his report on the cruise, he requested a 
superior type of life preserver-51 The request was denied, however, on the 
grounds that brigs were not allotted this particular type of safety 
equipment. 
The first cruise had been a shake-down voyage. Mackenzie used it 
both to test the Somers' sailing qualities, and to train her crew.52 He 
reported to the Secretary of the Navy his dissatisfaction with some of the 
apprentices, who had proven themselves "far below mediocrity [in 
constitution and intellect].,,53 MacKenzie blamed their limited intelligence 
and poor constitutions on the urban environment from which the 
apprentices were recruited: 
Most of them are drawn from our large cities, and in many 
cases, as their names and phylogeny denote, they are the children of 
foreigners of the lowest class, brought up precariously in confined 
situations, their constitutions in many instances impaired 
by ... diseases. 54 
48 Logbook of the Brig of War Somers, July, 27-29, 1842. 
49 Logbook of the Brig of War Somers, July 23, 1842. 
50 McKinley, CMP, p. 183. 
51 MacKenzie to Upshur, August 10, 1842, NA RG 45. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
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This assessment, and MacKenzie's solution, that the Navy "procure 
apprentices from the country, from among the children of our vigorous, 
hardy, and independent citizens ... Healthy, robust, accustomed from their 
infancy to serve, and without that inveterate disposition to sulk, and those 
vicious properties conspicuous in many of our present crew" 
fundamentally contradicted apprenticeship's intended reform of urban 
delinquents. It is apparent that MacKenzie had come to the conclusion that 
this was unrealisable, or at least beyond his abilities, and that the 
apprentice program would better serve the Navy by providing boys who 
needed only vocational, and not moral education. 
MacKenzie used the month between the Somers' return to New 
York on August 10, 1842, and her departure on September 13, to remove 
as many as possible of the deficient apprentices, replacing about sixty with 
others drawn from the North Carolina. 55 In addition, three seamen were 
transferred to the receiving ship, and another deserted. 56 On September 8, 
and 11, MacKenzie also made changes among his petty officers, 
transferring four of them, and replacing them with seamen brought on 
board the Somers.57 Another petty officer, the boatswain's mate, James 
Fairbanks, had deserted on September 4, and was duly replaced by a 
promoted seaman. 58 When the Somers set sail, she had on board eleven 
55 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 162. 
56 "Muster Returns From the U.S. Brig-of-War Somers, September 1, 1842 
to September 30,1846," NA RG 217 Musters and Personnel Records 
(hereafter MPR), Book 1424. 
57Ibid. The promoted seamen were: Thomas Dickerson, Carpenter's Mate; 
William Collins, Gunner's Mate; Andrew Anderson, Captain of the 
Forecastle; Charles Stewart, Captain of the Forecastle. 
58 Ibid. Oliver Browning replaced Fairbanks the day before the Somers 
set sail. 
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petty officers, six of whom had been on board for the first cruise: the senior 
boatswain's mate, Samuel Cromwell, a gunner's mate, Henry King, the 
sailmaker's mate, Charles Wilson, Michael Garty, the master-at-arms, and 
both quartermasters, Charles Rodgers and Elisha Smal1.59 
Finally, there was some turn-over among the officers on board. 
Norman Stoughton, the professor of languages responsible for running the 
school was discharged without replacement, and one of the midshipmen, 
J.M. Wainwright was transferred to the Naval School at Philadelphia on 
September 7. On to the Somers came two midshipmen, Henry Rodgers 
and Egbert Thompson, and two acting midshipmen, John Tillotson and 
Philip Spencer. This influx of officers could not have been wholly 
pleasing to MacKenzie, who had unsuccessfully asked for a second 
lieutenant. 60 
The four new arrivals were a decidedly mixed bag. Rodgers and 
Thompson were fairly experienced officers, both of them having been 
warranted in 1837.61 In fact, Rodgers was the senior midshipman on the 
Somers.62 The presence of these two served to mitigate the dearth of 
passed midshipmen on board the brig, a deficiency carried over from the 
first cruise. At no time was MacKenzie allowed the three passed 
midshipmen he had suggested in his original proposal. The presence on 
board of Spencer and Tillotson, moreover, placed two inexperienced 
midshipmen in the Commander's care. Spencer was the more senior of the 
59 Ibid. 
60 MacKenzie to Upshur, September 7, 1842, NA RG 45. 
61 Callahan, List of Officers of the Navy, pp. 469, 541. 
62 Henry Rodgers, COl, p. 30. 
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two, having been in the service almost a year, while Tillotson had entered 
the Navy barely two months before the cruise.63 
MacKenzie was only marginally successful, therefore, in achieving 
a balanced crew. Despite the experience gained by the shake-down cruise, 
the composition of the men and boys on board was ill-suited to the vessel's 
intended function as a cruising school-ship. The problem remained the 
disparity between experienced and inexperienced personnel, with the latter 
far outnumbering the former. This instability came to affect both the 
discipline and operations on board. 
In order to better understand this imbalance, however, it is 
necessary to examine the operational structure, which it reciprocally, was 
shaped by, shaped, and ultimately, disrupted. The Somers remained, 
despite her educational function, a fighting vessel of the United States 
Navy, and was run according to the standards of the service. The basis of 
any vessel's organization, commercial or naval, was the watch system. 
Watches were intended to ensure that the division of labour on board was 
apportioned in the most efficient manner by establishing both a temporal 
and functional discipline, enabling a ship to be manned and sailed at all 
hours. 
Each day's routine of duty was divided into a series of watches that 
delineated the passage of time. Thus, "every twenty-four hour [were] 
arranged into five watches, of four hours each, and two shorter ones of two 
hours each, called the dog-watches.,,64 Within each four-hour watch, 
ringing the ship's bell marked time. This was done every half hour, the 
number of chimes increasing with the passage of time. "At the end of the 
63 Callahan, List of Officers of the Navy, pp. 514, 546. 
64 Nordhoff, Man-of-War Life, p. 46. 
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first half hour of a watch, the ship's bell is struck one; at the end of the 
second half hour, two, and so on until eight bells, which marks the 
expiration of four hours ... when the series is recommenced.,,65 
Even as the ship's day was divided into hourly watches, the ship's 
crew was divided into complementary working watches. 
For the general purposes of working ship and daily routine 
[the crew] was divided primarily into two watches, called the starboard 
and larboard, one half being in each watch; and secondarily, into six 
portions or divisions, called from the parts of the vessel to which they 
are respectively attached, the forecastlemen, foretopmen, maintopmen, 
mizzen topmen, afterguard, and waisters.66 
Each of these functional watches was assigned to be on duty throughout 
each alternating temporal watch. Thus, the larboard watch might be on 
duty from midnight until four a.m., the starboard watch would take its 
place on deck until eight a.m., and the larboard watch would resume its 
duties until the next four hours had ended, and so on. The shorter dog-
watches introduced an odd number of watches into the day, and ensured 
that neither the starboard nor the larboard watch would have to suffer the 
same watches on a continual basis. Instead, watches would be replicated 
every other day. 
The sexpartite division of the watch encompassed the working parts 
of the vessel. Every section had its particular duties and characteristics, the 
nature of the work assigned affecting each one's composition. It was 
standard practice that forecastlemen included crewmen from all levels of 
experience.67 The topmen, however, were always the most experienced 
sailors: "Active able-bodied men; and with a few boys of the first class to 
65 Nordhoff, Man-oj-War Life, p. 47. 
66 Nordhoff, Man-oJ- War Life, p. 61. 
67 W. Brady, The Naval Apprentice's Kedge Anchor (New York: Taylor 
and Clement, 1841), p. 146; Totten, Naval Text Book, p. 193. 
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handle the light sails.,,68 The afterguard, which included those sailors 
called mastmen, were generally elderly seamen, "who though incapable of 
performing the rough work of a forecastle or top, [would] fill [their] 
stations well. ,,69 
As the Somers was a single-decked brig, she was too small to have 
any waisters or mizzen topmen. In addition, there was a final group of men 
on board, the idlers, who were not required to take part in a regular watch, 
as their duties required their attention throughout the day, or kept them 
belowdecks.70 They were the master-at-arms, cooks, officers' servants, 
surgeons, yeomen, and pursers.71 Furthermore, the captain or commander, 
first lieutenant, and staff officers could be designated idlers as their duties 
required them to work throughout the entire day outside the watch 
structure.72 
On board the Somers, Commander MacKenzie had established a 
routine of duty that was peculiar to the brig. This was posted throughout 
the vessel to ensure its accessibility to the crew and their familiarity with 
its contents. Additionally, each midshipman was required to copy it into a 
journal for his own edification. The bill of duty was a weekly calendar 
listing the specific tasks (mainly training and cleaning) to be performed by 
the watches on any given day whether at sea or in port.73 Also posted were 
the established times for waking, eating, quarters and inspection. 
68 Totten, Naval Text Book, p. 193. 
69 Ibid; Brady, Naval Apprentice's Kedge Anchor, p. 146. 
70 Gansevoort, CMP, p. 41. 
71 Brady, Naval Apprentice's Kedge Anchor, p. 147; Totten, Naval Text 
Book, p. 194; Nordhoff, Man-oj-War Life, p. 60. 
72 Totten, Naval Text Book, p. 194. 
73 MacKenzie to Upshur, August 10, 1842, NA RG 45; Journal oJ the 
U.S. Brig Somers September-November 1842, Historical Society of 
Pennsylvania," John Rodgers Papers E-89 (hereafter "Rodgers Journal.") 
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Thus, each day would always proceed along the following lines: 
When in port call all hands at 5 a.m. Stow the hammocks in 10 
minutes. Pipe to breakfast at 5.15 Turn the hands to [at] 5.45 .... At 
sea ... call all hands at 7:30 a.m. And go to breakfast at eight... In port 
and at sea beat to quarters at 9 a.m. For inspection after the retreat 
perform divine service ... Pipe to dinner always at meridian and turn to 
at 1 p.m. At 1 send the watch below to school for 2 hours. Serve 
provisions at 3 p.m. Go to supper at 5. Quarters and inspection of crew 
and battery at 5.30 in winter and 6 in summer, after quarters divine 
service. At sunset reeve the boats up and pipe the hammocks down.74 
Within this framework, each of the Somers' days contained a 
different set of tasks. The training schedule adhered to the guidelines set 
out in the 1841 regulations: "On Monday general exercise of the guns. On 
Tuesday exercise with small arms. On Wednesday with cutlasses. On 
Thursday at making sail, Reefing, and Furling. On Friday working at the 
rigging and squaring rattlings.,,75 
The mending and cleaning schedule varied according to whether the 
vessel was in harbour or at sea. For the former, it was: "Holystone the 
decks on Sunday. Scrub hammocks on Monday, Holystone the decks on 
Tuesday. Scrub clothes on Wednesday. Holystone the decks on Thursday. 
Scrape slush and varnish masts and booms and scrub the spar deck on 
Friday.,,76 If the brig was at sea, however, the routine of duty read: 
"Holystone decks with the watch on Sunday and Thursday, scrub clothes 
on Monday, Tuesday, Friday, and Saturday ... At 1 p.m., air bedding 1 hour 
and sling clean hammocks.,,77 Whenever the deck was holystoned, the sails 
were to be mended and the yards squared. The day's chores would come to 
74 "John Rodzers Journal." 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. Only one hour was ever allowed for scrubbing hammocks or 
washing yards. These were to hang until dry, and were piped down at 
11 :30 a.m., 1 p.m., or 3:30 p.m. 
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an end after sunset when the clotheslines or girtlines would be reeved, or 
holystones picked up. 
Each watch would begin by being piped on deck by the boatswain's 
mate for muster, or roll-call. Once the muster was completed, the crew 
would take their assigned stations, and the watch that they replaced was 
released. Although each watch was considered on duty until relieved, it did 
not necessarily follow that they would be continually kept busy. Indeed, on 
board the Somers most of the crew slept during night watches.78 When not 
called on to perform their immediate duties, the crew might also occupy 
themselves in any number of pursuits such as sewing, whittling, yarning 
(story-telling), skylarking (horseplay), dancing and singing, or reading. 
This apparent laxity did not mean that the vessel was left to its own 
devices. The watch was always ready to do as commanded, and a group of 
its seamen remained on alert at all times. In addition to their working 
divisions, each watch was again split into halves, called "quarter 
watches.,,79 When on duty, one of the quarter watches maintained its 
topmen at their stations at all times in readiness to go aloft or take in sai1.80 
Also, the lookouts were required to pay absolute attention to their duties. 
Thus, the continual cycle of duty did not disrupt the sleep and efficiency of 
the crew. 
At the same time, specific watch bills would be established for 
those duties requiring all hands. In such cases each crew member, 
including even the idlers, had a designated station and duty to perform.81 
78 Henry Stremmels, CMP, p. 28; Tyson, CMP, p. 114. 
79 Brady, Naval Apprentice's Kedge Anchor, p. 147; Nordhoff, Man-of-
War Life, p.61. 
80 Nordhoff, Man-of-War Life, p. 62. 
81 Nordhoff, Man-of-War Life, p. 64. 
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These specific watch bills governed such activities as "tacking and 
wearing, reefing and hoisting, making and shortening sail, mooring and 
unmooring, getting underway, and coming to anchor.,,82 This system 
demanded immediate and absolute attention, as an individual failure could 
have catastrophic results. 
The focus required of the crew was achieved through a relentless 
programme of drill. Crew members were mustered at their individual 
stations, or quarters, and "by dint of continued drilling, even the most 
persistently stupid were taught their places and duties.,,83 Additionally, 
crew members would be assigned a place at one of the guns on board. It 
was here that they would be mustered at quarters in order to answer the 
roll call.84 Special attention was paid to the responsibilities of the crew in 
case of battle. This exercise entailed 'mustering at "general quarters," 
which included the division of the men and boys at their guns and as sail 
trimmers. The later group were those men whose job it was to make, take 
in, and trim sails during combat. 85 During general quarters, the vessel 
would be cleared for action, the powder magazine opened, preparations 
made for battle, and combat maneuvers practiced. 
Fundamental to the watch structure was its hierarchical system of 
officers, petty officers, and men. This compartmentalised responsibility, 
and established the proper chain of command. "Thus, should the captain, 
coming on deck, wish a pull on the main brace, naval etiquette requires 
that he inform the officer of the deck, who in turn tells the midshipmen of 
82 Totten, Naval Text Book, p. 194. 
83 Nordhoff, Man-of-War Life, p. 73. 
84 Nordhoff, Man-of-War Life, p. 64. 
85 Nordhoff, Man-of-War Life, p. 63. 
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the watch who passes word to the boatswain's mate.,,86 In tum, "orders ... 
are communicated to the crew through [the boatswain's mates].,,87 The 
means by which orders were relayed demanded an unbroken chain of 
communication through the ranks. This was reinforced by the hierarchy of 
officers and men which gave each successive stage of the relay titular 
authority over the rank beneath it. 
At its top on board the Somers was Alexander Slidell MacKenzie, 
the brig's Commander. His duties were manifold, best captured in David 
Porter's adage, "A man-of-war is a petty kingdom, and is governed by a 
petty despot.,,88 As the senior officer on board he was ultimately 
responsible for all aspects of the brig's operation and the welfare of the 
crew. This absolutism was addressed by the Navy Regulations as follows: 
"After assuming command [the captain] will be responsible for the good 
government of the officers and others belonging to the vessel according to 
the laws and regulations of the Navy.,,89 Furthermore, the commander was 
"to prepare such internal regulations for the general police of the vessel 
under his command as he may think necessary."9O 
Second to Mackenzie was Guert Gansevoort, the first lieutenant. 
He kept no watch, but was on duty throughout the day. As executive 
officer his duties were considerable. The Commander's voice and ears, 
all communications to his superior were to be relayed through him.91 
86 Nordhoff, Man-oJ-War Life, p. 60. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Porter, Constantinople and its Environs, Vol.lI, New York (1835), p. 
10, quoted in Valle, Rocks and Shoals, p. 36. 
89 1843 Regulations, Chapter 3, "Commanders of Vessels," Article II, p. 8. 
90 1843 Regulations, Chapter 3, "Commanders of Vessels," Article III, p. 
8. 
91 Nordhoff, Man-oj-War Life, p. 53. 
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Likewise, he conveyed all of MacKenzie's commands to the sailing 
master and midshipmen of the watch. In the Commander's absence he 
had charge of the deck. 
Gansevoort was well-acquainted with the crew as disciplinary 
reports were made to him, and he was responsible for drawing up the 
watch, station, and quarter bills, "a matter for which [was] needed a 
thorough knowledge of the requirements of the ship, a judgement quick and 
secure, to decide upon the capabilities of the individuals composing the 
crew, and great patience and foresight.,,92 Furthermore, all petty officers 
made weekly reports to him concerning expenditure and stores. His 
familiarity with the crew was matched by his knowledge of the vessel, as 
he was required to make a daily inspection and to report his findings to the 
Commander. In short, the first lieutenant's role required great professional 
competence and demanded his constant attention. 
Next in rank was the sailing master, Matthew Calbraith Perry, Jr. 
This station was honorific as well as functional, bestowed upon passed 
midshipmen awaiting promotion to lieutenancy. He was the primary agent 
of the first lieutenant in keeping the vessel well-provisioned and ensuring 
that her rigging and sails were kept in good order. Additionally, he was 
responsible for keeping note of the ship's bearing and position, information 
that he was to report to the captain, besides entering it into the ship's log. 
As the only passed midshipman on board he was senior amongst the junior 
officers, and was one of the officers of the watch. 
Usually, a second lieutenant was assigned to command one of the 
watches from his station on the quarterdeck. These watch officers were 
92 Nordhoff, Man-of- War Life, p. 54. 
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"to see that the ship is properly steered, the sails properly set and trimmed, 
the log regularly hove, proper lookouts placed; and all necessary remarks 
duly entered upon the log slate, which he shall examine and sign at the 
expiration of his watch.'m Nonetheless, except in time of need, they were 
not to change course, alter the set of sails, or make signals without the 
express authority of their superior officers. Caretakers of authority, their 
power derived from being the immediate representatives of their seniors. 
As there were no second lieutenants on board the Somers, the 
responsibilities of the watch officers devolved upon the sailing master and 
the two senior midshipmen, Henry Rogers and Charles Hays. This was 
extraordinary, and under normal circumstances would have been in 
violation of naval regulations, as "the deck or watch [was] never to be left 
in charge of an officer of less rank than a lieutenant, except by permission 
of the commanding officer.,,94 As it was, the lack of any second lieutenants 
on board meant that there was no alternative to leaving the watches under 
the control of officers who had not yet attained command rank. This is not 
to say that these men were inexperienced: Perry had seven years naval 
experience, Rogers, five, and Hays, four.95 Nevertheless, it did mean that 
two of the three watch officers were men whose rank designated them as 
students of leadership, rather than as leaders themselves. Indeed, Hays had 
not yet fulfilled the requirement that all midshipmen serve three years at 
sea before being allowed to sit their examinations.96 
93 1843 Naval Regulations, Chapter 4, "Officer of the Watch," Article III, 
p.17. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Callahan, List of Officers of the Navy, p. 256. 
96 Hays to Upshur, June 15, 1841, NA RG 45, "Officers' Letters." 
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The least of the line officers on board were the remaining 
midshipmen, Philip Spencer, Egbert Thompson, John Tillotson, and Oliver 
Hazard Perry, Jr., who was MacKenzie's clerk, as well as an acting 
midshipman. It is already clear that their primary responsibility was to 
become familiar with the fundamentals of leadership and seamanship. This 
was to be accomplished through obedience and observation. As to their 
place in the actual operation of a vessel, the regulations were ambiguous, 
"midshipmen are to be respectful and obedient to their superiors, and 
prompt in the execution of their orders.,,97 
The midshipmen on board the Somers were each designated 
"midshipman of the watch," or "midshipman of the forecastle," and placed 
beneath the command of the officer of the deck.98 Thus, for each officer of 
the deck there was a corresponding midshipman of the deck. The junior 
midshipmen were stationed forward where they would best be able to issue 
commands to the boatswain's mates. They were the last 'gentlemen' in the 
chain of command. 
Beneath the line and staff officers, but above the enlisted men, 
were the petty officers. These were the boatswain's mates, gunner's 
mates, carpenter's mates, sailmaker's mates, captains of the forecastles 
and tops, master-at-arms, and quartermasters. Excepting the master-at-
arms, these individuals owed their positions to the commander, who was 
responsible every three months for reviewing them.99 They were all 
chosen by him from the enlisted men on the basis of their experience and 
97 1843 Naval Regulations, Chapter 9, "Midshipmen," Article I, p. 28. 
98 James Wales, CMP, p. 25. 
99 1843 Naval Regulations, Chapter 11, "Petty Officers," Articles I-IV, pp. 
31-32. 
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character,IOO and if they were deficient in carrying out their duties, they 
could be demoted to the ranks. Apart from the boatswain's mates, the 
petty officers did not have as such a direct place in the brig's relay of 
command, but performed specialized tasks on board that gave them 
greater status and responsibility than the general enlisted men. 
Since brigs were not allowed boatswains, the mates on board the 
Somers operated as if they were such. The two boatswain's mates were 
Samuel Cromwell and Oliver Browning. Cromwell was senior of the two, 
and as such was the chief sailor in the crew. The boatswain's mates were 
the penultimate element in the relay of command. "They [carried] a silver 
whistle, or call, with which they pipe, either to call attention to what is 
about to be ordered, or to give the order itself.,,101 In addition, they were 
expected to conduct, with the assistance of the sailmaker's mates and 
carpenter's mates, a daily inspection of the vessel. I02 The boatswain's 
mates were responsible for examining each morning and evening, "the state 
and condition of the standing and running rigging, and to report the result 
of this examination.,,103 
Most of the mates' duties went unsaid, however. As the most 
experienced sailors on board, their wide range of experience mandated a 
great number of daily tasks: 
This officer holds a station in the ship of the greatest possible 
utility. To all other inferior officers a specified duty is assigned, but 
with the boatswain it is otherwise, and consequently his vigilance 
should ever be on the alert, and his eyes should be everywhere. He 
ought for example to be a thorough seaman, and a good rigger, he 
should be active of limb, quick of sight, and ready in the exercise of his 
100 Totten, Naval Text Book, p. 193. 
101 Nordhoff, Man-of- War Life, p. 60. 
102 Nordhoff, Man-of- War Life, p. 58. 
103 Totten, Naval Text Book, pp. 251-252. 
mental facilities, but possessed of good temper and be of sober 
habits. 104 
130 
The captains of the forecastle, afterguard, and the fore and main 
tops were the ranking members of each watch. There were two of each to 
a watch, or one to each quarter watch. Thus, there should have been four 
captains, two first captains, and two second captains, in each principal 
division of the watch. The captains were selected according to experience 
and should have been among the most experienced of the seamen. They 
"[carried out orders given to [their] department, [exercised] a general 
oversight, and [were], to some extent, responsible for the good order of 
everything in [their] particular portion of the vessel.,,105 
The quartermasters were meant to supplement the captains as the 
most experienced men in a watch. 106 Their most important duties related 
to steering the vessel. "At sea one of their number [conned] the ship; that 
is, watches the helmsmen, and, standing in an elevated position, aids him 
in meeting the helm with the motions of the vessel.,,107 When the ship 
was in action or at quarters, they actually assumed the role of helmsmen. 
There were initially two quartermasters on board the Somers, Charles 
Rodgers and Elisha Small. Less than a month into the second cruise, 
however, on October 10, 1842, Small was demoted to seaman, and no 
replacement was made for him. 108 
The gunner's mates, sailmaker's mates, and carpenter's mates had 
tasks relating to the maintenance and supervision of their parts of the 
104 Totten, Naval Text Book, p. 247. 
105 Nordhoff, Man-oj-War Life, p. 61. 
106 Nordhoff, Man-oJ-War Life, p. 69. 
107 Nordhoff, Man-oJ-War Life, p. 59. 
108 "Muster Returns from the U.S. Brig-of-War Somers, September 1, 1842 
to September 30,1846," NA RG 217, MPR, Book 1424. 
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vessel. Thus, the gunner's mates, Henry King and William Collins, 
oversaw the brig's ordnance, whereas Charles Wilson, the sailmaker's mate 
was responsible for all the canvas on board. I09 Thomas Dickerson, who 
was the carpenter's mate, was in turn responsible for making repairs to the 
brig. 
The remaining petty officer was the master-at-arms, Michael 
Garty, the brig's policeman. It was his duty to prevent smuggling, and to 
see to it that "no improprieties are committed by the men below."llo 
Furthermore, he was in charge of the brig's small arms and was to oversee 
all training in their use. Garty was actually a marine who had been 
promoted to sergeant for the express purpose of holding this position on 
board the Somers. III 
Finally, there were the enlisted men who constituted the majority 
of the crew. These men were divided into four basic ranks according to 
their age and ability: seaman, ordinary seaman, landsman, and apprentice 
boy. They were the bottom of the chain of command, beholden to all, 
responsible for executing those orders that originated from above. In the 
performance of their duties the entire weight of naval custom and law fell 
upon them. 
Seamen and ordinary seamen were the most senior of the enlisted 
ranks, and had the greatest experience and ability. These were the crew 
from whom the mastmen were selected. The landsmen were those whose 
experience was least and whose competence most questionable. They 
were assigned rudimentary tasks, usually involving the ship's maintenance 
109 The sailmaker's mate was therefore responsible for hammocks as well 
as the brig's sails. 
110 1843 Naval Regulations, p. 32. 
III Garty, CMP, p. 78. 
132 
and cleaning. Least amongst the naval hierarchy were the boys, who were 
themselves divided into three classes (first through third) according to 
their experience and size. 
According to the testimony of the brig's purser, who kept the 
ship's muster, there were 120 men and boys on board the Somers. His 
description of the complement does not, however, quite agree with this 
sum: "seven were officers in the steerage ... four in the ward-room, and the 
Commander. There were eight petty officers, and four rated as seamen, 
making twelve, nine ordinary seamen, six landsmen, and seventy-four 
apprentices. ,,112 
Thus, the crew can be broken down as follows: two line officers 
(the Commander and first lieutenant), two staff officers (the assistant 
surgeon and purser), one sailing master, seven junior officers, nine petty 
officers, twenty-one enlisted men, and seventy-eight boys. The 
professional imbalance of the crew is apparent, even painfully so when it 
112 Horace Heiskill, COl, p. 28. The muster roll reveals that while the 
purser's account is accurate in its final tally, it is incorrect in detail. The 
officers are correctly enumerated, but the enlisted men demand closer 
scrutiny. Including the master-at-arms, there were nine petty officers. 
The four listed seamen were actually five, including the two rated as 
captains of the forecastle who were technically petty officers. These 
seamen were Henry Waltham, Henry Garribrandts, Mathias Gedney, 
Andrew Anderson (captain of the forecastle), and Charles Stewart (captain 
of the forecastle). There were nine ordinary seamen, although a landsman, 
Squire Godfrey, would be promoted on September 18, 1842. The 
landsmen, if one includes the cooks and stewards, numbered six. The 
boys numbered 78, but were really 77, as one would be promoted to 
landsman to take the place of the newly made ordinary seaman. 
Assuming the accuracy of the muster, and that the purser's steward ranked 
as a landsman, making their number seven, there would have then been 
120 officers and men on board. "Muster Returns from the U.S. Brig-of-
War Somers, September 1, 1842 to 1846," NA RG 217, MPR, Book 1424. 
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is understood that 96 officers and men was the recommended complement 
for a brig-of-war. 113 
A useful comparison can be made between the complements of the 
Somers and her sistership. The Bainbridge sailed with ninety-three 
officers and men on board. 114 She was commanded by a first lieutenant, 
who was assisted by two second lieutenants, a passed midshipman, and 
five other midshipman, as well as three staff officers. She had fourteen 
petty officers, in addition to a marine contingent of fifteen men, something 
entirely absent on board of the Somers. There were only three designated 
idlers, one cook and two stewards. Finally, the crew was larger and more 
experienced, with ten ordinary seamen, nineteen seamen, eleven 
landsmen, and just nine boys. Thus, the Bainbridge sailed with three more 
petty officers than the Somers, and almost twice as many enlisted men. 
The Somers was overmanned, but not with the right sort of sailors, 
having on board not enough lieutenants, passed midshipmen, petty officers 
and sailors, and too many midshipmen and boys. In fact, she had one-
quarter more boys and men than her accepted complement. This was the 
most drastic consequence of MacKenzie selecting an overwhelmingly 
young crew, a characteristic that extended to all ranks on board. It has 
become commonly accepted that over one third of the brig's crew were 
aged sixteen or less: "Forty-five of the crew were between thirteen and 
sixteen years of age.,,115 There were in fact, only thirty-five crew members 
113 1842 Navy Regulations, pp. 61-63. The 1842 Regulations give the 
number as 96, whereas Totten writing two years earlier gives the number 
as 71, pp. 196,204. 
114 "Muster Returns from the U.S. Brig-of-War Bainbridge," December 
20, 1842 to October 21,1847, NA RG 217, MPR, Book 2487. 
115 P. McFarland, Sea Dangers - The Affair of the Somers (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1985), p. 49. 
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answering this criterion, closer to one-quarter of the complement. Most of 
the remaining apprentices were aged seventeen, eighteen, or nineteen. 
There were forty-eight of these older boys, about two-fifths of the crew. 
Together, these older and younger teenagers represented just over two-
thirds of the entire crew. A handful of the oldest apprentices aged twenty 
and twenty-one completed the class of naval students. 
While several of the landsmen and seamen on board were older 
than the apprentices, there were more still in their teens and early twenties. 
The remaining ratings were not much older. Indeed, at twenty-four, 
William Celsor was the eldest of them. The youth of the sailors is notable, 
but hardly exceptional. Seafaring was a young man's profession, and 
many sailors began their careers while still in their teens. 116 
The petty-officers represented the core group of adult sailors on 
board. They were markedly older than the remainder of the crew, 
possessing authority commensurate not only with their position but also 
their age. 
The brig's officers were also young. Commander MacKenzie, at 
thirty-nine, was the oldest man on board. Although he was old relative to 
his crew, MacKenzie was one of the most junior officers of his grade in 
the Navy, ranked ninety-fifth out of ninety-six on the navy lists. 1I7 Indeed, 
there were only six other commanders whose entry into the service post-
dated his own. 118 The Somers was his first independent command. His 
lieutenant, the only other senior line officer on board, possessed greater 
1161. Dye, "Early American Merchant Seafarers," Proceedings of the 
American Philosophical Society (Vol. 120, No.5, October 1976), p. 357. 
117 1842 Navy Register, p. 7. 
118 1842 Navy Register, pp. 4-7. 
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seniority within his rank, being the 161st out of 328. 119 Nevertheless, at 
thirty-two, he was also young. As for the midshipmen, youth was a 
corollary of their rank. 
Examining the watch structure on board, the impact of the crew's 
youthfulness, especially that of the apprentices, is clear. Although the 
Somers' watch-bill has not survived, it is possible to reconstruct the 
division of the crew into the starboard and larboard watches. The watches 
were intended to be symmetrical. I20 Thus, each watch on board the 
Somers would have included one watch officer (out of three on board), 
one midshipman of the watch (out of four on board), one boatswain's 
mate, one gunner's mate, two additional petty officers, no more than three 
seamen, five ordinary seamen, three landsmen, and thirty-eight boys, not 
including the commander, first lieutenant and staff officers. 
The Bainbridge's watches would likely have consisted of one 
watch lieutenant, three midshipmen, one boatswain's mate, one gunner's 
mate, at least one quartermaster (out of three onboard), one quarter 
gunner, one captain of the forecastle, either a carpenter's mate or a 
sailmaker's mate, five ordinary seamen, ten or eleven seamen, five or six 
landsmen, and four or five boys, which again does not include the 
lieutenant commanding, staff officers, or idlers. The disparity between the 
numbers of experienced crew in the watches on each brig is easy to 
comprehend. 
119 1842 Navy Register, p. 16. 
120 "Care should be taken that the physical force is as equally distributed as 
possible, and there should be as many seamen, ordinary seamen, 
landsmen, boys, and marines, in one watch, as in the other." Brady, Naval 
Apprentice's Kedge Anchor, p. 146. 
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That the Somers had insufficient men for each watch can be further 
discerned by comparing these numbers to those suggested in Totten's 
Naval Text-Book "for watching the officers and crew of a brig or schooner 
of war.,,121 The manual suggests that there be seven watch officers (three 
lieutenants and four passed midshipmen and midshipmen) between the two 
watches, which are in tum commanded by the first lieutenant and another 
passed midshipmen. The listed officers also include the idlers, two of 
whom are listed as belonging to both the starboard and larboard. Each 
watch is assigned six petty officers, including one boatswain's mate, one 
gunner's mate, two quartermasters, one quarter gunner, and a captain of the 
forecastle. Eight enlisted men are assigned to the forecastle, ten to the 
foretop, twelve to the maintop, and six more in an undesignated capacity, 
but probably the afterguard. These enlisted men were to include eight 
seamen, six ordinary seamen, four landsmen, and three boys. In all, each 
of the projected watches consisted of thirty-five officers and men. 
Two primary points of instability have emerged: the paucity of 
senior officers relative to the excessive number of midshipmen, and the 
dearth of petty officers and crew relative to the preponderance of the 
apprentices. In each circumstance youth and inexperience predominated 
over maturity and knowledge. Thus, the Somers was at once overcrowded 
and undercrewed. Her complement was akin to her design, over-rigged 
and unstable. 
These twin disparities had immediate consequences for the brig's 
operation, which manifested themselves at each level of the chain of 
command. To appreciate these repercussions, it must be understood that in 
121 Totten, Naval Text Book, p. 204. 
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addition to sailing the Somers, the officers and for that matter, the men, had 
to teach a large number of inexperienced boys the rudiments of 
seamanship. The few experienced sailors on board had their attention 
divided between two complex tasks. MacKenzie's line of command, thin 
to begin with, was dangerously over-extended. 
First, the line officers were subjected to an increased burden of 
responsibility and authority. This exaggerated burden began with the first 
lieutenant and devolved downwards through to the midshipmen. The crux 
of the problem was the lack of junior lieutenants on board. Gansevoort 
was the only lieutenant where there should have been at least four. As the 
brig's penultimate commander his responsibilities must have markedly 
increased as he presided over a cadre of officers, most of whom were still 
students of their trade. 
This problem extended further to the sailing master and senior 
midshipmen. They were substituted for the missing lieutenants, and 
assumed duties as watch officers. Although this was not unprecedented, it 
was out of the ordinary, and however competently they conducted 
themselves, the fact remains that they were acting in a capacity above their 
station. 122 Given that he was the only passed midshipman on board, and 
thereby qualified for the role, Matthew Calbraith Perry, Jr., would have 
acted in a dual capacity, as sailing master and semi-official second 
lieutenant. Rodgers and Hays would have turned to him and Gansevoort 
in place of the second lieutenants to whom midshipmen acting as officers 
of the deck would normally have had recourse. 
122 B. Sands, From Reefer to Rear-Admiral (New York: Frederick A. 
Stokes, 1899), pp. 41, 58. 
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The three remaining midshipmen, alone of the junior officers, were 
acting in their official capacity in the forecastle. Nevertheless, they had 
above them none of the passed midshipmen who would have been 
expected on board a brig. Also, it is reasonable to assume that as there 
was a shortage of officers on board, the attendant increase in responsibility 
would have extended to them, if only because there was no other choice. 
These most junior officers, because of this increased responsibility, were 
actually rather unfit for their positions. None of them had substantial 
naval experience, and they would have been better suited to the duties of 
observation and study that were the norm for their rank. Instead, they 
found themselves in positions of considerable importance. 
The shortage of qualified personnel also affected the petty officers. 
Once again, the dearth of experienced men had the additional effect of 
making those who were present far more important than would normally 
have been the case. The petty officers, vital to the operation of the vessel 
in any circumstances became even more so on board the Somers. For 
instance, despite repeated insubordination, Cromwell was never punished 
except by repro val since his services were crucial to the operation of the 
vessel: "We had not one to fill his place without crippling some other part 
of the vessel... ,,123 
The lack of petty officers had another consequence, the disruption 
of discipline. As experienced crewmen their importance was inflated, and 
thereby they assumed an extraordinary stature that ran counter to the rigid 
hierarchy demanded of the vessel. This increased prestige came at the 
expense of the brig's officers, whose authority was compromised by their 
123 Gansevoort, CMP, p. 56. 
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reliance on the senior crewmen. Indispensable to a large degree, the petty 
officers became exempted from many of the normal workings of naval 
discipline. 
This disruption of discipline extended to the ranks of the seamen 
and boys. This is not to say that the enlisted ranks all benefited from the 
perquisites of the petty officers. Rather, they were liable to be exposed to 
any insubordinate behavior and attitudes of their immediate superiors, and 
while insubordinate language might go unpunished, it did not go unheard. 
Furthermore, the importance accredited to the petty officers underscored 
any criticism they might make of their superiors. Their words carried an 
authority that came at the expense of men whose power over the crew 
those very words diminished. Thus, the shortage of men led to 
unpunished insubordination, which in turn disrupted the chain of 
command by allowing enlisted men the opportunity to denigrate their 
superiors without fear of the retribution such actions might normally elicit. 
Additionally, such insubordinate behavior could make an 
impression on the least experienced portion of the crew, the apprentice 
boys. Many of them had no naval experience whatsoever, and looked to 
the more experienced in order to determine what was the appropriate 
behavior of a sailor. Indeed, as a sequestered training environment, the 
Somers was an experiment in naval socialisation. Boys who witnessed 
insubordinate behavior would be more likely to imitate it, thinking it made 
them 'salty.' Nordhoff remarked on exactly this imitation of drinking and 
chewing tobacco: 
Most of the old tars make it a point to keep constantly about 
half drunk, and many of the beginners eagerly follow and even exceed 
them in this pet vice. In fact, I had occasion to notice among the green 
hands a very general and prevalent impression, that the easiest and 
quickest way to become a thorough sailor was to drink rum and chew 
tobacco ... Many of our boys, in the beginning of the cruise, labored 
under the hallucination already mentioned, as common to tyros in sailor 
craft, that to be a true sailor, one must chew tobacco. 124 
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Finally, several of the enlisted men on board were quite 
inexperienced. William Neville, with only one year's naval experience 
was made second captain of the foretop.125 Meanwhile, William Celsor 
was an ordinary seaman with only seven months experience. 126 Edmund 
Storms, who had enlisted as an apprentice in August 1841, was made a 
landsman on September 18, 1842, and served throughout much of the 
cruise as an ordinary seaman. 127 
Although Commander MacKenzie had selected the crew, it was 
Lieutenant Gansevoort's duty to determine how the complement would be 
divided into watches. In doing so, his primary objective must have been 
to compensate for the lack of experienced sailors on board. He attempted 
to meet this task by drawing from the ranks of the apprentice boys the 
most experienced and oldest amongst them. These boys would serve in 
the tops as mastmen, and on deck as the after guard and forecastle hands, 
taking the place of the absent seamen. 
Indeed, at least two of the oldest boys were placed in positions of 
considerable importance. George Warner and Charles Van Velsor, aged 
twenty-one and eighteen, were each acting as captains of the foretop.128 
This is not altogether surprising as Warner had been in the service for five 
years, and Van Velsor, four. l29 Other apprentices such as Mathias Gedney 
124 Nordhoff, Man-of-War Life, pp. 31-32, 76. 
125 Matthew C. Perry, Jr., CMP, p. 80. 
126 William Celsor, COl, p. 40. 
127 Edward Storms, COl, p. 40; "Muster Returns of the u.S. Brig-of-War 
Somers, September 1, 1842 to September 30, 1846," NA RG 217, MPR, 
Book 1424. 
128 Charles Van Velsor, COl, p. 38; George Warner, COl, p. 39. 
129 Warner, COl, pp. 38, 39. 
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(aged twenty with five years experience) had long service records. l3O 
William Houghland, 2nd class boy, aged seventeen, was a mastman of the 
forecastle. 131 It is also clear from the court-martial records and 
punishment logs that other apprentices were employed in the tops. Able-
bodied, and essentially adults, these older boys would have been 
substituted for the required seamen. This only made sense as more than 
forty of the apprentices on board were aged seventeen or more. 
Although some of the sixteen year-olds, and a few of the fifteen 
year-olds were possibly employed in place of seamen, it is highly unlikely 
that the majority of the boys aged thirteen to fifteen could have been very 
useful in this capacity. MacKenzie himself had criticised the abilities of 
very young boy sailors after the Somers' first cruise, remarking that they 
were "wholly useless from their diminutive size.,,132 
While there is evidence that the smaller apprentices were not 
entirely inactive, their services were tolerated at the commander's 
discretion: 
A short time after we left Mesurado, we were struck by a 
squall, and some of the little boys sprung up in the rigging to take in 
sail; the commander ordered some of the smallest down, told them not 
to go up; Cromwell remarked that the commander was too damned 
afraid of the boys, would not suffer them to go into any danger. 133 
Thus, the Somers' crew, and more directly, her apprentices, could 
additionally be classified, apart from all the other formalised divisions on 
board, into those who sailed and those who studied how to sail. 
Apprentices in the former category compensated for the lack of a proper 
crew, and in doing so, realized the ideal of a functioning school-ship. The 
130 Mathias Gedney, COl, p. 38. 
131 William Houghland, COl, p. 41; Henry Corny, CMP, p. 99. 
132 MacKenzie to Upshur, August 10, 1842, NA RG 45. 
133 Wales, CMP, p. 15. 
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remaining apprentices increased the size of the crew but did not 
effectively contribute to its operation, probably decreasing overall 
efficiency. In effect then, the Somers had a core group of enlisted men 
and older apprentices who were entrusted with the greater part of 
responsibility for the brig, as well as a periphery of younger apprentices, 
the "small fry who eat a lot of biscuit...[and] were a useless article on 
board a vessel.,,134 
Although MacKenzie did not succeed in establishing a balance 
between age and inexperience, he did achieve national homogeneity. 
Whereas most American naval vessels carried a large number of foreign 
sailors, if not an actual majority, the Somers' crewmen were by-and-Iarge 
native-born sailors. This is not to say that there were no foreign-born 
sailors on board. Ordinary seaman Edmund Gallia came from Malta, and 
apprentice Alexander McKee, and the master-at-arms, Michael Garty, 
came from Ireland. 135 Almost entirely native-born Americans, it seems 
likely that the crew would have consisted of English speakers, or at least, 
persons whose first language was English. This was remarkable as the 
preponderance of foreign-born sailors in the Navy made its ships polyglot 
environments. There were, however several Spanish-speakers on board 
the Somers, notably Spencer, Cromwell, Small, and Gallia.136 
Apprenticeship itself dictated that the greatest part of the Somers' 
crew be American. After all, the programme was intended, among other 
134 Ibid. 
135 There were probably more foreign-born sailors on board than these 
three, but there is no other documentation to prove the point. 
136 Wales, CMP, p. 11; Corney, CMP, p. 97; Thomas Dickerson, CMP, 
p.148. MacKenzie could speak Spanish as well, although there is no 
evidence that he ever did so on board the Somers. 
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things, to end the Navy's dependency on foreign-born sailors.137 
Notwithstanding this fact, many of the apprentices were actually alleged to 
have been the children of foreigners if not foreigners themselves. 138 But 
since the former qualify as 'native-born' citizens anyway, these allegations 
need not be taken with much seriousness. In 1842 only 89, or less than 
9% of some 1,086 apprentices and boys in the United States Navy were 
certainly foreign-born. 139 Furthermore, on board the Somers, the only 
mention of foreign boys was MacKenzie's reference to those born of 
foreign parents, whom he probably replaced following the shake-down 
cruise. 14O What is certain is that the Somers' crew was almost entirely 
American. 
Apart from being homogeneous in nation and language, the crew 
appears to have consisted of men and boys drawn mainly from New 
England and the Middle Atlantic states. The apprentices on board had 
been selected from the North Carolina, the receiving ship for the New 
York Rendezvous, which drew half of the Navy's enlisted men. 141 
Furthermore, three of the Navy's remaining six rendezvous were in the 
region. 142 There were boys from Boston, Portland, and Providence, who 
137 "The American Marine," The New Era, August 7, 1839, quoted in 
Goin, Remarks on the Home Squadron and Naval School, p. 15. 
138 Langley, Social Reform in the United States Navy, pp. 110-11. 
139 "Letter from the Secretary of the Navy Regarding Petty Officers, 
Seamen, &c., in the Naval Service," House Document 132, 27th Congress, 
3rd Session, February 9, 1843. 
140 MacKenzie to Upshur, August 10, 1842, NA RG 45. 
141 W.E. Griffis, Matthew Calbraith Perry - A Typical Naval Officer 
(Boston: Cupples and Hurd, 1887), p. 437. 
142 The remaining rendezvous were at Portsmouth, Boston, Philadelphia, 
Baltimore, Norfolk, and Pensacola. 
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were likely to have enlisted at one of these stations. 143 Another ten are 
known to have entered the service at the Philadelphia Rendezvous. 144 
The Somers' complement also included a group of individuals 
whose race set them apart. These were the brig's stewards and cooks, all 
of whom were African-American or of mixed ancestry. There were five 
of them onboard: Justin Mundon (the captain's cook), James Dunn (the 
captain's steward), Henry Garrabrandts (the wardroom cook), Henry 
Waltham (the wardroom steward), and Manuel Howard (the steerage 
steward). 145 
The presence of African-Americans on board was not uncommon 
in 1842, as the Navy had been integrated since its establishment. l46 
Indeed, in 1839 it was stipulated that no more than five percent of a ship's 
crew could be African-American, and that such recruits could only be 
entered into the service with the "approbation of the Commander of the 
station.,,147 This was presumably a reform designed to improve the stature 
of the Navy by reducing its reliance on African-American enlistments. l48 
143 "Prisoner's List," COl, p. 6. 
144 Enlistment papers survive for Charles R. Lambert, Thomas Bywater, 
John Cavanaugh, Alexander McKee, Absalom Taylor, John Finnecy, John 
Reershardt, Frederick Snyder, Jeremiah Cory (all Philadelphia), as well as 
Charles Van Velsor, George Kneavels, and Charles Golderman (all New 
York). 
145 "Muster Returns from the U.S. Brig-of-War Somers, September 1, 1842 
to September 30,1846," NA RG 217, MPR, Book 1424. 
146 Langley, Social Reform in the United States Navy, p. 92 
147 T. Moebs, Black Soldiers - Black Sailors - Black Ink: Research Guide 
on African-Americans in U.S. Military History, 1526-1900 (Chesapeake 
Bay: Moebs Publishing Company, 1994), p. 349. 
148 Congressional interest in the subject was demonstrated by the passage 
of a resolution in 1842 by the House of Representatives requesting to 
know the number of African-Americans in the naval service; "Letter from 
the Secretary of the Navy Regarding Colored Persons in the Navy of the 
United States," House Document No. 282, 27th Congress, 2nd Session, 
August 10, 1842. 
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Furthermore, in 1842, Senator John C. Calhoun of South Carolina made an 
unsuccessful attempt to limit African-Americans to those positions which 
they held on board the Somers, stewardships and ships' COOkS.149 
By avoiding heterogeneity in his crew, MacKenzie also eliminated 
a primary reason for a severe disciplinary regime, since it was argued that: 
Men are here congregated together from almost every country 
under heaven. They bring with them no natural principles of 
amalgamation, but on the contrary almost as many apples of discord as 
there are individuals in the crew. Nothing but necessity can bind into 
one harmonious whole so many discordant elements, and that necessity 
must result from a system of discipline, stern in its nature, and prompt 
in the execution of its penalties. ISO 
Although this was not the case on board the Somers, MacKenzie did 
operate a rigorous disciplinary system. In the broadest sense it consisted 
of two parts: one moral, the other physical. The former was intended to 
prevent his wards from misbehaving, and the latter was to punish them if 
they did. 
The youth and professional inexperience of the apprentices was 
mirrored by a belief in their social inexperience and attendant 
vulnerability. It was, after all, in order to sequester them from older, more 
dissolute sailors, that they had been assigned to the Somers. Concern for 
their moral development affected the daily routine of the vessel and 
resulted in a social regimen that was on the one hand, an intensification of 
naval practice, and on the other hand, anomalous in the service. 
The U.S. Navy had long maintained that it was the duty of its 
officers to maintain the moral well-being of their crews. This tenet was 
149 Langley, Social Reform in the United States Navy, p. 93. 
150 E. Wines, Two Years and a Half in the Navy; or, Journal of a Cruise in 
the Mediterranean and Levant, on board the U.S. Frigate Constellation in 
the Years 1829,1830, and 1831, Vol. 1 (Philadelphia: Carey and Lea, 
1832), p. 26. 
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enshrined in the very first passages of the Articles of War, which stated 
explicitly: 
Section I) Article I. The commanders of all ships and vessels 
of war belonging to the navy, are strictly enjoined and required to show 
in themselves a good example of virtue, honour, patriotism and 
subordination; and be vigilant in inspecting the conduct of all such as 
are placed under their command; and to guard against, and suppress, all 
dissolute and immoral practices, and to correct all such as are guilty of 
them, according to the usage of the sea service. 
Article II. The commanders of all ships and vessels in the 
navy, having chaplains on board, shall take care that divine service be 
performed in a solemn, orderly, and reverent manner twice a day, and a 
sermon preached on Sunday, unless bad weather, or other extraordinary 
accidents may prevent it; and that they cause aU, or as many if the 
ship's company as can be spared from duty, to attend to every 
performance of the worship of Allmighty [sic] God. ISI 
The Somers was too small a vessel to be assigned a chaplain.152 
Pastoral authority therefore devolved upon MacKenzie. In cases such as 
this, the temper of the vessel's devotion depended greatly on the piety of 
the commanding officer. On board the Somers, religious observance 
would be a fundamental part of shipboard life. Divine service was 
performed each Saturday before the assembled crew, at which time the 
Articles of War were also read. 153 Prayers were recited each day during 
the muster and inspection of the watches. 154 Indeed, a prayer book was 
distributed to each member of the crew for study and worship. 155 Given 
the importance of religion in the proposed educational schemes for naval 
apprentices, it is likely that the naval school on board involved some form 
of Bible study besides reading, writing, and arithmetic. 
151 Articles of War - Rules and Regulations for the Government of the 
United States Navy, 23 April 1800, Sixth Congress, ]Sf Session, 1800. 
1521842 Naval Regulations, p. 61. 
153 "Log Book of the U.S. Brig-of-War Somers," NA RG 24; "Rodgers 
Journal." 
154 "Rodgers Journal." 
155 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 118; "Logbook ofthe Brig of War Somers," 
June 4, 1842, NA RG 24. 
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Even as it was necessary to expose the crew to good morals 
through Christian worship, it was felt necessary to shield them from vice, 
especially those most commonly associated with naval life: cursing, 
tobacco usage, and above all, drinking. Religious observance was 
therefore reinforced by orders that either banned these things, or limited 
their use. It was not enough to teach the apprentices what was right, they 
were to be given no opportunity to stray from these lessons. 
Swearing, as well as drunkenness and other offences were already 
proscribed by the Articles of War: 
Article III. Any officer, or other person in the navy, who shall 
be guilty of oppression, cruelty, fraud, profane swearing, or any other 
scandalous conduct, tending to the destruction of good morals, shall, if 
an officer, be cashiered, or suffer such other punishment as a court 
martial shall adjudge; if a private, shall be put in irons, or flogged, at 
the discretion of the captain, not exceeding twelve lashes ... 156 
Although the ban on cursing was often honoured in the breach, 
MacKenzie was detennined to enforce these regulations: 
Swearing, which is specifically forbidden by the act of 
Congress for the Government of the Navy must not be tolerated by the 
officers and they will exert themselves on all occasions to enforce 
silence which is essential to the official and creditable appearance of 
the vessel. 157 
At the same time, the Navy's regulations for apprentices refused 
them a tobacco ration, but did not necessarily prohibit its use: 
"Apprentices are not to be allowed to draw the spirit part of their ration, 
nor receive tobacco, but, on the contrary, they are to be encouraged, and 
156Articles of War - Rules and Regulations for the Government of the 
United States Navy, 23 April 1800, Sixth Congress, r Session, 1800, 
Article III. 
157 MacKenzie to Upshur, August 10, 1842, NA RG 45. 
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required, if possible, to abstain from the use of both.,,158 MacKenzie 
determined to enforce this regulation as well, and placed tobacco 
restrictions on all ranks. The apprentices, however, were subjected to an 
unconditional ban.159 
Finally, alcohol was absolutely forbidden to the crew. The 
decision to make the Somers dry reflected MacKenzie's belief in 
temperance. In 1837, he had proposed in the Naval Magazine that for 
naval apprentices, "small stores would be substituted for their spirit 
rations.,,16O At the time of his court-martial, he made a statement to the 
effect that he considered malaria to be preferable to the drinking of 
brandy. 161 Furthermore, a year later, having been made a life-member of 
the American Seaman's Friend Society, he wrote the Sailor's Magazine 
that "intemperance is called in as the most efficient ally in completing [the 
sailor's] ruin.,,162 
The influx of apprentices into the Navy had given rise to new 
concerns about the pernicious effects of grog on the service's enlisted 
men. This concern manifested itself in a resurgence of support for 
158 Callan, "Act of Congress providing for the enlistment of boys for the 
naval service of the United States, approved March 2, 1837," Laws of the 
United States, Relating to the Navy and Marine Corps, p. 301. 
159 MacKenzie to Upshur, August 10, 1842, NA RG. The regulations 
governed the places where smoking was permitted: "The petty officers, 
seamen, and ordinary men can smoke forward of the foremast during 
meals, and from quarters until gunfire; at sea until 8 o'clock. The officers, 
anywhere forward of the mainmast until the lights are doused in their 
respective apartments." 
160 A. Slidell, "Thoughts on the Navy," The Naval Magazine (Vol. 2, No. 
1, January 1837), p. 23. 
161 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 196. 
162 Mackenzie, "Letter to Captain Edward Richardson, President of the 
American Seaman's Friend Society," The Sailor's Magazine (Vol. 15, No. 
12, August 1843), p. 382. 
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temperance measures, especially those intended to protect the young 
sailors. Beginning in 1837 the number of memorials to Congress 
requesting the abolition of the spirit increased markedly, and in 1842 the 
campaigners forced the Navy to adopt a more stringent grog policy. 163 
The daily ration was reduced to a single gill (a quarter-pint), and no 
commissioned officer or midshipmen, or any person under twenty-one was 
allowed to receive it. l64 Since most of the Somers' crew were forbidden 
grog by the new regulation, it was not difficult for MacKenzie to impose 
his vision of a temperance vessel upon them. However, the oldest enlisted 
men, and the petty officers were affected by the ban, which deprived them 
of their sanctioned ration. 
MacKenzie's control over the crew also extended to his authority 
over their bodies. He was the final arbiter of justice and punishment on 
board, responsible for ordering detention, stoppage of leave, and corporal 
punishment. Most often, he had recourse to the last option. Punishments 
were usually administered with a colt, but in exceptional circumstances, 
the cat-of-nine-tails was used. 
MacKenzie, therefore, sought to control his crew by means of 
standard naval operating procedure, coupling the Bible with the lash. The 
Spartan regimen imposed upon his wards reflected not only his stringent 
moral and professional utopianism, but also the dilemma that he faced as 
the commander of a school-ship. The problems of sailing a fully rigged 
vessel of war, be she only a brig, were greater than anticipated. 
MacKenzie's efforts to compensate for this reflected his concern that the 
163 Langley, Social Reform in the United States Navy, pp. 232-237. 
164 Lathrop, "Grog, Its Origin and Use in the United States Navy," pp. 379-
380. 
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vessel nevertheless be equal to both its purposes, both a school and a fully 
functional brig-of-war. 
This became an impossible task. The two could not be happily, or 
at least efficiently, merged. No larger vessels were available, and in any 
case anything much larger than a brig would have been beyond the 
capabilities of the young crew to sail. While apprentices might perform 
well on board the Hudson, Ohio, and North Carolina, these ships never 
left port. Had the Somers remained in coastal waters as she had on her 
first cruise, her skeleton crew could have compensated for the surplus of 
boys. Across blue water, however, her complexity and instability 
demanded more experience. That this was lacking is clear from the brig's 
complement and the means used to command them. 
Ultimately, MacKenzie failed to redress the problems he faced; 
the relationship between the brig and crew remained fundamentally 
skewed. Although the operational plans made possible the sailing of the 
vessel, they did not do so with alacrity. The tensions on board were not 
alleviated but repressed. MacKenzie's attempts at imposing order created 
additional instability, distorting the chain of command as experienced 
sailors and inexperienced officers acquired an importance that 
contradicted their rank. In this way, he actually compounded his 
disciplinary problems. 
The crux of the issue is that the Somers could not have been a 
fully-functional vessel of war by definition, because she was not a 
normally functioning vessel of war. She was a school, and required an 
operational plan to match that status. Intended only to produce 
experienced sailors for eventual service, the Somers was instead managed 
as if her task was already done. The allowances made for her crew were 
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not enough, and the disciplinary measures imposed upon them proved 
insufficient and unworkable. As if this was not enough, instead of being 
sailed in a controlled environment, she was ordered to the African Station, 
on active service. 
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Chapter Four 
The Second Cruise: To the African Station 
Having saluted the U.S.S. Missouri, and shown her own colours and 
number, the Somers stood down the bay from the Brooklyn Navy Yard on 
September 12, 1842.1 Her educational mission was unchanged, but she 
also carried dispatches for delivery to Commander William Ramsay on 
board the U.S. sloop-of-war Vandalia, then cruising along the African 
coast.2 MacKenzie had instructions to pursue Ramsay by way of the 
Canary and Cape Verde Islands, and then by Sierra Leone and Monrovia. 
If unable to locate him upon reaching Liberia, the brig was to return to the 
United States.3 
Although the object of the mission was simple enough, the cruise 
represented a considerable undertaking. The African coast had long been 
notorious for yellow fever, dysentery, and malaria.4 The previous year, the 
Secretary of the Navy had said as much in his annual report.5 Concern for 
the crew's safety was expressed in MacKenzie's orders, which forbade him 
from remaining on the coast for more than a day if he could help it, "not 
1 "Rodgers Journal," September 12-13, 1842. 
2 Upshur to MacKenzie, September 7, 1842, NA RG 45. 
3 Ibid. 
4 M. Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant 
Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700-1750 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 46; W. Howard, 
American Slavers and the Federal Law, 1837-1862 (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1963), pp. 41-42. Technically speaking, there would 
not be an "African Station" until the formal designation of the Africa 
Squadron in 1853. P.E. Coletta, The American Naval Heritage (New 
York: University Press of America, 1987), p. 103. 
5 SNR 1841, p. 371. 
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allowing any of [his] crew to be on shore after night.,,6 This last 
stipulation was presumably intended to prevent any drunken liberties such 
as the one described by Hugh Thomas: "Within an hour or two, most of the 
[sailors] would be drunk on local spirits. To sleep off the effects, they 
would lie all night in the gutters. By the time they returned to sobriety, 
they would probably have been infected with malaria, if not yellow fever."? 
MacKenzie who had spent two years (1824-1826) invalided ashore by the 
effects of yellow fever, would have appreciated this threat. 
Danger also lurked offshore. The palmwood trade had grown 
considerably in the past twenty years, but the basis of the regional 
economy remained the traffic in slaves. Despite the presence of the Royal 
Navy's anti-slaving squadron, slave ships abounded off the coast. The 
Somers' course would not take her as far south as the Bight of Benin where 
the greatest part of the slave trade was centred, but in her passage she 
would enter the slavers' world. The Cape Verde Islands were its most 
northerly outpost, visited by slavers replenishing their supplies before 
proceeding to the slave markets. Down the coast, the Gambia River had 
been largely cleared of the traffic by 1840, but slaving flourished south of 
it, especially along the Casamance, Nunez, Pong as and Gallinas Rivers (the 
latter continued to be the most popular slaving station north of the equator, 
in spite of the destruction of its barracoons, fortifications, and store houses 
in 1840).8 If an encounter with a slave ship might not be probable, it 
would not be unlikely, and therefore was a cause for concern. 
6 Upshur to MacKenzie, September 7,1842, NA RG 45. 
? H. Thomas, The Slave Trade - The History of the Atlantic Slave Trade: 
1440-1870 (London: Picador, 1997), p. 687. 
8 Thomas, The Slave Trade, pp. 682-687; W.L. Mathieson, Great Britain 
and the Slave Trade, 1839-1865 (New York: Octagon Books, 1967), p. 61. 
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Labelled pirates by international law since 1820, slavers were a 
threat peculiar to the coast. Most relied on stealth, speed, or the safety of 
an American flag to elude pursuit and capture, but some were willing to 
use force against anyone trying to intercept them. The Venus, of 
Baltimore, was reported to be "fully armed and prepared for resistance.,,9 
Slavers had also in the past attacked other unarmed slavers, or turned upon 
legitimate merchantmen in the vicinity of the Cape Verde Islands and 
Sierra Leone. 10 
The Somers had been ordered, therefore, to the most perilous of the 
Navy's stations. Rarely visited by American cruisers, it did not even have 
an official status. Although this decision might seem unreasonable, it did 
make a certain sense. The mission as a dispatch vessel was actually one 
that MacKenzie had suggested in his original proposal to the Secretary of 
the Navy.ll What is more, a trans-Atlantic crossing would further test the 
brig's seaworthiness while demonstrating the capabilities of her 
apprentices. All of these conditions could have been met by a 
Mediterranean cruise, however, which would also have provided greater 
educational opportunities for the crew, and a higher profile for the 
apprenticeship program. Thus it was most probably another factor that 
decided the issue for Africa, the ratification of the Webster-Ashburton 
Treaty in August 1842. 
The boundary disputes along the Canadian border were in large 
measure responsible for the war scares that the treaty was meant to remedy, 
9 Anon., The Army and Navy Chronicle (Vol. 10, No.7, 1840), p. 101. 
10 Mathieson, Great Britain and the Slave Trade, p. 26; W.E.F. Ward, The 
Royal Navy and the Slavers: The Suppression of the Atlantic Slave Trade 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969), p. 107. 
II MacKenzie to Upshur, April 30, 1842, NA RG 45. 
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but there were also significant differences over the slave trade. Great 
Britain had abolished the trade in 1808, emancipated all slaves in British 
possessions in 1833, and by 1842 was the foremost anti-slaving nation in 
Europe. The United States, despite outlawing the trade in 1807, had 
allowed its flag to become the means by which slavers eluded the British 
blockade. The Webster-Ashburton Treaty hoped to enlist the U.S. Navy in 
this blockade whilst driving slavers from the protection of the Stars and 
Stripes. 
The British had adopted a tripartite strategy for eradicating the 
slave trade, negotiating treaties with other nations that further abolished the 
traffic. This was fundamental to the success of the second part of their 
strategy, blockading the coast. In order to seize a vessel for slave trading 
it was necessary to intercept, board, and search it. If slaves, or evidence 
indicating that the vessel intended to take on slaves was discovered, it 
could be escorted to Freetown and the British court. There, the third part 
of the strategy was enacted, the resettlement and emancipation of freed 
slaves at Sierra Leone. Boarding a ship required the consent of its home 
nation, however, which was obtained through the anti-slaving treaties. 
Thus, when Portugal agreed to stop slaving in 1839, only the United States 
remained in defiance of British policy. 
American intransigence ran deep, rooted in traditional anglophobia 
and memories of the War of 1812. At stake were several principles 
evocative of that conflict. The United States regarded itself as the 
champion of neutral rights, and (perhaps paradoxically in this case) the 
freedom of the seas. 12 Any action that impinged on these was contrary to 
12 H. Soulsby, The Right of Search and the Slave Trade in Anglo-American 
Relations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1933), pp. 62-63. 
156 
American policy. That any nation could impose its will upon maritime 
commerce was bad enough, for Britain to attempt it was unthinkable. The 
United States maintained that the colours flown by a vessel were a 
manifestation of national sovereignty, that the flag was a sacred protection, 
and that in peacetime no nation besides the United States could claim any 
jurisdiction over a ship flying the Stars and Stripes: "[It is] the fixed 
determination of my government, that their flag is to be the safety and 
protection to the persons and property of its citizens, and all under it...,,13 
Furthermore, since Britain refused to renounce the right of 
impressment (which could only inflame American passions), the protection 
of the flag seemed even more vital. In fact, the Royal Navy only claimed 
the right to impress British citizens (who owed service to the crown), but 
this was no great comfort to Americans who saw it in terms of past abuse. 
Impressment for them represented a disregard of American sovereignty, 
and so seemed less another nation's internal policy, than a threat to the 
liberties of seafaring Americans. No matter that representatives of each 
government declared the issue a dead letter: in the early 1840s, it remained 
inflammatory in the United States. 14 
The two nations' long standing maritime rivalry produced another 
more practical, if equally anglophobic rationale for American defiance. It 
was widely argued that Britain used the pretense of abolishing the slave 
trade to disrupt American shipping for commercial reasons. 15 Indeed, the 
Secretary of the Navy reported to President Tyler in 1842 that African 
13 Andrew Stevenson (American Minister to England) to Lord Palmerston, 
April 16, 1841, quoted in Soulsby, The Right of Search, p. 57. 
14 Soulsby, The Right of Search, p. 86. 
15 Soulsby, The Right of Search, pp. 39-40; Ward, Royal Navy and the 
Slave Trade, p. 147. 
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commerce was "rapidly on the increase," before expressing concern that 
British naval hegemony (and conversely the absence of any American 
naval presence) "enabled the English to exclude us from the most valuable 
part of the trade of Gambia and Sierre [sic] Leone.,,16 Unfortunately, and 
less righteously, the slave trade was also good business. It provided work, 
and both foreign and domestic contracts brought considerable wealth to 
American shipyards. Providence, Bristol, Salem, Beverly, Boston, 
Portland, and even Philadelphia built ships for the Brazilian slave trade. 17 
New York would eventually dominate this shipbuilding, but in the late 
1830s the leader was undoubtedly Baltimore. 18 The city's clippers were 
turned out at a furious pace, and Baltimore shipbuilding actually enjoyed a 
boom during the depression of 1837-1838, when most other shipyards saw 
their business slump. 19 
Finally, American sectional politics hindered any rapprochement 
with Britain. Whereas British abolitionism had already won its great 
battle, the nascent American movement was divided and thus, ineffectual. 
The abolitionists had split apart over the issue of political action. William 
Lloyd Garrison repudiated political action since this was a moral issue, 
which put him into conflict with those who sought to achieve a political 
resolution.20 In this instance, principle had collided with pragmatism. 
16 British and Foreign State Papers 1843-1844, Upshur to Tyler, 
December 27, 1842, pp. 445-449, quoted Souisby, The Right of Search, p. 
120. 
17 Thomas, The Slave Trade, p. 680. 
18 Thomas, The Slave Trade, p. 770. 
19 Howard, American Slavers and the Federal Law, p. 32. 
20 A.S. Kraditor, Means and Ends in American Abolitionism: Garrison and 
His Critics on Strategy and Tactics, 1834-1850 (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1969), pp. 118-140; W.M. Merrill, Against Wind and Tide: A 
Biography of Wm. Lloyd Garrison (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1971), pp. 201-202; R.H. Sewell, Ballotsfor Freedom: Antislavery 
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Although the abolitionists were prevented from sending any memorials to 
Congress, abolition could only come with legislative action. Not that· 
they could have overcome the Southern interests there. Likewise, pro-
slavery forces resisted any attacks on the international slave trade for fear 
that they would engender domestic attacks on their peculiar institution. 
This belligerence was compounded by perceived British interference with 
American internal affairs, notably abolitionist activities in Texas, and the 
Creole Incident.21 Besides this, slavery had always been integral to the 
American economy in a way that it was not to the British counterpart, and 
the emergence of cotton as the principal American export ensured that 
abolition would be more difficult to achieve.22 
In the anti-slaving dispute the United States raised the old flag of 
"sailors' rights and free trade." The slavers were quick to imitate this, and 
themselves hoisted the Stars and Stripes. Since only the U.S. Navy could 
detain American-flagged vessels, and since the U.S. Navy was nowhere to 
be seen, the Stars and Stripes became a simple and effective way of 
thwarting the Royal Navy. The British acknowledged that they had no 
authority to detain American ships, but wanted nonetheless to pursue 
Politics in the United States 1837-1860 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1967), pp. 20-24; J.L. Thomas, The Liberator: William Lloyd 
Garrison, A Biography (Boston: Little, Brown, & Company, 1963), pp. 
256-280. 
21 Soulsby, The Right of Search, p. 44; Ward, Royal Navy and the Slave 
Trade, p. 144. In autumn 1841, the Creole (an American registered ship) 
was commandeered by the slaves which she was transporting from 
Virginia to New Orleans. The slaves forced the crew to Nassau in the 
Bahamas, and upon arrival declared themselves freed. The British 
authorities there upheld this decision. 
22 H.P. Temperley, "British and American Abolitionists Compared," 
M. Duberman, ed., The Antislavery Vanguard: New Essays on the 
Abolitionists (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 355. 
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foreign slaving ships hiding behind false colours. The perverse calculus of 
the situation dictated that because of the United States' adamant refusal to 
allow the searching of American-flagged vessels, it was precisely these 
ships that were the likeliest object of the blockade. A belated effort was 
made to heal the breach in 1840 when two American cruisers, the Dolphin 
and the Grampus, were dispatched to patrol the coast in cooperation with 
the Royal Navy Despite some success, they were quickly recalled. 
Meanwhile, American-flagged vessels continued to be boarded, searched, 
and seized for slaving. 
This was the maritime controversy that Webster-Ashburton was 
designed to solve. Although it failed to address the fundamental questions 
of impressment and the right of search, the treaty did achieve a diplomatic 
resolution of the crisis, ensuring that both countries would "maintain in 
service on the coast of Africa a sufficient and adequate squadron or naval 
force of vessels, of suitable numbers and description, to carry in all not less 
than eighty guns, to enforce separately and respectively the laws, rights, 
and obligations of each of the two countries for the suppression of the slave 
trade.,,23 Thus, the United States navy would be responsible for enforcing 
American laws against slaving, thereby driving foreign-owned vessels 
from the safety of its flag and forcing American slavers to give up the 
trade. 
In the Autumn of 1842, however, only the Vandalia was on the 
African coast. Her two dozen 24-pounders failed even to approach the 
treaty requirements, and one ship patrolling some 4,000 miles of coastline 
constituted neither a squadron nor a blockade. The Navy's task was 
23 Quoted in Thomas, The Slave Trade, pp. 670-671. 
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therefore to assemble an anti-slaving squadron of eighty guns. This could 
not be done without considerable preparation, and would not be 
accomplished for another year. By sending the Somers after the Vandalia 
the Navy increased its gun strength to forty, and demonstrated that if the 
United States was not yet in compliance with the treaty, there was at least, 
future intent. Nevertheless, it was not enough for the United States to 
demonstrate intent. Once the brig was assigned to Africa, she was to help 
enforce the treaty. Apart from tracking the Vandalia, the Somers was to 
verify the credentials of any American-flagged vessels that she 
encountered, a task for which she was well-fitted. 
Speed and manoeuvrability were required to compete with the 
slavers' fast brigs and sloops. A small ship carrying a low rig was more 
difficult to spot as it approached another ship, and a shallow draught 
enabled it to patrol coastal waters where the slavers might be caught as 
they loaded their captives. Furthermore, MacKenzie had some experience 
in small ship actions and coastal interdiction. Early in his career, he had 
served for two years (1822-1824) with Commodore David Porter's 
"Mosquito Fleet," suppressing the revival of piracy in the West Indies. 
This squadron consisted of small, shallow-drafted schooners which 
patrolled individually and together, cruising inshore, stopping and 
searching any suspicious vessels (duties more or less the same as those of 
the British blockading operation).24 MacKenzie, who was waiting for his 
24 The anti-piracy patrol was frustrating for the officers and men involved. 
Indeed, their complaints bear a remarkable resemblance to the later ones 
of British officers on the Africa Station. "The fact is our enemy is an 
invisible one; he has only to throw on the fairy mantle of a Spanish 
passport, which they all go furnished with, and the pirate is completely 
concealed from view." Porter, David, June 11, 1822, quoted in G.W. 
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lieutenancy, served on the Terrier, the second largest of the schooners 
(with a displacement of only 61 tons, she was half the size of the Somers).25 
If the brig was being sent in harm's way, she was not to avoid it. 
The possibility did exist that the Somers would encounter and search 
another vessel during the cruise. Furthermore, any vessel so encountered 
might be a slaver, and in the worst scenario, would resist. MacKenzie had 
already made bold claims about the proficiency of his training crew, 
asserting that they would quickly be the equals of any regularly manned 
brig.26 Now they might be put to the ultimate test, and MacKenzie had the 
example before him of another school-ship, the revenue cutter Washington, 
which three years earlier, with a crew of only four or five adult sailors and 
around forty apprentices had captured (without any real struggle) the slave 
ship Amistad, then anchored off the coast of Long Island.27 The capture 
had created a media sensation, and the singularity of the Washington's 
crew had not gone unnoticed. The event had brought a wave of beneficial 
publicity for the apprenticeship program, which received numerous 
endorsements in the press.28 How much greater would be the gains if the 
Allen, Our Navy and the West Indian Pirates (Salem, MA: Essex Institute, 
1929), p. 51. 
25 F.B.e. Bradlee, Piracy in the West Indies and its Suppression (New 
York: Library Editions, 1970), p. 33. 
26 MacKenzie to Upshur, April 30, 1842, NA RG 45. 
27 H. Jones, Mutiny on the Amistad: The Saga of a Slave Revolt and its 
Impact on American Abolition, Law, and Diplomacy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), p. 28. On July 2, 1839, there had been a slave 
revolt on board the Amistad, a Spanish schooner operating out of Havana. 
In the month following the takeover, she had been sailed by the two 
surviving crewmen at the behest of their captors. By day, they had sailed 
to Africa, and by night, northwards in the hope of reaching the United 
States. 
28 "Naval Apprentice Boys," New York Star, "A Home Squadron," 
Baltimore Sun; "The Low, Black Schooner Captured," Journal of 
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Somers actually captured a slaver on the coast of Africa? It was not likely, 
but if it did happen, the rewards would be enormous. 
As if this was not responsibility enough, the cruise had been made 
even more complicated by the arrival of one of the new midshipmen, Philip 
Spencer (Figure 7). MacKenzie did not want Spencer on board, and 
although he was against transferring officers for convenience's sake from 
one command to another, he attempted to do so in this case.29 
Nevertheless, the request was denied, and the midshipman remained. 
~pencer's life before entering the Navy is little known. He was 
born in 1824, the youngest of John Canfield Spencer's three sons.30 Indeed, 
it is his father and grandfather who, less notorious, are better remembered. 
His grandfather, Ambrose Spencer, had first established the family name in 
New York politics at the beginning of the century. First a member of the 
State Assembly, he had served on the pivotal council of appointment for 
over twenty years. Furthermore, in 1802 he had become a Justice on the 
State Supreme Court, where he remained for twenty-one years, spending 
the last four as Chief Justice. Far from diminishing his role in politics, he 
used his place on the bench to wield even greater authority. By 1823, 
however, his power had been broken. 31 
Commerce, all quoted in Goin, Remarks on the Home Squadron and 
Naval School, pp. 17,30,35. 
29 A.S. Mackenzie, "Thoughts on the Navy," The Naval Magazine (Vol. 2, 
No.1, January 1837), p. 40. 
30 W. Gay, "Recollections of Philip Spencer," Purple and Gold (Vol. 24, 
No.2, April 1895), p. 37. 
31 Elected as a Federalist to the New York State Assembly in 1793, he had 
defected to the Republicans in 1798, a year after his appointment to the 
unanimously Federalist Council of Appointment. He retained his place 
there until it was abolished in 1821, holding "almost undisputed 
dictatorship of politics in New York." This power was derived from the 
vast system of patronage overseen by the council. By 1813 Spencer 
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Ambrose Spencer's decline was matched by the rise of his eldest 
son, John Canfield Spencer (Figures 8 and 9) who had early followed his 
father into public service. Known equally for his brilliance and temper, he 
had quickly become a force in New York politics.32 In 1829, Van Buren 
appointed him as the special prosecutor investigating masonic involvement 
in the murder of William Morgan.33 The murder caused a furor in western 
/ 
emerged with governor Daniel D. Tompkins as the most powerful 
Republican in the state. The next seven years saw him ascendant, but 
power brought him into conflict with Martin Van Buren, who would 
ultimately defeat him at the New York Constitutional Convention of 182I. 
There, Van Buren had the Council of Appointment abolished, stripping 
Spencer of his power. His defeat was more or less complete when the 
State Senate, dominated by Van Buren's Bucktails, refused to reappoint 
him to the Supreme Court in 1823. J.P. Boyd, "Ambrose Spencer," M. 
Dumas, ed., Dictionary of American Biography, Vol. 17 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1935), p. 444; H. McBain, DeWitt Clinton and the 
Origin of the Spoils System in New York (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1907), pp. 77-78. 
32 After serving as Daniel D. Tompkins' private secretary, he was admitted 
to the New York bar in 1809. Five years later he was made postmaster of 
Canandaigua, and in 1815 he was appointed assistant attorney general and 
the district attorney general for the five western counties of New York. In 
1817, he was elected as the Clintonian candidate for the U.S. House of 
Representatives, which he left after one term in order to be the Republican 
candidate for the United States Senate. In the 1819 Republican caucus he 
had the firm support of the Clintonians, and managed to secure a majority 
for his nomination, but the caucus broke up without a vote amid mutual 
recrimination between the Clintonians and the Bucktails. Afterwards, Van 
Buren authored a pamphlet praising the Federalist candidate, Rufus King. 
This decided the issue, and Spencer lost the nomination when the 
legislature reconvened in 1820. He quickly recovered from this defeat with 
a victory in the state elections, and was elected as Speaker of the General 
Assembly. He remained there until 1825, when he moved to the upper 
house. D.B. Cole, Martin Van Buren and the American Political System 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 54; E.M. Shepard, 
Martin Van Buren (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1916), p. 69; M. 
Van Buren, The Autobiography of Martin Van Buren, J.e. Fitzpatrick, ed. 
(Washington, D.e.: Government Printing Office, 1920), pp. 100-lOI. 
33 McFarland, Sea Dangers, pp. 56-60. William Morgan was a Mason 
who had threatened to publish a book divulging the secrets of the Masonic 
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New York, where the Masons were seen as a corrupt and pernicious force 
threatening the liberties of the Republic. In response to the outcry, a 
number of conservative Republicans, Clintonians, and Federalists formed 
the Anti-Masonry party.34 Spencer was among their early leaders. It has 
been supposed that Van Buren appointed him in order to put Spencer in an 
impossible situation: success meant alienating Masonic voters, and failure 
rites of initiation. He had been arrested, held unfairly, and then kidnapped 
before being murdered, likely by drowning in Lake Niagara. 
34 The anti-masonic movement actually preceded the party, which was 
formed to give it broader political direction and to challenge Van Buren's 
power. The movement originated in the towns along the Erie Canal, and 
its members were largely hostile to Van Buren, who had earlier sought to 
prevent the canal's construction. As anti-masonry carne out of the "burnt 
over" district of western New York, it is hardly surprising that it also 
shared many of the characteristics of evangelicalism, notably a belief in 
conspiracy and a desire for reform. As the movement grew in strength, it 
attacked masonry across a range of issues. Anti-masons maintained that 
the secret society fostered aristocracy since it was exclusionary, and that 
its disregard for due process of law in the Morgan case made it a threat to 
republican liberties. Furthermore, masonry was anti-temperance and anti-
community, since it encouraged its members to ignore their families in 
favour of strong drink. When John Quincy Adams was defeated by 
Jackson in 1828, the anti-masons took over the role of opposition in New 
York from Adams' shattered political machine. Notwithstanding later 
successes in New York and the Northeast, the party did not establish itself 
as a dominant force in national politics. This was understandable since an 
anti-masonic party was essentially self-defeating. As anti-masonry grew, 
masonry receded, leaving the party without any larger purpose. Even so, 
anti-masonry had a profound impact on American politics, producing a 
new generation of leaders from its ranks who would lead the Whig party 
in the future. In fact, anti-masonry reshaped Northern Whiggery, and 
provided the initial platform for its sustained opposition to the Democrats. 
This was undoubtedly the movement's greatest contribution to American 
political life. Formisano, The Birth of Mass Political Parties, pp.199-221; 
M. Holt, "Anti Masonic and Know Nothing Parties," A.M. Schlesinger, 
Jr., ed., History of u.s. Political Parties, Vol. 11789-1860, From Factions 
to Parties (New York: Chelsea House, 1973), pp. 582-592; H.Y. Watson, 
Liberty and Power: The Politics of Jacksonian America (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1990), pp. 180-182. 
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meant personal embarrassment.35 Others have accorded him more altruistic 
motives, his respect for Spencer's ability and his desire to see the job well 
done. 36 At any rate, Spencer was zealous in his prosecution, publishing a 
pamphlet on Freemasonry, and ceasing his pursuit only when he had 
exhausted his funds. 37 What is more, he actually survived two 
assassination attempts, presumably by masons.38 
In 1831, he returned to the General Assembly where he stood out as 
the leading member of his party, "always forward and assuming.,,39 His 
political stature was undoubtedly increased by his close relationship with 
the leading Anti-Mason in the Senate, William Henry Seward, whose 
protege he became.4O In 1832 he was again involved with Federal politics 
when he was one of two electors nominated by the Anti-Masons.41 His 
role in the presidential election was inconsequential, however, and he 
remained a state politician throughout the 1830s, serving on the General 
Assembly until Seward's victory in the gubernatorial race of 1839. By then 
a Whig, he was appointed Secretary of State of New York, a position 
which he left two years later to become the Secretary of War under 
President John Tyler. Spencer's decision caused a breach between him and 
his father, who disassociated himself from it.42 John Canfield Spencer's 
35 J. Hammond, The History of Political Parties in the State of New York, 
from the Ratification of the Federal Constitution to December 1840, 
quoted in Shepard, Martin Van Buren, pp. 174-175. 
36 Shepard, Martin Van Buren, p. 175. 
37 J.e. Spencer, A Portrait of Masonry (Washington: n.p., 1832). 
38 McFarland, Sea Dangers, p. 59. 
39 G.G. Van Deusen,William Henry Seward (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1967), pp. 16-17. 
40 C.M. Wiltse, John Calhoun - Sectionalist: 1840-1850, Vol. 2 (New 
York: Russell and Russell, 1968), p. 48. 
41 Shepard, Martin Van Buren, pp. 245-246. 
42 R. Seager, ed., The Papers of Henry Clay, The Whig Leader-
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national role had been won only with the enmity of his fellow Whigs. 
Nevertheless, it had increased his political profile. Apart from the obvious 
responsibilities of his cabinet post, Spencer had considerable influence 
over the President's fiscal policy.43 Thus, when Philip Spencer entered the 
Navy, his father exercised significant power at the national level, and 
retained considerable influence in his homestate of New York. 
Philip Spencer's early years belied his father's success. While they 
did not betray a lack of promise, they do indicate a rebellious, even 
juvenile frame of mind. He did not suffer for want of schooling, but 
responded poorly to discipline and authority. The recollections of his 
classmates describe a bright boy unfettered with ambition or seriousness, 
an assessment borne out in his academic record. 
Spencer entered Hobart College in 1838, where he remained for 
three years without advancing to the sophomore class. On April 21, 1841 
he was granted dismission from Hobart and transferred to Union College in 
Schnectedy, New York.44 The President of Union College was an old 
friend of John Canfield Spencer and agreed to the boy's admission in spite 
of his poor academic standing. Spencer's time there was brief, notable 
only as the occasion for his founding of a secret society, Chi Psi 
January 1, 1837-December 31, 1843, Vol. 9 (Lexington, KY: University 
Press of Kentucky, 1988), p. 786. 
43 Wiltse, John Calhoun, p. 75. 
44 Gay, "Recollections of Philip Spencer," p. 39. The letter of dismission 
was a compromise worked out between Spencer's father and the college. 
"Philip Spencer, at the request of his father received a dismission from 
[Hobart] college. The request was made in consequence of his continued 
neglect of college exercises and this neglect stated in the letter of 
dismission; but inasmuch as a change of association might prove 
favorable, it was also stated that the faculty of [Hobart] college would 
make no objection on account of his deficient standing here, to his 
immediate reception at any other college." 
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Fratemity.45 This was an obvious kick at his father's anti-masonry. As 
such, the secret society presaged an even greater revolt against parental 
authority. 
Sometime before the resumption of the fall term, Spencer stole 
$300 from his father and ran away, intending to make a new life for 
himself on board a whaling ship.46 Indeed, he was alleged to have then 
weathered the great gale of October 1841 whilst hunting "black fish.,,47 
Although he succeeded in evading his family for a short while, he was 
discovered two days before sailing, and another man was paid to take his 
place. Exasperated with his son's apparent incorrigibility, John Canfield 
Spencer decided upon what must have seemed an excellent solution. Since 
the boy was so enamoured with the sea, he would be put into the Navy as 
an acting midshipman.48 
There were a number of reasons why this decision would have been 
appropriate. In the first place, it was within his power. Midshipmancy had 
always been highly politicised, and by the 1840s the connection between 
patronage and appointment had grown close. Indeed, Spencer was one of 
223 midshipman appointed in 1841, the great size of the class being a 
45 Ibid. 
46 Charles Sibley, CMP, p. 171. 
47 New York Weekly Tribune, December 24, 1842, quoted in H. Hayford, 
ed., The Somers Mutiny Affair - A Primary Sourcebook (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1959))p. 14. 
48 Gay, "Recollections of Philip Spencer," pp. 37, 39-40. Much has been 
made of Philip Spencer's preoccupation with stories of the sea and 
swashbuckling, particularly his fascination with Charles Elms' The Pirates 
Own Book, a compilation of lurid piratical tales. See C. Elms, The Pirates 
Own Book - Authentic Narratives of the Most Celebrated Sea Robbers 
New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1993, originally published 1837). 
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product of the previous year's Whig electoral victory.49 The Navy's junior 
officers had been effectively incorporated into the spoils system. As a 
cabinet member, especially one with a military portfolio, John Canfield 
Spencer had immediate access to the Secretary of the Navy, and could 
disregard the extensive waiting list for midshipman's warrants. Moreover, 
he could claim the favour since his presence in the cabinet was important 
for its credibility. Tyler was extremely unpopular with his party, and 
Spencer's place helped establish the centrist cabinet's Whig credentials. 50 
Finally, there was a more immediate precedent, family tradition. 
The Spencer family, while not so distinguished as the Perrys, Decaturs, or 
Rodgers', possessed its own naval tradition. Spencer's uncle, William 
Spencer, had been promoted captain in January 1841, having already 
served thirty-two years. 51 Spencer's brother Ambrose was his captain's 
clerk on board the Columbus. 52 Indeed, he had been put there presumably 
to keep out of further trouble following his arrest for forging five hundred 
dollars worth of checks in his father's name.53 Finally, the eldest of John 
Canfield Spencer's sons, John Canfield Spencer, Jr., was the assistant 
surgeon on board the Potomac. 54 Thus, Philip Spencer had a powerful 
patron within the Navy itself. His uncle was well-positioned to follow his 
49 P. Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and 
the Emergence of Modern American Navalism (New York: The Free 
Press, 1974), p. 21. 
50 McFarland, Sea Dangers, p. 77. 
51 Callahan, List of Officers of the Navy, p. 534. 
52 W.H. Parker, Recollections of a Naval Officer, 1840-1865 (Annapolis: 
Naval Institute Press, 1985), p. 20. 
53 Seager, Papers of Henry Clay, pp. 659-660. 
54 Callahan, List of Officers of the Navy, p. 534; M. Peterson, ed., The 
Journals of Daniel Noble Johnson (1822-1863) United States Navy 
(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1959), p. vi. 
169 
nephew's progress, keeping his brother appraised of the boy's 
circumstances, and if need be, helping him out of difficulty. 
On November 21, 1841, the Secretary of the Navy appointed 
Spencer as an acting midshipman. Less than three months later, and 
before his first overseas posting, Spencer was involved in a relatively 
serious incident. His uncle had arranged for a passed midshipman, 
William Craney, to help him learn his duties on board the North Carolina. 
The two did not get along, however, for which Craney blamed Spencer's 
dissolute and drunken behaviour. Their animosity grew, and eventually 
caused a fight between them. Craney was dissuaded from pressing 
charges (Spencer was guilty of striking a superior officer, a grave offence) 
on this occasion, but he did so after a second and more public fight in 
January 1842, and then resigned when they were not pursued.55 
Afterwards, Spencer was assigned to the frigate John Adams, then 
attached to the Brazilian Squadron, where his problems followed him. He 
did not associate much with his fellow midshipmen, who sent him to 
coventry. Abandoned by his peers, Spencer appears to have drunk often, 
and alone, or allegedly with "the odds and ends of society, in and out of 
caberets borgnes ... the reeky bagnios of the Rue Saboa ... ,,56 It was not 
long before these habits resulted in another serious breach of .discipline. 
On May 21, 1842, Spencer had by his own admission, been 
"overcome by the liquors [he] had [drunk]," and had grossly insulted an 
55 [Anon] W. Craney, The New York Tribune, December 21, 1842, p. 7. 
Craney claimed that he had been dissuaded in the first instance because 
"Spencer had powerful friends," and that on the second occasion, Captain 
Spencer had arranged for the complaint to be delayed until his nephew 
could be transferred to another vessel. 
56 R.C. Rogers, "Reminiscences of Philip Spencer and the Brig Somers," 
United Service Magazine (Second Series, No.4, July 1890), p. 27. 
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English midshipman while on shore.57 After being arrested, he appealed to 
the squadron's commander to be spared punishment, or allowed to tender 
his resignation in order to spare his father any embarrassment. 
Commodore Morris first accepted the resignation, but then announced that 
it was beyond his authority to do so, and ordered Spencer home for his 
case to be heard by the Secretary of the Navy. 
Two months later, from the Boston Navy Yard, Spencer wrote to 
his brother casually dismissing his problems, and predicting an imminent 
return to sea. "I shall probably be in Albany in a few days as soon as 1 can 
get detached from the ship, but shall not stop for more than a day as 1 shall 
apply for sea service immediately.,,58 His confidence was not misplaced. 
Less than a week later he received a letter from the Secretary of the Navy 
which, having censured and condemned his actions, forgave them, and 
returned his midshipman's appointment. On August 15, 1842, Spencer 
was ordered to the Somers. 
Upshur's letter to Spencer had read, "what has past will be 
forgotten but if otherwise it will be remembered against you. ,,59 This has 
certainly proven the case, and his career on board the Somers has 
understandably been seen in light of his previous misadventures. Yet his 
behaviour is not to be as easily explained as some would have it. 
Undisciplined as he was, to dismiss him as a "young punk" is both facile 
and a disservice to the subject.60 His experience and environment 
57 Spencer to Morris, May 25, 1842, quoted in Hayford, The Somers 
Mutiny Affair, p. 218. 
58 Spencer to Spencer, July, 31, 1842, quoted in Hayford, The Somers 
Mutiny Affair, p. 219. 
59 Upshur to Spencer, August 6, 1842, quoted in Hayford, The Somers 
Mutiny Affair, p. 219. 
60 Morison, Old Bruin, p. 247. 
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conditioned Spencer's actions. The former helps us understand his 
impetuousness, and the later ultimately demonstrates that it was neither as 
extreme nor as anomalous to his rank as it might at first appear. While 
this does not excuse his behaviour, it does help clarify it. 
In the first place, Spencer was not in the Navy by choice, but by 
compulsion. When Spencer signed on board the whaler he was making a 
decisive break from his family, removing himself from their influence for 
the three years he would be cruising on the South Pacific whaling grounds. 
His father's intervention had thwarted this design, and Spencer remained 
his father's son, and not his own man. That he resented his position is 
clear. On board the Somers, he expressed this on several occasions, as 
well as his intention to leave the Navy in favour of the merchant marine.61 
Spencer's behaviour in college demonstrated his aversion to formal 
education. While there he had shown himself to be uninterested, even-
self-destructive. At his best, he was unconventional, at his worst he was 
indolent. As a midshipman he was once again a student. A uniform had 
been substituted for his gown, a ship for the classroom, and an officer for 
his professor, but the role was essentially the same. One cardinal 
difference existed, the severity and seriousness of military discipline. 
Throughout 1841, his family's influence had been able to soften Spencer's 
worst conflicts with the Navy, but if discipline was wanted, the 
midshipman's appointment was a mistake. When Spencer was assigned to 
the Somers, which was officially designated as a school-ship, the mistake 
was compounded further. His rebelliousness emerged almost 
immediately. 
61 Garty, CMP, p. 119; John Tillotson, CMP, p. 168; Sibley, CMP, p. 171. 
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Upon reporting to the brig, Spencer was introduced to the line and 
staff officers on board. The first thing he did afterwards was not to deepen 
his ties with them, but to distribute a box of cigars amongst the petty 
officers.62 Spencer clearly wanted to impress them, and this was an easy 
way to do so. The cost was inconsequential to him, and the gift would 
have been welcomed. In a new environment, Spencer went about 
establishing himself as an officer by flaunting his superior means. 
Uncertain of commanding the petty officers' respect, he sought to buy 
their esteem. What he lacked in authority and experience, he compensated 
for with patronage. In doing so, Spencer sent a mixed message of 
belonging and separation. On the one hand, the gift signalled familiarity, 
that he was not a 'sun-downer,' on the other, it made clear that his were 
the prerogatives of command, of wealth, and of class. 
Spencer did not confine his gifts to the box of cigars; he also made 
occasional presents of money. The principal recipient was the boatswain's 
mate, Samuel Cromwell. He received cash on at least two occasions. The 
first, and most notable gift was given early in the cruise, between New 
York and Madeira. It amounted to fifteen dollars, according to Cromwell, 
"a pretty good present.,,63 Indeed it was, being nearly a month's pay for 
the mate.64 Another petty officer, the quarter-master Elisha Small, 
received two silver coins from Spencer.65 
In each instance the midshipman was rewarding men of singular 
importance. Cromwell was the most experienced sailor on board, a large 
and intimidating man. His respect was not easily won, and he was quick 
62 Oliver Hazard Perry, Jr., CMP, p. 172. 
63 Wales, CMP, p. 14. 
64 1842 Navy Register, ii. 
65 Wales, CMP, p. 16. 
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to anger. If Spencer wanted familiarity with the crew he risked losing the 
respect due his rank. Cromwell's friendship ensured the deference of the 
enlisted men to one of their own. His association with Cromwell 
transferred the crew's respect and fear of the petty officer to Spencer as 
well. Moreover, if Spencer wanted to win over the enlisted men, he 
needed Cromwell's acceptance. The boatswain's mate was not given to 
respect superior rank on its own merit, as seen in his disrespect for 
MacKenzie and the threats he is alleged to have made against Lieutenant 
Montgomery Lewis during his service with the Florida Squadron.66 His 
regard had to be earned. Spencer had only one year's experience against 
Cromwell's nine or more.67 Money would help make up the difference. 
As Small was another experienced sailor, and more importantly, 
Cromwell's friend, his good-will was also needed. 
Finally, on at least one occasion, Spencer threw coins onto the 
deck for the smaller boys to chase.68 Contemptuous as it may seem, this 
gesture complemented his first gift, the box of cigars. The message of 
belonging and separation remained, but the motive and emphasis were 
different. The cigars had shown his respect for the petty officers' 
experience. Spencer remained an officer, but told them that they were not 
his inferiors, that they were men worthy of his respect. In turn, he asked 
them to accept him in spite of his rank and inexperience. The boys, 
66 MacKenzie, COl, p. 45. " ... when employed in the Florida flotilla, 
under Lieut. McLaughlin, on one occasion, when in a boat expedition 
under Lieut. Rodgers, Cromwell, having been put in irons for drunkenness 
and mutinous conduct, menaced Lieut. Lewis by telling him that the next 
time they fell in with Indians other shots would be received than those that 
were fired by Indians; and that there would be some killed." 
67 NA Sailor's Protection Certificates Applications, 1833: Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, "Samuel Cromwell, May 17, 1833." 
68 Wales, CMP, p. 16. 
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however, were told that they were his inferiors, or at least certainly not his 
equals. Those who scrambled fastest would be grateful to him, but the 
coins were not given, they were thrown away. Chasing them, the 
apprentices struggled for his table-scraps. The act reinforced the divide 
between them. Spencer was not much older than the apprentices, and he 
had precious little experience, but he held a midshipman's warrant. No 
matter his relationship with the petty officers, the smaller boys were to 
remember this. At the same time, this gesture enhanced the mutual respect 
he sought from the petty officers. His need for the forecastle's acceptance 
was not absolute. Spencer had no desire to be the equal of 'small-fry.' He 
remained an officer, and his company was a privilege for those lucky 
enough to enjoy his favour. 
Although Spencer most actively courted the petty officers, he also 
sought the company of certain other seamen and older apprentices, 
offering them frequent gifts of cigars and chewing tobacco.69 Cheap and 
plentiful, they were the common currency of his friendship.70 The cigars 
were usually reserved for seamen and petty officers, but might have been 
given on occasion to the apprentices. More often, the boys received 
chewing tobacco, which was also given to some sailors, as much as a 
pound at a time.71 The apprentices, who had been forbidden any by 
MacKenzie, especially prized the tobacco. Spencer knowingly suborned 
the policy. Apart from giving the apprentices tobacco, he promised to 
protect them if they were discovered. Billinger Scott, a fifteen year-old 
apprentice, accepted tobacco from Spencer only after such assurances: 
69 Thomas Dickinson, COl, p. 37. 
70 Heiskill, CMP, p. 161. Drawn from the purser's store, the cost of a 
pound of tobacco was 38 cents, while cigars were 3 cents each. 
71 Wales, COl, p. 18. 
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"He said 'if I got hauled up for it he would stand between me and the 
commander. ,,,72 
This claim belied his authority. The assumption that Spencer 
could defend the apprentice was ridiculous. The midshipman's word was 
nothing against the commander's order. At best, he could deflect blame, 
but both were guilty of disobedience. Indeed, as an officer, Spencer's 
guilt was even greater. That Spencer was guilty as well enhanced the 
gifts' message of belonging and separation. He had access to the 
forbidden tobacco, but was also responsible for enforcing the ban. 
Instead, he used his position to circumvent it. The gift was a friendly 
enough gesture, but under these conditions it became much more. Each 
present bound him to the apprentices, and they to him. 
Spencer was defining his own hierarchy of values. The gifts 
demonstrated his regard for certain members of the crew. Moreover, they 
showed that their esteem was one of his highest priorities. His concern for 
their well-being outweighed his loyalty to MacKenzie. Spencer's sense of 
duty extended not to him, but them. 
r have seen him giving tobacco and segars [sic] to the smaller boys, 
saying, when he gave it to them, that "he knew it was contrary to the 
rules of the vessel to give it to them, but if the commander would not 
let them have it, he would accommodate them.73 
Whenever an apprentice accepted tobacco, he conspired with Spencer 
against the lawful authority on board. On the one hand, Spencer's gift 
showed that his concern for the boys exceeded MacKenzie's; on the other 
hand, its acceptance demanded gratitude. It created a bond in which 
Spencer was an alternative authority figure. The gifts did more than 
72 Billinger Scott, CMP, p. 9l. 
73 Wales, CMP, p. 16. 
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tighten his connections to the crew, they challenged MacKenzie for the 
boys' loyalty. Indeed, their defiance of his commands insulted him. 
Apart from offering these gifts, Spencer adopted an easy fraternal 
style with his favorites. He spent much of his time in their company, 
dancing and making music. His was a special contribution, since he could 
dislocate his jaw, and then playa variety of tunes on it. This was "very 
pleasing" to the crew, and they would ask him to play for their 
amusement.74 He may have joined in their yarn-spinning sessions, 
listening avidly to the tales of the older crewmen, and presumably offering 
his own.75 
Time spent with the crew was time spent apart from his fellow 
officers, and Spencer risked alienating the steerage. The abnormality of 
his behaviour was great enough to attract attention, and on a brig as small 
as the Somers, it was impossible for it to go unnoticed. Indeed, his 
intimacy with the crew, and his aloofness from the officers was widely 
noted.76 Other midshipmen socialised with the crew, but were more 
discerning, and talked only with the senior petty officers.77 Although 
Spencer dined in the steerage, and participated in some of the "steerage 
amusements," he was very much an outsider.78 Since his arrival on the 
brig, this had been the case. In the first place, Spencer's position and 
behaviour invited trouble with his peers. Steerages were notorious for 
their rivalries, bullying, and general rambunctuousness. On the one hand, 
74 Wales, CMP, p. 14; Dickinson, COl, p. 37. 
75 Matthew C. Perry, Jr., CMP, p. 70. 
76 Wales, CMP, p. 23; Matthew C. Perry, Jr., CMP, p. 63; Heiskill, CMP, 
p. 157; Daniel McKinley, CMP, p. 178; MacKenzie, CMP, p. 197. 
77 English, CMP, p. 85; William H. King, CMP, p. 90; Charles Van 
Velsor, COl, p. 39. 
78 Rodgers, CMP, pp. 128, 132. 
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clannish, midshipmen were also quick to ostracise any of their number not 
conforming to whatever conventions of behaviour they had established for 
themselves.79 Moreover, hazing was commonplace, especially against 
younger midshipmen and those who were new to the steerage.80 Spencer 
had reported in late summer after the first cruise. The midshipmen already 
on board had been together for three months, and would have forged their 
own friendships. Spencer was the newcomer in a settled environment. 
His arrival had increased the over-crowding in the steerage, and on these 
grounds alone could not have been terribly welcome. Finally, most of the 
other midshipmen were related to the brig's Commander, either by blood 
or marriage. Adrian Deslonde was the nephew of his brother, John Slidell. 
Matthew C. Perry, Jr., and Oliver Hazard Perry, Jr., were his own 
nephews, and Henry Rodgers was their cousin. MacKenzie was close to 
all of them, and appears to have told them of Spencer's past problems, and 
warned them against him.81 Finally, Spencer's open hostility to 
MacKenzie, evident in remarks to the effect that the commander's initials 
would better reflect his character had his last name begun with an 'S,'82 or 
that he was a "humbug,,,83 could only have increased the tension between 
him and the other junior midshipmen. 
It behooved Spencer to ingratiate himself with his new comrades. 
Instead, he reinforced the divide between them. Rather than overcome the 
social barriers of the steerage, he avoided them, preferring the company of 
79 Bury, Education in the Old Navy, p. 101. 
80 Maclay, Reminiscences of the Old Navy, p. 27. 
81 Matthew C. Perry, Jr., CMP, p. 68; Heiskill, CMP, p. 158. 
82 Rodgers, COl, p. 30. 
83 Egbert Thompson, COl, p. 31; Adrian Deslonde, COl, p. 32; Tillotson, 
COl, p. 34. 
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the crew. Spencer was playing a dangerous game: the gulf between 
quarter-deck and forecastle was not so easily crossed. In attempting to do 
so, he defied the social hierarchy that divided officers from men. There 
was meant to be an absolute social cleavage between the ranks. Officers 
would consort with their own kind, and enlisted men would do the same. 
Interaction would, of course, occur during watch duties, since the 
operation of a ship demanded it, but such interactions would be 
professional. Apart from maintaining a coherent chain of command, the 
hierarchy of rank paralleled a rigid caste structure defining the social roles 
of the vessel's complement, while providing the conventions that 
determined what was appropriate behaviour. Spencer was distorting these 
conventions and boundaries, affecting the subordination of the brig. 
Nevertheless, apart from Spencer's unconventional behaviour, the 
first leg of the cruise passed by without serious incident. The daily routine 
was established, and the apprentices schooled in their various tasks. 
Throughout the crossing, discipline was good, and the brig in fine working 
order.84 Although Samuel Cromwell is said to have had boys punished for 
the most trivial infractions, the number of punishments inflicted belies this 
allegation.85 Indeed, the brig's good discipline was reflected in the relative 
infrequency and mildness of the punishments on board. On thirty-three 
occasions, crewmen were colted, usually for the indeterminate offences of 
skulking or disobedience of orders, but also for sleeping on watch, 
84 Gansevoort, CMP, p. 59; Matthew C. Perry, Jr., CMP, p. 60; Henry 
King. CMP, p. 138. 
85 Wales, CMP, p. 16; William H. King, CMP, p. 88; Jonas Humbert, 
CMP, p. 101. These allegations most likely refer not to the quantity of the 
punishments, but to the severity with which Cromwell carried them out. 
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fighting, and washing clothes without permission.86 Most of these 
punishments were ordered on two separate occasions, September 22, and 
then October 2, two days before the brig's arrival at Madeira. In the first 
instance, nine boys were punished for disobedience of orders and another 
for skulking, and on the later occasion, ten were punished for a variety of 
offences including being dirty at muster, skulking, impertinent answers to 
the master-at-arms, and fighting. The cat-of-nine tails was only used on 
one occasion, September 25, when two apprentices, Dennis Manning and 
Stephen Swift, were punished before the assembled crew. Manning 
received eight lashes for theft, and Swift twelve for filthiness, the latter 
offence most likely to have been masturbation.87 Furthermore, Richard 
Gilmore was disrated to third class boy, making him the only apprentice to 
drop in rank during the cruise.88 At the same time, MacKenzie rewarded 
It is also possible that these offences were not punished by beatings, but 
by other means such as additional duties and look out. Green, CMP, p. 
216. 
86 New York Tribune, January 14, 1843, 'Punishment Log of the Somers' 
Skulking refers to the avoidance of duty whereas disobedience of orders 
was the failure to obey properly a command. This and all other 
quantifiable references to flogging are drawn from the punishment log of 
the Somers, which was a list of punishments inflicted on board. The 
punishment log was arranged chronologically, covering the first two 
cruises of the Somers, from June 3, 1842, to December 10, 1842. Each 
entry recorded the date of the punishment, the name of the crew member 
punished, his offence, and the severity of his punishment. Furthermore, 
there was a second list containing a summary total of the punishments 
each crew member received throughout the cruise. Several of these 
summary entries included remarks on the crewman's character and 
abilities, presumably taken from the school records kept on board the 
U.S.S. North Carolina. 
87 The supposition is derived from the flogging's severity, and the 
euphemistic term 'filthiness,' which has been connected to such acts. 
Valle, Rocks and Shoals, p. 174. 
88 "Muster Returns from the Brig of War Somers, September 1, 1842 -
September 30, 1846," NA RG 217, MPR, Book 1424. 
180 
good behaviour and seamanship by promoting three apprentices on the 
same occasion.89 He had already made several such promotions, most of 
them on September 18, when five apprentices were raised in rank.9O 
On October 4, after three weeks at sea, the Somers arrived at the 
harbour of Funchal, Madeira. Upon entering the harbour MacKenzie 
ordered a twenty-one gun salute for the Portuguese flag, and another 
seven-gun salute for the American Consul, who made an official visit.91 
The first leg of the cruise had been an easy one. En route, the brig had 
encountered only eight other vessels, none of which had aroused any 
concern.92 Indeed, the only difficulty had been the winds, which had 
driven the Somers as far north as the Azores.93 This had cost some sailing 
time, but caused no great discomfort. MacKenzie wanted to make up the 
lost time, so the brig departed the next morning for Tenerife. The rapid 
departure denied the crew any opportunity for liberty since they had to 
provision the brig. Samuel Cromwell resented the work, openly 
complaining that it was "damned hard usage," and that the Commander 
wanted more labour out of the crew than was necessary.94 Although 
MacKenzie and most of the other officers were off the brig, Guert 
Gansevoort and several others heard the remarks. Additionally, Cromwell 
was very slow obeying the Lieutenant's orders, and made a minimal effort 
89 "Muster Returns from the Brig of War Somers, September 1, 1842 to 
September 30,1846," NA RG 217, MPR, Book 1424 .. 
90 Ibid. 
91 "Rodgers Journal," October, 4, 1842. 
92 "Rodgers Journal," September 16,20,22,24,27,28,29, and October 2, 
1842. All of the vessels save one were American, the exception being a 
French brig seen off the Point of St. George on September 29. 
93 MacKenzie to Upshur, October 4,1842, NA RG 45. The Somers 
arrived off Fayal, in the Azores, on September 27. 
94 CMP, pp. 14,54; COl, p. 18. 
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to see that the crew followed them.95 Whilst getting under weigh, in the 
presence of Lt. Gansevoort and Sailing-Master Perry, Cromwell had also 
sworn "God damn the jib and the lacing, and the damned fool that 
invented it.,,96 The damned fool, was of course, MacKenzie. Although 
this outburst (the beginning of an increasingly insubordinate pattern of 
behaviour) earned Cromwell a severe reproof, there was no further 
punishment. 
Cromwell's irritation may have stemmed from the short distance to 
be sailed. After just two days' sailing, the peaks of Teneriffe were sighted 
on October 7, and late in the evening, the Somers dropped anchor off 
Santa Cruz. The next morning MacKenzie rewarded fifteen of the 
apprentices by allowing them to go ashore on liberty. Apart from the 
obvious respite this gave them from a month's time spent on board, liberty 
was a considerable privilege since the lucky fifteen would now escape the 
day's work, further provisioning of the brig. Those who remained on 
board had to load and stow 270 pounds of fresh beef and 424 pounds of 
vegetables. Whatever pleasure there might have been in saluting the 
Spanish flag with a seventeen-gun salute (which was returned gun for 
gun), did not compensate for hauling supplies in the rain.97 Additionally, 
thirteen boys were col ted whilst in the port, most of them for 
undeanliness.98 The irritation of those who remained on board would 
have been exacerbated when they were denied their own leave later in the 
day. Several apprentices had remained onshore too long, and by the time 
95 COl, p. 24. 
96 CMP, pp. 54, 67, 90. 
97 "Rodgers Journal," October 8, 1842. 
98 New York Tribune, 'Punishment Log of the Somers,' January 14, 1843. 
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they returned, it was too late for any others to leave the brig.99 The next 
morning the Somers received on board further supplies and another 800 
gallons of water. Early in the evening, the brig set sail for the Cape Verde 
Islands. Some time later, Daniel McKinley was punished for breaking his 
liberty. He was the only apprentice to be flogged for the liberty-breaking, 
probably because he had been specifically ordered by MacKenzie to return 
to the brig. loo At any rate, his punishment was severe, twelve strikes with 
the cats. 
The cruise to the Cape Verde Islands was as quiet as its 
predecessor as dnly two other vessels were seen, a schooner and a brig. 101 
On board, however, several noteworthy incidents occurred. There were 
twenty-four floggings, one of which was with the cats. The offences for 
which these were ordered show an increase of tension amongst the crew. 
Whereas skulking and disobedience of orders had been prevalent before 
Madeira, fighting was the most common transgression between Santa Cruz 
and the island of St. lago, accounting for one quarter of the 
punishments. 102 Most of the other coltings were for acts of carelessness 
such as dropping a knife from aloft, leaving jackets about the deck, and 
not having proper attire. One apprentice, Dennis Manning, colted on three 
separate occasions, had a particularly difficult time. 
99 Gansevoort, COl, p. 25 Several of the apprentices broke their liberty, 
but only two are named: Daniel McKinley and Benjamin Green. 
100 Sears, CMP, p. 115. 
101 "Rodgers Journal," October 9 and 10, 1842. 
102 New York Tribune, 'Punishment Log of the Somers.' Those punished 
were: Dennis Manning (October 9; 9 colts), William Houghland (October 
17; 6 colts), Wallace Dowd (October 17; 6 colts), Peter Tyson (October 
17; 6 colts), Stephen Swift (October 17; 6 colts), and Daniel McKinley 
(October 20; 6 colts). 
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Manning was also flogged with the cats the day after the Somers 
arrived at the Cape Verde Islands. He had been caught stealing and was 
given twelve strikes. He was not the first person to have been flogged for 
that offence on board. A little more than a week earlier, Peter Tyson had 
received the same punishment. The absence of privacy, and the presence 
of two thieves could only have increased whatever tensions were present. 
It is not surprising that both Manning and Tyson were also punished for 
fighting during this crossing. 
Sometime after Madeira, Cromwell's zeal in administering 
punishment appeared to relax. Although he continued to be responsible 
for flogging, he reduced the force with which he struck these blows. 103 
Furthermore, he began to be friendlier with the younger apprentices, 
allowing them to skylark around him, and curse his name. 104 Finally, he 
began to associate more with certain members of the crew. 105 Cromwell 
was, however, caught in a paradoxical situation. Beforehand, he was 
criticised for being too hard on the boys, and now, for being too lenient 
and familiar. 106 
The Somers had sailed for eleven days before reaching the harbour 
of Porto Praya in the Cape Verde Islands on October 20, 1842. Upon 
arrival, MacKenzie made the customary salute to the sovereign flag of the 
island, firing seventeen guns in honour of Portugal, each of which was 
returned by the harbour fort. Furthermore, another seven were offered to 
103 Wales, COl, p. 19; Matthew C. Perry, Jr., CMP, p. 63; William H. 
King, CMP, p. 88; Humbert, CMP, p. 10l. 
104 Dickinson, COl, p. 37. 
105 William H. King, CMP, p. 88. 
106 Dickinson, CMP, p. 148. 
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the United States Consul. I07 MacKenzie learned from him that the 
Vandalia had last been at the island on July 7, and that there had been no 
further word from her. The next day, a Royal Navy brig entered the 
harbour, and her commander told MacKenzie that he had spoke the 
Vandalia off the Isles de Los seven days after she had departed Porto 
Praya.108 
MacKenzie, having no means of knowing the current whereabouts 
of the Vandalia, decided to press on to Cape Mesurado with all possible 
speed. 109 Lingering at Porto Praya only to replenish his provisions, 
receiving on board two live bulls as well as fruit and vegetables, he set sail 
the day after his arriva1. 110 That evening, there was another mass coIting. 
Eight boys were punished, primarily for disobedience of orders, but also 
for fighting and improper language. Besides Dennis Manning's flogging, 
another apprentice, Jonas Humbert, was given six strikes with the cats for 
disobedience. 
By this stage of the cruise, Spencer was a clear favorite of the 
crew. There were, however, a select few with whom he was especially 
close. He was most intimate with the two senior enlisted men, Cromwell 
and Small. Although Small had been disrated from quartermaster to 
seaman before the brig's arrival at Madeira, he remained one of the most 
experienced sailors on board. To begin with, Spencer was closer to Small, 
but as the cruise progressed, he spent more and more time with the 
boatswain's mate. That Spencer and Cromwell had been close before the 
107 "Rodgers Journal," October 20, 1842. 
108 "Rodgers Journal," October 21, 1842. 
109 MacKenzie to Upshur, October 21, 1842, NA RG 45. 
110 "Rodgers Journal," October 21, 1842. The livestock was presumably 
kept on the forecastle. 
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trans-Atlantic crossing is clear, but it was only after their departure from 
Madeira that they became especially tight. III 
Spencer's immediate circle also included apprentices and seamen. 
Closest to him were Benjamin Green, Alexander McKee, and Daniel 
McKinley.ll2 Less intimate, but also close were Charles Wilson, George 
Warner, and Henry Waltham. Finally, Spencer's associations extended to 
William Neville, Jonathan Cavanaugh, Henry Stremmels, Edmund Gallia, 
and Charles Golderman. His closeness with these last crewmen is 
uncertain since they are often referred to only once in connection to 
Spencer. Edmund Gallia for instance, would borrow Spencer's pipe, and 
speak Spanish with him, but nothing more is known of their 
relationship. 113 Spencer was also likely to have been close with the 
captain of the forecastle, Charles Van Velsor, and three other apprentices, 
Richard Hamilton, George Kneavels, and Eugene Sullivan. I 14 
Two of those named as being his friends, Billinger Scott and Jacob 
Blackman, were actually Spencer's hammock boys."s They stowed his 
hammock in the morning, readied it at night, and scrubbed it when 
required, for which they were paid in small cash, or as has been seen, 
III Oliver Browning, COl, p. 36. 
112 That these men and boys were friends of Spencer is without doubt, but 
the closeness of the friendships relative to one another is a matter of 
conjecture. In assigning them levels of familiarity, I have relied on the 
number of times which they were referred to by other members of the 
crew as having been friends of the midshipman, e.g., Benjamin Green is 
mentioned seven times, Alexander McKee, six times, and Daniel 
McKinley, four times. 
113 Wales, CMP, p. 15. 
114 This supposition is based on their arrest as likely mutineers later in the 
cruise. 
115 COl, p. 34, 39. 
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tobacco. 116 Manuel Howard was the steerage steward. He was responsible 
for serving all the midshipmen at meal times and accommodating their 
wishes. On at least one occasion he gave Spencer a head massage. 117 
Thus, these three were not so much intimates as servants. 
Spencer had also ordered the galley cooks to give Cromwell coffee 
whenever he wanted. ll8 Whether or not his other friends enjoyed this 
privilege is uncertain since there is no record of it, and certain of the 
galley cooks later disavowed any familiarity with the midshipman. 119 
Cromwell, who was said to be "very tight" with the galley cooks may very 
well have been the only one of Spencer's circle to benefit in this way.l20 
At any rate, Spencer was again extending the prerogatives of his own rank 
to someone whose status on board did not otherwise command it. 
Spencer's actual friends were the oldest and most experienced boy-
sailors on board. Waltham, Wilson, Warner, Gallia, and McKinley were 
all in their early twenties, and all of the others were seventeen or older. 
The two hammock boys were only fifteen, but since his relations with 
them were likely to have been more professional than personal, their youth 
is not an issue. The one exception to the rule was John Cavanaugh, who at 
thirteen years of age, was the youngest boy on board. Apart from simple 
misidentification, there are two plausible explanations for Spencer's 
friendship with Cavanaugh. He could have been moved simply by pity for 
the youngest and presumably most vulnerable boy on the brig, or he might 
have had sexual relations with him. 
116 Bury, Education in the Old Navy, p. 97. 
117 Manuel Howard, COl, p. 40. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Henry Garrabrandts, COl, p. 40. 
120 Charles Stewart, CMP, p. 154. 
187 
Spencer was probably having homosexual relations with older 
members of the crew. At least, the other midshipmen assumed so, 
referring to his companions as his "chickens. ,,121 This was naval slang for 
the junior partner in a homosexual couple. I22 Such couples were junior-
senior pairings, with the senior partner playing the role of protector and 
provider in exchange for sexual favours. Spencer's gift-giving and higher 
rank was commensurate with the senior's role. These relationships did not 
necessarily extend to actual intercourse, and often consisted of nothing 
more than mutual masturbation, a practice which was sometimes called 
the "boom cover trade," since it was often carried out there. 123 Although it 
hardly constitutes proof of Spencer's homosexuality, he was seen beneath 
the booms on at least one occasion. At any rate, if Spencer's sexuality is 
uncertain, that his fellow officers considered him capable of 
homosexuality is not. 
Besides "familiarity that [did] not acquit an officer and a 
gentleman,,,124 Spencer was providing his closest friends with alcohol. 
These gifts constituted a very serious breach of discipline since they were 
a direct contravention of naval regulations, and sabotaged MacKenzie's 
temperance policy. Far more than his gifts of tobacco, they aligned 
Spencer against the Commander and with the crew. MacKenzie, like 
many other naval officers, considered the grog ration to be responsible for 
many of the Navy's woes. In keeping with his beliefs, he had decreed that 
121 McKinley, CMP, p. 176. 
122 B.R. Burg, An American Seafarer in the Age of Sail - The Erotic 
Diaries of Philip C. Van Buskirk 1851-1870 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1994), p. 79; Valle, Rocks and Shoals, p. 327. 
123 Burg, An American Seafarer, p. 74. 
124 Thompson, COl, p. 31. 
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the Somers be a 'dry' ship, without any ration. Nevertheless, there were 
supplies of liquor on board, both sanctioned and illicit. These stores 
would provide Spencer and his friends with their alcohol. 
The legitimate supply of liquor was kept in the wardroom. Lt. 
Gansevoort was in favour of the senior officers enjoying a drink with their 
meals, which MacKenzie allowed: 
In the wardroom, the officers, of course, had their wine. I 
knew what had been the views on that subject of my friends 
Commodores Pendergrass and DuPont on board the Ohio, and what 
had been their practice with regard to the total exclusion of spirituous 
liquors from the wardroom of that ship. I knew that Lieut. Gansevoort's 
views were identical on all subjects with those of his two distinguished 
messmates above named. I did not, therefore, interfere with regard to 
the wardroom ... 125 
Thus, there was a supply of liquor for the benefit of the line and 
staff officers. This cache was made available to the midshipmen when they 
were invited to dine in the wardroom. 126 On the one occasion that 
Gansevoort extended such an invitation to Spencer, brandy was served, and 
the midshipman drank to excess. 127 Even when they were dining amongst 
themselves, however, Gansevoort made a practice of sending wine for the 
midshipmen to drink with their dinner. 128 
The propriety of the Lieutenant's actions is uncertain. As only two 
of the junior officers were old enough to drink, and the brig's commander 
had forbidden them their own store of wine, Gansevoort's generosity 
represented no other authority but his own, which while considerable, did 
in fact, contravene his commander's orders. 
125 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 195. 
126 Rodgers, CMP, p. 133. 
127 Gansevoort, CMP, p. 51. 
128 Heiskill, CMP, p. 168. 
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Gansevoort was also the only officer from whom enlisted men 
legitimately received liquor: 
Q. Have you ever known Mr. Gansevoort to give brandy to any of the 
men? 
A. Yes, sir; I have known him to give brandy to Browning when he had 
been overboard, to hook the standing part of the foresheet; also, to 
Stewart, the captain of the forecastle, when he had been under the 
bows, shackling the chain, during the cold weather on the coast. I only 
saw the men go down to the wardroom wet and cold, and he gave them 
a drink. 129 
These gestures were representative of naval custom, and Gansevoort was 
making judgements as the executive officer. This was "splicing the main 
brace," an additional ration of grog given to sailors following duty in bad 
weather or after they had been much exposed to the elements. 130 The 
brandy was on the one hand a reward for services rendered, and on the 
other, a medicinal remedy to help counter the effects of cold. 
Despite Gansevoort's occasional distribution of brandy to the 
midshipmen and crew, MacKenzie was largely successful in eliminating 
drinking on board. This was a success for the temperance-minded 
commander, who ensured that the corruptive influences of alcohol did not 
come from above, a charge frequently levied at the Navy for its spirit 
ration. Indeed, there were hardly any recorded instances of punishments 
relating to drunkenness on board the Somers. What problems there were 
had occurred much earlier, when the brig was still in New York City. 
129 Rodgers, CMP, p. 133. 
130 E.H. Stringham, 'Letter to the Secretary of the Navy on Corporal 
Punishment and the Spirit Ration,' quoted in Lathrop, "Grog, its Origin 
and Use in the United States Navy," p. 380. 
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Then, four apprentices had been coIted for drunkenness, and two of them 
reassigned. 131 Nonetheless, the temperance policy was a failure. 
While the Somers might have been a dry vessel for a short while 
during her summer anchorage in New York, she had not remained so for 
long. The harbour presented plenty of opportunities to smuggle liquor on 
board before the vessel set sail, and at least one instance was alleged 
during the court-martial. Elisha Small was said to have smuggled liquor 
onto the Somers from the U.S.S. Savannah, which was lying alongside the 
brig. Small had brought the liquor on board during Spencer's watch, and if 
Spencer was not aware of this at the time, he later shared a drink with 
Small and Cromwell. 132 Therefore, even before the brig set sail, certain 
enlisted men refused to countenance the temperance regime. Both 
Cromwell and Small were old enough to receive the spirit ration, had 
sufficient experience at sea to expect it, and would have been aggrieved by 
its deprivation, particularly at MacKenzie. Whereas the abolition of grog 
was intended to curb disciplinary problems, it actually created them as well 
by giving cause for resentment towards the Commander, and by 
encouraging smuggling. What is more, Spencer was already fraternising 
with members of the crew to an unprecedented degree. This was a clear 
contravention of his duty, which would have been to report any smuggling, 
and most assuredly, not to participate in it. 
It is uncertain how long this cache of liquor survived during the 
first stage of the Somers' voyage, but as the cruise progressed, so too did 
the illicit drinking on board. Whether or not there were other illicit stores 
131 New York Tribune, 'Punishment Log of the Somers.' On August 22, 
1842, Richard Hamilton, Benjamin Frease, Thomas Phelps, and Augustus 
Sarony were so punished. Frease and Phelps were reassigned. 
132 Henry King, CMP, p. 138. 
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of liquor on board between New York and Madeira is debatable. There is 
certainly no documentary evidence of any liquor beyond Gansevoort's 
personal supply. Once the brig had left New York, the opportunity to 
smuggle liquor from adjoining vessels vanished, and all further supplies 
had to be found on board. 
Between Madeira and Cape Mesurado on the Liberian coast a 
dramatic increase in the alleged incidents of drunkenness occurred. By this 
time then, the crew was obtaining liquor. In fact, it was being stolen by the 
wardroom steward at Spencer's behest. There was on board a supply of 
brandy that had been ordered by Richard Leecock, the ship's doctor. 
Leecock was concerned about the brig's eventual voyage to Liberia, and 
brandy was considered by him to be "salutary in preventing the effects of 
malaria.,,133 When this brandy had been procured, double the amount that 
had been requested was actually brought on board. Henry Waltham, the 
wardroom steward responsible for the order, had submitted it to two 
separate grocers, ensuring that there was a surplus of brandy to which he 
had immediate access.134 It was from this medicinal store that liquor would 
be stolen. 
Spencer was alleged to have induced Waltham to steal brandy for 
him to hide, and then drink at his own leisure: "I saw Waltham bring some 
liquor and give it to Mr. Spencer who put it in his 10cker ... ,,135 The steward 
would have aroused no concern in the wardroom, and the starboard 
locker's immediate proximity to the steerage made it easy for him to 
deliver the liquor to Spencer. The midshipman had earned the steward's 
133 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 196. 
134 McKinley, CMP, p. 178. This store of brandy was presumably the 
same one kept in the starboard locker of the wardroom. 
135 Gansevoort, CMP, p. 50; Howard, COl, p. 40. 
I' 
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trust by presenting him with a considerable number of gifts including a 
frock coat and bundle after bundle of cigars. 136 In exchange for one 
commodity, cheap to himself, Spencer obtained brandy, a considerable 
luxury. 
Once the brandy was in Spencer's possession, he would drink it 
with select members of the crew, especially Cromwell and Small. Usually, 
he did not get drunk, but on occasion he did: 
Q. Have you ever known Mr. Spencer to give Cromwell liquor? 
A. Yes, sir: one morning Mr. Spencer came forward, and Cromwell 
was sitting on the forehatch; Mr. Spencer asked Cromwell if he would 
like to have something to drink, Cromwell said he would; Mr. Spencer 
went aft and beckoned to him, and Cromwell followed him; Cromwell 
stopped at the mainmast, Mr. Spencer went below in the steerage; Mr. 
Spencer put his head above the hatch, and looked round to see if the 
officer of the deck was aft; Mr. Cromwell gave Spencer a cup, 
Cromwell drank something out of it; when he gave him the cup, Mr. 
Spencer was intoxicated at the time; Cromwell came forward, Mr. 
Spencer followed him; Mr. Spencer asked Cromwell if it was good, 
Cromwell said, "Yes;" they piped to breakfast, and I went below ... 
Q. How did you know Mr. Spencer was intoxicated? 
A. I could see it on him, his face was red and he could not walk 
straight. 
Q. Did he talk thick? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did he stagger much? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Might that not have been from the roll of the brig? Was it calm, or 
otherwise? 
A. It was calm; it could not have been from the rolling of the brig' she 
was not rolling. 137 
Although most reported instances of drinking on board referred to 
Spencer, Cromwell, and Small, there were other members of the crew with 
whom Spencer shared his cache. Charles Stewart, the Captain of the 
forecastle, received a glass of brandy from Spencer for lending him his 
mattress when he had lost his overboard, and for scrubbing a pair of 
136 Ibid. 
137 Humbert, CMP, pp. 100-101. 
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pantaloons. 138 This reward was willingly accepted even though Stewart 
was aware that it violated the regulations of the brig. On another occasion 
Benjamin Green was alleged to have been drunk down in the galley, and in 
possession of "a skin containing liquor. ,,139 The skin would have been 
secreted on Green's person, and is reminiscent of the "snake," a tube made 
of intestines that sailors used to smuggle liquor. 140 
Even as he sabotaged the temperance policy, Spencer's behaviour 
before the crew became increasingly insubordinate. This was in marked 
contrast to his behaviour before the Commander, which was servile to the 
point of obsequiousness. 141 Away from MacKenzie, he often castigated 
him for slights both real and perceived. In doing so, he followed 
Cromwell's example, mimicking his comments that MacKenzie wanted 
too much work out of the crew and issued orders only to see them 
followed. 142 Nevertheless, Spencer was more circumspect than Cromwell 
in his outbursts. Whatever carelessness he might have shown in the 
steerage, he was still careful not to speak too ill in front of officers and 
men. That is to say, he made sure his insubordination did not occur in 
mixed company. 
As he became more comfortable with the crew, however, he 
expressed his dislike of the Commander more often. On one occasion, 
after MacKenzie had reprimanded him for neglect of duty, Spencer 
remarked in the presence of several crewmen that he would like to throw 
138 Stewart, COl, p. 36. 
139 Dickinson, CMP, p. 154. 
140 Valle, Rocks and Shoals, p. 203. 
141 Wales, COl, p. 8; Rodgers, CMP, p. 129. 
142 Wales, COl, p. 19. 
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the Commander overboard the first time he had a chance. 143 This neglect 
of duty was likely the result of his fraternisation with the crew. His 
superior in the watch, Henry Rodgers, often had to go forward and 
complete orders that should have been relayed by Spencer, but which had 
been ignored because he was too deep in conversation. l44 Finally, Spencer 
openly questioned MacKenzie's disciplinary practices, asking at least one 
crewman if he thought that the Commander wasn't being too hard 
flogging the crew, and calling MacKenzie a "son-of-a-bitch."145 
Indeed, punishments on board were becoming more severe. 
Between Porto Praya and Mesurado, there had been twenty-three coltings 
and two floggings.l46 While this figure was not much greater than the 
number of punishments administered between Santa Cruz and Porto Praya, 
the number of strikes inflicted for these punishments had begun to 
increase. In the first instance, slightly more than half of the punishments 
had numbered six or less strikes. Between Porto Praya and Mesurado, 
however, two-thirds of the punishments were of nine or more blows.147 
At the same time as this increase in punishment, the officers and 
forward ·officers reported that discipline, which had been good through 
Santa Cruz had begun to deteriorate. 148 The failing discipline manifested 
itself in the slowness of the crew to follow orders, and the haphazard 
143 Neville, COl, p. 38. 
144 Rodgers, COl, p. 31. 
145 Neville, COl, p. 38; Gansevoort, CMP, p. 50. 
146 New York Tribune, 'Punishment Log of the Somers.' This figure does 
not include the eight coltings and two floggings that took place the when 
the brig departed Porto Praya. 
147 Between Santa Cruz and Porto Praya there were twenty four coltings, 
thirteen with less than six strikes, and eleven with nine or more. The 
twenty three coltings between Porto Praya and Mesurado consisted of 
fifteen with nine or more strikes, and eight with six or less. 
148 Gansevoort, COl, p. 24; Matthew C. Perry, Jf., CMP, p. 60. 
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manner III which their duties were accomplished. Typical of this 
behaviour were Charles Wilson's remarks about the forecastle, "Damn 
them, they have got plenty of men forward, let them do it themselves.,,149 
The overwhelming attitude appears to have been that work was to be 
avoided as much as possible. Most seriously affected was the discipline of 
the older boys on board. 150 
Since Spencer was most familiar with the older boys, it was later 
assumed that his insubordination was responsible for their misbehaviour. 
This assumption does not withstand scrutiny. Those closest to Spencer, 
and therefore most likely to suffer the effects of his insubordination, were 
not subjected to any increase in discipline. While several of them were 
punished during this period, there is no evidence that their behaviour 
became any worse than it had been before. Indeed, six of them went 
unpunished on both cruises, and several of the others either had not been 
punished since before Spencer's arrival or would not be punished until 
later in the cruise. The only ones whose disciplinary records stand out are 
Billinger Scott, Charles Wilson, and Charles Van Velsor. Scott was the 
only one of Spencer's associates whose behaviour earned him several 
beatings, but at fifteen he was hardly one of the older boys on board, and 
besides which, he was not even that close to Spencer. Wilson and Van 
Velsor are of note only because they were each flogged within a day of 
one another for striking a boy. This was the only time Wilson was 
punished, however, and he received just twelve from the colt. Van 
Velsor, on the other hand, had been punished three times already, always 
149 Tyson, COl, p. 38. 
150 Gansevoort, COl, p. 25. 
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for fighting. Thus, his punishment was much more severe, twelve with the 
cats. 151 
Wilson's good disciplinary record concealed a quick temper. 
Earlier, he had thrown a bag at James Dunn, one of the galley cooks, and 
threatened him with future retaliation after being chased from the galley. 152 
He had also publicly declared his intention to take the lives of Joseph 
Weaver and Peter Tyson at the earliest opportunity.153 These later 
comments were made after he had been flogged for striking them, and 
reflect more his 'passionate' nature than any actual intent. 154 His anger is 
actually quite understandable since the petty officers on board were rarely 
physically punished. Indeed, apart from Charles Van Velsor, Wilson was 
the only one of them to be flogged during the cruise. 
Samuel Cromwell, for instance, had been III several violent 
encounters with other crewmen, but was never punished. Like Wilson, he 
had threatened Joseph Weaver, but without further incident. 155 A more 
serious altercation occurred between him, an apprentice named Joseph 
Sears, and the carpenter's mate, Thomas Dickinson. Sears had been 
ordered to the forepeak in order to get wood for a chock, and while doing 
so, had caused a log to roll away and strike Cromwell. 156 Cromwell threw 
the offending log at Sears, and was preparing to strike him with another 
when Dickinson intervened. Cromwell demurred, but not before 
threatening to knock out Sears' brains, and telling Dickinson that his time 
151 New York Tribune, 'Punishment Log of the Somers.' 
152 James Dunn, COl, p. 39. 
153 James Travis, CMP, p. 106. 
154 Ibid. 
155 John Dunscomb, COl, p. 40. 
156 Sears, CMP, p. 118. 
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was "damned short.,,157 Later, he threatened Dickinson again while 
refusing to obey an order that the carpenter's mate was passing onto him. 
Furthermore, Cromwell persisted in his insubordination, freely making 
remarks to the effect that he wished the brig and all her officers in Hel1. 158 
During this part of the cruise, Spencer's relations with the other 
midshipmen were in sharp decline. He was considered "quarrelsome and 
morose," and was ostracised outside the mess. 159 What is more, he began 
to fight them, in and outside the steerage. Once when John Tillotson did 
not relieve him quickly enough from watch duty Spencer struck him a 
blow that was returned in kind. 16O Another time in the steerage he 
exchanged words with Egbert Thompson, an altercation that resulted in a 
scuffle between them. Again, Spencer is said to have struck first. 161 
While fights in a steerage were common enough in the old navy, 162 on 
board the Somers they did not represent normality, but the peculiar social 
environment created by Spencer. 
The increased tension perhaps reflected the increasing seriousness 
of the cruise as the brig sailed south towards the slaving coast. If the 
Somers was to be called on for action, it would be here. Nevertheless, the 
crew's martial training was not markedly increased, and only once were 
they exercised with pistols and broadsword. 163 Prior to this, they had 
practiced with small arms on two separate occasions, and with the 
157 Dickinson, CMP, p. 148. It is safe to assume that Cromwell had his 
vengeance on Sears on the four occasions when he was called upon to colt 
the apprentice. 
158 Wales, COl, p. 18. 
159 Matthew C. Perry, Jr., COl, p. 26; Rodgers, COl, p. 31. 
160 Tillotson, COl, p. 34. 
161 Oliver Hazard Perry, Jr., CMP, p. 189. 
162 W.F. Lynch, A Naval Life (New York: Charles Scribner, 1851), p. 37. 
163 "Rodgers Journal," November 2, 1842. 
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carronades thrice. l64 If the crew hoped for action they were to be 
disappointed, since only one vessel was seen, on October 30. The Somers 
was helping enforce the anti-slaving blockade, however, so the crew was 
called to quarters, and the ship intercepted. For the first time, the brig sent 
across a boarding party to examine a merchantman's papers. The vessel in 
question turned out to be the French barque Gaspar, sailing from 
Bourbon, and there was nothing suspicious about her. 165 
While the Somers did not encounter any slaving ships, there was 
certainly much talk of them on board. Spencer was especially interested 
in the slave trade, and spoke at great length about it with Small and 
Cromwell. 166 Both claimed to have served on board slavers in the past, 
although only Small's account can be verified. 167 He had worked on the 
African coast as an agent of Richard Brookhouse of Salem,168 which was 
one of the slaving companies operating out of that port.169 Small told 
Spencer how the slavers would anchor in creeks and lagoons before 
sending cutters up river to collect slaves, 170 and that he himself had killed a 
black man. 171 He also maintained that he never made as much money as 
he did when he worked on board a slaver. Cromwell's claims are less 
certain, but included tales of piracy and imprisonment in the Moro 
Castle.172 These subjects fascinated Spencer, who asked other members of 
164 "Rodgers Journal," September 25 and 28, 1842, October 2, 5, and 9, 
1842. 
165 "Rodgers Journal," October 30, 1842. 
166 Wales, COl, p. 19. 
167 Richard Leecock, COl, p. 29. 
168 Samuel Holbrook, CMP, p. 53. 
169 Thomas, The Slave Trade, p. 683. 
170 Scott, eMP, p. 90. 
171 Dunscomb, COl, p. 40. 
172 Wales, CMP, p. 26; Tyson, CMP, p. 113. 
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the crew if they had also served on slavers. 173 Moreover, Spencer spoke at 
length about the Somers' suitability as a slaver.174 Small was heard to 
agree with him that she was suited for the work, but would require a 
greater supply of small arms. 175 All of this talk amounted to nothing more 
than idle words, however, as the Somers made port without any difficulty. 
On November 9, nineteen days out from Porto Praya, the Somers 
reached Cape Mesurado in Liberia. As was customary, MacKenzie 
saluted the local authorities upon entering the harbour, this time with 
seventeen guns. 176 The brig had arrived late in the day, so there was only 
time to send a single launch for fresh water; but the following day, 
MacKenzie sent crewmen onshore for liberty and to obtain fresh supplies 
of wood and water. 177 At midday the governor of Liberia visited the brig, 
which was cause for another salute. 178 During the afternoon, MacKenzie 
learned that the Vandalia had not been seen for some time, and decided to 
return to the United States rather than sail north to Sierra Leone. The 
undelivered dispatches were left with the Governor in case the Vandalia 
stopped by Mesurado later. 
The next day was therefore spent preparing for another trans-
Atlantic crossing, which meant even more provisioning of the brig. 
Throughout the day, the launches were sent back and forth bringing in 
fresh supplies. By day's end, five barrels of bread, a boatload of wood 
173 Warner, COl, p. 38. Two members of the crew reported being asked 
this by Spencer, Charles Rodgers and George Warner. Neither of them 
said that they had. 
174 Browning, COl, p. 38. 
175 Samuel Van Norden, CMP, p. 97. 
176 "Rodgers Journal," November 9, 1842. 
177 "Rodgers Journal," November 10, 1842. 
178 Ibid. 
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and another of water, 1,000 oranges, 500 limes, ten bushels of potatoes, 
and four more live bulls were brought on board. At the same time, various 
sundry items were removed from the brig's stores and sent ashore for the 
use of the American colony.179 As it turned out, the bread was of inferior 
quality and had to be thrown overboard. ISO 
Throughout the day's work, Spencer had been in charge of the 
second cutter. ISI When bringing supplies to the Colony, MacKenzie had 
reproved him for not wearing his dress uniform, a rebuke that Spencer had 
quite simply ignored. Rather than change, he had lowered the boat, and 
ordered the crew to begin rowing. They had proceeded about thirty yards 
when MacKenzie called to them asking if they had an American ensign. 
Spencer replied that they had not, and then to the crew, that he'd be "God-
damned if he was going to go back after it either, for the damned old 
humbug, [who can] go to Hell."ls2 He then cursed MacKenzie until the 
cutter reached shore, whereupon he supervised the unloading of the 
supplies before visiting an Italian slave-dealer. ls3 Spencer's outburst 
revealed more than his insubordination. It had taken place before several 
of the crew, and while pleasing to them, could not have been so to Henry 
Rodgers, who was also on board. Spencer's animosity towards 
MacKenzie, and his alienation from his fellow officers had overcome his 
restraint. It was dangerous enough to belittle MacKenzie in the company 
179 "Rodgers Journal," November 11, 1842. 
ISO Heiskill, COl, p. 28. 
lSI Wales, COl, p. 17. 
IS2 Ibid. 
IS3 Oliver H. Perry, Jr., COl, p. 34. This allegation raises the question of 
what was a slave-dealer doing in Monrovia? It is possible that the meeting 
never took place and that the allegation was simply a slander. 
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of officers, but to do so before officers and enlisted men was tantamount 
to sedition. 
The next day, the brig hoisted anchor and sailed westward away 
from the slaving grounds and towards the open ocean. The return passage 
began without serious incident, although the officers reported that 
discipline on board became steadily worse. 184 As was the case earlier, this 
claim is not fully corroborated by the number and nature of the 
punishments ordered. Rather, it was the severity of these punishments that 
had markedly increased. Between the brig's departure and November 25, 
there were thirteen coltings, six of these on November 22. Three-quarters 
of these consisted of more than six strikes, and infractions such as 
skulking, and insolence were usually punished with twelve. 
Nevertheless, the officers had correctly identified that their 
disciplinary problems involved the older apprentices. Beforehand, the 
punishments had been more or less divided between boys sixteen and 
younger, and the boys seventeen and older. After the brig's departure 
from Liberia, only three of the boys punished were youngsters. Even so, 
none of the boys punished during this part of the cruise came from 
Spencer's circle. 
As the Somers sailed westward, she had her only truly serious 
encounters with other vessels. On several occasions, the brig was chased 
by British cruisers, which had mistaken her for a slaver. 185 Each time, 
MacKenzie ordered the brig to outrun their pursuers. Once, during a night 
watch, he went so far as to make preparations to repel an attack by boats 
184 Rodgers, COl, p. 31; Matthew C. Perry, Jr., CMP, p. 61. 
185 Thompson, COl, p. 32; Scott, CMP, p. 91; Tyson, CMP, p. 113; Sears, 
CMP, 116. 
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sent off from a British cruiser that had managed to close the distance 
between the two vessels. 186 In light of the Somers' supposed mission, the 
commander's behaviour seems unnecessary and provocative. He was 
meant to be cooperating with the Royal Navy, not wasting its time, and 
jeopardizing the blockade. Apart from personal animosity, the only 
reasonable explanation is that he wanted to test the brig's speed and the 
crew's handling under duress. 
Finally, the Somers stopped and boarded one other vessel on the 
homeward voyage. 187 Prior to the interception, MacKenzie beat the crew 
to quarters, and ordered the decks cleared for action. This prompted 
another outburst from Cromwell who said to several of the crew that the 
preparations were more of the same "humbug," and that he been in combat 
before without any of this "humbugging.,,188 As had been the case before, 
the vessel turned out to be a legitimate French merchantman, Le Preferre, 
bound to Goree. Cromwell had been right. MacKenzie released the 
vessel, and the Somers continued westward towards St. Thomas in the 
Danish West Indies. 
The mission had been an operational failure. The Vandalia had 
never been seen, and the dispatches gone undelivered. Indeed, the only 
word MacKenzie had of her in his pursuit predated his departure from 
New York. Although the Somers had shown the American flag off the 
coast, her contribution to the blockade had been negligible. At the same 
time, MacKenzie did have some grounds for satisfaction. The brig had 
proven its seaworthiness, and more importantly, he had taken an untrained 
186 Thompson, COl, p. 32. 
187 "Rodgers Journal," November 19, 1842. 
188 COl, p. 32. 
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crew across the Atlantic, down the coast of Africa, and would soon return 
to the United States. This alone was a success for the apprenticeship 
program. 
Additionally, none of his wards had taken ill during the cruise. 
The good health of his crew had been a priority for the commander, who 
had taken considerable measures to ensure their safety. He had insisted 
that they bathe frequently, and that the brig be washed down on a regular 
basis. 189 Furthermore, he had provided the crew with fresh vegetables and 
fruits at every opportunity. Throughout the cruise, only minor ailments, 
particularly boils, were ever reported. 19O This was quite an 
accomplishment. When the Grampus and the Dolphin had patrolled off of 
Africa their crews had "suffered severely from the diseases of the 
c1imate.,,191 Indeed, the Somers' doctor, Richard Leecock, had only just 
recovered from the effects of yellow fever contracted whilst on board the 
Grampus. 192 
While MacKenzie could look back on the cruise with some 
satisfaction, his crew would likely have been glad that it was drawing to a 
close. For them, it would have been a disappointment. In the first place, 
they had been subjected to rigorous discipline that had been enforced for 
at least a third of the cruise with unnecessary force. Between New York 
and the interception of Le Pre/erre, there were 113 coltings and eight 
floggings. Fifty-five members of the crew had been beaten at least once, 
and many of them had been beaten on several occasions. Dennis 
Manning, who was coIted ten times, and flogged twice, for a total of 101 
189 Leecock, COl, p. 30. 
190 MacKenzie to Upshur, October 4, and October 31,1842, NA RG 45. 
191 SNR 1841, p. 371. 
192 Upshur to Leecock, January 15, 1842, NA RG 45. 
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blows, suffered the most, but there were others who were punished three, 
four, five, or even six times. 193 
Moreover, the cruise had delivered none of the excitement 
associated with an African cruise. Precious few other ships had been seen, 
and certainly no slavers. In the first place, the promise of excitement was 
. illusory. The African station was actually notorious for its monotony and 
the dreariness of the coast. What excitement there had been came late in 
the cruise, and had been a poor substitute for chasing slavers. Finally, the 
exoticism of the African station had been lost amidst the constant 
provisioning of the brig and infrequent liberties. As the Somers sailed 
homeward, the crew would have been tired, irritable, and anxious to be 
done with the cruise. 
193 New York Tribune, 'Punishment Log of the Somers.' E.g., Peter 
Fenton, colted six times and flogged once; William Houghland, coIted 
four times; James McDunseomb, eoIted four times 
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Chapter Five 
Mutiny: Events and Executions 
On November 25, sometime during the second day watch, Spencer 
asked the purser's steward, James Wales, to join him atop the booms for a 
conversation. The Somers was thirteen days out from Monrovia, and ten 
from landfall at St. Thomas, in the Danish West Indies. The conversation 
immediately took an unexpected tum when Spencer asked whether Wales 
feared death or the presence of a dead man, and would he kill another 
man. l Wales responded tentatively, but positively enough for Spencer to 
continue. The Midshipman made Wales take an oath of secrecy, 
whereupon Spencer said that he was in league with about twenty of the 
crew to seize the vessel, murder the officers, and commence pirating. The 
plan was simple enough: 
The affray would commence some night when [Spencer] had 
the mid-watch; some of those concerned with him would get in a 
scuffle on the forecastle; Mr. Spencer would then cause them to be 
brought to the mast; he would then call Mr. Rodgers, the officer of the 
deck, to pretend to settle the matter; as soon as Mr. Rodgers had got to 
the gangway, they were to seize him and pitch him overboard; they 
would then have the vessel to themselves; he would then proceed to 
station his men at the hatches, to prevent anyone corning on deck ... 
[Spencer] would then furnish his men with arms; this done, he was to 
proceed to the cabin and murder the commander with the least noise 
possible; this done, he would go with some of his men to the ward-
room, and murder the ward-room and steerage officers... this 
accomplished, he should corne on deck. have the two after guns slewed 
round so as to rake the deck; he would then have the whole crew called 
on deck, and would select from among them such as would suit his 
purposes, the remainder he should cause to be thrown overboard.2 
Having described his scheme, Spencer called Elisha Small to join their 
discussion. Small did not stay long, speaking only briefly with Spencer in 
1 Wales, CMP, p. II. 
2 Ibid. 
- ---- -----------1 
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Spanish. After offering Wales the position of 3rd officer under his 
command, Spencer asked his opinion of the plan, and arranged to have 
another meeting the next day. The conversation ended with a warning to 
the steward: "If I breathed a syllable of that which he had communicated 
to me, that I would be murdered, if he did not do it some of those 
concerned with him would ... ,,3 
Although Wales has only ever been associated with Spencer in 
terms of this pivotal dialogue, the two knew each other well. Whether or 
not they were friends is uncertain, but the volume of goods that Spencer 
purchased during the cruise ensured some degree of familiarity. Indeed, 
their relations may well have been closer than some of those who were 
named as Spencer's close friends, particularly his hammock boys. Wales 
ran the brig's shop, freeing the purser to keep his books, monitor the 
profits, and maintain the payroll. Almost every financial transaction 
Spencer made had been through the steward. Furthermore, Wales was 
complicit in Spencer's distribution of tobacco to the apprentices. He must 
have known that Spencer was violating the Commander's orders, but his 
dedication to profit outweighed his loyalty to MacKenzie. In all, Spencer 
spent $24.80 on tobacco and cigars, approximately a fifth of his total 
expenses.4 
Even so, Wales was terrified by what he had learned. After several 
abortive efforts to inform the lieutenant about the conversation, he 
succeeded in speaking to the purser the next morning. Heiskell then 
arranged for Wales to speak with Gansevoort, at which time he repeated 
the allegations of a mutinous conspiracy. The lieutenant immediately 
3 Wales, CMP, p. 12. 
4 Heiskill, CMP, p. 161. 
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reported the news to MacKenzie, who did not at first believe the report. 
" .. .It seemed to me so monstrous, so improbable, that I could not forbear 
treating it with ridicule."s The Commander suspected that Spencer, 
having read some "piratical stories," had amused himself at Wales' 
expense. Nevertheless, the allegations were serious enough to warrant 
further investigation, so Gansevoort was sent to observe him, and report 
back. 
Gansevoort followed Spencer around the brig throughout the day. 
After several encounters, Gansevoort became convinced of Spencer's 
guilt, especially after he caught him "staring at me with the most infernal 
expression I have ever beheld on a human face.,,6 He reported this to 
MacKenzie, advising him to secure the midshipman. MacKenzie 
demurred, saying he did not want to do anything hastily. Rather, he 
wanted Wales to hold another conversation with Spencer in order to verify 
the allegations that had been made.7 By sundown quarters, however, he 
had changed his mind. 
MacKenzie ordered all the officers save one to the quarterdeck, 
and sent forward those members of the crew normally stationed aft.8 
When Spencer arrived, he was arrested. MacKenzie described the scene: 
'I learn, Mr. Spencer that you aspire to command of the Somers?" 
Spencer responded, "with a deferential, but unmoved and gently 
smiling expression, 'oh, no, sir.'" MacKenzie then confronted him with 
Wales' allegations, to which Spencer said, "I may have told him so, sir, 
but it was in joke." MacKenzie's response was clear, "This, sir, is 
joking on a forbidden subject - this joke may cost you your Iife ... You 
must have been aware that you could only have compassed your 
5 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 194. 
6 Gansevoort, CMP, p. 32. 
7 MacKenzie, CMP, 197. 
8 Wales, CMP, p. 23; Gansevoort, CMP, p. 32; Gansevoort, CMP, pp. 
36,42-43; Rodgers, CMP, pp. 133-134; Heiskill, CMP, p. 159; 
MacKenzie, CMP, p. 197. 
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designs by passing over my dead body, and after that, the bodies of all 
the officers; you have given yourself, sir, a great deal to do; it will be 
necessary for me to confine you, sir.9 
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The Midshipman was searched, and his sword taken away. He was 
then placed in double irons and handcuffs, and ordered to sit down on the 
stem post. Gansevoort kept watch over Spencer, with orders to shoot him 
if he tried to communicate with the crew. Once the crew and battery were 
inspected, and the retreat beaten, the remaining officers returned to their 
quarters. The officers of the watch were armed with pistols and cutlasses. 
Moreover, both decks were frequently patrolled, and the crew kept to their 
hammocks. 10 
The speed with which MacKenzie's incredulity became belief is 
remarkable. In less than a day, he had become convinced of a potential 
revolt. Spencer, from being insubordinate and undisciplined, now seemed 
to have become actually murderous. The crew, whom the Commander 
had that very morning considered "in good discipline," was really 
mutinous. MacKenzie maintained that the basis for this conviction was 
Spencer's previous familiarity with the crew, II but there were other factors 
behind his actions. While Spencer's fraternisations were unusual, by 
themselves they were not enough to suggest a mutiny. MacKenzie was 
reacting to more than Spencer and the situation that had now arisen on the 
Somers. His response must be understood in light of a mutiny that had 
occurred on board a British warship some forty years before. 
In 1797, the Royal Navy was wracked by three separate mutinies. 
Two of these, at Spithead and the Nore, were really expressions of labour 
9 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 197. 
10 Ibid. 
II Ibid. 
209 
unrest involving entire fleets. 12 Neither of them had much impact on the 
officers and men of the U.S. Navy. They were observed, certainly, but not 
incorporated into the mentality and mythology of the service. The third 
mutiny, however, had a very different character, and did impact upon the 
United States Navy. It had taken place on board a thirty-two gun frigate, 
H.M.S. Hermione, then cruising off Puerto Rico. During the night of 
September 21-22, 1797, members of the crew had risen up, massacred 
their officers, and seized control of the ship.13 They then sailed the 
Hermione into a Spanish harbour, La Guaira, surrendered their ship, and 
gradually dispersed. 
When they left Spanish territory, the "Hermiones" as they were 
known, had reintegrated themselves into the maritime world of the 
Caribbean and parts beyond. Thirty-three of them were eventually 
recaptured by the Royal Navy, and faced trial for their acquiescence or 
participation in the mutiny. In 1806, the last mutineer to be recaptured 
12 Between April 16 and May 15,1797, the sailors of the Channel Fleet, 
anchored at Spithead, issued petitions demanding better pay and better 
working conditions, expelled officers from their vessels, and refused their 
orders to sail. The collective action ended with the Admiralty granting 
them concessions, and the issue of royal pardons to the mutineers and their 
ringleaders. The Nore mutiny followed the conclusion of the Spithead 
uprising. The Nore uprising was essentially spontaneous, and showed 
none of the coherence or solidarity of its predecessor. Not surprisingly, it 
fell into disarray and internal dissent. An abortive attempt to blockade 
London failed, resulting in a brief fratricidal schism within the squadron. 
Soon after, the mutiny was completely suppressed, and its leaders hanged. 
L. Guttridge, Mutiny: A History of Naval Insurrection (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 1992), pp. 42-72; L. James, Mutiny in the British and 
Commonwealth Forces, 1797-1956 (London: Buchan & Enright, 1987), 
pp.33-75. 
13 D. Pope, The Black Ship (New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1964), 
pp. 154-180. The captain, three lieutenants, the lieutenant of marines, the 
purser, a midshipman, the surgeon, boatswain, and captain's clerk were 
slain. 
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was tried and condemned, bringing the total number of Hermione 
executions to twenty-four. 14 Nevertheless, over one hundred members of 
the crew escaped, and their subsequent movements remained unknown. 
Several of the captured mutineers, however, had been found sailing in 
American merchant ships.15 Indeed, one of the ringleaders, Thomas Nash, 
arrested in Charleston, South Carolina, even possessed a sailor's 
protection declaring him an American citizen. 16 While the spectre of 
violent mutiny haunted any officer, Hermione took on special significance 
for the Americans, particularly in the first twenty years of the nineteenth 
century. Indeed, their specific reaction to mutiny has been called the 
"Hermione Phobia.,,17 This phobia was as much about the mutineers 
themselves, as it was about the mutiny. 
The Hermione Phobia projected what was known of the captured 
mutineers onto the unknown number of the escaped. As several of the 
mutineers had been found in the American merchant marine, there were 
doubtless more that had gone undetected. If mutineers had entered the 
commercial marine, than others would have made their way into the Navy. 
Moreover, one of the executed mutineers, John Watson, had been detected 
and arrested on board the U.S.S. Constellation, Thomas Truxton 
commanding. 18 Where one man had been caught, many more were 
14 Pope, The Black Ship, p. 301. 
15 Pope, The Black Ship, pp. 257, 263. 
16 Pope, The Black Ship, p.276. Sailor's protection certificates were 
documents issued to American citizens, or often enough, foreigners 
masquerading as Americans. They provided notarised proof of 
citizenship, and were intended as a safeguard against impressment. 
17 McKee, A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession, p. 255. 
18 W.M.P. Dunne, "The Constellation and the Hermione," Mariner's 
Mirror (Vol. 70, No.1, 1984), p. 84. 
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thought to be lurking. Properly speaking, the Hermione phobia was the 
fear of these unknown mutineers. 
At the same time, the Hermione mutiny itself had become a potent 
symbol for officers and enlisted men. Mutiny was not understood in 
economic, political or social terms, but as violent revolution. 19 The 
Hermione set a standard for the Navy's officers, and gave substance to an 
enlisted man's threats. The seriousness with which officers regarded the 
Hermione is well represented by the extreme punishments imposed on 
sailors simply for invoking her name. In 1804, a seaman named Robert 
Quinn, wrote a letter to Commodore Samuel Barron in which he attacked 
the disciplinary practices on board his command, comparing them to the 
Hermione. When QUinn's authorship of the letter was discovered, he was 
court-martialled and sentenced to have his head and eyebrows shaved, 
'mutiny' branded on his forehead, and to be flogged through the squadron 
with 320 lashes.20 
What is more, the phobia did not fade with time. Long after it was 
possible to have actual Hermione mutineers on board, officers feared the 
unseen mutineer. Mutiny became indelibly associated with the unknown 
elements in a ship's crew, and was also explicitly defined in terms of 
violence. 
The phobia's survival into the 1840s is not surprising. The 1842 
Navy Register reveals that one-third of the total number of captains had 
entered the service before the final Hermione execution, and that only 
19 McKee, A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession, p. 255. 
20 Records of General Courts-Martial and Courts of Inquiry of the Navy 
Department, NA RG 125, quoted in McKee, A Gentlemanly and 
Honorable Profession, p. 256. 
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seven of the remainder had been commissioned after 1810.21 These were 
the men, especially the most senior, who could have been influenced by 
the Hermione Phobia's original incarnation, and who would have passed 
on their fears to those who served with them subsequently. The same was 
true, albeit to a lesser extent, of the commanders, most of whom had 
received their commissions before or during the War of 1812. 
The phobia survived also because it evolved, and the nature of the 
maritime world facilitated this evolution. In the first place, the United 
States Navy had acute recruiting problems, which forced the service to 
accept whoever it could, regardless of their character. Since mariners 
commonly saw the Navy as the employment of last resort, this policy did 
little to improve the quality of enlisted men. Needless to say, many 
enlisted men did conform to the worst stereotypes of their class. If we are 
not to believe the numerous accounts by officers to this effect, Herman 
Melville's admission of this point is perhaps proof enough: " ... the truth is, 
that among the crew of a man-of-war, scores of desperadoes are too often 
found, who stop not at the largest enormities.,,22 
Apart from the difficulty of obtaining recruits, there was the 
additional burden of keeping them on board once they were enlisted. 
Sailors had long been able to move freely throughout the maritime world. 
Desertion remained a fundamental problem for the Navy. Whenever a 
new port of call was reached it was likely that several crewmen would run, 
forcing the captain to replace them with whoever could be recruited. 
Sailors found ashore were likely to be foreigners, or wayward Americans. 
21 1842 Navy Register, pp. 2-4. 
22 Melville, White Jacket, p. 40. 
213 
The former were already associated with mutiny, 23 and the latter with 
desertion, drunkenness, and disciplinary problems.24 Needless to say, 
there was a constant turnover in the enlisted ranks. For all the officers' 
familiarity with their crew, they knew precious little about their previous 
history: who they were, where they were from, what they had done, and 
what they were capable of doing. The unknown element persisted, and 
with it the threat of mutineers. 
These fears were not groundless. In 1824, the whaling ship Globe, 
whilst cruising in the Pacific, had been the scene of a mutiny in which the 
captain, and three of the mates were murdered. The mutiny's ringleader 
had been on board since the barque had left the United States, but his two 
chief accomplices had only recently been recruited with five other men in 
order to replace six of the original crew who had deserted in the Sandwich 
Islands.25 This was precisely the nightmare scenario envisioned by the 
Hennione Phobia. 
While such mutinies had always been uncommon in the merchant 
marine, and were virtually unheard of on naval vessels,26 there was a 
recent precedent. In February 1842, a mutiny had broken out on board the 
Texan schooner-of-war San Antonio. 27 In this instance, the sergeant of 
marines had actually led the mutiny, which resulted in the murder of the 
schooner's lieutenant, and the wounding of two midshipmen. Moreover, 
23 Gain, Remarks on the Home Squadron and Naval School, p. 9. 
24 E.P. Hoyt, The Mutiny on the Globe (London: Arthur Barker, 1975), p. 
63. 
25 W. Lay, and C.M. Hussey, The Globe Mutiny (New London, 
CT: William Lay and C.M. Hussey, 1822), pp. 18-19. 
26 N.A.M. Rodger, The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian 
Navy (London: Collins, 1986), p. 238. 
27 Anon, "The Murder on the San Antonio," The Army and Navy Chronicle 
(Vol. 13, No.6, 1842), p. 94. 
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the presence of marines had not prevented the Hermione mutiny. Whether 
or not the San Antonio was on MacKenzie's mind throughout his own 
crisis is uncertain, but it was clearly of importance to him after the fact. In 
a letter to Lieutenant John Bullins, MacKenzie expressed his belief that 
the revolts on board the San Antonio and the Somers were equal parts of a 
larger conspiracy designed by Spencer and a midshipman on board the 
San Antonio.28 According to MacKenzie, the two vessels were to have 
rendezvoused at the Isle of Pines, and commenced raiding in tandem. 
On board the Somers, Spencer's plan had invited a phobic response 
since it called for the violent overthrow indelibly associated with the 
Hermione. Bloody mutiny demanded its perpetrators, monsters unknown, 
already in the crew. MacKenzie found them in Spencer and his closest 
friends. The Commander had complained before of the dearth of "prime, 
American seamen" on board the North Carolina, from which the crew of 
the Somers had been drawn. Circumstances had forced him to make do 
with the men available, and by his own estimation, he must not have 
chosen well. In selecting Cromwell and Small, he had invited mutiny on 
to his command. Cromwell was rumoured to have been a pirate, and 
Small was known to have been a slaver.29 Spencer, perhaps worst of all, 
was a traitor. 
Soon after Spencer's arrest, Small was ordered aft and interviewed 
by the commander. MacKenzie asked him if Spencer had said anything to 
him about a mutiny, to which Small replied that while Spencer had spoken 
to him about such things, "he was in no mutiny," and that it had only been 
28 MacKenzie to Bullins, June 6, 1843, New York Historical Society, 
Naval Manuscripts Collection. 
29 Wales, CMP, p. 26. 
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a "foolish conversation.,,30 Word of the arrest quickly spread throughout 
the brig. Most assumed that it was the consequence of a fight in the 
steerage, but talk of Spencer's involvement in a mutinous conspiracy 
persisted.31 Indeed, Cromwell explained to Joseph Sears that this was the 
cause of the arrest, and since the apprentice did not know what mutiny 
was, told him it was an attempt to murder the captain and officers, and 
take their vessel. 32 While Small might have mentioned his conversation 
with MacKenzie to the boatswain's mate, Cromwell had first hand 
knowledge of the arrest since he had been present when Gansevoort 
discussed it with the petty officers.33 
Meanwhile, Spencer's locker was searched. Inside was a looking 
glass case, and within one of its drawers, a razor case containing three lists 
was discovered. The lists themselves were written in Greek characters, 
and constituted the one concrete piece of evidence against Spencer (Figure 
10).34 The information contained within them exacerbated the officers' 
fear of unknown mutineers. While one list contained the names of three 
men not on board, another listed the names of numerous crewmembers.35 
This second list had been divided into three sections labelled: 'certain,' 
'doubtful,' and 'to be kept, willing or unwilling.' The list also included a 
brief reference to what appeared to be a planned mutiny. Additionally, 
there was a watch bill, which assigned certain stations and responsibilities 
30 Gansevoort, CMP, p. 185. 
31 Scott, CMP, p. 92; McKinley, CMP, p. 183; Benjamin Green, CMP, p. 
216. 
32 Tyson, CMP, p. 111. 
33 Gansevoort, CMP, pp. 36,45, 55. 
34 Although the lists were presented as evidence during MacKenzie's 
court-martial, they were subsequently lost. 
35 Gansevoort, CMP, p. 36. 
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to Spencer, McKee, McKinley, Wilson, and Small. Whatever suspicions 
the officers had, the lists confirmed them. 
Spencer had said that there were twenty members of the crew in 
his conspiracy. Although Cromwell and Small had already come under 
suspicion, here was reason to suspect a wider circle. Inclusion on the 
watch bill was tantamount to guilt, since it was interpreted as detailing 
each man's responsibilities during the mutiny.36 Moreover, each of the 
men named there were close friends of Spencer, further 'proof' of their 
involvement. It was the larger list of names, however, that caused much 
of the following days' confusion and paranoia. 
Interestingly enough, the four names marked 'certain,' did not 
contribute much to the officers' fears relative to those marked 'doubtful,' 
or 'to be held willing or unwilling.' The certain mutineers only confirmed 
previous suspicions. At the same time, it was also assumed that this list 
was incomplete, and that there were other names from the other categories 
that had not yet been included.37 Spencer was already arrested, and 
McKinley highly suspect for being on the watch bill. Wales had revealed 
the plot, so his innocence was guaranteed. The final name, E. Andrews, 
did not even belong to anyone on board. MacKenzie's conviction over 
Cromwell's involvement was such, however, that he assumed Andrews 
was merely a pseudonym which the boatswain's mate had insisted upon to 
allay suspicion.38 Indeed, Cromwell's name never appeared in the Greek 
lists, but this was not consonant with MacKenzie's conclusions, so his 
exclusion became proof not of innocence, but of criminal premeditation. 
36 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 198. 
37 Neville, CMP, p. 78. 
38 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 204. 
217 
Notwithstanding that Cromwell's 'alias' indicated the 
Commander's belief in the mutiny, it was the other two categories that 
contributed to the Hermione Phobia. The second category 'doubtful,' was 
actually regarded as complicity, or at least awareness of the plot.39 
McKee and Wilson were already mentioned on the watch bill, and their 
inclusion here only confirmed their gUilt beyond doubt. The remaining 
names belonged to members of the crew considered close to Spencer. It 
made sense that he would have found his accomplices amongst them. The 
question remained whether some or all of them were involved. The final 
category, 'to be held ... ,' evoked the same question. Although some of the 
men listed were obviously innocent, the doctor for instance, others met the 
officers' criterion for mutiny, that is, they were close to Spencer. Ten men 
were listed as doubtful, and another eighteen were to be held willingly or 
. not. Here was the mutinous conspiracy, though its full extent remained 
unknown. 
The threat of mutiny had been identified, and the principal 
mutineer arrested, but the officers considered themselves in as great a peril 
as they had been before. Upon discovery, the threat had not receded, but 
emerged. The mutiny had certainly been disrupted, but so long as the 
mutineers remained free to act, it had not been averted. Therefore, the 
following days were dominated by the officers' attempts to determine the 
guilt or innocence of their crew, and to confine those sailors whom they 
considered the most dangerous. That a mutiny had been planned, they 
were certain, it remained to shatter the conspiracy behind it. In order to do 
so, they would have to unmask the conspirators. Again, the officers were 
39 Neville, CMP, p. 78. 
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confronted with the fear of the unknown. Moreover, their anxiety was 
amplified by a sense of urgency. Until the mutineers were apprehended a 
threat remained. The officers' perception of the threat's nature is evident 
in the language that they used to describe it. At its core was a "mysterious 
agency," which was likened to an infection spread amongst the crew.4O 
At the same time, several other factors contributed to the officers' 
ready belief in the threatened mutiny. In his defence, MacKenzie referred 
to the brig's diminutive size, which did not provide room for holding 
prisoners, and was too cramped to mount an adequate defence against a 
concerted attack.41 Once again, these fears had foundation. Violent 
mutinies had a greater chance of success on a small vessel. Four years 
earlier there had been a mutiny on board the brig Braganza in which the 
captain and a mate were slain. Another mate was wounded and thrown 
overboard, but managed to climb back aboard and joined several others 
who barricaded themselves in the captain's cabin. This resulted in a 
standoff between them and the mutineers, who eventually allowed them to 
leave the brig on one of the launches.42 In 1842, a mutiny that strongly 
resembled the Somers affair had been attempted on board the brig 
Despatch. In this instance, three men were turned over to the U.S. brig 
Boxer, and charged with an attempt at revolt and piracy. It had been their 
plan to induce the crew to murder their officers, and run away with the 
brig, but the plan had been discovered before it could be carried OUt.43 
40 MacKenzie, CMP, pp. 199,234. 
41 Sands, CMP, p. 150; MacKenzie, CMP, p. 231. 
42 Anon., "Mutiny on the Brig Braganza," The Sailor's Magazine (Vol. 11, 
No.2, November 1838), p. 100. 
43 Anon., "Attempt at Revolt and Piracy," The Anny and Navy Chronicle 
(Vol. 10, No.8, 1840), p. 127. 
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While both of these cases suggest the ease of attempting or 
carrying out a mutiny on board a brig, they also seem to contradict 
MacKenzie's defence. On board the Braganza, the mutineers had not 
been able to overwhelm the persons within the cabin. On board the 
Despatch, once the mutiny had been discovered, it had been suppressed. 
The difference between these mutinies and that on the Somers was that 
these were civilian vessels, while the Somers was a brig-of-war. Thus, she 
carried a wide array of weapons with which the mutineers could 
overwhelm any resistance. Furthermore, there were no marines on board. 
MacKenzie made this latter point a part of his defence.44 Whereas a brig 
would normally have had on board around ten marines, the only marine 
present on the Somers was Michael Garty, the master-at-arms; and he, in 
any case, was ill throughout the crisis, and did not rise from his hammock 
until November 27.45 
Besides these recent mutinies, there were two other factors 
influencing the officers. The first of these was true of all mutinies, that a 
solitary cruiser was much more likely to be seized by her crew than a 
vessel sailing in concert with another. The Hermione mutiny had taken 
place when the frigate had drifted away from her escort,46 and the Globe 
mutineers had expressly sailed away from her companion.47 The Somers, 
alone in the central Atlantic, had no support. 
Finally, there was the exceptional nature of the Somers' crew. 
Apprenticeship relied on recruiting urban children, particularly the 
destitute, abandoned, and delinquent. Given their origins, the apprentices 
44 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 232. 
45 Garty, CMP, pp. 122-123. 
46 Pope, The Black Ship, p. 152. 
47 Hoyt, The Globe Mutiny, p. 79. 
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on board were deemed either predisposed towards mutinous behaviour, or 
at least susceptible to it. "Never was a crew where malcontents could 
have had a fairer chance of making proselytes. The crew of the Somers 
were almost all apprentices; many of them men in physical strength, but 
all of them boys in mind... The season of youth, especially of untutored 
youth, is proverbially exposed to temptation.,,48 
Thus, an initial fear of mutiny had rapidly become the belief in a 
larger conspiracy, and this, in turn, led to a hunt for the mutineers. This 
search was driven by a conviction that the mutineers would strike 
whenever they had an opportunity, that the conspiracy was widespread, 
and that the most likely suspects were those crewmen closest to Spencer. 
Most importantly, the officers believed from the outset that they faced a 
mutiny. Everything that happened in the following days confirmed this 
immediate judgement. Even before the discovery of the Greek lists, for 
instance, Cromwell's guilt was assumed.49 Likewise, McKee was 
confronted by Gansevoort around their discovery, and told "You have 
been very thick lately with Mr. Spencer, and I know damned well you do 
know something. ,,50 As will be seen, everything that happened after 
Spencer's arrest was interpreted as further proof of the conspiracy. The 
Hermione Phobia had left MacKenzie no room for manoeuvre. 
Apart from the changes in the officer's watch structure,51 the 
evening of Spencer's arrest passed without further event. The next 
morning, however, the officers noted that the crew seemed disaffected. 
"Orders were not obeyed unless repeated two or three times; the crew 
48 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 233. 
49 Gansevoort, CMP, p. 55. 
50 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 216. 
51 Matthew C. Perry, Jr., CMP, p. 61. 
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collected aft out of their stations, were sullen while they were attending to 
their duty, talking to themselves and each other.,,52 Additionally, many of 
the crew gathered together in "knots," which broke up whenever an officer 
approached.53 This 'disaffection' extended to Cromwell, who disobeyed 
Gansevoort's order to go aloft and inspect the rigging.54 Although he did 
not reprimand Cromwell, Gansevoort held this against him, and freely 
expressed his suspicions to a second petty officer, Thomas Dickinson.55 
Throughout the day, the attentions of the officers were focused on 
Spencer's friends amongst the crew. Although anything that these sailors 
might have done would have aroused suspicion, three sets of behaviour 
excited particular alarm. In violation of his orders of confinement, 
Spencer was meant to have exchanged a number of "stealthy glances" 
with several of them, notably, McKinley, McKee, and Wilson.56 He was 
also alleged to have communicated with the later by means of sign 
language, which consisted of shaking his hands and knocking his feet. 57 
The small size of the brig played upon the officers' fears. The quarterdeck 
occupied one third of the brig's length, and the maintopmen would not 
have been more than twenty-five feet from Spencer. In fact, their duties 
would have given them good reason to approach the place of his 
confinement, and certainly brought them close enough to make eye 
contact. Furthermore, McKinley and Wilson had already missed their 
52 Wales, CMP, p. 13; Gansevoort, CMP, p. 38; Matthew C. Perry, Jr., 
CMP, p. 61; Neville, CMP, p. 79; Sears, CMP, p. 118; Garty, CMP, p. 
120; William Collins, CMP, p.143. 
53 Wales, CMP, p. 13; Gansevoort, CMP, p. 52. 
54 Henry King, CMP, p. 145. 
55 Henry King, CMP, p. 145; Dickinson, CMP, p. 149. 
56 Wales, CMP, p. 23; Gansevoort, CMP, p. 43. 
57 William Inglis, CMP, p. 109. 
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muster earlier in the day, as had Green and Neville.58 They were also seen 
together in one of the many knots of apprentices that gathered about the 
deck during the day.59 The apprentices were aware of the attention that 
they attracted, since McKinley had been present when the 'watchbill' had 
been read aloud, and had reported to them that their names had been said.60 
Charles Wilson came under particular scrutiny. He had been 
accused of insubordination earlier in the week, and had a serious 
altercation with James Wales.61 Wales had been armed by the officers, 
and confronted him at the stem of the launch (which was where Spencer's 
friends had been congregating). He believed that Wilson was behaving 
suspiciously, gathering together an assortment of holystones, and pulling 
at a handspike from one of the carronades. Wales threatened to "blow his 
brains out" before ordering Wilson to other duties.62 The steward's 
sudden elevation had not earned him any respect from the crew, rather the 
opposite. Indeed, Wales claimed that eventually he had several of them 
flogged for disobedience and contempt. The punishment log, however, 
does not indicate that this was the case. Indeed, only one apprentice, 
William Fry, was colted for disobedience.63 Regardless of this, his 
precipitate threats must have increased the tensions on board. 
These tensions continued to increase throughout the day until the 
afternoon, when catastrophe struck the brig. The wind had dropped, and 
58 Wales, CMP, p. 13. 
59 Charles Hays, CMP, pp. 213-214. 
60 McKinley, CMP, p. 176. 
61 Inglis, CMP, p. 109. 
62 Wales, CMP, p. 13. MacKenzie placed this incident on the November 
29, but Wales' own testimony made clear that this was not the case. 
MacKenzie, CMP, p. 200. 
63 New York Tribune, "Punishment Log of the Somers," January 14, 1843. 
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the royal-studdingsails were set in compensation.64 Such a large set of 
sail placed considerable pressure on the upper yards, and might carry them 
away.65 This had been a concern of MacKenzie's throughout the cruise, 
and he had repeatedly ordered that the preventer-braces leading aft from 
the main and main-topsail yards, and all the after-braces leading forward, 
be kept slack in order to reduce the strain on the light masts and yards.66 
On this occasion, he ordered the slack increased by letting go the weather-
main-royal brace.67 
The watch was already engaged setting the fore-sky-sail68 when 
MacKenzie's orders were forwarded by the officer of the deck, Charles 
Hays.69 The midshipman of the watch then relayed them to the crew. 
Under normal circumstances, this would have been Spencer, but since his 
arrest, the captain's clerk, Oliver Hazard Perry, Jr., had taken his place. 
Perry misunderstood the order and commanded the crew to do the 
opposite "Haul through the slack of the weather-main-royal-brace, 
and .. .leave the lee one slack.,,70 Far from increasing the slack, the crew 
were told to tighten the brace. Perry was said to have called for "half a 
dozen to clap on the brace," but it appears that only two responded. 71 
Small had been sitting on the bitts when the order was given. He 
rose up, and joined by an apprentice, Henry Corney, gave a tug at the 
brace. When MacKenzie realised what was happening, he jumped off the 
64 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 198. 
65 Ibid. 
66 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 213. 
67 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 211. 
68 Oliver H. Perry, Jr., CMP, p. 173. 
69 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 211. 
70 Henry King, CMP, p. 145. 
71 McKinley, CMP, p. 178. 
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roundhouse, and shouted for the order to be belayed.72 The shout was 
taken up by Hays, and repeated by which time, Perry had also ordered the 
men to belay. 73 While the offices were attempting to remedy the initial 
mistake, Small was compounding it. Warned already to be careful since 
an apprentice, Ward Gazely, was on the yard above, he gave not one, but 
two sharp tugs on the brace.74 When the order came to belay, Corney had 
stopped, but Small persisted in one more pul1.75 
The timing of what happened next is uncertain. One account has it 
immediately after Small's last pull, another thirty or forty seconds later, 
and yet another, a full five minutes afterwards, but however long it took, 
the royal mast was carried away.76 It fell forward over the topgallant yard, 
and lay hanging across the top hamper.77 Witnesses immediately assumed 
that Gazely had been thrown from his perch and would fall to the deck.78 
Fortunately, Gazely managed to catch hold of the royal-shroud, and land 
safely in the belly of the topgallant sai1.79 
Horror quickly gave way to confusion. Gansevoort was below in 
the wardroom, presumably with Matthew C. Perry, Jr., and came above 
when he heard the mast give. 80 They joined MacKenzie on the 
quarterdeck, and attempted to take control of the situation. Orders were 
gi ven for the crew to begin repairs, "breaking out and restoring the booms, 
scraping, slushing, and cutting fid and shear-holes in the spare 
72 Oliver H. Perry, Jr., CMP, p. 173. 
73 Oliver H. Perry, Jr., CMP, p. 173; Hays, CMP, p. 213. 
74 Corney, CMP, p. 98; Henry King, CMP, pp. 145-146. 
75 Corney, CMP, p. 98. 
76 Corney, CMP, p. 99; Henry King, CMP, p. 145; Hays, CMP, p. 213. 
77 Andrew Anderson, CMP, p. 225. 
78 Henry King, CMP, p. 147; MacKenzie, CMP, p. 198. 
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topgallantmast," and "unreeling and coiling down [the] running rigging, 
and bringing down the light sails to the yards."sl Meanwhile, Cromwell, 
Small, Wilson, and several others had gone aloft to ascertain the damage.s2 
Their attention aroused suspicion, given their friendships with Spencer, 
and the fact that some of them had gone aloft out of their stations.s3 
Regardless of their normal stations, however, that Cromwell, 
Wilson, and Small went aloft made perfect sense. Cromwell was the 
senior enlisted man on board, and was responsible for examining the sails 
and rigging, Small was one of the most experienced sailors in the crew, 
and had been at least partly responsible for the accident, while Wilson was 
the sailmaker's mate. Furthermore, this was the first real crisis that had 
occurred on board during the cruise, and it only made sense they had to act 
quickly lest further damage be done aloft by the fallen mast. 
Notwithstanding these facts, their response was interpreted only in 
light of the officers' preconceptions about the mutiny. Never mind that 
Perry had issued an incorrect order, and that MacKenzie reprimanded 
him.84 The loss of the mast had not been by accident, but by design. 
According to MacKenzie, the conspirators intended to sow confusion by 
causing the crisis of a lost mast, and by throwing Gazely overboard: "I 
knew it was an occasion of this sort, the loss of a boy overboard, or an 
accident to a spar, creating confusion and interrupting the regularity of 
duty, which was likely to be taken advantage of by the conspirators, were 
81 Matthew C. Perry, Jr., CMP, p. 77. 
82 Gansevoort, CMP, pp. 33, 44; MacKenzie, CMP, p.198; Anderson 
CMP,p.224. 
83 Gansevoort, CMP, p. 44. 
84 Hays, CMP, p. 211; Alexander McKee, CMP, pp. 215-216. 
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they still bent on the prosecution of their enterprise.,,85 Indeed, 
MacKenzie's immediate orders for the repairs were as much intended to 
prevent confusion as they were to address the mast.86 
That Cromwell and Small went aloft after the mast was carried 
away confirmed for MacKenzie their participation in the mutiny. 
"Whether animated by some new-born zeal in the service of their country, 
or collected there for the purpose of conspiring, it was not easy to decide; 
the coincidence confirmed the existence of a dangerous conspiracy, 
suspended yet not abandoned.,,87 The statement is both self-contradictory 
and revealing. On the one hand it asserts that their motives were not easy 
to determine, but then immediately states that here was confirmation of an 
ongoing conspiracy. Another critical juncture had been reached; not only 
did the officers believe that mutineers remained on board, but now they 
maintained that these persons had further designs on the brig. Far from 
repairing the damage which they were alleged to have done, they had gone 
aloft to conspire out of earshot. On deck, Gansevoort approached Henry 
King, the remaining gunner's mate, and remarked that he did not like 
Cromwell's 100ks.88 
Suspicious of their intent, and dissatisfied with their progress, 
Gansevoort ordered Andrew Anderson, gunner's mate and captain of the 
forecastle, to join them aloft.89 The sailors were indeed "talking 
earnestly," but he took no notice of their conversation.90 Instead, he joined 
85 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 198. 
86 Matthew C. Perry, Jr., CMP, p. 77; MacKenzie, CMP, p. 198. 
87 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 198. 
88 Henry King, CMP, p. 147. 
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Cromwell in assessing the damage. The boatswain's mate had already 
been at work on the cap and had sent down the heel of the mast.91 Now, 
he helped Anderson bring up a tail block.92 The other sailors were alleged 
to have offered no assistance, raising the question of their continued 
presence aloft. By this time, however the mast had become very crowded, 
"there were so many there, there was no room for them to do anything; all 
the topmen were there, and Van Velzor [sic]; they could do no good on the 
top-sail yard.,,93 Instead, they remained on a lower yard, presumably to 
assist in bringing down the wreckage to the deck. 
When the wreckage was cleared, the crew was piped to supper. 
Afterwards, the replacement mast was swayed. But far from defusing the 
earlier tension, this resulted in another eruption, even more serious than its 
predecessor. While the mast was being hauled up, the mast rope had to be 
manned at all times. William Collins, the gunner, had been made 
responsible for this while Cromwell supervised pointing the mast from 
aloft. Upon checking the rope, however, Collins discovered that all but 
three or four of the apprentices had left their station.94 As the crew usually 
did during a watch, they had removed themselves forward, and some 
twenty-five to thirty of them were sitting and standing around the 
mainmast and gangways.95 Collins ordered the apprentices back to the 
rope, but was not obeyed, even after he repeated the order three or four 
times.96 This was not altogether surprising, since Collins had only been 
91 Matthew C. Perry, Jr., CMP, p. 63; Sears, CMP, 118. 
92 Anderson, CMP, p. 224. 
93 Ibid. 
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promoted to boatswain's mate half an hour earlier,97 and was not usually 
concerned with anything besides the brig's armaments. Frustrated, he 
returned aft and told the officer of the deck, Charles Hays, that he was 
needed forward with a boatswain's mate in order to get the crew back to 
work.98 
Hays drew his pistol, and approached the forecastle with Oliver 
Browning, who brought his colt.99 Hays ordered Browning to start the 
crew aft and back to the mast rope, which he did. lOO After he colted three 
or four of the crew, the entire body ran aft along the gangways. Intent on 
avoiding being struck, they scrambled and pushed one another, making 
considerable noise along the way. 101 
Unfortunately, Gansevoort and MacKenzie had not been informed 
that the men were being sent aft. The two of them were standing on the 
larboard side of the quarterdeck when the 'rush aft' commenced.102 Since 
it was dark, they heard the crew before they actually saw them, "an 
unusual noise - a rushing on deck."103 The noise was soon followed by the 
actual sight of the apprentices, "a body of men in each gangway rushing 
aft toward the quarter-deck."I04 Notwithstanding that at least twenty-five 
of the apprentices rushing aft were among the youngest on board -
precisely those whom the officers regarded as the only remaining reliable 
members of their crew - Gansevoort was only able to identify Wilson in 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Rodgers, CMP, p. 135. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Humbert, CMP, p. 103; Inglis, CMP, p. 110. 
102 Gansevoort, CMP, p. 37. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 
229 
their number. 105 Both the Commander and Lieutenant assumed that they 
were about to be attacked. Once more, the small size of the brig 
contributed to their response. The officers' view of the deck was limited 
by obstructions on the deck, and they would only have seen the 
apprentices when they passed the booms. Thus, they found themselves 
confronted by what seemed a hostile mob at a distance of no more than 
twenty feet. At that distance they would have only had a few seconds in 
which to react. 
Gansevoort cried out, "God, I believe they are coming," before 
drawing his pistol. 106 According to the Lieutenant, MacKenzie was 
unarmed, and stood behind him as he jumped onto the roundhouse. 
Another account had the Commander armed and pointing his pistol at the 
men, although it is likely that he had only just returned from his cabin with 
the gun. 107 At any rate, Gansevoort aimed his pistol at the crew and said 
that he would blowout the brains of the first man who set foot on the 
quarterdeck. lOS When he heard the threat, although he claimed that 
Gansevoort had called out "what noise is that," Hays shouted out that he 
was starting the men aft. 109 Newly aware that the rush had not been an 
attack, Gansevoort warned the apprentices against any sudden or irregular 
movements, before reminding them of the present state of the vessel. 110 
The crew was then ordered to continue swaying the mast. 
105 King, CMP, p. 139; McKinley, CMP, p. 178; Gansevoort, CMP, p. 37. 
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While the crew was so employed, MacKenzie decided to act 
against Cromwell. It was now after dark, and he had decided that the 
boatswain's mate could not remain at large during the night, "the season 
of danger." I I I At some point thereafter, Gansevoort and MacKenzie 
determined to arrest him as soon as he came down onto the deck. 
Considering Collins' earlier promotion to boatswain's mate, it is quite 
possible that they had reached this conclusion then. Thus, when Cromwell 
descended, MacKenzie and several of the officers met him.112 Although 
there is no further information about the arrest, it was accompanied by the 
discharge of a pistol. 113 The Boatswain's Mate was escorted aft, and after 
a brief interrogation in which he denied complicity in any plot, he was 
arrested and put in irons. 114 MacKenzie said to him that "there were so 
many suspicions against him, that...it was necessary to confine him; and 
he should therefore be confined as Mr. Spencer was; to be taken home and 
tried by the laws of his country.,,115 Soon after, Small was also called 
back, interrogated, and confined in irons. 116 Like Spencer, they were 
placed in the stern of the brig. Cromwell was chained to the larboard arms 
chest, and Small to the after port gun. None of the prisoners were allowed 
to speak with one another, although Spencer asked if Cromwell's arrest 
had anything to do with his confinement, before asserting the mate's 
innocence. I 17 
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That evening, quarters were dispensed with. Not surprisingly, the 
enlisted men's talk that night was dominated by the events of the past two 
days. Rumours and innuendo must have flourished, since there had been 
as yet no official word on these matters apart from Gansevoort's warnings. 
Moreover, the officers had changed their watch system and increased their 
armaments. From this point onward, they kept three watches instead of 
four, and the officers of the deck had to wear two pistols, a cutlass, and a 
cartridge bOX. 118 Furthermore, they kept a constant watch belowdecks, 
continually moving throughout the vessel. 1l9 Spencer's friends must have 
felt the pressure keenly. Cromwell had been arrested on the strength of his 
relationship with the midshipman, and the lieutenant had already 
confronted a number of them. Indeed, that night Daniel McKinley 
predicted his imminent arrest to his messmates; a conclusion that he based 
on the close observation to which he had been subjected throughout the 
day. 120 
Despite the officers' fears, the night did not prove to be the season 
of much besides sleep. The next morning, however, "two crimes of 
considerable magnitude appeared on the master-at-arms' report of 
prisoners.,,121 Henry Waltham, who had already been confined for stealing 
brandy from the wardroom had told Daniel McKinley that three more 
bottles of wine could be found hidden elsewhere in the brig.122 McKinley 
had promptly informed Gansevoort of this, which MacKenzie correctly 
118 Matthew C. Perry, Jr., CMP, p. 6l. 
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assumed was "occasioned by his desire to relieve himself of suspicion.,,123 
McKinley's denunciation ensured that Waltham would be flogged twice, 
once for the initial thefts, and again the following day for the hidden 
brandy. Furthermore, Charles Lambert, an older apprentice, and therefore 
suspect, had stolen sinnit for a hat from Ward Gazely. Although 
Waltham's offence mandated a severe punishment, Lambert might have 
escaped with a lesser sentence had the brig's discipline been better. In this 
instance, however, MacKenzie was determined to enforce the full measure 
of the law. Accordingly, Lambert and Waltham were both given twelve 
blows with the cats before the assembled crew. 124 
Following the floggings, MacKenzie addressed the crew about the 
arrests for the first time. The timing was well considered, since the 
commander had just exercised his lawful authority over the crew. He 
began by explaining to them the general nature of Spencer's project. 125 
MacKenzie hoped to mollify them, and to allay the suspicions of those 
who were most suspected. Allegedly, his tone was mild and kind, even 
reassuring, as he spoke to the crew of their loved ones back in the United 
States. 126 His object was to remind them of the life that they would have 
to sacrifice were they to mutiny. At the same time, he did not want to 
reveal his own suspicions, and made no reference to the Greek lists. l27 
Nevertheless, he did allude, however obliquely, to the possible presence of 
mutineers in the crew when he reminded them, "[that] whatever might be 
123 Ibid. 
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their inclination" the best part of the crew would have suffered the same 
fate of the officers had the mutiny been successful. 128 
According to MacKenzie, the speech had an immediate effect on 
the crew, particularly the youngest apprentices who were the likeliest 
candidates for execution by the mutineers. Indeed, many of them broke 
down and wept as MacKenzie outlined what Spencer was alleged to have 
contemplated. 129 The speech also increased paranoia and anxiety amongst 
the crew. "It filled many with horror at the idea of what they had escaped 
from; it inspired others with terror at dangers awaiting them from their 
connexion [sic] with the conspiracy.,,130 The crew now shared the 
officers' fear of the unknown. What mutineers remained amongst them? 
How safe were they? What is more, Spencer's friends were now certainly 
. inspired by the dangers awaiting them from their connection with the 
midshipman! Although MacKenzie "considered the crew tranquillized 
[SiC],,131 by his speech, the reality was that the anxiety on board had 
probably been increased. 
Nevertheless, the remainder of the day passed uneventfully. 
Gansevoort continued attending to the prisoners, but when he asked 
Spencer if he was ready to speak about the Greek lists, the Midshipman 
demurred. 132 Later he would speak, but he was not yet ready. Earlier, he 
had finally lost his composure when MacKenzie had ordered that his 
tobacco ration be stopped. "He remained the whole day with his face 
buried in the grego, and when it was for a moment raised, it was bathed in 
128 Gansevoort, CMP, p. 39. 
129 Gansevoort, CMP, p. 45. 
130 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 199. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Gansevoort, CMP, p. 32. 
234 
tears.,,133 Indeed, he had good reason to weep, as the relative calm of the 
brig belied the mood of her officers. For the first time, they had begun to 
speak of executing their prisoners. 134 Whatever MacKenzie's thoughts on 
"tranquilising" the crew, his three senior subordinates were becoming 
convinced that so long as the 'ringleaders' remained alive, the brig would 
never be safe. 
These tensions increased throughout the following day. In the 
early morning, the crew was once again gathered together to witness 
Waltham's second flogging. Afterwards, MacKenzie spoke to the crew 
again, urging them to conform to the discipline of the brig, and to obey the 
officers' commands. 135 The Commander had revised his earlier beliefs 
about the crew's tranquillity, and now considered them "far from being 
tranquillized [SiC].,,136 His feelings were shared by the petty officers who 
maintained that further arrests were necessary for the safety of the vessel. 
MacKenzie's fears continued to be dominated by the undeclared 
mutineers he assumed were on board. " ... There were still many at liberty 
who ought to be confined ... an outbreak having for its object the rescue of 
the prisoners, was seriously contemplated.,,137 Moreover, Spencer's 
friends were now invested with associative guilt. Their own guilt had 
been assumed because of their friendship with him, and now anyone 
associating with them was suspect: "individuals not before supposed to be 
133 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 200. 
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very deeply implicated, were now found in close association with those 
who were.,,138 
Whatever the heightened fears of the officers, the day passed by 
without further incident. During the night, however, this fragile 
equilibrium was shattered. Already ordered to be especially attentive to 
their duties, Warner, Green, Gedney, and McKinley, missed their 
musters. 139 McKinley later explained that he had been on deck, but as it 
was overcrowded he had been unable to get to his place in line before his 
name was called OUt. I40 Such explanations were regarded as an attempt to 
conceal his true purpose, that "there was probably an agreement to meet 
around the officer of the deck, and commit some act of violence.,,141 
Never mind that the officers were now on their guard against just such an 
attack, and that all were heavily armed. 
Later in the night, there was another, but milder, rush aft. The brig 
was in heavy seas, and rolling heavily, when the boom-tackle was carried 
away.142 The officer of the deck, Matthew C. Perry, Jr., immediately took 
in the slack on the weather-sheet, and called out for assistance, "Some of 
you lay aft.,,143 The order was ignored, and it was not until it had been 
repeated several times that "a great number" of the crew ran towards 
him.l44 Confronted with more help than he found comfortable, Perry 
ordered them back, and called out the names of two or three individuals 
138 Ibid. 
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whom he still trusted. 145 The situation was then resolved, although Perry 
told the crew who had approached him that their failure to obey orders 
endangered their lives. Given the consequences of the previous rush aft, 
however, the crew's reticence to approach a solitary officer on the 
quarterdeck at night is understandable. Theirs was a nigh impossible 
situation: to ignore orders invited charges of insubordination or 
conspiracy, but to obey them with too much alacrity invited allegations of 
disingenuity or even mutinous assault. 
Finally, when the subsequent watch was called on deck, several 
more of the crew missed their muster. After this second round of absences 
MacKenzie decided on further action. "I could not contemplate this 
growth of disaffection without serious uneasiness."I46 He was convinced 
that the mutiny's discovery had not stopped the conspiracy, but that on the 
contrary, it had actually increased its size. Far from diminishing his 
concerns, the arrests had increased them. Writing retrospectively, 
MacKenzie commented: "Each new arrest of prisoners seemed to bring a 
fresh set of conspirators forward ... ,,147 
The next morning, he wrote a letter to the officers of the brig.148 
The letter read as follows: 
145 Ibid. 
Gentlemen: 
The time has arrived when I am desirous of availing myself of 
your council in the responsible position in which, as commander of this 
vessel, I find myself placed. You are aware of the circumstances which 
have resulted from the confinement of Midshipman Philip Spencer, 
Boatswain's Mate Samuel Cromwell, and Seaman E. Small, as 
prisoners, and I purposely abstain from entering into any details of 
them, necessarily ignorant of the exact extent of disaffection among a 
146 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 200. 
147 Ibid. 
148 MacKenzie, CMP, p.201. Excepting the two acting midshipmen, John 
Tillotson and Oliver Hazard Perry, Jr. 
crew which has so long and so systematically and assiduously been 
tampered with by an officer. Knowing that suspicions of the gravest 
nature attach to persons still at large, and whom the difficulty of taking 
charge of the prisoners we already have, makes me more reluctant than 
I should otherwise be to apprehend, I have determined to address 
myself to you, and to ask your united council as to the best course to be 
now pursued, and I call upon you to take into deliberate and 
dispassionate consideration the present condition of the vessel, and the 
contingencies of every nature that the future may embrace, throughout 
the remainder of our cruise, and enlighten me with your opinion as to 
the best course to be pursued. 
I am, very respectfully, gentlemen, your most obedient, Alex. 
Slidell MacKenzie, Commander. 149 
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Notwithstanding MacKenzie's immediate reference to his responsibilities 
as the brig's commander, the letter was more than anything else, a 
diffusion of those responsibilities. In presenting a request for advice, 
MacKenzie incorporated the officers of the council in his own decision-
making process. Thus, they were all partially accountable for his ultimate 
actions. Whatever happened next, the brig's junior officers shared the 
responsibility for it as well. 
Before he delivered the note, however, four more of the crew were 
arrested. The arrests took place at nine o'clock, after morning quarters. 150 
They began with Charles Wilson who had come aft of his own accord to 
speak with MacKenzie about any suspicions that might be entertained 
against him. 151 For his trouble, the Sailmaker's Mate was arrested and 
ironed. Immediately afterwards, McKinley was summoned, and whilst 
MacKenzie and Gansevoort pointed pistols at his head, he was confined as 
welL Alexander McKee was called next, and told that while there were 
suspicions against him, he would not yet be confined. Several minutes 
later, however, he was called back with Benjamin Green, and they were 
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confined together. 152 During his arrest, Green was told that he had been a 
valuable member of the crew, but "during the last two or three days 
[MacKenzie] thought he perceived a change [in his behavior],,,153 Each of 
these arrests contributed to the officers' sense of insecurity since their 
mode of confinement brought them closer and closer to the crew. Like 
Small, the four new prisoners were chained to the after guns, so that now 
fully one third of the deck was occupied by confined mutineers. 
Meanwhile, having agreed to speak with Gansevoort, Spencer was 
confronted with the Greek lists. 154 He had already told the Lieutenant that 
he had planned such mutinies on board the Potomac and the John Adams, 
that it had not been taken so far before, and that he thought it was a 
"mania" with him. 155 Now, Spencer translated the Greek lists for him and 
for Adrian Deslonde, who was transcribing what Spencer said. Henry 
Rodgers had already translated the lists,156 but Spencer was made to do so 
in order to identify "E. Andrews.,,157 He claimed that this was Small, but 
the issue was never resolved, and the officers continued to believe that it 
was actually Cromwell. 158 
Mackenzie delivered his letter to Gansevoort around eleven 
o'clock, and the Lieutenant convened a council of officers in the 
wardroom. 159 The officers discussed the situation on board throughout the 
day, and called upon several witnesses to testify as to the state of the 
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vessel, and how to ensure its safety. The character of these witnesses is 
revealing. Only the first three, Charles Van Velsor, George Warner, and 
Matthew Gedney, were enlisted men. Friends of Spencer, they were 
called in the hopes that they might incriminate themselves, or any other 
hidden mutineers. l60 Excepting James Wales, who repeated his account of 
the conversation on the booms, the remaining witnesses were all petty 
officers. Several of these men had earlier asserted that the prisoners 
required execution, and three of them maintained as much on this 
occasion. Furthermore, another two declared rather euphemistically that 
Spencer, Cromwell, and Small needed to be 'removed' from the brig. 
Accounts of Spencer's familiarity with Cromwell (on which every witness 
commented), and various actions of his, which retrospectively were 
considered evidence of premeditation, dominated the remainder of the 
testimony. Finally, the galley cooks were identified with the mutiny on 
account of their friendship with Cromwell. At no time were the accused 
made aware of the proceedings or allowed to speak on their own behalf. 161 
Although the officers had been instructed to consider 
"contingencies of every nature," they rejected without question the option 
of taking the Somers to the safety of a nearby port. Several islands were 
nearby, and the authorities there could have provided shelter and safety for 
the brig. Over the previous four days, the Somers had averaged 169 miles 
distance per day, and but for the loss of her mast would have averaged 
189 miles per day.162 Although St. Thomas remained a few more days 
distant, at this speed the brig could have made Barbados, Martinique, 
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Dominique, Guadeloupe, or St. Lucia within two days. Moreover, had the 
Somers changed course for any of these islands, she would have had a free 
wind behind her, and would have actually increased her speed. 163 
This option was dismissed, not so much because of expediency or 
viability, but on account of honour. While the officers were concerned 
that any change of course might precipitate further reaction;64 Perry 
declared that he would rather go overboard than seek protection. In effect, 
he was saying that it was better to murdered by mutineers than to admit a 
loss of control. "It would be a disgrace to the United States, the navy, and 
particularly the officers of the brig [to seek help]; my reasons were that if 
an American man-of-war could not protect herself, [there was] no use in 
having any.,,165 Perry's views were shared by the senior midshipman, 
Rodgers, "I should [have] thought it a disgrace to the flag, to attempt to 
seek protection from any foreign power and to give up the prisoners ... ,,166 
The officers were governed by their sense of propriety and caste. Failure 
to take decisive action might expose them, them to future charges of 
cowardice from their peers. Such a prospect was unthinkable, especially 
to men with distinguished naval antecedents. Whatever action was to be 
taken, it had to buttress them against any attacks that they might later face. 
Regardless, the deliberations continued for the better part of the 
day. The council had not yet reached a decision by the time it broke for 
the evening at six o'clock. The night watch was their immediate priority, 
so the officers agreed to reconvene the next morning. By now, however, 
they were beginning to suffer from their security arrangements. Since 
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Spencer's arrest the officers had averaged only three to four hours of sleep 
each day, and then only at intervals. 167 Furthermore, constant patrols and 
the burden of their armaments had exacerbated their fatigue. 168 By their 
own estimates they could not have maintained this regimen much further, 
no more than two or three days, and more likely, even less. 169 
Moreover, the officers were now convinced that the mutiny had 
spread throughout most of their crew. Gansevoort reported that at least 
one-half, and perhaps as many as two-thirds of the crew had some part in 
the conspiracy.170 Rodgers maintained that the figure was even greater, 
that as many as three-quarters of the crew were inv01ved.17I MacKenzie 
was more circumspect. Certainly, most of the crew knew the mutineers' 
identities, but their actual numbers remained small. 172 Nevertheless, 
concerned by the officers' deteriorating condition, MacKenzie determined 
that "another night should not be passed.,,173 Thus, he prepared a watch 
bill detailing the stations to be taken by the officers during an execution. 174 
The council of officers reconvened early on December 1. The 
deliberations continued for another four hours, whereupon the officers sent 
MacKenzie the following letter: 
Sir: 
In answer to your letter of yesterday, requesting our 
counsel as to the best course to be pursued with the prisoners, Acting-
Midshipman Philip Spencer, Boatswain's Mate Samuel Cromwell, and 
Seaman Elisha Small, we would state, that the evidence which has 
167 Matthew C. Perry, Jr., CMP, p. 74. 
168 Matthew C. Perry, Jr., p. 74; Leecock, CMP, p. 221. 
169 Gansevoort, CMP, pp. 58,61; Rodgers, CMP, p. 131; Leecock, CMP, 
p.221. 
170 Gansevoort, CMP, p. 58. 
171 Rodgers, CMP, p. 132. 
172 MacKenzie, CMP, p.199. 
173 MacKenzie, CMP p. 202. 
174 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 202-203. 
come to our knowledge is of such a nature as, after as dispassionate and 
deliberate a consideration of the case as the exigencies of the time 
would admit, we have come to cool, decided, and unanimous opinion, 
that they have been guilty of a full and determined intention to commit 
a mutiny on board of this vessel of a most atrocious nature; and that the 
revelation of circumstances having made it necessary to confine others 
with them, the uncertainty as to what extent they are leagued with 
others still at large, the impossibility of guarding against the 
contingencies which 'a day or an hour may bring forth,' we are 
convinced that it would be impossible to carry them to the United 
States, and that the safety of the public property, the lives of ourselves, 
and of those committed to our charge, require that (giving them 
sufficient time to prepare) they should be put to death, in a manner best 
calculated to make a beneficial impression upon the disaffected. This 
opinion we give, bearing in mind our duty to our God, our country, and 
to our service.175 
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Mackenzie concurred with their decision, and began preparations 
for the executions. First, he mustered the petty officers on the 
quarterdeck, and armed each one with a cutlass, pistol, and cartridge 
bOX.176 He had been considering this "for a few days," but had not wanted 
to arm anyone besides the officers. They were then given the simple 
instructions, "My lads, you are to look at me, to obey my orders, and to 
see my orders obeyed. Go forward.,,177 MacKenzie's command carried 
two great risks. In the first place, it involved a leap of faith that he was 
not actually arming any mutineers. At the same time, if the petty officers 
were loyal, he was investing them with an extraordinary amount of power 
over their fellows. The three "principal criminals" were to be hanged at 
the main-yard arms, and when all hands were called aft to witness 
punishment, MacKenzie further consolidated his control by promoting 
several apprentices whom he apparently trusted. 178 
175 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 202. 
176 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 203. 
177 Ibid. 
178 "Muster Returns from the U.S. Brig of War Somers, September 1, 1842 
to September 30, 1846," NA RG 217, MPR, Book 1424. The promoted 
apprentices were: William Clark, Ward Gazely, Thomas Harrison, 
Theodore Humbert, Manuel Howard, Henry Stremmels, and John 
Whitmore. 
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The prisoners were to be hoisted aloft by their shipmates, 
especially those with whom they had worked, and were thought to have 
influenced most. Thus, the after-guard and idlers of the watches were 
mustered around the whip intended for Spencer, the forecastle and 
foretopmen around the one for Cromwell, and the maintopmen for 
Small. 179 The officers and petty officers were, in turn, stationed around 
the brig according to the watch bill drawn up the night before. Each had 
orders to cut down any of the crew who relaxed their hold of the whip, or 
who did not haul upon it when ordered. 180 These things done, MacKenzie 
put on his dress uniform and went to inform the prisoners of their fate. 
What followed was as much designed to impress certain lessons on 
the crew as it was to remove the perceived threat of the 'ringleaders.' 
Certainly, MacKenzie believed that the executions were crucial. Through 
the punishments, the commander hoped to reassert his absolute mastery of 
the brig. MacKenzie's evaluation of their importance is reflected in his 
narrative, almost half of which covered the executions. In writing his 
account during the remainder of the cruise, the commander was unlikely to 
have had recourse to the elaborate literature of executions produced in the 
first twenty years of the 19th century, but he would have been familiar 
with them and their content. Between 1790 and 1820, numerous 
pamphlets were printed describing various executions. The points of 
emphasis in these pamphlets, the moments described and the speeches 
made, carried explicit societal lessons. The pamphlets were intended to 
propagate further the messages of the execution day. Whatever the 
179 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 203. 
180 Ibid. 
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relation between MacKenzie's narrative and the pamphlets, the one is 
representative of the other and conveys the same messages. 
At any rate, the Somers executions resembled those of the early 
Republic, and were not representative of contemporary attitudes towards 
capital punishment. By 1842, public executions had been abolished 
throughout much of the North-East. 181 This is not to say that capital 
punishment had been abolished, it was simply no longer conducted in 
public. The social costs of the spectacle were deemed to outweigh its 
benefits. Public executions had become increasingly identified with mob 
violence. 182 Against the riotous backdrop of the 1830s, executions seemed 
to provide a dangerous opportunity for lawlessness. 183 Apart from the 
increased likelihood of crime, exposure to the killing of another human 
was supposed to excite violent and criminal tendencies. l84 The Somers 
executions did exactly these things, however. They challenged the mob 
and its violence. Now, the mutineers would be their most desperate. If 
there was going to be any rescue attempt, this would be its last hope. 
Needless to say, MacKenzie took steps to quell any incipient 
revolt. The threat of mob violence was already in his mind, and the 
executions took place in a highly coercive environment. When 
MacKenzie armed the petty officers, he increased the number of guards 
181 L.P. Masur, Rites of Execution: Capital Punishment and the 
Transformation of American Culture, 1776-1865 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), p. 94. Public executions were abolished in 
Pennsylvania in 1824, and in New Jersey, New York, and Massachusetts 
in 1834. Indeed, Ambrose Spencer had been one of the early advocates of 
penal refonn and the abolition of capital punishment. 
182 At the same time, these executions were public only within the brig. 
This was hardly a public spectacle. 
183 Masur, Rites of Execution, p. 100. 
184 Masur, Rites of Execution, pp. 98-99. 
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from eleven to sixteen, all of whom had the most draconian orders to 
maintain control during the hangings. Moreover, the commander had 
supposedly buttressed his support to twenty-three men and boys with the 
promotions. Thus, he could count on one-fifth of the crew in the event of 
any disturbances. 
Furthermore, hanging was the traditional form of execution for 
mutineers and pirates. Indeed, the hanging of pirates took public 
execution to its most graphic, public, and extended form with the 
gibbeting of the victim. At the same time, hangings rarely took place in 
the old Navy. Prior to the Somers mutiny, only fourteen men had been 
sentenced to death, and only one of them after 1819.185 Three of those 
sentenced were mutineers, but only one seems to have been executed. 186 
The other men were condemned for murder or desertion. Whatever their 
infrequency, however, such punishments were conducted according to 
traditional rules and carried traditional lessons. 
Obviously, these messages were intended above all else, to 
demonstrate the power of government, and as a warning to those who 
would violate the law. 187 At the same time, the spectacle also incorporated 
the authority of the church, as the execution sermon and the last words and 
dying confessions of the prisoners, articulated the moral lesson to be 
drawn from the day.188 Mackenzie relied on the judicial and the sacerdotal 
185 "Index to courts-martial of the United States Navy, 1798-1861," NA 
RG 273, "Records of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy of the 
United States." 
186 Valle, Rocks and Shoals, p. 103. 
187 Masur, Rites of Execution, p. 27. 
188 Masur, Rites of Execution, p. 26. 
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elements of execution in order to reassert his control over the brig, and to 
address those members of the crew who remained secretly mutinous. 
Besides being a judicial ritual, public execution was imbued with 
political force, through which sovereign power was manifested. 189 This 
was its primary purpose. When MacKenzie donned his dress uniform, he 
was emphasising his authority as a representative of the government and 
people of the United States. However the mutineers had wronged him, 
their actions constituted a much more serious attack on the Republic 
itself.19O This point was underscored by his decision to hoist the ensign 
and pendant simultaneously with the executions. 191 Indeed, MacKenzie 
was illustrating the heights of his own lawful authority, and the feebleness 
of Spencer's attack upon it. l92 The commander had earlier demonstrated 
this authority through the floggings, but was now demonstrating it at its 
most extreme. Before, he had shown the crew his power over their bodies, 
now he demonstrated that his power extended to their lives. 
Following Spencer's arrest, the officers increasingly felt that their 
control over the brig was being lost. They were no longer leading, but 
reacting; the actions of others dictated their policies. Indeed, the unknown 
mutineers had usurped control of the situation when they forced the 
officers to alter their watch structure and command policies. The 
execution was an absolute counter-strike. Not only were the officers 
seizing the initiative back, they were doing so through the ultimate 
189 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish - The Birth of the Prison, 
A. Sheridan, trans. (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), p. 47. 
190 Crime had always been seen as an attack on the Republic, (Masur, Rites 
of Execution, p. 40) but in this case it really was an act on and against 
Federal property! 
191 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 203 
192 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 49. 
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expression of their power. In this context, capital punishment did more 
than execute justice, it reasserted and reactivated that power. 193 
Going to the prisoners, MacKenzie spoke first with Spencer, 
accusing him of having contemplated murdering him "without a moment 
to utter one murmur of affection to my wife and children ... ,,194 For this 
and his other offences, Spencer's life was "now forfeited to his country, 
and the necessities of the case, growing out of his corruption of the crew, 
compelled [MacKenzie] to take it." If the midshipman had any last 
communications that he wished to send his family he had to compose them 
immediately since he had only ten minutes to live. 195 Spencer replied that 
"he was not fit to die," and that he wished a little more time to prepare 
himself.196 MacKenzie agreed with him, but maintained that there was no 
other option, whereupon he crossed over to the larboard arm-chest and 
told Cromwell and Small of their impending execution. 
The Boatswain's Mate had been reading a copy of the Penny 
Magazine, which he dropped as he fell to his knees. 197 In falling, he cried 
aloud, "God of the Universe, look down on my poor wife; I am 
innocent.,,198 The scene was then interrupted by Spencer who said "These 
are about the last words I am going to say, and I trust they will be 
believed ... Cromwell is innocent."I99 Spencer's declaration had a 
profound impact on the commander. Final words were not to be 
discounted, since they were spoken with nothing to gain by deceit or 
193 Ibid. 
194 Tillotson, CMP, p. 169; MacKenzie, CMP, p. 203. 
195 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 203. 
196 McKinley, CMP, p. 179. 
197 MacKenzie, CMP, pp. 197-180. 
198 McKinley, CMP, p. 180. 
199 Ibid; MacKenzie, CMP, p. 203. 
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equivocation.2°O MacKenzie sought Gansevoort's advice, and then the 
counsel of the petty officers.20l They unanimously agreed that Cromwell 
was especially gUilty. Indeed, they regarded him as the driving force 
behind the mutiny, while Spencer was merely his dupe.202 Philip Spencer 
was "the damned fool on the larboard arm-chest..." and Cromwell was 
"the damned rascal on the starboard.,,203 Thomas Dickinson, no friend of 
the boatswain's mate, remarked that he "ought to have thought of his dear 
wife before, not after it was too late.,,204 
Spencer was then told that his declaration was to be ignored. 
MacKenzie accompanied the news with the petty officers' remarks, and 
his own belief that had the mutiny been successful, Spencer would have 
merely been Cromwell's secretary.205 The Commander concluded that far 
from being 'proper' last words, Spencer's request had a hidden purpose: 
"He more probably hoped [Samuel Cromwell] might yet get possession of 
the vessel and carry out the scheme of murder and outrage matured 
between them.,,206 The midshipman became "aroused," and his 
"countenance assumed a demoniacal expression.,,207 MacKenzie assumed 
that this was a manifestation of Spencer's thwarted plan, and not an 
expression of anger that his last words had been so distorted. 
Meanwhile, Small had received the news "with composure.,,208 
When asked if he had any message to send or preparations to make, he 
200 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 43. 
201 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 203. 
202 Ibid. 
203 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 204. 
204 Dickinson, CMP, p. 149. 
205 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 204. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Ibid. 
208 Ibid. 
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remarked, "I have nobody to care for me but my poor old mother, and I 
would rather that she should not know how I died.,,209 MacKenzie 
returned to Spencer, and asked him if he had any messages to send to his 
family. "None that they would wish to receive," Spencer respondec£lO 
MacKenzie pressed him further, and Spencer said: 
Tell [my friends and family] that I die wishing them every 
blessing and happiness; I deserve death for this and many other crimes 
- there are few crimes that I have not committed; I feel sincerely 
penitent, and my only fear is that my repentance may be too late .. .! 
have wronged many persons, but mainly my parents ... this will kill my 
poor mother .. ,1 fear that this will injure my father. 211 
Spencer's declaration served two purposes. On the one hand, it 
admitted his guilt, thereby justifying his punishment. A successful public 
execution legitimised justice and this required the acquiescence or better 
still, approval, of the condemned man.212 Spencer's admission provided 
this, although as he himself said his 'confession' had the deeper motive of 
repentance. At the same time, Spencer's concern for his parents was an 
established part of the execution ritual. Since the family was considered 
to be the basis of a stable social order it was imperative to show that the 
failures of the condemned belonged to the criminal alone, and not his 
parents.213 In this manner, the older generation exculpated itself from the 
younger generation's guilt, and excused themselves from responsibility for 
the actions and eventual fate of their children.214 
Notwithstanding this declaration, MacKenzie deflected Spencer's 
concern for his father, telling him that it was: 
209 Ibid. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Ibid. 
212 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 44. 
213 Masur, Rites of Execution, p. 35. 
214 Masur, Rites of Execution, p. 36. 
almost too late to think of that - that had he succeeded in his wishes, it 
would have injured his father much more - that had it been possible to 
have taken him home, as I intended to do, it was not in nature that his 
father should not have interfered to save him - that for those who have 
friends or money in America there was no punishment for the worst of 
crimes - that though this had nothing to do with my determination, 
which had been forced upon me in spite of every effort which I had 
made to avert it, I on this account the less regretted the dilemma in 
which I was placed; it would injure his father a great deal more, if he 
got home alive, should he be condemned and yet escape; the best and 
only service he could do his father was to die.215 
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In other words, if Spencer were not executed, his father would compound 
his misdeeds by acting improperly on the Midshipman's behalf. Thus, 
Spencer's guilt would cross generational lines and infect his own father. 
The execution of this "base son of an honoured father" was not only 
necessary in the name of justice, but in order to protect the Spencer family 
from itself. 216 
Indeed, it is likely that Spencer would have escaped serious 
punishment had he been returned to the United States. This had already 
happened once before, and there was little reason to assume that it would 
not happen again. MacKenzie's assertion that "money or friends" would 
allow Spencer to escape appropriate punishment rings true. This had as 
much to do with established naval practice, however, as it did with his 
father's influence. While the latter would have helped guarantee Spencer a 
lighter punishment (certainly lighter than execution!), the former set the 
precedent. 
Between 1798 and 1843, 196 acting midshipmen, midshipmen, and 
passed midshipmen were convicted of various offences by courts-
martial. 217 Their sentences fell into three basic categories: dismissal from 
215 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 204. 
216 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 196. 
217 "Index to Courts-Martial of the United States Navy, 1798-1861," NA 
RG 273. 
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the Navy, a reprimand, or suspension. Dismissal was the most common 
sentence, and was passed on fifty-five occasions. This figure is actually 
higher if the twenty-eight other midshipmen who were ordered cashiered 
are also included. Reprimands were the next most common punishment. 
This could be a private reprimand from a commanding officer or the court, 
or it could be a public one, issued before the assembled crew and 
proclaimed throughout the squadron. Taken together, there were forty-
nine such reprimands and admonishments. Suspensions ranged in severity 
and duration. They could cost an officer all or half of his pay, and they 
might run for as little as one month, or as long as several years. Moreover, 
they were often combined with a reprimand or a transfer. Finally, on a 
few occasions, midshipmen were assigned further sea duty before being 
allowed to take their exams, or were dropped to the foot of the 
midshipmen's list. 
The courts-martial that had passed these sentences were convened 
and approved by Presidents of the United States, Secretaries of the Navy, 
and squadron commanders.218 The council of officers on board the Somers 
fell far short of their authority. Moreover, it called for a punishment 
radically more severe than had ever been ordered for a midshipman. 
Spencer's person, like these men before him, was inviolate.2I9 Officers 
were exempted from sanguinary punishments, and subject only to the 
discipline of a court-martial juried by their peers.220 The council's 
decision was therefore, unprecedented and contrary to law and tradition. 
218 Articles of War, Article XXXV. 
219 Articles of War, Article III; 1832 Naval Regulations, p. 25. 
220 Articles of War, Article III. 
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Spencer perhaps had this in mind when he then questioned MacKenzie's 
decision. 221 
First he asked, "have you not formed an exaggerated estimate of 
the extent of this conspiracy?,,222 MacKenzie's response was revealing, "I 
knew the conspiracy was extensive - I did not know how extensive.,,223 
The fear of unknown mutineers continued to drive him. Spencer then 
asked, "But are you not going too far - are you not too fast? Does the law 
entirely justify you ?,,224 Clearly, the law did not justify MacKenzie, far 
from it. Not surprisingly, MacKenzie made no reference to the Articles of 
War or courts-martial in his answer. Instead, he referred to the council of 
officers, "I had consulted all his brother officers, his messmates included, 
except the boys, and I placed before him their opinion.,,225 Moreover, 
when describing his actions, MacKenzie's own narrative quite self-
consciously and clearly admitted that they were extra-judicial: "In the 
necessities of my position I found my law, and in them also I must trust to 
find my justification.,,226 
At any rate, Spencer's next question was not about MacKenzie's 
decision, but as to the manner of his own execution. When told that he 
was to be hanged, he objected, asking to be shot instead. MacKenzie 
refused his request on the grounds that it would be unfair to the other two 
221 There has been some controversy as to whether or not the following 
passages accurately describe Spencer's last words. The issue of their 
veracity arose during MacKenzie's court-martial, but even if they did 
distort Spencer's utterance, it is clear that they reflect MacKenzie's 
anxieties over the legality of his actions, and may have been constructed 
by him to justify them and assuage his own concerns. 
222 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 205. 
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condemned men. Spencer acquiesced. He then asked for a blindfold, and 
that he be given more time to prepare himself. To these requests, 
MacKenzie agreed, and extended the choice of a blindfold to Cromwell 
and Small. The next hour was spent in prayer. 
[Spencer] asked for a bible and prayer-book, they were 
brought, and others ordered to be furnished to his accomplices. 'I am a 
believer,' he said- 'do you think that repentance at this late hour can be 
accepted? I called to his recollection the case of the penitent thief who 
was pardoned by our Savior upon the cross. He then read in the Bible, 
kneeled down and read in the prayer-book; he asked again if 1 thought 
that his repentance could be accepted - that the time was so short, and 
he did not know if he really was changed. 1 told him that GOD, who 
was all-merciful as well as all-wise, could not only understand the 
difficulties of his situation, but extend to him such a measure of mercy 
as his necessities might require. He said, 'I beg your forgiveness for 
what I might have meditated against you.' I gave him my hand, and 
assured him of my sincere forgiveness ... 227 
This preoccupation with repentance was typical of the execution 
ritual. Indeed, it was crucial for its success. Prisoners were encouraged to 
recant publicly their sins and put themselves before God's mercy. Public 
repentance accomplished several things. First, it introduced religious 
lessons to the ritual. The execution was made, on the one hand, more 
palatable since the deceased 'would be that day with God,' yet the 
audience was also reminded that the prisoners would soon face His 
j udgement. 228 The execution was a momento mori, and observers were 
encouraged to apply the penitential lesson to themselves. 
What is more, the penitent's example was designed to appeal most 
of all to those criminals and sinners who lurked unseen in the crowd. In 
the execution ritual the audience was reminded that God, who would be 
their final judge at an inevitable end, was omnipresent and omniprescient. 
If the civil authorities that executed another man were unaware of a 
227 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 205. 
228 Masur, Rites of Execution, p. 41. 
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malfeasant's true nature, God, in whose name they claimed to act, was not 
deceived. The audience was encouraged to dwell on its own sins, and 
begin its own repentance accordingly.229 On board the Somers, this 
message would have been intended most for those members of the crew 
whose part in the mutiny was still undiscovered. 
Cromwell, Spencer, and Small were marched from the quarter-
deck to the mainmast. They were still encumbered by their manacles, and 
their progress was slow.230 The sight of them in chains increased the 
ritual's power. Each was made the "herald of his own condemnation, 
announcing their crimes by their very presence.,,231 Moreover, the image 
reinforced the discrepancy of power between the prisoners and their 
captors. MacKenzie continued to reassert his authority with the bodies of 
the 'ringleaders.' 
En route, they said their good-byes to one another and to some of 
the assembled officers. Forgiveness and repentance dominated these 
encounters. Spencer first shook hands with Egbert Thompson, who was 
weeping.232 As they bade one another goodbye, Spencer told the other 
Midshipman to take warning by his fate. 233 Spencer asked Thompson to 
send for Henry Rodgers, but he was never summoned.234 Finally, Spencer 
shook hands with Gansevoort, "and in the most earnest manner asked me 
to forgive him the great injuries he had done me.,,235 
229 Masur, Rites of Execution, p. 40. 
230 Gansevoort, CMP, p. 60. 
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255 
As the prisoners reached the gangways, Spencer received 
permission to speak with James Wales. "Mr. Wales, 1 sincerely trust that 
you will forgive me for tampering with your fidelity," to which the 
steward replied, "I [do] so from the bottom of my heart, and hoped God 
would forgive him also.,,236 Spencer asked again for Rodgers before he 
turned to Small, and begged his forgiveness as well.237 Small, at first, 
refused, but when pressed, relented: "Ah, Mr. Spencer, this is a hard thing 
for you to ask me; we shall soon be before the face of God, and there we 
shall know all about it. ,,238 Spencer implored him again, saying that he 
could not die without his forgiveness. Small then offered it: "I do forgive 
you, Mr. Spencer; may God Almighty forgive you also.,,239 
Small next asked Gansevoort for forgiveness, including words to 
the effect that he was guilty, and deserved death.24O Then, Gansevoort 
walked over to Cromwell, and bid him goodbye. The Boatswain's Mate 
gripped his arm very tightly, and yet again protested his innocence. At the 
same time, he also asked for forgiveness. 241 After Gansevoort took leave 
of him, MacKenzie spoke with Small, asking why he wouldn't bid him 
farewell. Small replied that he meant no slight, but that he "didn't know 
that [MacKenzie] would bid a poor bugger like [him] good-by [sic].,,242 
MacKenzie explained that he was very sorry for what was about to 
happen, but that the honour of the flag and the safety of the crew 
demanded it. Small said to him, "Yes, sir, 1 honor you for it, and God 
236 Wales, CMP, p. 16. 
237 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 206. 
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bless that flag and prosper it.,,243 This appeared to affect MacKenzie very 
much, and he is said to have wept. 
The three had now reached the mainmast, and the whips were put 
about their necks. Small was placed on the hammocks forward of the 
gangway, while Spencer and Cromwell were similarly placed abaft the 
gangway on the other side. The Midshipman called out for Gansevoort, 
and said that he wanted it known that he had died a brave man. Thus, he 
asked for, and received permission to give the order to fire the gun which 
would signal his own execution.244 Spencer's one other request was that 
there be no delay between the order to fire and the actual firing. To be 
sure of this, MacKenzie obtained live coals from the galley to use in place 
of a lock and wafer. Whilst waiting for the coals to be brought aft, 
Cromwell and Small addressed the crew. 
Cromwell spoke first, although it is not certain if he had received 
the Commander's permission. His words were short, more like an 
outburst than a speech. "Tell my wife I die an innocent man; tell 
Lieutenant Morris I die an innocent man.,,245 To the end, Cromwell 
vehemently protested his innocence. He had offered only one apology, to 
Gansevoort, and had shown more concern for his wife than his own 
penitential soul. In dying, he set a different moral example for the crew. 
His words confirmed another reading of the mutiny: that it did not exist, 
and that the three men were innocent. If we accept James Travis' 
243 Ibid; MacKenzie, CMP, p. 206. 
244 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 206. 
245 Ibid. The officer was later identified as Lieutenant Charles W. Morris, 
with whom Cromwell had apparently made several cruises. M. 
Gouverneur, As I Remember, Recollections of American Society during the 
Nineteenth Century (New York: D. Appleton, 1911), p. 93. 
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subsequent account of the hangings, this interpretation was widespread.246 
During the court of inquiry, however, only seven of fifty-one apprentices 
asked felt that the executions had been unnecessary. Another seventeen 
maintained that they had no opinion on the subject. It is possible, 
however, that these figures represent circumspection more than they do 
the boys' actual feelings. At any rate, for those of the crew that believed 
this, Cromwell proclaimed the amorality of what was happening. These 
three men were about to be hanged, for a crime that they did not commit, 
and certainly without due process oflaw. 
Small's hood was removed before he spoke to the crew. 
"Messmates and shipmates, I am no pirate; I never murdered anybody.,,247 
At this point, MacKenzie turned to Gansevoort and asked if he should be 
suffered to continue. A penitential address would have increased the 
moral value of the execution immeasurably, but a defiant voice would 
damage it, especially after what Cromwell had said. The imminence of 
death allowed a "momentary saturnalia," in which a man with nothing left 
to lose could excoriate the forces at work against him.248 Small's next 
words, however, allayed the Commander's fears. "It is only because I said 
I would [kill a man], that I am about to depart this life; now, see what 
words will do; take warning by me. It was going in a Guinea-man that 
brought me to this; beware of a Guinea-man.,,249 According to 
Gansevoort's account, he also said words to the effect that he deserved his 
246 J. Travis, "The Hangings on the Somers," Frank Leslie's Budget 
(October 1881), p 7. Travis was an apprentice on board ofthe Somers. 
247 Gansevoort, CMP, p. 39. 
248 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 70. 
249 Gansevoort, CMP, p. 39; MacKenzie, CMP, p. 206. 
258 
punishment and did not object to it. 250 Small turned to Spencer, and said, 
"I am now ready to die, Mr. Spencer, are yoU?,,251 The moral lessons and 
authority of the executions had been reinforced. 
Spencer remained silent, and ultimately made it known that he 
could not bring himself to give the order. Accordingly, MacKenzie gave it 
himself. Although at least one of the men on the whips, Henry Waltham, 
appeared unwilling to pull on the rope, the execution went ahead.252 The 
remaining prisoners had been kept looking aft throughout the execution, 
but at the last moment, Daniel McKinley turned his head and watched the 
three men run up the yard-arm.253 
The crew were ordered aft, so MacKenzie could speak. He 
mentioned each of the victims in turn, attaching moral lessons to them. 
He began with Spencer, describing his illustrious father and the 
advantages that his son had enjoyed. MacKenzie then attacked Spencer's 
brief naval career, which had culminated in an assault upon his authority. 
" ... He had aspired to supplant me in command, which I had only reached 
after thirty years of faithful servitude ... ,,254 The point was that diligence 
was the key to success. He had achieved it only after much time spent, 
and the same was true for the apprentices. If they were to "advance 
regularly, and step by step," the apprentices could aspire to the "situations 
of warrant officers, and masters in the navy.,,255 Alternatively, they might 
rise to respectability in the merchant marine. Interestingly, Mackenzie did 
250 Gansevoort, CMP, p. 39. 
251 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 207. 
252 Rodgers, CMP, p. 137. 
253 McKinley, CMP, p. 18I. 
254 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 207. 
255 Ibid. 
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not mention the possibility of a commissioned rank. Whatever the 
practice on the larger school-ships, he was not likely to name an acting 
midshipman from this crew. 
MacKenzie spoke next of Cromwell, who had "fallen through 
brutish sensuality, and the greedy thirst for gold.,,256 Spencer was 
supposed to have lured him with his gifts of money, before tempting him 
further with an illusory chest of gold said to be in MacKenzie's cabin. 
The Commander also related an anecdote in which he compared Cromwell 
un favourably to Collins. He invited the crew to choose between them for 
themselves, Collins piping their orders and Cromwell swinging from the 
yard-arm. 257 
Finally, he spoke about Small, saying only that he was also meant 
for better things, but that his love of liquor had led him astray.258 
MacKenzie made sure to remind them of Small's blessing of the flag. On 
the one hand, it reasserted his power, reminded the crew that he was the 
representative of that flag. Moreover, he was also its agent; the executions 
were legitimised by the flag's authority, and Small's acceptance of it. This 
was his final point of emphasis, since he then concluded the execution 
ritual with three cheers for the American flag.259 It was only then that the 
remaining prisoners were informed that they were not to be executed.260 
The crew were piped down to supper. An hour later, preparations 
were made for the burial. Although he had been denied the protection of 
his rank in life, Spencer was extended the prerogatives and privileges of 
256 Ibid. 
257 Ibid. 
258 Ibid. 
259 Ibid. 
260 Gansevoort, CMP, p. 181. 
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an officer in death. He was buried in a coffin as was customary for 
officers. The Midshipman was also laid out in full dress uniform, minus 
his sword, "which he had forfeited the right to wear.,,261 Cromwell and 
Small were stitched in their hammocks. Finally, the corpses were placed 
on the deck in order of their ranks. 
For the second time that day, all hands were called. The colours 
were reversed, and the ensign lowered to half mast. Thus, the symbolic 
value of the flag was incorporated into mourning. By lamp-light, the crew 
collected on the booms, in the gangways and on the lee-quarter-boat, to 
witness the burial. Prayer books were distributed, and after the 
appropriate service, the bodies were consigned to the deep. MacKenzie 
closed the final ritual of the day with the following prayer. One last time 
God and the Republic were invoked: 
Preserve us from the dangers of the sea and from the violence 
of enemies, that we may be a safeguard unto the United States of 
America, and a security for such as pass on the seas upon their lawful 
occasions; that the inhabitants of our land may in peace and quietness 
serve thee, our God; and that we may return in safety to enjoy the 
blessings of the land with the fruit of our labor, and with a thankful 
remembrance of thy mercies, to praise and glorify thy holy name, 
through Jesus Christ, our Lord?62 
Three days later, during the Sunday sermon on December 4, 
MacKenzie reiterated the lessons of the execution. The passage of time 
had probably convinced him that the crew was pacified, but the first 
church service since the executions would allow him to reinforce the 
lessons of penitence and obedience. First, he spoke about Spencer's 
parents, and how he had squandered his advantages and spumed their wise 
counsel. He read aloud from a letter written by Small's mother in which 
261 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 208. 
262 Ibid. 
261 
she expressed her joy at the news that no liquor was to be served on board 
the brig. He also recited some verses from the Sailor's Magazine, which 
were found within Small's Bible. 
In closing, MacKenzie returned to the social messages of the 
execution. He reminded the crew of the sacred judgement that the three 
had faced. "I endeavored [sic] to call to their recollection the terror with 
which the three malefactors had found themselves suddenly called to enter 
the presence of an offended God.,,263 Then, he called their attention once 
more to Spencer's parents, and the Midshipman's apologetic last words. 
His purpose he made clear: "From these two circumstances they might 
draw two useful lessons - a lesson of filial piety, and a piety towards 
God.,,264 
MacKenzie exhorted the crew to prayer, comparing it to the cheers 
they had earlier given for the American flag. The flag was raised, and 
above it, "the only banner to which it may give place," the chaplain's 
pennant of the crosS.265 A final time, the Commander invoked and 
combined the flag and God. The crew then sang the 100th Psalm, and the 
usual Sunday service was performed. 
The next day, the 5th of December, the Somers arrived at S1. 
Thomas. The Vandalia was not there, so the brig continued northwards to 
the United States. The officers had reduced the intensity of their watches, 
but continued to wear arms. All of them maintained that discipline had 
been restored immediately after the executions.266 By their account, 
263 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 209. 
264 Ibid. 
265 Ibid. 
266 Wales, CMP, p. 14; Matthew C. Perry, Jr., CMP, p. 63; Rodgers, CMP, 
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orders were obeyed with alacrity, and never needed repeating. Although 
there might have been an immediate affect along these lines, overall 
discipline showed a marked deterioration in the last ten days of the cruise. 
Only Gansevoort's description of the brig's state approached the truth, and 
then obliquely: "After we left St. Thomas I think I observed a bad feeling 
among a few of the older part of the crew, whom I supposed to be 
implicated before.,,267 
On December 7, four apprentices were colted for fighting.268 This 
was the largest number of boys punished on a single occasion for that 
offence. The next day, three members of the crew were punished for 
disobeying orders. One of them, Peter Fenton, was actually given twelve 
lashes with the cats. Although this offence was punished thirty-seven 
times during the cruise, this was only the second occasion in which the 
cats had been used. The severity may well have reflected Fen ton's 
disciplinary record, as this was the sixth time he had been punished. 
On December 10, the greatest possible failure of discipline 
occurred. A mutiny did take place. During squally weather, the 
maintopmen of one watch all refused an order to go aloft and furl the 
maintopsail. This refusal, a collective decision to disobey an order, was a 
direct challenge to the officers' authority. There is no evidence of what 
sparked it, and how the work stoppage was resolved beyond the 
punishments that were inflicted afterwards.269 These reveal that eleven 
267 Gansevoort, CMP, p. 40. 
268 New York Tribune, "Punishment Log of the Somers." The colted 
apprentices were Billinger Scott, William Reed, Alfred Magee, and 
Jonathan Finnecy. 
269 It is possible, if not likely, that the stoppage was related to the ongoing 
confinement of the remaining prisoners on board. After the executions, 
the prisoners had been kept in irons, and placed within canvas bags 
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members of the crew were involved, and that their punishments were 
relatively light, twelve strikes with the colt.270 Close to home, it would 
appear that the officers wanted to avoid any more crises. Besides this, the 
passage north met with severe weather throughout, and the officers could 
not afford to arrest any more of their crew. 271 At any rate, nine days 
difficult sailing brought the brig safely to Sandy Hook. The next morning, 
December 15, she would drop anchor at the Brooklyn Navy Yard. 
The cruise was over, and MacKenzie had returned his command 
more or less safely, but the mutiny was not behind him. Three days later, 
it erupted into what has ever since been called the Somers Mutiny Affair. 
MacKenzie certainly anticipated that there might be controversy over his 
actions. Whatever his justifications, he had acted extra-judicially in 
executing Spencer, Cromwell, and Small. It was Spencer's death, 
however, that guaranteed trouble. By destroying his son, MacKenzie had 
made John Canfield Spencer a determined enemy. It was not in Spencer's 
character to allow the deed to go unpunished. Indeed, it was within his 
ability to see that MacKenzie did not escape justice. The power that 
MacKenzie feared would have rescued the midshipman would now be 
used to take vengeance upon his executioner. 
designed to hinder their movement and protect them from the elements. 
Although these proved terribly hot in day, and bitterly cold at night, the 
prisoners remained in them until the last part of the cruise, when the drop 
in temperature required that they be removed below. Matthew C. Perry, 
Jr., CMP, p. 74; Gansevoort, CMP, pp. 92-93; McKinley, CMP, pp. 182, 
184. 
270 New York Tribune, "Punishment Log of the Somers." The mutineers 
were Thomas Brown, Samuel Cowles, Peter Fenton, Charles Golderrnan, 
Theodore Humbert, James Kelly, George Kneavels, Charles Ross, 
Billinger Scott, Joshua Smith, and Joseph Weaver. 
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Chapter Six: 
Courts-Martial: The Somers Mutiny Affair 
On the night of the brig's arrival, December 14, only one person 
was allowed on shore. This was Oliver Hazard Perry, who carried a nine-
page report from MacKenzie to the Secretary of the Navy. Once it was 
delivered, he was to receive any orders, and return with them to the 
commander. As Perry began his three-day journey to Washington, the 
Somers remained under secret guard. 
The next morning, upon dropping anchor, MacKenzie arrested 
eight more members of the crew: Charles Golderman, George Warner, 
Charles Van Velsor, Richard Hamilton, George Kneavals, Edmund Gallia, 
Eugene Sullivan, and Henry Waltham. Apart from Hamilton, all had been 
mentioned on the Greek lists. Only two of them were December 10 
mutineers, however, Kneavals and Golderman. Accompanying the 
original four prisoners, they were put in solitary confinement on the North 
Carolina.' The remainder of the crew were sequestered on board the brig. 
MacKenzie himself said nothing even to his wife, although he obviously 
confided in Matthew Calbraith Perry, the Navy Yard's commander. 
Regardless, the veil of secrecy was sustained for only two days before the 
events on board the Somers were reported in the New York City press. 
On December "17, several papers ran stories on the alleged mutiny. 
All of them acknowledged that Spencer had been its leader, but besides 
this, they were comprehensively inaccurate. MacKenzie had not 
, MacKenzie to Upshur, December 16, 1842, NA RG 273, "Court Records 
of the Court Martial of Alexander Slidell MacKenzie." 
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prevented word of the mutiny from leaking out, but he had ensured that 
what was heard was more rumour than accurate report. According to one 
account, fifty mutineers had been overcome after a sharp battle.2 The New 
York Tribune admitted doubts about the veracity of its account before 
relating that Spencer and the master-at-arms had been arrested at quarters 
before seventy-six other conspirators. 3 Finally, another story related that 
Spencer and the mutineers had been arrested after a thwarted attack during 
which Spencer had actually put a loaded pistol against MacKenzie's 
Over the next two days, the exaggeration and distortion diminished 
somewhat. Indeed, the morning edition of the New York Herald on 
December 19 read that "there now appears division of opinion ... Yesterday 
and the day before facts have been ... circulated which throw a different 
light [on affairs].,,5 Later that same day, the paper reported more 
critically, "There was no overt act [of mutiny] ... The plot was merely in 
embryo ... In such circumstances a great difference of opinion exists as to 
the necessity and legality of MacKenzie's conduct.,,6 These articles 
marked a departure from the Herald's original reports, and were the 
beginning of an editorial position that would ultimately emerge as the one 
most critical of MacKenzie. 
2 New York Herald, December 18, 1842, quoted in McFarland, The Somers 
Mutiny Affair, p. 158. 
3 New York Tribune, December 18, 1842, quoted in McFarland, The 
Somers Mutiny Affair, pp. 158-159. 
4 New York Express, December 18, 1842, quoted in Hayford, The Somers 
Mutiny Affair, p. 3. 
5 New York Herald, December 19, 1842, quoted in Hayford, The Somers 
Mutiny Affair, p. 5. 
6 Ibid. 
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The commander still enjoyed considerable support in the press, 
however, and on December 19, an account of the mutiny faithful to 
MacKenzie's narrative was published in the New York Courier and 
Enquirer. Some question arose at the time over the paper's acquisition of 
MacKenzie's narrative.7 MacKenzie and the newspaper's editor, James 
Watson Webb, were neighbours in Tarrytown, New York. Moreover, 
Webb was a personal friend of Commodore Perry. Whatever their 
connection, the Courier and Enquirer was already hostile to John Canfield 
Spencer, and proved to be MacKenzie's greatest media support.8 
The next day, however, the first authoritative challenge to 
MacKenzie's conduct was issued in the Madisonian. Written by John 
Canfield Spencer under the pseudonym'S,' it attacked the commander's 
conduct with a brief, forceful, and knowledgeable argument. On receipt of 
MacKenzie's first report, Upshur had immediately summoned the 
Secretary of War, and they spent the remainder of the day together in 
conference.9 During this meeting, Spencer had read MacKenzie's report. 
Notwithstanding the leaked account in the Courier and Enquirer, his 
article was the first published account of MacKenzie's narrative, which 
was not officially released until December 29. With reference to the 
narrative, Spencer addressed the inaccurate reporting of the New York 
press, and accused MacKenzie of compounding his own misconduct in his 
dealings with them: 
7 Hayford, The Somers Mutiny Affair, p. 5. 
8 Ibid. A few days before the Somers' return, the paper had denounced 
John Canfield Spencer as a "miserable wretch," and a "traitor," among 
other epithets. 
9 Mackenzie to Upshur, December 22,1842, NA RG 273. 
Various publications have however appeared in the New York 
papers, giving versions of the transaction, the materials for which, if 
not the versions themselves, were obviously furnished by some officer 
who had a hand in the bloody deed. This is evident from their 
containing some facts which could be known only to those officers -
but so perverted, so exaggerated, and interspersed with so much 
surmise, and so much downright falsehood, as to evince the deep 
anxiety felt to make sure of the first impression on the public mind. 10 
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Spencer denied that there had been any disorder or mutinous 
character on board the brig. He also revealed for the first time, the extra-
judicial proceedings of the council of officers. Besides these allegations, 
he clarified various misstatements about his son's age and service record. 
The article also ridiculed the notion that Spencer, "a mere boy ... would 
seriously induce to mutiny an old seaman who had arrived at the rank of 
boatswain's mate, and who [was] represented to have been employed 
heretofore on board of a slaver, or to have been a pirate."l1 Furthermore, 
he repeated his son's only proper testimony about the conspiracy, "that it 
was all a joke." Finally, he demonstrated that as yet there was no evidence 
whatsoever against Cromwell. 
Spencer also indulged in a number of personal attacks against the 
officers of the brig, MacKenzie in particular. The commander's actions 
were either the result of a "despotic temper," or an "unmanly fear." In 
closing, Spencer issued a forceful call for the press to rein in its prose, and 
for MacKenzie to be prosecuted. 
These remarks are made, not to excite prejudice, but to repel the 
attempt to create it, and to enable the American people to see what 
mighty principles are involved in this unheard-of proceeding. Let 
justice be done; let it not be denied, because one of the victims was 
connected with a high functionary of government, nor because another 
is unknown, and has not a friend or relation upon the face of the earth. 
10 J.e. Spencer, "Communicated," The Madisonian, reprinted Niles' 
Weekly Register (Vol. 73, December 24, 1842), pp. 260-261. 
II Ibid. 
And let not wanton opprobrium be heaped upon the memory of the 
dead, to justify the bloody deeds of the living.12 
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The article horrified MacKenzie. The Madisonian was the semi-
official newspaper of the government, and provided Spencer's attacks with 
exceptional authority. The next morning, he wrote Upshur protesting that 
Spencer had been given access to the first narrative of the cruise. "I think 
sir that the documents which I had the honour to forward to you might 
have furnished materials for a very different statement. .. than the article 
which I attribute to Mr. Spencer.,,13 Ignoring the article in the Courier and 
Enquirer, MacKenzie deplored the article for superseding any official 
statement from the Navy Department. At the same time, he took issue 
with Spencer's more pointed remarks. Especially galling were the attacks 
on his and his officers' courage, intelligence, and integrity. In response to 
these "calumnies," MacKenzie proposed the publication of certain letters 
found amongst the junior Spencer's papers. These purported to 
demonstrate Spencer's true character as expressed by his own parents, 
specifically, that he was a "liar, villain and a thief.,,14 MacKenzie made 
much of these and other remarks, and mentioned them again on several 
occasions. It may be that these letters referred to Spencer's attempt to run 
away, and his theft of $300 to help him begin a new life free from family. 
MacKenzie was still distressed when he wrote Upshur the 
following day. Included in the letter were endorsements of his junior 
officers, which he asked to be appended to his report. This done, he 
remarked upon Spencer's use of the narrative, adding "I will not Sir do 
you the injustice to ask that when my case comes under consideration, if it 
12 Ibid. 
13 MacKenzie to Upshur, December 21, 1842, NA RG 273. 
14 MacKenzie to Upshur, December 26, 1842, NA RG 273. 
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be necessary to seek counsel any where, it will not be of the Secretary of 
War." 15 The commander assumed that consequences of the Secretary's 
meeting with Spencer were inadvertent, "affording no evidence of any 
willingness to refuse me the protection, which until my conduct is passed 
by a competent tribunal, I claim ... ,,16 MacKenzie anticipated further and 
more serious attacks against himself. Spencer would not be content to let 
matters lie, and was certainly planning other action. MacKenzie's letter 
illustrated his desire that if he was to be tried, it would be by the Navy. 
Later that same day, a court of inquiry was ordered to convene. The 
proceedings were to begin within the week, on December 28. 17 
If MacKenzie was concerned about Spencer's actions, he certainly 
was not afraid of antagonising the Secretary of War. At his meeting with 
Upshur, Spencer had requested that his son's possessions be delivered into 
his care. His wish was met on December 23, excepting the 'incriminating' 
letters that MacKenzie retained as "necessary for his justification.,,18 
Three days later, the commander reconsidered, and returned the letters in 
his possession, but not before making copies of them. 19 
His next letter, written just after these correspondences were 
returned, was defensive in tone, and had good reason to be so. Word had 
come from Washington that Upshur was disappointed with MacKenzie's 
report, and required more information about the "late melancholy affair on 
board the Somers. ,,20 The Secretary was also irritated that only Oliver 
15 MacKenzie to Upshur, December 22, 1842, NA RG 273. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18Jones to Upshur, December 23, 1842, NA RG 273. 
19 MacKenzie to Upshur, December 26,1842, NA RG 273. 
20 MacKenzie to Upshur, second letter, December 26, 1842. This letter 
forms the basis of the following two paragraphs. 
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Hazard Perry, the most junior officer on board, had been sent to him. 
Accordingly, MacKenzie sent Henry Rodgers to deliver a second report, 
which was accompanied by statements from the various junior officers. 
Gansevoort soon followed him. 
After making more complaints about the Madisonian article and its 
publication throughout the national press, MacKenzie turned his attention 
to the imminent court of inquiry. He had learned that the proposed 
president, Commodore Charles Stewart, might not be available, and that 
Captain Francis Gregory of the North Carolina, would probably take his 
place. The prospect troubled him. MacKenzie did not object to Gregory 
on professional grounds, since he had "the reputation of being a zealous 
and efficient officer." Rather, he considered it below his dignity to be 
tried by someone so low on the captain's list. Stewart, for instance, was 
the second most senior officer in the service, while Gregory was only 
forty-second. MacKenzie asked instead that he be examined by "one of 
the historical names ... at the head of the Navy Register ... [such as] Isaac 
Hull...Lewis Warrington ... James Biddle ... Charles Ridgely ... [or] John 
Downes." 
Perhaps to reassure himself, MacKenzie closed the letter with a 
declaration that he did not fear the court's decision on his "standing as an 
officer and as a man." Nevertheless, the spectre of civil prosecution 
concerned him. Thus, he appealed to Upshur to allow him the only 
protection available, that of "the Department whose orders I was 
continually endeavoring to fulfil." 
The court of inquiry opened against a backdrop of public debate. 
This was sustained by the newspapers, which introduced their own 
professional animosities into the story. The Herald rather disingenuously 
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proclaimed its own impartiality before attacking the partisanship of the 
Tribune. 21 In response, the Tribune noted the early sensationalist reports 
of the Herald, and speculated that the change in editorial position was the 
result of bribery.22 
Most of the apprentices on board had been released for a winter 
holiday, when the court first convened on board the North Carolina.23 It 
consisted of three officers: Alexander Dallas, Jacob Jones, and Charles 
Stewart, who was the President. All three had distinguished themselves in 
the War of 1812, and now held important positions. Dallas was 
Commodore at the Navy Yard in Pensacola, Florida, Jones was port 
captain for New York, and Stewart was commander of the Home 
Squadron. Finally, Ogden Hoffman was appointed judge advocate. 
Hoffman was an eminent attorney and politician. He had also 
served in the Navy as a midshipman during the War of 1812, and been 
captured on board the U.S.S. President. 24 After the war, Hoffman had 
begun practicing law, and had since divided his time between his practice 
and politics. He had been elected to the state legislature in 1825, and then 
gone to New York as a Tammany Hall assemblyman in 1828.25 Hoffman 
spent the next seven years as the District Attorney for New York City, and 
had twice been elected to the U.S. House of Representatives, serving there 
21 The New York Herald, December 27, 1842, quoted in Hayford, The 
Somers Mutiny Affair, p. 19. 
22 The New York Tribune, December 28, 1842, quoted in Hayford, The 
Somers Mutiny Affair, p. 19. 
23 COl, p. 5. 
24 R.B. Morris, "Ogden Hoffman," Dictionary of American Biography, 
Vol. 13, p. 115. 
25 Ibid. 
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between 1837 and 1841.26 At the time of the court of inquiry, he was the 
District Attorney for the Southern District of New York. 27 
Various other officers attended. Amongst them were Commodore 
Perry, and Captain Joshua Sands, who had overseen the construction of 
the Somers. All the officers of the North Carolina were present. Of 
particular note was the acting sailing master, Passed Midshipman Henry 
Eld. He had been made the provost martial of the court, and all matters 
pertaining to evidence had been entrusted to his care. Furthermore, the 
court was packed each day with newspaper reporters and civilian 
spectators.28 
The court began by establishing and clarifying its business. Little 
more was accomplished. The following day, a list of witnesses was 
presented, but nothing else was done. Commodore Stewart had objected 
to proceeding further without a copy of MacKenzie's narrative, with 
which the judge advocate concurred. This was the cause of some 
confusion. MacKenzie readily agreed to the request, and assured the court 
that he could procure a report within half an hour. Such time passed, and 
the commander did not produce the narrative. Rather, since "he did not 
know until [the day before] that the copy of this document would be 
required before the Court [sic] ... unavoidable errors had occasioned which 
he greatly regretted. It [would] be ready [the following day.],,29 
After a night presumably spent revising the text, on December 30, 
MacKenzie presented a narrative "which he said would be found both 
26 Morris, "Ogden Hoffman," pp. 115-116. 
27 Morris, "Ogden Hoffman," p. 116. 
28 Hone, The Diary of Philip Hone, Tuckerman, ed., Vol. II, p. 170, quoted 
in Hayford, The Somers Mutiny Affair, p. 36. 
29 MacKenzie, COl, p. 7. 
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accurate and complete.,,30 The narrative was then read before the court. 
After this, the first witness, James Wales, was called to testify.31 Wales, 
who was questioned by both Hoffman and MacKenzie, described in great 
detail his conversation with Spencer on the booms. His testimony also 
referred to the subsequent arrests, and other events of the fatal week. At 
the same time he made various comments about the character and 
behaviour of the mutineers, especially Spencer, Cromwell, and Small. The 
rest of the day and part of the next he remained on the stand. This was 
only appropriate since his testimony remained fundamental to 
understanding the events on board the Somers. Without Wales, there was 
no mutiny to suppress. 
After Wales, the examination of witnesses continued for two-and-
a-half weeks. The various persons called, nearly the entire crew, were 
brought to the stand in order of their rank. This was sensible enough, 
since it was essentially the behaviour of the officers that was under 
scrutiny. Thus, Gansevoort was followed by Matthew C. Perry, Jr., who 
in turn was followed by staff officers, then midshipmen, and finally, the 
petty officers. The nature of their testimony was more or less the same. 
Each was called upon to describe his experience during the week of crisis, 
and to discuss any events occurring earlier in the cruise that might shed 
light on the inception of the mutiny. Once the upper ranks had spoken, the 
remainder of the crew were called. These enlisted men were put in the 
precarious position of having to answer questions posed to them by their 
commanding officer. Consequently, their testimony followed a pattern 
similar to their superiors, describing their personal experiences, and any 
30 Ibid. 
31 Wales, COl, pp. 15-19. 
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pertinent events prior to the first arrests. Conspicuously absent from the 
list of witnesses were any crew associated with the mutiny itself. Only 
two of the twelve prisoners were called, George Warner and Charles Van 
Velsor. Indeed, they were only called to testify about the evidence that 
they had presented before the original council of officers.32 
The Court acted quickly, and by January 7, a conclusion to the 
inquiry was in sight.33 Hoffman had been delicate in his cross-
examination, and none of the witnesses were subjected to rigorous 
questioning. Nor had MacKenzie gone to any great lengths to challenge 
any testimony. His purpose had been more to shape it in keeping with his 
own account. This is hardly surprising, since he wanted to control the 
court's understanding of the events in question. Like his various 
narratives, the court of inquiry was constructing a history that legitimised 
the officers' perceptions and responses. With reference to the mutiny, 
each witness had to tell a story resolving the ambiguities in the event in 
order to justify the certainty of the officer's ultimate actions.34 In effect, 
the testimony was designed to affirm the accuracy of the officers' 
perceptions of the mutiny threat. The absence of an actual revolt meant 
that the embryonic development of the mutinous conspiracy had to be to 
be traced in order to establish the intent of the executed men. 
MacKenzie's exoneration by the court would be the final imprint of truth 
upon his history. Throughout the court of inquiry, he was largely 
successful in this aim. The apparent placidity of these proceedings, 
32 Hoffman, COl, p. 39. . 
33 MacKenzie to Upshur, January 7, 1843, NA RG 273. 
34 G. Dening, Mr. Bligh's Bad Language - Passion, Power and Theatre on 
the Bounty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 38. 
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however, belied events outside the court. External forces were impacting 
upon it, and disrupting MacKenzie's control of history. 
John Canfield Spencer, in concert with Cromwell's wife, Margaret, 
and with Charles Cleveland, a friend of Elisha Small, had begun pursuing 
civil charges for murder and manslaughter against both MacKenzie and 
Gansevoort. In doing so, they trapped MacKenzie in a paradox. If the 
court of inquiry sustained him, no judgement would be rendered on his 
actions. The case would remain, as it was, untried. Thus, it could devolve 
upon the civil courts. The only way to avoid this, therefore, was for his 
actions to be referred to a court-martial. Even so, he would be liable for 
arraignment during any lapse of time between the court of inquiry and the 
court-martial. Since MacKenzie obviously wanted to avoid a more 
dangerous civil trial, he requested the Secretary of the Navy order a court-
martial without delay.35 But by surrendering himself to a court-martial, 
MacKenzie risked exposure to his enemies within the service. That he had 
enemies was certainly the case. His prominence in the Perry-Elliott 
controversy, and his attacks on the seniority system could not have 
endeared him to particular officers. Therefore, accepting the protection of 
the Navy's judicial system, he also sought to protect himself from anyone 
who might use it to pursue personal hostilities against him: 
... 1 venture to express the hope, that [the court-martial] may 
embrace no names, of doubtful reputation, but those only, most 
endeared to the country by past services, those most distinguished in 
the opinion of the Navy, for high and uncompromising honor, and for 
that humanity which is its ordinary accompaniments. 36 
It is likely, however, that many of these officers were disgusted by 
MacKenzie's conduct. Commodore Robert Stockton had publicly stated 
35 MacKenzie to Upshur, January 7,1843, NA RG 273. 
36 Ibid. 
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that the commander was guilty of murder, and that if he were on 
MacKenzie's court-martial board, Stockton would vote to hang him.37 
Another prominent officer, Commodore James Biddle, had frequently and 
publicly said the same.38 Whatever past enmities MacKenzie had 
incurred, these officers were the most immediate threat. 
As it turned out, his early concerns about Captain Francis Gregory 
were well founded. Unbeknownst to the commander, Gregory had 
completed a confidential report for the Secretary of the Navy on the 
"condition of the crew of the Somers. ,,39 Upshur had ordered the report 
upon receiving indirect word that the apprentices were suffering from their 
confinement on board. He had ordered Jacob Jones as post captain of 
New York, to carry out an investigation, a responsibility that Jones had 
given to Gregory. The completed report was damning. 
The crew "had been treated with a severity unusual in the service, 
particularly as regards duty and punishments."4O In the first instance, 
Gregory noted that the crew had not been adequately prepared for the 
change in climate which accompanied the last week of their cruise. 
Between December 9 and December 14, the temperature had dropped. 
almost fifty degrees, to just 30° Fahrenheit.41 This was obviously 
detrimental to the health of the apprentices, and at least one in ten had 
been sick at any time since their arriva1.42 On December 7, seventeen were 
37 New York Weekly Tribune, February 4, 1843 quoted in Hayford, The 
Somers Mutiny Affair, p. 124. 
38 MacKenzie to Upshur, January 23, 1843, NA RG 273. 
39 Gregory to Jones, January 7, 1843, NA RG 273. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Gansevoort, CMP, p. 94. 
42 Gregory to Jones, January 7, 1843, NA RG 273. This letter forms the 
basis of the following four paragraphs. 
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ill, and thirteen others had been transferred to the naval hospital in the 
Yard. MacKenzie's commands since their arrival had compounded the 
suffering. On various occasions the crew was occupied with bright work, 
which was conducted without regard for the winter weather. Gregory 
wrote that he had never seen the "crew of an American man-of-war so 
dirty and dejected in their personal appearances." 
He next addressed the disciplinary regime on board. Gregory 
prefaced his remarks with a discussion of apprenticeship. The brig's crew 
were "young, inexperienced ... unused to the privations of a sea-life, and 
physically incompetent to perform the duties required on board such a 
vessel." MacKenzie's operation of the brig had shown no regard for their 
fragility, and "could not fail to break down their spirits; and injure their 
healths [sic]." Gregory's opinion carried weight. As captain of the North 
Carolina, he was responsible for the naval school on board. Indeed, 
MacKenzie had selected his own crew from Gregory's wards. Of 
particular concern was the amount of flogging that had accompanied the 
cruise. 
Gregory had examined the logbook of the Somers, which was 
deposited in the wardroom of the North Carolina. This revealed that 
between June 3 and December 10, there had been 247 separate beatings 
with the cats or the colts. These floggings had resulted in 2,265 blows 
being struck "on that crew of boys! all [sic] within a period of six months 
and seven days." Gregory also noted that certain apprentices had been 
punished on numerous occasions, generally for petty offences. Moreover, 
the floggings had not ceased. Since her arrival, two boys had been 
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flogged with the cats, and two others with the coltS.43 Such discipline was 
"in the aggregate beyond all precedent." Enclosed with the report was a 
copy of the punishments registered in the log so that Upshur could judge 
for himself. 
Gregory closed with a request that the apprentices on board be 
removed from MacKenzie's command, and quartered elsewhere. The 
Somers was damp, confined, and overcrowded. It was the pastoral 
obligation of the Navy that they be removed from the brig. If the 
subpoenaed apprentices had to remain nearby, at least it could be in the 
Navy Yard. 
Unaware of Gregory's report, MacKenzie received good news on 
January 10. District Judge Samuel Betts had declined to issue an arrest 
warrant for the commander. On behalf of Margaret Cromwell, Joseph 
Scholes had made the application, on the basis of MacKenzie's admission 
that he had executed her husband without trial. The district attorney had 
earlier declined to pursue MacKenzie, and Betts saw no reason to do 
otherwise.44 The judge did make the point that the "necessity of the case 
must be made apparent beyond any fair ground to doubt, before any 
functionary, under whatever plenitude of power, can, on his own mandate, 
take the life of a citizen.,,45 Nevertheless, MacKenzie's actions could not 
be the subject of a civil court whilst a duly ordained naval court of inquiry 
was in progress. 
43 Their names and their offences are not known. 
44 26 F. Cas. 1118, United States vs. MacKenzie et al., District Court, S.D. 
New York, January 10, 1843, p. l. 
45 26 F. Cas. 1118, United States vs. MacKenzie et aI., District Court, S.D. 
New York, January 10, 1843, p. 2. 
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Whatever relief MacKenzie might have felt was short-lived. In the 
first place, John Canfield Spencer showed no signs of being deterred by 
Judge Betts' ruling. He continued to press charges, and had lawyers 
prepare a second challenge. Then three days later, MacKenzie suffered a 
double blow. In the first place, he learned of Gregory's report. 
MacKenzie immediately seized the logbook, and confronted him. The 
captain remarked that he was only doing what he felt was his duty, to 
which MacKenzie replied that putting "this new difficulty in my path 
whilst surrounded by such serious embarrassments was unfortunately 
timed ... ,,46 More seriously, that same day, the New York Standard 
published the punishment register from the logbook itself. The register 
was quickly reprinted in other New York newspapers, and excited 
negative comment. On this occasion, MacKenzie reacted with fury, 
providing the court of inquiry with one of its most dramatic moments. 
The logbook had been left in the North Carolina's wardroom. 
Only an officer, therefore, could have supplied it to the newspaper. 
MacKenzie demanded an investigation into the incident, declaring that the 
"honor of the Navy is concerned in the discovery of this officer.,,47 The 
court refused to take any such action, arguing that the matter was beyond 
its authority. MacKenzie then lost his temper. 
Capt. MacKenzie - I would ask who got the log-book when it was left 
here (by Passed Midshipman Matthew C. Perry). 
Lieut. Eld - I did. Mr. Perry left it in the ward-room, and I said I would 
look after it. 
Capt. MacKenzie (with some feeling) - Then sir, it was in your charge. 
Lieut. Eld - No. 
Com. Stewart - It was in charge of Mr. Perry, and when left by him in 
the ward-room, Mr. Eld voluntarily offered to look after it. 
46 MacKenzie to Upshur, January 15, 1843, NA RG 273. 
47 New York Herald, January 14, 1843. 
Judge Advocate - As far as the Court is informed, Mr. Perry had charge 
of it. 
Capt. MacKenzie (with increased feeling) - Then Mr. Eld is 
responsible for the use made of it, if not to the Court, to the Naval 
Department. 
Mr. Eld (who had nothing whatever to do with the copying of the 
extracts, and knew nothing of it until after the publication) smiled and 
made no reply. 
Com. Jones - We have no means in our power to correct the alleged 
injustice. Perhaps the editor will have the sense of justice to state that 
the brig was in a very unusual condition to require the exercise of such 
apparent severity. 
Capt. MacKenzie (with much feeling) - I wish the Court to stigmatize 
the officer who has done this. I wish - I know it has been done through 
the agency of an officer, an officer of the United States Navy. I have 
no doubt of it. I hope the Court will stigmatize him. 
Com. Stewart - We have already said that we have nothing to do with 
this matter. 
Capt. MacKenzie - I shall take care, then to call, the attention to the 
Secretary of the Navy to the matter - that I shall - in some shape or 
another.4~ 
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True to his word, MacKenzie wrote to the Navy Secretary on 
January 15.49 He drew Upshur's attention to the article, and then 
proceeded to discuss Gregory's report. It was clear that he suspected the 
captain of leaking the log to the press, and he wanted to know who had 
brought the condition of the Somers' crew to Upshur's attention. Finally, 
MacKenzie remarked that besides this interference, certain witnesses had 
been "tampered with. ,,50 
Apparently, one of the confined mutineers, Eugene Sullivan, had 
threatened to kill, or have killed another apprentice, James Mitchell. 
Mitchell had told "a little more than the truth" in his testimony on January 
12, for which his life was forfeit.sl Mitchell's testimony had given 
Sullivan a vague complicity in the mutiny: 
48 Ibid. 
49 MacKenzie to Upshur, January 15, 1843, NA RG 273. 
50 Ibid. 
Sl James Mitchell and Alexander McKee, signed affidavits, December 15, 
1843, NA RG 273. 
One day after the execution I was sitting in the main-top with 
Sullivan, and I asked him if he thought they could have took the vessel. 
He said he thought they could, and I then asked him ["]what they 
would kill all hands and sink the vessel[?,,]52 
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Although there is no evidence of what steps were taken to resolve the 
problem, the affidavits illuminate conditions on board the Somers during 
the Affair. The crew had not yet been allowed off the brig, which was 
obviously uncomfortable and over-crowded. Tensions already present 
had been exaggerated by the prolonged close confinement. Moreover, the 
crew would probably have been divided between those who supported the 
officers' interpretation of events, and those who were sympathetic to the 
executed men and remaining prisoners. The daily business of testifying in 
a matter that could ultimately result in capital charges against those 
prisoners, could only have magnified these problems. Discipline clearly 
suffered. 
MacKenzie's suspicions about Gregory were confirmed the next 
day when he received an anonymous letter detailing the captain's 
invol vement in the episode. 53 The author had accompanied someone 
visiting one of the prisoners on board the North Carolina. In order to do 
so, they had required Gregory's permission, which he had given. As they 
left, it was alleged that Gregory took the visitor aside, and spoke to him 
about the contents of the punishment register. After reiterating the 
aggregate number of floggings and strikes, the captain remarked "that the 
cause of the mutiny was easily accounted for.,,54 
Many other officers must have shared Gregory's opinion. Even 
those who supported MacKenzie's suppression of the mutiny would have 
52 Mitchell, COl, p. 41. 
53 Taylor to MacKenzie, January 16, 1843, NA RG 273. 
54 Ibid. 
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been troubled that the need had ever arisen. The stigma of mutiny was 
attached to MacKenzie as much as the mutineers. This might explain the 
rigidity and cool reception that met MacKenzie's outburst in the court. 
Military institutions regard mutiny as an aberration, the consequence of a 
commander's professional failure.55 The punishment log demonstrated 
where this failure might have occurred. MacKenzie realised this, and had 
earlier attempted to deflect some of this criticism. 
On January 5, he had offered to prove that his disciplinary 
practices had not resulted in mutiny. He made this point explicitly, "as all 
mutinies on record have been provoked by injustice towards the crews or 
gross tyranny or incapacity on the part of the Commanding Officer, it 
concerns me to show that no such causes existed on board the Somers. ,,56 
Accordingly, he described various other mutinies including that on the 
Hermione, which had been occasioned by the "systematic cruelty of her 
captain.,,57 He compared these precedents with his own record, which 
showed him to be "attenti ve to the rights, the comfort, and the happiness 
of [his] crews ... ,,58 Although this statement had been made in response to 
allegations made against him in various newspapers, it was ill-timed. 
However benevolent he claimed his conduct had been on board the 
Independence or the F airjield, it was little help when confronted with the 
stark realities of the punishments on board the Somers.59 
55 Rose, "Anatomy of a Mutiny," p. 563. 
56 MacKenzie, COl, p. 28. 
57 Ibid. 
58 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 29. 
59 In fact, there is reason to doubt MacKenzie's claims. In 1841, he had 
been mentioned in a pamphlet against flogging in the Navy, which 
revealed that whilst a lieutenant on the Independence, he had ordered a 
marine to be struck twelve times with the cats for throwing orange peels 
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Most of MacKenzie's civilian opponents did not see the 
punishments as the grounds for the mutiny. Indeed, they saw no mutiny. 
Rather, the floggings were evidence of the commander's general 
professional incompetence, which had reached its zenith in creating a 
mutiny out of a boy's joke. In this interpretation, MacKenzie was a 
coward, or a madman.60 One person who characterised the commander's 
conduct in this way was James Fenimore Cooper, who wrote to his son 
that "such a medley of folly, conceit, illegality, feebleness and fanaticism 
was never before assembled ... ,,61 
At any rate, MacKenzie's correspondence with Upshur impelled 
Captain Gregory also to write to the Secretary of the Navy in defence of 
his actions.62 Gregory maintained that he had no desire to injure 
MacKenzie, and that he deeply regretted the publication of the 
punishments register. He justified the report on the grounds that the 
disciplinary practices on board fell under his remit to investigate the 
welfare and happiness of the apprentices. Of MacKenzie, he wrote that he 
had no bias against him: "[I have] always said Commander MacKenzie 
had in my belief acted conscientiously from his own convictions - but as a 
matter of opinion only - [I] differed with him ... as to the absolute 
necessity of proceeding to the extremes he did.,,63 While Gregory 
disavowed any immediate involvement in the publication of the 
into spit boxes on the spar deck. S. Sanborn, An Exposition on Official 
Tyranny in the United States Navy (New York: n.p., 1841), p. 27. 
60 New York Herald, January 17, 1843, quoted in Hayford, The Somers 
Mutiny Affair, p. 109-110. 
61 Cooper, Correspondences of James Fenimore Cooper, J.F. Cooper, Jr., 
ed., pp. 487-488, quoted in Hayford, The Somers Mutiny Affair, p. 111. 
62 Gregory to Upshur, January 21, 1843, NA RG 273. 
63 Ibid. 
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punishment log, his explanation was hardly convincing. Since the log had 
been free for any officer to read, Gregory had lent a copy of it to "a friend 
of long-standing ... for his own perusal - at his particular request.. .The 
respectability of this gentleman is not to be questioned, I believe.,,64 
However respectable, Gregory's friend had a very definite interest in the 
register, for his son, George Warner, was one of the imprisoned mutineers. 
The father had promised to return the log in a few days, but whilst it was 
in his possession, he had forwarded a copy to the press. "I considered as a 
father and a citizen I had not only a right, but it was my duty to make it 
known to the public.,,65 
Outside the court of inquiry, the Somers Affair had stimulated 
commercial and cultural activity. There was considerable demand for 
material related to the Affair. The Bowery Theatre began staging a 
dramatised performance of the events on board. Although it was attacked 
as "in defiance of all good feeling and taste," the production probably did 
good business.66 More acceptably, Nathaniel Currier issued a portrait of 
the Somers on January 21 (Figure 5). The lithograph depicted the brig in 
full sail and was captioned as follows: "A mutiny was discovered on board 
this vessel Nov. 26th 1842 while on her outward voyage from the coast of 
Africa, and the three ringleaders, Philip Spencer, midshipman, Samuel 
Cromwell, boatswain's mate, Elisha Small, seamen, were hung at the 
yardarm Dec. 1 st 1842, which completely suppressed the mutiny." A later 
engraving was more lurid, and depicted Cromwell and Small hanging 
from the yardarm (Figure 11). Finally, The New York Tribune published a 
64 Ibid. 
65 George Warner to Jacob Jones, January 21, 1843, NA RG 273. 
66 Chicago Express, January 18, 1843, quoted in Hayford, The Somers 
Mutiny Affair, p. 107. 
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pamphlet with the proceedings of the court of inquiry compiled from its 
daily reports.67 
The continued interest in the Somers was accompanied by an 
apparent turn in public opinion against MacKenzie.68 Thus, the Navy 
Department took steps to protect and control his fate. On January 23, 
various officers were ordered to participate in a court-martial to be 
convened on February 1. The commander himself immediately began 
making preparations for his trial. On January 24, in response to Gregory's 
bias against him, MacKenzie requested that the prisoners be taken from 
the captain's care and placed under his own custody. A more stringent 
confinement would ensure that they would not be subjected to interference 
or tampering. Towards this end, Commodore Perry had furnished 
facilities within the Yard. MacKenzie had come to the conclusion that 
while all were involved in the mutiny, only two or three might be 
convicted on the basis of the evidence presented before the court of 
inquiry.69 He hoped that if they were kept in complete isolation, one or 
two selected apprentices might be convinced by the naval authorities to 
turn state's evidence.7o 
At any rate, MacKenzie wanted them away from Gregory. The 
captain had continued to allow the prisoners visitors, and it was likely that 
they had had access to legal counsel.7I Furthermore, he allowed his crew 
to give the prisoners "encouragement and handihood.,,72 Indeed, one of 
67 New York Weekly Tribune, January 14, 1843. 
68 New York Herald, January, 19, 1843. 
69 MacKenzie to Upshur, January 29, 1843, NA RG 273. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
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the marines assigned to guard them had been heard telling visitors that 
there were "no ringleaders and no mutiny.'>73 
Four days later, on January 28, the court of inquiry concluded, 
having found no wrongdoing by MacKenzie. At the same time, he 
received good news from the Navy Department. According to his wishes, 
the remaining prisoners on board the North Carolina were to be taken 
from Gregory's care, and placed under Perry's supervision.74 The 
prisoners were then removed under heavy guard, to a cellar beneath the 
pay-house in the navy yard.75 
Nor had MacKenzie forgotten Gregory's actions against him. On 
February 1, the commander wrote to Upshur again asking why 
Commodore Jones was to have examined the crew of the Somers, and to 
have provided for their comfort.76 MacKenzie was certain that Upshur's 
orders were in response to a negative report from Gregory. The captain 
had admitted to MacKenzie that he knew the cause of Upshur's order, but 
declined to reveal it. MacKenzie accused Gregory of leading a conspiracy 
against him. The commander believed that Gregory had provoked an 
order that in turn justified the subsequent report, making possible the 
ultimate leak of the register to the New York City press. MacKenzie 
desired a copy of the Gregory's first letter for a statement that he was 
making on the captain's conduct, "with a view of requesting that it may be 
made the subject of charges against him.'m As no charges were ever 
73 Ibid. 
74 Jones to Upshur, January 28, 1843, NA RG 273. 
75 Wilson to Upshur, February 4, 1843, NA RG 273. 
76 MacKenzie to Upshur, February 1, 1843, NA RG 273. 
77 Ibid. 
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brought against Gregory, it is reasonable to assume that the request was 
denied. MacKenzie had been responsible for enough prosecution already. 
On February 2, the court-martial convened on board the North 
Carolina.78 Five charges had been prepared against MacKenzie: murder 
on board a United States vessel on the high seas, oppression, illegal 
punishment, conduct unbecoming an officer, and cruelty and oppression. 
The first three charges referred to the executions, the fourth to 
MacKenzie's treatment of Spencer at that time, and the last to his 
disciplinary regime on board the Somers.79 The charges relative to the 
executions were capital offences. Throughout the court-martial, more than 
MacKenzie's control of history was at stake. 
The board of the court-martial was composed of thirteen officers, 
the largest allowed by naval law.80 The President of the court was 
Commodore John Downes, whom MacKenzie had named as acceptable in 
his letter of December 26. The remaining officers were all senior captains, 
and included the heads of the major navy yards besides New York. Their 
initial dispositions towards MacKenzie are not known, but at least three 
were certainly favourable. Commodore Daniel Turner was "to all intents 
and purposes, one of the Perry family," and Captain Benjamin Page "was 
John Slidell's second in his duel... [and] has ever since been caressed by 
the Slidell connection.,,81 Furthermore, Captain Henry Ogden commanded 
the U.S.S. Hudson, and had accompanied MacKenzie on his visit to Robert 
78 On February 10, the court transferred to the chapel in the navy yard. 
79 CMP, pp. 1-4. 
80 Articles of War, Article XXXV. 
81 Beard, The Letters and Journals of James Fenimore Cooper, vol. IV, p. 
362, Cooper to Shubrick, February 5, 1843, quoted in McFarland, Sea 
Dangers, p. 206. 
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Taylor, at which time he had concurred with MacKenzie's assessment of 
Gregory's actions.82 
The Judge Advocate presiding was William Norris, a little known 
lawyer from Baltimore, Maryland.83 Norris was probably familiar to 
Upshur, however, who was a jurist from the Eastern Shore. In trying the 
case, the judge advocate declined to take an adversarial position, 
announcing that he would act as an "English judge ... [able] to ask 
questions that would be legal, from either side.,,84 As such, he did not 
expect "to be treated and restrained as a prosecutor.,,85 His purpose was 
not try the accused, but to reach the truth over whether or not there had 
really been a mutiny on board the Somers. In consequence, much of the 
evidence and testimony before the court was designed to elicit the gUilt or 
innocence of the mutineers. Although it was MacKenzie in the dock, the 
court-martial sat in judgement on the men whom he had executed. 
That Norris had to define his own role and responsibilities was 
indicative of the ambiguity of American naval justice. The service had no 
corps of trained judge advocates, nor any formal texts of jurisprudence.86 
The 1832 Regulations said almost nothing on the subject besides that the 
president of a court-martial was to "certify the account of the Judge 
Advocate," who would, in turn, do the same for the witnesses.87 Upshur, 
82 MacKenzie to Upshur, January 16, 1843, NA RG 273. 
83 Beard, The Letters and Journals of James Fenimore Cooper, vol. II, p. 
498, Shubrick to Cooper, March 10, 1843, quoted in McFarland, Sea 
Dangers, p. 183. 
84 Norris, CMP, p. 6. 
85 Ibid. 
86 J. Snedeker, A Brief History of Courts-Martial (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 1959), p. 53. 
87 1832 Naval Regulations, Chapter 30, Articles 1 and 2. 
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the former judge, had addressed the failings of the Navy's judicial system 
in his first report: 
The first step ought to be the preparation of a full code of laws 
and rules for the measure of reform will be unavailing. It is of the 
essence of free government that the rights, the duties, and the 
responsibilities of all men, in all conditions, should be ascertained and 
accurately defined; and it is of the essence of tyranny that men should 
be punished for imputed offences, or at the arbitrary discretion of their 
judges. This truth applies with peculiar force to those engaged in 
military service. The strict discipline which that service requires, 
renders necessary a great variety of rules which would be useless in the 
ordinary conditions of society, which involve no moral or social crime, 
but which, nevertheless, it is often necessary to enforce by the most 
rigorous sanctions. It is in the highest degree unjust in itself, and 
violative of the spirit of our institutions, that these new and peculiar 
responsibilities should be in any respect uncertain. And yet it is in 
many cases extremely difficult to determine, according to existing 
rules, what is and what is not an offence in our naval service; and in a 
great variety of cases it is altogether uncertain, and dependant upon the 
arbitrary will of the courts-martial, in what mode, government and 
regulation of the naval service. Without this, every other and to what 
extent, offences, real or imputed, shall be punished.88 
In consequence, there was no settled and uniform interpretation in 
either substantive or procedural matters.89 This is not to say that the Navy 
was entirely without a judicial structure. The Articles of War included 
directions on the size of courts-martial, the oaths to be administered to 
members of the court and the judge advocate, and the nature of 
testimony.9O Thus, all witnesses were to speak under oath, subject to the 
laws of perjury. Furthermore, the rights of the prisoner were addressed, 
particularly that no charges against him could be kept secret, or adjusted 
during the course of the tria1.91 Nevertheless, naval justice was clearly an 
uncertain proposition, and its vagaries would now be subject to close 
public scrutiny. 
88 SNR 1841, p. 375. 
89 Snedeker, A Brief History of Courts-Martial, p. 53. 
90 Articles of War, Articles XXV, XXVI, and XXXVII. 
91 Articles of War, Article XXXVIII. 
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It was clear that MacKenzie had killed Spencer, Cromwell, and 
Small. What Norris wanted to discover was the propriety of that act.92 
He insisted that the mutiny was merely alleged, whereas the officers of the 
Somers only ever referred to the mutiny as factua1.93 Norris' initial 
approach had been flawed from the onset. He was attempting to conduct 
an impartial investigation whilst listening to a defence make its case. 
Norris might have considered himself impartial, but the evidence before 
him would have a decided bias in favour of MacKenzie. The absence of a 
prosecutor meant that there was no real balance to the proceedings. 
The court-martial convened on February 2, and the first few days 
were spent conducting administrative business. Norris complained that 
he had not been allowed to prepare his examination: 
... He had not been furnished by the [Navy] Department ... with 
any list of witnesses on the part of the government; ... he has not been 
furnished with any list of witnesses on the part of the government; ... he 
has had no opportunity of conversing with any of the witnesses, of 
whose names he is even entirely ignorant, except by rumor in respect 
to a few of them, and that therefore he will need time to prepare the 
case by conversing with the officers and crew of the brig Somers, 
before he could commence the case on the part of the government.94 
At Norris' request, the court adjourned until the next morning. 
MacKenzie had been allowed to retain legal counsel for his 
defence. Thus, he had employed John Duer and George Griffin. 
Although Griffin remains obscure, Duer was already a prominent man. 
His legal career dated back to 1816 when he acted as counsel in the New 
York State Court of Errors, opposed by Martin Van Buren.95 The two 
became political allies, however. Indeed, Duer first came to public 
92 Norris, CMP, pp. 6-7. 
93 Norris to Upshur, February 3, 1843, NA RG 273. 
94 Norris, CMP, p. 8. 
95 W.A. Butler, The Revision of the Statutes of the State of New York and 
the Revisers (New York: Banks and Brothers, 1889), p. 13. 
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attention as a delegate to the Convention of 1821 that had broken Ambrose 
Spencer's power.96 Four years later, Van Buren appointed the attorney to 
the commission revising the New York statutes. Duer then worked on the 
commission with John Canfield Spencer for two years before leaving to 
become the Attorney General for the Southern District of New York.97 
Since 1829, he had been in private practice.98 Apart from his obvious 
skills, Duer was the uncle of MacKenzie's wife, Catherine.99 
When the court reconvened, MacKenzie's lawyers asked to retract 
their acceptance of Norris' status as a neutral jurist. The purpose of this 
decision, presumably, was to force him into an adversarial position, 
thereby preventing any other counsel from assuming that role. The court 
assented to the request. The roles of the court were then redefined. Norris 
"presided on only the stringent prima facie case against Commander 
MacKenzie and [left] it to him to discharge or extenuate the alleged fault 
of his conduct."loo On February 4, two more lawyers, among the finest in 
the state, appeared before the court. Benjamin F. Butler and Charles 
O'Connor had been retained by John Canfield Spencer for the purpose of 
representing the Spencer family at the trial. Butler had grown up in 
Kinderhook, Martin Van Buren's home town. IOI In fact, upon passing the 
bar in 1817, he became a partner in Van Buren's firm, which Butler 
inherited in 1821. Four years later, Van Buren appointed him to the 
commission for the revision of the New York completing the triumvirate 
96 Ibid. 
97 Butler, The Revision of the Statutes of the State of New York, p. 26. 
98 H.W.H. Knot, "John Duer," Dictionary of American Biography, Vol. 5, 
p.485. 
99 Hayford, The Somers Mutiny Affair, p. 18. 
100 Norris to Upshur, February 3, 1843, NA RG 273. 
101 Butler, The Revision of the Statutes of the State of New York, p. 14. 
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of Spencer, Duer, and Butler. 102 He had already been appointed District 
Attorney of Albany County, and remained there until this appointment. 
Since then, he had risen to national prominence. A state legislator for six 
years, he had declined an appointment to the state supreme court in order 
to enter President Jackson's cabinet in 1833 as Attorney General. I03 In the 
closing months of the administration, he became Secretary of War. In 
1838, he returned to New York, and for the last three years had been 
District Attorney for the Southern District of New York, including New 
York City. 
O'Conor had lived his entire life in New York City, and had 
become renowned for his legal genius. Entirely self-taught, he had been 
admitted to the bar at the age of twenty.I04 In the early years of his 
practice, he had gone unrecognised, but in 1837, his conduct of the Forrest 
divorce case fixed his name and reputation as the ablest member of the 
New York bar. 105 
Since Norris had declined to take an adversarial position, the two 
attorneys asked to assume that role: 
[Butler and Q'Conor asked to be] present at the trial, and to 
examine and cross-examine the witnesses who may be produced, by 
propounding such questions as may be approved by the Court, and to 
offer, from time to time, such suggestions in relation to the 
proceedings, and to present such comments on the testimony, when the 
102 Butler, The Revision of the Statutes of the State of New York, p.15. 
103 D.S. Muzzey, "Benjamin Franklin Butler," Dictionary of American 
Biography, Vol. 3, p. 356. 
104 J.C. Walsh, "Charles O'Conor," American Irish Historical Society, Vol. 
27, p. 291. O'Connor would gain greater fame later in his career for his 
defence of Jefferson Davis after the Civil War, and his role in the 
dissolution of the Tweed Ring in New York. 
105 F.e. Hicks, "Charles O'Conor," Dictionary of American Biography, 
Vol. 16, p. 621. 
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Court), as they deem necessary.l06 
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The request was subject to the approval of the court, and after "mature 
deliberation," was denied. 107 The court was then adjourned until the 
following Monday, February 6. 
As the court-martial opened another controversy arose over civil-
military jurisdiction. The term of George Warner's enlistment was 
scheduled to end on February 5, and it appeared that an appeal would be 
mounted on his behalf in order to obtain his discharge. 108 Furthermore, the 
appeal was to be accompanied by a writ of habeas corpus intended to 
guarantee his freedom from prosecution. Perhaps in response to this news, 
the orders governing the prisoners' confinement were changed the day 
before Warner's discharge. They were to be allowed visitors once again, 
and greater care was taken for their comfort. I09 Even so, on February 6, a 
petitioner wrote a letter to the Navy Secretary complaining that Charles 
Wilson's family had not been granted access to the prisoner. IIO It was not 
until four days later, that Perry released eight of the prisoners from their 
irons, and ensured that all were removed to a "lighter and warmed [room], 
were they [were kept] as comfortable as humanity should require.,,111 
In an attempt to forestall any writs of habeas corpus, MacKenzie 
began preparing charges against the mutineers, particularly George 
Warner. 1I2 That same day, Commodore Perry reported that an effort to 
106 Butler and Q'Conor, CMP, pp. 8-9. 
107 CMP, p. 9. 
108 MacKenzie to Upshur, January 30, 1843, NA RG 273. 
109 Perry to Upshur, February 4, 1843, NA RG 273. 
110 James J. Roosevelt to Upshur, February 6, 1843, NA RG 273. 
111 Perry to Upshur, February 10, 1843, NA RG 273. 
112 MacKenzie to Upshur, February 6, 1843, NA RG 273. 
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free the same apprentice was imminent. 113 Sometime that afternoon, a 
writ of habeas corpus on his behalf was presented to the Supreme Court 
Commissioner for King's County.1l4 The case was argued for a day, and 
was considered by the Judge for one more, before a verdict was returned 
that remanded Warner to Perry's authority.1l5 Warner did not stay 
confined for long, however, since the same day he was placed under 
Perry's custody. another writ of habeas corpus was presented to the State 
Supreme Court. After "some delay," he was released by order of the 
presiding judge. 116 
Four days later, on February 13, two more apprentices, Charles 
Van Velsor and Eugene Sullivan, were released on writs of habeas corpus. 
The grounds for their release was that having been confined for nearly two 
months, charges had still not been brought against the prisoners.1l7 
Sullivan was not released from naval service, however, as the terms of his 
enlistment had not expired. lIS Van Velsor, however, was set at large since 
"he was indentured as an apprentice to the Navy before the age of 
thirteen." I 19 Although Sullivan had not been released from naval 
authority, he was free from prosecution. Perry deplored this development 
as "entirely subversive of all future military authority ... ,,120 In 
contravention of the Court's orders, he had the two apprentices held on 
113 Perry to Upshur, February 6, 1843, Spencer Murray Collection, U.S. 
Navy Department Library. 
114 Perry to Upshur, February 8, 1843, NA RG 273. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Perry to Upshur, February 9, 1843, Spencer Murray Collection. 
117 Perry to Upshur, February 13, 1843, Spencer Murray Collection. 
118 Justice Greenwood, decision on a writ of habeas corpus in the matter of 
Eugene Sullivan, February 15, 1843, NA RG 273. 
119 Perry to Upshur, February 16, 1843, NA RG 273. 
120 Perry to Upshur, February 13, 1843, Spencer Murray Collection. 
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board the steamer Fulton, "under a proper guard.,,121 The commodore 
predicted that unless charges were preferred against the apprentices 
without delay, "the prisoners will all be taken under the same process.,,122 
In fact, soon after, writs of habeas corpus were presented for all of the 
prisoners. 123 It is unclear how many of them were released, but on 
February 21, George Kneavels was discharged on the grounds that he had 
been enlisted before the age of thirteen. 124 In an effort to prevent any more 
releases, Upshur ordered charges drawn up against the remaining 
prisoners. 125 Nevertheless, the nature of MacKenzie's court-martial 
prevented any formal action being taken against the mutineers before 
judgement had been rendered on their Commander. If MacKenzie was 
guilty, then they were certainly innocent. Thus, while charges might be in 
preparation, they could not be presented until after the accusations of 
mutiny had been verified. 
Accordingly, MacKenzie had begun his case with his one material 
witness, James Wales. The purser's steward was on the stand for five 
days, from February 4 to February 9. Although his testimony went into 
greater detail than it had before, it was much the same as what he had said 
before the court of inquiry. Again, it centred upon the conversation on the 
booms, the crisis leading to the executions, the executions themselves, and 
any incidents that shed light upon the development of the mutiny. In this 
instance, however, he was subjected to a vigorous cross-examination. 
121 Perry to Upshur, February 16, 1843, NA RG 273. 
122 Perry to Upshur, February 13, 1843, Spencer Murray Collection. 
123 Perry to Upshur, February 18, 1843, NA RG 273. 
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Indeed, on the second day of testimony, Mackenzie objected to one 
of the judge advocate's questions. The objection accused Norris of 
sophistry. The judge advocate had proposed a question that was actually a 
line of argument designed to entrap Wales in an admission he would not 
have made under direct interrogation: 126 
When Mr. Spencer told you he intended to make a scuffle 
some night when he had the mid-watch, run with his associates to the 
main-mast, call Mr. Rogers, and throw him overboard, did you tell him 
that it would be likely to rouse the men, and prevent him from going on 
with his plan ... considering he had but twenty associates in a crew of 
one hundred and twenty men and boYS?127 
If Norris really was acting in a non-adversarial capacity, he could 
not rely on such questions. They were argumentative and improper for a 
factual inquiry. "If a portion of an argument may be presented in a 
question, why not an entire argument, embracing of the whole case? .. "128 
According to MacKenzie's counsel, Norris was not allowed to make a 
case, but was to investigate the events on board. At any rate, the exchange 
augured an increasingly antagonistic relationship between the judge 
advocate and the commander. 
Norris' interrogation proved the purser's steward an uneven 
witness. In the first place, he contradicted himself on at least one 
occasion. When describing Cromwell's treatment of the apprentices, 
Wales said the boatswain's mate "would bring them up for the most trivial 
offences and have them punished.,,129 Later, in defence of MacKenzie's 
disciplinary policies, Wales maintained that he "never saw an instance of 
unjust punishment on board the brig.,,130 One of the statements was 
126 Duer, CMP, pp. 18-19. 
127 Norris, CMP, p. 18. 
128 Duer, CMP, pp. 19-20. 
129 Wales, CMP, p. 22. 
130 Wales, CMP, p. 27. 
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untrue, probably the second. Cromwell likely did have apprentices 
flogged for trivial reasons, but MacKenzie was equally culpable. Since 
the commander approved all punishments inflicted on board, than he must 
have inflicted trivial and unjust punishments as well. In effect, th~ same 
punishments were used to demonstrate Cromwell's tyranny and 
MacKenzie's humanity. 
Furthermore, Wales demonstrated a near complete ignorance of 
nautical matters and seafaring customs. This emerged whilst Norris was 
questioning him about the operations of the vessel in order to determine 
the viability of Spencer's plan. When asked how many men would be on 
deck during the mid-watch, Wales replied, "I don't know much about it, I 
am no saiIOr. .. ,,131 Soon after, Wales admitted that he knew nothing about 
the watches. 132 Wales' ignorance is understandable. Before his 
assignment to the Somers, he had only ever served one month, on board 
the Ontario. 133 The admission was important. MacKenzie's star witness 
had precious little knowledge on which to base the various allegations that 
he was making about the mutineers. Norris caught Wales in this when he 
pressed him on the 'mutinous gatherings,' which had occurred after 
Spencer's arrest: 
Q. Do you think it a mutinous indication that...[the] crews 
should gather in knots and talk as to the cause of [Spencer's] 
confinement, not having had the cause explained, and seem 
dissatisfied? 
A. I don't see why they should be secret about it, and separate 
when an officer approached them, and go to another part of the vessel, 
and still continue to converse in a low tone of voice. 
Q. Is it the habit of naval seamen to be heard by officers 
discussing such matters? 
131 Wales, CMP, p. 20. 
132 Wales, CMP, p. 21. 
133 Wales, CMP, p. 24. 
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A. I don't know. l34 
Whatever damage had been done to Wales' credibility, 
MacKenzie's next three witnesses were called to help restore it. William 
Neville, Henry Stremmels, and Ward Gazely testified that they had all 
witnessed the conversation on the booms. While none of them heard any 
of Spencer's remarks, the conversation had clearly taken place. Having 
established this fact, MacKenzie called Horace Heiskill to testify. The 
purser confirmed that Wales came to him with news of a mutiny on the 
morning after the conversation with Spencer.135 Since Heiskill had 
immediately notified Gansevoort of the report, MacKenzie next called the 
lieutenant to the stand. The commander would not speak on his own 
behalf, so Gansevoort was the highest -ranking officer to be called from the 
Somers. Although his testimony related to his own perceptions of the 
cruise and mutiny, Gansevoort was very much MacKenzie's voice. 
Furthermore, he brought a professional competence that Wales obviously 
lacked. 
Gansevoort's testimony began with a narrative account of the 
events on board the brig from the time he first learned of the mutiny to the 
end of the cruise. 136 MacKenzie then cross-examined him, manipulating 
the testimony in order to endorse his own conduct, and impeach the 
character of the mutineers. Not that Gansevoort needed much 
encouragement; if MacKenzie was convicted, he would most likely face 
charges himself. After building his case for two days, MacKenzie finally 
asked Gansevoort if he believed the Somers could have been brought back 
safely to port without the executions. The lieutenant's response was 
134 Wales, CMP, p. 23. 
135 Heiskill, CMP, p. 31 
136 Gansevoort, CMP, pp. 31-41. 
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emphatic: "I did believe then, and do believe now, that she never would 
have been brought back into port in the hands of her officers, without the 
execution of those three men.,,137 
Norris' cross-examination commenced immediately. His questions 
focused on MacKenzie's dealings with the midshipmen, the rush aft, and 
the swaying of the mast. Gansevoort proved a difficult witness. 
Repeatedly, he claimed not to recollect what was asked of him.138 Often, 
when he did answer a question, his language was guarded. Rather than 
assert, he replied that he "thought" or "understood" certain events to have 
occurred. Furthermore, he and Norris had several pointed exchanges. On 
the first day of cross-examination, Norris pressed Gansevoort on whether 
or not the midshipmen on board had been treated without regard to their 
familial connections to the commander. Specifically, would he have 
reacted differently had Wales reported a mutinous conversation with any 
other midshipman? Not surprisingly, Gansevoort maintained that he 
would have acted as he did regardless of the officer. 139 On another 
occasion, the judge advocate asked Gansevoort what injuries Spencer had 
done to him, presumably to determine if the lieutenant had any previous 
dispute with the midshipman. Gansevoort dryly replied, "none that I 
know of, except having meditated taking my life, and taking the vessel out 
of the hands of her officers."I40 
Gansevoort finished testifying on February 16, and was followed 
by Matthew Calbraith Perry, Jr. As he had done at the court of inquiry, 
MacKenzie intended to call his remaining witnesses in order of rank. 
137 Gansevoort, CMP, p. 41. 
138 Gansevoort, CMP, pp. 42-52. 
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The passed midshipman remained on the stand until February 21. He too, 
was subjected to a thorough cross-examination. By this time, the brig's 
officers were becoming more hostile to Norris. Indeed, whilst Perry was 
giving evidence, Henry Rodgers wrote sarcastically to his sister that. 
" ... The judge advocate ... [is] very fond of cross-examining. Calbraith is 
now undergoing this delightful process and I anticipate the pleasure 
sometime this, or next week.,,141 Rodgers' prediction was incorrect, 
however, since circumstances led MacKenzie to alter the order of his 
witnesses. 
On February 21, MacKenzie begged leave of the court to deviate 
from his examination of the officers: 
... Several of the most important witnesses among the 
apprentices of the Somers having recently disappeared mysteriously, in 
a manner to indicate an agency to injure my cause before this court, and 
the length to which this trial is drawing out, being likely to furnish time 
for additional inroads in the number of those witnesses, I propose, with 
the permission of the court, to suspend for the present the examination 
of the officers, in order to introduce testimony more directly bearing on 
, the guilt of Cromwell, ere it be too late to obtain it. 142 
Although MacKenzie's certainty that he was the object of a conspiracy 
seems paranoid, some of the apprentices had actually vanished. These 
disappearances were likelier desertions than part of a plan directed against 
the commander. Furthermore, the number of desertions had not yet 
become considerable. Since the brig's arrival in New York, only four 
members of the crew had run away: Edmund Lego, Jeremiah Cory, 
William Clark, and Joseph Weaver. 143 All but Weaver had run from the 
141 Henry Rodgers to Nannie Rodgers, February 20, 1843, Rodgers Family 
Papers, Library of Congress. 
142 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 79. 
143 "Muster Returns from the U.S. Brig of War Somers, September 1, 1842 
to September 30, 1846," NA RG 217, MPR, Book 1424. 
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naval hospital, which had prompted MacKenzie to write to Upshur with a 
request that security there be increased. 144 
The next five witnesses were all apprentices. Their testimony 
dwelt upon the exceptional intimacy between Cromwell and Spencer. 
Their private conversations, and Cromwell's various insubordinate 
remarks were each commented upon in turn. MacKenzie focused 
especially upon a paper which Cromwell and Spencer had been seen 
discussing on various occasions. Whether or not the apprentices were 
describing the same document is ambiguous, but they more or less agreed 
that it "had marks on it like crosses; it was not English writing, and [it 
had] geometrical figures on the back.,,145 The supposition was that 
Cromwell and Spencer had been discussing one of the Greek lists, and that 
these conversations were proof of Cromwell's involvement in the 
mutiny.l46 There is an equally plausible explanation for these 
conversations, however, which was in fact, supplied by MacKenzie's 
primary witness. Wales testified that he had seen Cromwell assist Spencer 
in his navigation exercises. 147 The paper touted as proof of Cromwell's 
guilt did not contain mutiny plans, perhaps, but homework. 
Gansevoort was recalled on February 23 in order to discuss the 
confinement of the prisoners on the last leg of the cruise. Apart from 
Gansevoort's brief reappearance, and two days' testimony by Michael 
Garty, MacKenzie called only apprentices for over a week. The 
Commander feared that he would lose particular witnesses through 
144 MacKenzie to Upshur, January 31, 1843, NA RG 273. 
145 Neville, CMP, p. 79. 
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conspiracy and desertion. '48 On March 2, MacKenzie resumed his 
examination of the officers with Henry Rodgers. Rodgers did not testify 
for long, just two days.'49 He was the senior midshipman, and the only 
steerage officer MacKenzie called in his defence. MacKenzie elicited 
from him various statements about Spencer's premeditative behaviour as 
an officer and member of the steerage. "[Spencer] examined the palm of 
my hand, told me I should die a violent and sudden death, that my life 
would be a short one."ISO Besides this, Rodgers discussed his own part in 
the events leading to the execution. 
MacKenzie then called three of the brig's petty officers: Henry 
King, Thomas Dickerson, and William Collins, the gunner's mate, the 
gunner, and the carpenter's mate respectively. 151 Their testimony followed 
the familiar pattern: the character of the executed men, any premeditative 
actions by them, MacKenzie's professional competency, and the 
witnesses' own experiences throughout the week prior to the executions. 
MacKenzie concluded with Horace Heiskill. The purser had taken down 
the minutes of the council of officers, and much of his evidence concerned 
its proceedings. MacKenzie himself had tried to introduce the minutes as 
evidence earlier in the trial, but the judge advocate had objected to their 
receipt by the court. Norris had then asserted that the minutes could not 
be used as incriminating evidence against the executed men: "It is not the 
proceedings of a lawful court. As evidence to show the guilt of any of the 
148 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 79. 
149 Rodgers, CMP, pp. 128-138. 
150 Rodgers, CMP, p. 128. Prophetically, Spencer was right. Rodgers was 
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parties and their connexion [sic], it is wholly unallowable.,,152 Now, 
however, Norris himself actually introduced them as evidence, because he 
wanted to prove that they had been doctored. His cross-examination, 
however, was inconclusive, for when Heiskill answered a question, more 
often than not, he simply answered in the negative, or said that he did not 
recollect. 
When the court reconvened on March 9, Norris opened his case. 
The first witness called was Midshipman John Tillotson. The midshipman 
was the first of Norris' witnesses whose testimony had not yet been heard 
by the court. The judge advocate requested that his examination of these 
witnesses be conducted as a cross-examination: "It is a settled principle of 
law, that... [when] one side has to call a witness biased against its views of 
the case, the privilege [of cross-examination] will be allowed." Rather 
than conduct a simple factual examination along the lines of the court of 
inquiry, Norris wanted the cross-examiner's right to ask leading questions 
designed to entrap a witness. Norris felt that the officers' behaviour and 
character demanded that this be allowed: 
This case furnishes every incident to justify and enforce the 
exception. Some of the witnesses are the relatives and connexions [sic] 
of the accused. But above all, the attendant circumstances of the 
transaction, which is the basis of this prosecution, and the mutual 
position of the officers ever since its occurrence, give a peculiar claim 
for the allowance of the privilege. With a view to keep them on the 
spot, and the duration of this trial not being foreseen, these officers 
have remained aboard the Somers ever since, in constant association 
with each other, and exposed, by the influence of natural laws and 
motives, to the exchange of their recollections, conversations, and 
deductions, as to facts and witnesses, as might well prevent the most 
mature minds from separating fact from opinion and belief, and from 
avoiding the insensible adoption by each as his own of that knowledge, 
or that state of mind, which was originally individual and peculiar to 
one, or a few. It will naturally, under such circumstances, occur, that 
several minds, if not made critically to practice self-inspection, will not 
152 Norris, eMP, p. 34. 
so much be that number of mirrors, reflecting one transaction, as the 
multiplication of the same reflection. ls3 
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Norris had been suspicious of the officers' testimony for some 
time. In a letter to Secretary Upshur, he had remarked " ... the 
responsibilities will be arduous in a case where it had already become 
obvious that every species of resort is to be had to resist any investigation 
likely to disturb preconceived views of the testimony and witnesses.,,'54 
The Judge Advocate had been placed in an untenable position, since the 
basis of his case depended on testimony from witnesses hostile to his 
cause. 
Already, on two occasions, his investigation had been obstructed 
by the intransigence of the officers. When the court-martial was first 
preparing to convene, Norris had interviewed Charles Hays. "After 
replying to a few trivial questions, he candidly stated to me, that he did not 
think me entitled, except on the stand to his information.,,155 The Judge 
Advocate did not attempt another interview until the day before he opened 
his case, when he asked Tillotson if he had any objection to discussing his 
testimony in private. The midshipman replied that he did, and no 
interview was granted, never mind that Norris was acting under the 
authority of the Navy Department. 156 
MacKenzie's counsel objected to the request on several grounds, 
the most serious being that Norris' request exposed the officers to charges 
of perjury: "The peculiar character of cross-examination only attaches 
itself when it is suspected that the witness is gUilty of perjury, or at least 
misrepresentation of the facts, or when it is wished to convey that 
153 Norris, CMP, p. 163. 
154 Norris to Upshur, February 16, 1843, NA RG 273. 
155 Norris, CMP, p. 163. 
156 Norris, CMP, p. 164. 
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impression to the jury."J57 In effect, the Judge Advocate had accused the 
officers of lying. His intention, then, would be to impeach the credibility 
of the witnesses whom he called. Moreover, it was feared that if Norris 
was given the liberty of cross-examination, he would use it to call upon 
the imprisoned mutineers. Given the Judge Advocate's concerns about the 
officers' motives, the defence's argument was rather disingenuous. "They 
are notoriously willing witnesses for the charges, and to give the counsel 
for the people the liberty to put leading questions to willing witnesses 
would be, in a capital case, to give it a ruthless and appalling character.,,158 
The court sustained the objection, and Norris commenced his first 
examination unable to ask leading questions or otherwise entrap the 
witnesses. Tillotson was on the stand very briefly, answering questions 
about relations in the steerage, Spencer's dealings with MacKenzie, and 
the midshipman's recollection of the week before the executions. Norris' 
next witness was Charles Sibley, an apprentice. Sibley had little to say, 
but his discharge was expected soon, and the judge advocate wanted to be 
sure of his testimony. 159 
Next, he called Oliver Hazard Perry, Jr., to the stand. Norris 
pressed him on Spencer's final moments, particularly his last message to 
friends and family. When Perry had first delivered MacKenzie's report to 
157 Sedgwick, CMP, p. 165. MacKenzie had been represented by Theodore 
Sedgwick since February 24, when John Duer's appointments 
(presumably his own civil defence of the commander) had precluded his 
continued service as defence counsel in the court-martial. Sedgwick was a 
prominent New York lawyer, and would have been known to MacKenzie 
through his wife's social circle. Duer, eMP, pp. 99-100; E.L.W. Heck, 
"Theodore Sedgwick," Dictionary of American Biography, Vol. 16, pp. 
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Upshur, the Midshipman had said that it was his impression that Spencer 
had dictated such a document to MacKenzie. l60 Although MacKenzie had 
alluded to his meeting with Spencer in various reports, no letter had ever 
been produced. On this occasion, the commander inquired aloud as to 
what Norris was attempting to do. MacKenzie denied that Spencer had 
even written one in the first place. "He said he did not wish to write.,,161 
Norris pounced upon the statement: "But I am told that he afterward 
dictated to you what to write.,,162 MacKenzie was compelled to admit that 
this was the case, which the commander did with "shaking agony.,,163 
The court then adjourned for the day. 
The following morning, MacKenzie submitted a document 
admitting that he had misrepresented the transaction between himself and 
Spencer. "Not having for some time read his official report, or refreshed 
his recollection of what occurred between himself and the late acting 
Midshipman Philip Spencer, Commander MacKenzie may have been 
mistaken in admitting that Mr. Spencer declined to write, that he said he 
did not wish to write."I64 The remainder of the submission corrected his 
initial report's failure to acknowledge that Spencer had been asked 
whether or not he wished to send any message, and the circumstances in 
which his last words had been delivered. 165 
160 Oliver H. Perry, Jr., CMP, p. 172. 
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The matter was dropped for the time being, and Perry concluded 
his testimony. In his interrogation, Norris emphasised the officer's role in 
the loss of the mast. By and large, however, Perry's testimony 
recapitulated the responses of his seniors. After closing his examination 
of Perry, Norris called another midshipman, Adrian Deslonde. The 
midshipman's testimony did not reveal much, although it became clear 
that Spencer was not the only member of the steerage with ties to the 
crew. On the day of Spencer's arrest, Benjamin Green had pricked a 
tattoo onto Deslonde's arm. 166 Outside of the court there was also 
evidence that one midshipman, at least, was fraternising with a petty 
officer. Charles Hays and Oliver Browning, the boatswain's mate had 
both come down with syphilis, implying that they had both been 
frequenting prostitutes. 167 If they had not been doing so together, it is 
clear that Hays' conduct was hardly that expected of an officer and a 
gentleman. 
Deslonde's testimony was brief, and added little to the record. A 
more substantive witness, Daniel McKinley, followed him to the stand. 
His testimony provided the court with a very different perspective from 
that it had previously seen. McKinley had been present when the Greek 
lists were discovered, and was questioned on the subject. He also gave 
evidence about the days leading to the executions, as well as a detailed 
account of the executions themselves. Finally, he discussed his own 
experience under confinement during the last leg of the cruise. When 
166 Deslonde, CMP, p. 176. 
167 "Medical Journal of the United States Brig of War Somers," Medical 
Journals of Ships, 1813 to 1889, NA RG 52. 
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MacKenzie cross-examined him, McKinley proved an intractable witness. 
On several occasions he flatly contradicted the commander's questions: 
Q. Did the commander then go on to tell you that he had 
treated you kindly that he had given you an opportunity to improve 
yourself in your profession and in your education, and that in return for 
these benefits that you had joined in a plot to take his life, to deprive 
him of his command, and to dishonor him as an officer? 
A. He never said anything of that kind to me. l68 
Realising, probably, that his cross-examination would not be productive, 
Mackenzie kept it short, just seventeen questions. 
Norris then briefly recalled Gansevoort to clarify his earlier 
testimony. This done, he called another midshipman, Egbert Thompson. 
Thompson was twenty-one years old, and proved a harder witness to 
question than the teenaged midshipmen who had preceded him on the 
stand. Thompson's answers were evasive, and he was uncooperative. 
Furthermore, he and Norris had a few notable exchanges during the 
examination: 
Q. Did the commander address to you any observation when he 
commenced to write? 
A. Not that I recollect. Ah yes; after he had spoken to the other, he 
told Mr. O.H. Perry, I think, to note the time; Mr. Perry and myself 
both noted it. 
Q. Did you report the end of the time? 
A. I think I did. It is so long since these things occurred, that it is 
impossible to remember these trivial things, such as the way Mr. 
Spencer held his head or hands. 
Q. Do you regard it as a trivial thing to report the expiration of ten 
minutes, which were the limits of Spencer's life? 
A. I did not say that was a trivial thing; my remark referred to some 
trivial questions that you put to me; my answer is by no means. 169 
Soon after, Norris, perhaps irritated by Thompson's frequent response that 
he could not remember the events in question, asked him if he a poor 
168 MacKenzie to McKinley, CMP, p. 183. 
169 Norris to Thompson, CMP, p. 186. 
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memory. The midshipman simply responded, " I can't say that I have a 
good one.,,170 At any rate, Norris did not question him much further. 
Likewise, MacKenzie spared Thompson any more time under oath. He 
asked only a few questions, all of which brought replies complimentary to 
the commander's behaviour. The court then adjourned. 
It did not reconvene again until four days later, on March 17. 
MacKenzie had taken ill, and been unable to attend the proceedings.171 
When he did return, he brought with him what he claimed were the 
original notes from his conversation with Spencer. Norris had resumed his 
interrogation of Oliver Hazard Perry, Jr., and MacKenzie wanted to 
silence the assumption that he had never delivered Spencer's last message. 
After condemning the Judge Advocate for this "gratuitous and offensive 
assumption," he submitted the notes with a notarised affidavit declaring 
their authenticity.172 The notes were three pages in length, and had 
obviously been written in great haste. The writing was cramped, 
uncertain, and fragmentary. These notes were utterly unlike MacKenzie's 
other communications, which were written with meticulous care. 
Moreover, only the first half of the text contained Spencer's 
communication. The remaining half was a narrative of the executions. 
MacKenzie hoped to demonstrate that while he had been writing in 
Spencer's company, what he had produced was not a letter but a narrative 
"for the purpose of keeping alive his recollection of the facts.,,173 
Even so, considering that MacKenzie had spoken with Spencer for 
over an hour, the notes seemed scarcely sufficient. Norris certainly 
170 Thompson, CMP, p. 187. 
171 MacKenzie, CMP, pp. 188-189. 
172 MacKenzie, CMP, pp. 191-193. 
173 MacKenzie, CMP, pp. 192-193. 
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doubted their authenticity. He believed that MacKenzie had feigned 
illness in order to produce a counterfeit letter, the original having been 
destroyed earlier. 174 As far as Norris was concerned, the affidavit was 
worthless, since it was the counterfeiter who provided the document's 
provenance. On these grounds, he objected to their admission as evidence. 
After some deliberation, the court allowed their entry for the record, but 
not as legal evidence. 175 
Perry was then allowed to stand down, and the Judge Advocate 
began reading MacKenzie's official report aloud. He concluded his 
recitation the following day. Norris then called the last line officer to 
testify, Charles Hays. His testimony was much the same as the officers 
before him. All of his answers were designed to justify the actions taken 
on board. While Hays was more forthcoming than most, he often claimed 
not to recollect what was asked of him. Probably in compensation for this 
inconclusive testimony, Norris next called two of the imprisoned 
mutineers. He had interviewed them earlier, and had "charged [them] 
repeatedly ... not to venture an untruth. ,,176 First, Alexander McKee 
testified to his experiences on board the brig. At the same time, he denied 
having ever been contacted by Spencer for the purpose of raising a 
mutiny, and that the first he had heard of the plan was when the 
commander had announced it to the crew. m Green's testimony was more 
comprehensive, and dwelt upon his experiences during the week prior to 
174 "[Norris] Memoranda, quoted in Egan, "The MacKenzie Court-Martial 
Trial: Cooper's Secret Correspondence with William H. Norris, " pp. 
152-153. 
175 Norris, CMP, p. 194. 
176 Norris, CMP, p. 218. 
177 McKee, CMP, p. 214. 
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the executions, the executions themselves, and his subsequent 
confinement. Passed Assistant Surgeon Richard Leecock was then called 
to comment upon the treatment of the prisoners, particularly Daniel 
McKinley. At the same time, he gave evidence as to the physical state of 
the officers before the executions. Although Norris had earlier hinted at a 
deeper friendship between Spencer and the witness, he did not press the 
issue. 178 
The Judge Advocate's next five witnesses were all apprentices. In 
response to their testimony, MacKenzie called two more apprentices and 
two of the petty officers, Andrew Anderson and Charles Rodgers. One of 
the two apprentices, Frederick Snyder, reported an incriminating 
conversation between Spencer and Cromwell. According to Snyder, they 
had discussed how best the brig could be converted to a pirate or slaver. 179 
The apprentice's testimony was unreliable, however, which Norris 
promptly demonstrated. Snyder had recently deserted, but been 
recaptured. 180 At the time of his testimony, therefore, he was under 
MacKenzie's command and awaiting punishment at the commander's 
discretion. Obviously, his testimony was influenced by his situation 
178 Norris to Heiskill, CMP, p. 158. 
179 Snyder, CMP, p. 224. It is unlikely, though, that Snyder was ever 
punished for his offence, since Charles Brown (Dem. - PA) intervened on 
his behalf following the receipt of an anguished letter from a friend acting 
for the apprentice's parents. In particular, "the tragical circumstances 
which took place [on board] have made [Snyder] very unhappy and 
extremely anxious to be discharged." The letter itself is the cause of some 
confusion, however, since it was received on January 28, 1843, is 
annotated to the effect that Snyder was discharged on February 3, 1843, 
and the testimony in question was delivered on March 21, 1843. James M. 
Hutchinson to Charles Brown, January 28, 1843, "Miscellaneous Letters 
Received by the Secretary of the Navy," NA RG 45. 
180 Ibid. 
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outside of the court. Under cross-examination, the apprentice quickly 
retreated from certain statements that he had made in response to 
MacKenzie. 
Then, quite suddenly, MacKenzie's trial was over. On March 15, 
during his illness, he had once again been charged with murder and 
manslaughter in civil court. Indeed, the new charges may very well have 
precipitated his retreat from the court-martial. This was a more 
formidable challenge than its predecessor. Charles O'Conor and 
Benjamin Butler, denied a part in the . military proceedings, had pursued 
MacKenzie in the civil courts instead. They were acting on behalf of 
Henry Morris, John Canfield Spencer's son-in-law, as well as Margaret 
Cromwell and Charles Cleveland. 
For five days, the lawyers had argued their cases before the grand 
jury. Butler and O'Connor maintained that MacKenzie had overstepped 
his constitutional authority: 
In the fifth amendment to the constitution, V.S.C.A., 
providing that no person shall be held to answer for a capital or 
otherwise infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
grand jury, "except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the 
militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger," the 
clause, "when in actual service in time of war or public danger," 
applies only to the militia; and therefore congress has power to provide 
for the trial by court-martial of all crimes committed by persons in the 
army or navy, regardless of the fact of peace or war."181 
In short, the commander's council of officers was fundamentally illegal, 
and whatever the state of his command, he was obligated to convene a 
formal court-martial for any capital offence. 
181 30. F. Cas. 1160, United States vs. MacKenzie et ai., District Court, 
S.D. New York, p.l. 
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MacKenzie's defence responded in kind. Regardless of the 
propriety of the commander's actions, he could only be tried according to 
naval law, as established by the Constitution. Even if MacKenzie had 
been wrong, the civil courts had no authority over him, and the case 
should be dismissed. Furthermore, it was not the place of "courts ... of a 
subordinate character" to attempt the construction of the Constitution. 182 
Whatever the ambiguities in the language of the law, their correction was 
a matter for the Congress. 
When asked to deliberate, the Grand Jury was unable to resolve the 
question of jurisdiction. In the hope that he would clarify the issue, on 
March 30, they asked the District Judge presiding whether or not they had 
any jurisdiction over an alleged crime on board a naval vessel, and if there 
were grounds to try the case before them. 183 In doing so, they effectively 
ceded authority for the decision to the Judge. As this was Samuel Betts, 
his decision was a foregone conclusion: 
... With the facts before us, that the naval code, as a distinct 
system of jurisprudence under our laws, has been in force for nearly 
forty years, that thirty of the last years of that period have witnessed a 
large increase of the naval forces, and a vast scope of employment, and 
that the application of the naval code by means of courts martial has 
been constant and notorious to every department of the government. . .I 
think we must all feel a deep conviction that this court ought not to be 
the first to assume such a jurisdiction, and arraign the parties accused 
on a matter touching their lives. l84 
MacKenzie and Gansevoort were free of the civil courts. No further 
indictments were sought against them. 
On March 21, Norris had dropped the charge of conduct 
unbecoming an officer. Norris had never been comfortable with the 
182 Ibid. 
183 Ibid. 
184 30. F. Cas. 1160, United States vs. MacKenzie et al., District Court, 
S.D. New York, p. 12. 
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charge, and had earlier petitioned the Navy Secretary to have it dropped. ISS 
The following day, which was the first after the Grand Jury decision had 
been reached, the Judge Advocate closed his case. This gave rise to an 
attack against him in the New York Courier and Enquirer: 
... The Circuit Court of the United States having determined 
on Monday, that the Civil Courts have no jurisdiction in the case of 
MacKenzie ... there no longer exists any object in procrastinating the 
sitting of the court [martial]; and accordingly at its first meeting after 
the decision was known, the Judge Advocate gave notice that the trial 
was at an end ... 1t was very apparent that the Judge Advocate intended 
to give the Grand Jury an opportunity to interfere. 186 
Whatever the newspaper's partisan support of MacKenzie, the 
editorial was absolutely correct. By the end of the trial, Norris had 
become convinced that there had been no mutiny, and that MacKenzie was 
guilty of murder. 187 The conduct of the defence gave him legitimate 
grounds for suspicion. MacKenzie and the officers had obstructed his 
investigation throughout, and Norris assumed that they had co-ordinated 
their stories. Moreover, for all MacKenzie's complaints about witness 
tampering, it is clear that he had himself been guilty of the same conduct. 
After the brig's return, Gansevoort, presumably with MacKenzie's 
approval, had interviewed various members of the crew about their 
recollections of the cruise. ISS Furthermore, MacKenzie and Commodore 
Perry had also interviewed certain apprentices at the Commodore's home 
ISS Norris to Upshur, February 4, 1843, NA RG 273. 
IS6 New York Courier and Enquirer, March 25, 1843, quoted in Hayford, 
The Somers Mutiny Affair, p. 151. 
IS7 "[Norris] Memoranda," quoted in Egan, "The MacKenzie Court-
Martial: Cooper's Secret Correspondence with William H. Norris," p. 151. 
ISS Humbert, CMP, p. 102. 
315 
in the navy yard. 189 Meanwhile, Norris had been denied access to the 
crew. 190 
In his closing statement, MacKenzie attempted to manipulate this 
last fact in order to strengthen his case. "The omission to examine 
Wilson .. .is a virtual admission that the prosecutor was afraid to examine 
him; that, if examined, he would have betrayed secrets fatal to the 
prosecution, and which are still locked up in the breasts of the 
conspirators." 191 Besides this, his defence recapitulated the officers' 
proofs of the mutineers' guilt, defended their performance, and pled the 
law of necessity in justification of his own actions. 192 
The Judge Advocate responded to MacKenzie's allegation in his 
own summation. "Wilson was not called by me only because of the 
impatience at what was called protraction of the proceedings, expressly 
averred by the accused in court.,,193 Moreover, Norris' hostility to 
MacKenzie was apparent throughout his closing statement. First, he 
proclaimed the fundamental right of naval personnel to judicial process. 
"The subordinates of a vessel of war, are not serfs of an irresponsible 
power. They are shielded by guaranteed privileges; gUilt is not to be 
branded upon them by imputation. ,,194 Whilst explaining the need for 
such safeguards in the law, the Judge Advocate obliquely attacked 
MacKenzie's conduct: 
Who has ever witnessed a single trial, without being forcibly 
impressed with the value of each cautionary provision? A single 
189 Conger, CMP, p. 126. 
190 Norris, CMP, p. 8. 
191 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 235. 
192 Griffin, CMP, pp. 236-237. 
193 Norris, CMP, p. 259. 
194 Norris, CMP, p. 250. 
question may unravel a mystery, expose a perjurer, or reduce an 
imputed crime to mere error. A web of interlaced circumstances, of 
alarming imputation, may be shown to be but the knitted shreds of 
suspicion, or artist-like craft. 195 
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Norris then outlined the criminality of MacKenzie's actions. At 
issue was whether or not MacKenzie was justified according to the laws of 
necessity, on which he had based his defence. If he was not, his actions 
constituted legal malice: " ... a wrongful act done intentionally without just 
cause or excuse."I96 Norris also maintained that the law of necessity could 
only justify a capital punishment when all other avenues had been 
exhausted. It had been the officers' responsibility to take refuge in a 
foreign port, rather than execute the prisoners. Their refusal to do so on 
the grounds of "mere professional pride," constituted a clear violation of 
the law. 197 Furthermore, if any of the executed men were actually 
innocent, MacKenzie's actions could not be excused by the exigencies of 
the moment. 198 
Norris was making a case against MacKenzie that condemned his 
behaviour regardless of the guilt or innocence of the mutineers. If the 
executed men were actually innocent, than Mackenzie was clearly guilty 
of murder. If, however, they really had been mutinous, MacKenzie was 
still guilty of legal malice, since he had not obeyed the stringent 
requirements of the law of necessity. Norris closed emphasising the latter 
argument, which was the stronger of the twO. 199 
Beginning on March 23, the officers of the court read the 
accumulated testimony of the past two months.2°O On March 28, a verdict 
195 Ibid. 
196 Norris, CMP, p. 253. 
197 Norris, CMP, p. 256. 
198 Norris, CMP, p. 253. 
199 Ibid. 
200 Downes, CMP, p. 242. 
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was returned. 201 They found that none of the charges against MacKenzie 
had been proven, and acquitted him on all counts. John Canfield 
Spencer's furious pleas to the President that the verdict be overturned 
were refused. Rather, Tyler allowed judgement to stand, but without the 
usual Presidential endorsement. Thus, a blemish remained on the 
acquittal. Although the decision ended the threat to MacKenzie's life, his 
reputation had not emerged unscathed. The events on board remained a 
topic of debate for some time to come. Indeed, even MacKenzie's 
supporters must have shocked by the suicide of Richard Leecock. Just 
three days after the court rendered its decision, the brig's doctor had shot 
himself in the wardroom. Although his death was attributed to a "settled 
melancholy and a partial derangement induced by a long and severe attack 
of the yellow fever," there was probably some connection with the 
mutiny.202 
Whatever the official verdict, the crew of the brig voted with their 
feet, and ran. It seems likely that their confinement on board was relaxed 
after the court closed. Whereas only four had deserted since the brig's 
arrival, eleven disappeared during the month of April.203 Furthermore, 
another twenty-two ran over the course of the summer.204 Thus, thirty-five 
apprentices, roughly a quarter of the crew, deserted from the service. 
201 Downes, CMP, p. 243. 
202 New York Weekly Tribune, April 8, 1843, quoted in Hayford, The 
Somers Mutiny Affair, p. 158. 
203 "Muster Returns from the United States Brig of War Somers, 
September 1, 1842 to September 30, 1846," NA RG 217, MPR, Book 
1424. 
204 "Muster Returns from the United States Receiving Ship North 
Carolina, 1843," NA RG 217, MPR, Book 1239. 
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Although public interest waned over the course of the court-
martial/05 the Somers had made a profound impact upon the American 
people. Throughout the remainder of 1843, the officers' actions were 
contested in the court of opinion, where the commander still enjoyed 
considerable support. Soon after his acquittal, MacKenzie was feted by 
his fellow residents of Tarrytown.206 Furthermore, he received various 
gifts, including a pair of gold epaulettes, and a dress sword?07 On May 
11, a letter in support of MacKenzie signed by "three hundred merchants 
and others of our most respectable citizens," was published.208 These 
merchants had also taken it upon themselves to pay the commander's legal 
costS.209 Four hundred citizens of Boston sent MacKenzie a similar letter 
on July 8.210 Finally, a number of letters and articles were published in 
support of MacKenzie, the most notable of which was written by Charles 
Sumner, the noted anti-slavery Massachusetts lawyer who would later be 
elected to the United States Senate.2\l Sumner had exchanged 
correspondences with MacKenzie throughout the trial, and came to know 
205 Hone, The Diary of Philip Hone 1828-1851, Bayard, ed., pp. 174-175; 
quoted in Hayford, The Somers Mutiny Affair, p. 134. 
206 Niles' National Register, April 29, 1843, quoted in Hayford, The 
Somers Mutiny Affair, p. 164. 
207 New York Weekly Tribune, April 15, 1843, and The Chicago Express, 
April 20, 1843, quoted in Hayford, The Somers Mutiny Affair, pp. 158, 
160. 
208 Hone, The Diary of Philip Hone 1828-1851, Bayard, ed., p. 183; quoted 
in Hayford, The Somers Mutiny Affair, p. 164. 
209 Ibid. 
210 Niles' National Register, July 8, 1843, quoted in Hayford, The Somers 
Mutiny Affair, p. 177. 
211 Anon. [CO Sumner], "The Mutiny on the Somers," The North American 
Review (VoL 53, No. 120, July 1843), pp. 195-242. 
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him through their mutual acquaintances, Francis Leiber and Henry 
Wadworth Longfellow.212 
At the same time, MacKenzie's detractors were not silent. 
William Sturgis, an experienced mariner who had been a member of the 
Massachusetts House of Representatives and State Senate, published a 
series of letters critical of the court martial and the commander's initial 
conduct.213 While they first appeared in the Boston Courier, he later 
published these in a pamphlet. Sturgis' maritime experience was needed 
to counter a less travelled, but better known sailor-author, Richard Henry 
Dana, Jr. Dana was friendly with MacKenzie's in-laws, and had publicly 
defended the commander. 214 
In addition to Sturgis, another author issued several attacks on 
MacKenzie. This was James Fenimore Cooper, whose enmity MacKenzie 
had earned two years earlier. The crux of their dispute was a naval feud 
that had festered within the service for over twenty-five years. 215 At issue 
was the Battle of Lake Erie, and the conduct of Jesse Elliott during the 
fight. Although Perry's initial report of the battle had absolved Elliott of 
any blame and shared the glory of victory, they had later fallen out, and 
questions continued to persist about the subordinate's conduct during the 
212 G.H. Haynes, "Charles Sumner," Dictionary of American Biography, 
Vol. 18, p. 208. 
213 W.M. Emery, "William Sturgis," Dictionary of American Biography, 
Vol. 18, pp. 183-184. 
214 McFarland, Sea Dangers, p. 170. 
215 Indeed, it may have contributed to the death of Commodore Stephen 
Decatur, who was killed in a duel with Captain James Barron in 1820. 
Certainly, Elliott was Barron's second, and the only captain in the service 
who had voted for his reinstatement in 1818. Whether or not he was 
motivated by his hatred of Decatur (who had loudly supported Perry's 
subsequent account of Lake Erie) is uncertain. D.F. Long, "The Board of 
Navy Commissioners," J. Hagan, ed., In War and Peace, p. 66. 
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battle. Apart from cementing his ties with the Perry family, MacKenzie's 
1840 biography of Perry had made public his hostility towards Jesse 
Elliott's conduct at Lake Erie and afterwards. In fact, the biography was 
probably written in order to refute Cooper's account of the battle.216 
Indeed, partisanship had already led the commander to write a 
review critical of James Fenimore Cooper's History of the United States 
Navy, which had paid no attention to the controversy, and was based upon 
Perry's original report. 217 MacKenzie's review was for the most part 
favourable of the book, but took exception with his treatment of Lake Erie. 
To MacKenzie's review were added attacks by Tristam Burges, a former 
Representative from Rhode Island, and William Duer, the President of 
Columbia College.218 The reviews had a devastating effect on the sales of 
Cooper's book, and earned MacKenzie his enmity. 
Now, Cooper published a defence of his own account of the Battle 
of Lake Erie in July or August 1843,which addressed MacKenzie's earlier 
attacks against his work in light of the Somers Affair. 219 In particular, he 
criticised MacKenzie's judgement and sophistication as a historian: "[He] 
can see only one side of a question. He is a man of prejudice and 
denunciation, and he accuses, less under evidence, than under 
convictions ... ,,220 
216 H. Egan, "Enabling and Disabling the Lake Erie Discussion: James 
Fenimore Cooper and Alexander Slidell MacKenzie Respond to the 
PerrylElliott Controversy," American Neptune, Vol. 57, No.4, 1997, p. 
346. 
217 A.S. MacKenzie, "Cooper's Naval History," North American Review 
(Vol. 50, No. 105, 1839), pp. 432-467. 
218 McFarland, Sea Dangers, p. 45. 
219 Hayford, The Somers Mutiny Affair, p. 169. 
220 J.F. Cooper, The Battle of Lake Erie; or Answers to Messrs. Burges, 
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The Lake Erie pamphlet was the first of three such works that 
Cooper wrote in the following year. The second was published 
anonymously, entitled, The Cruise of the "Somers"; Illustrative of the 
Despotism of the Quarter Deck and the Unmanly Conduct of Commander 
MacKenzie. The pamphlet went into three editions, the last of which was 
bound with Sturgis' letters critical of MacKenzie. It was Cooper's third 
commentary on the mutiny, however, which exerted the greatest influence. 
This was his Review of the Proceedings of the Naval Court Martial, which 
he had attached to the published edition of MacKenzie's court martial. 
The review was brilliantly articulate and scrupulously comprehensive in 
its examination of MacKenzie's conduct and court-martial. In preparing 
it, Cooper had benefited from a private correspondence with William 
Norris.221 The Judge Advocate provided Cooper with his impressions of 
the trial, and his own theory of events. Although Cooper discarded the 
more vitriolic claims, he incorporated much of Norris' memoranda in his 
own report. 
The continued debate illustrated the impact of the mutiny on the 
broader public. While mutiny can remain a strictly military affair, its 
repercussions may also escape institutional boundaries and affect society 
at large.222 This was certainly the case with the Somers Mutiny Affair. 
Different classes and interests read different meanings into the events on 
board, as well as the manner in which the Navy had addressed and 
resolved them. By and large, there were two such interpretations, which 
not surprisingly, reflected the divide between those who supported and 
221 Egan, "The MacKenzie Court-Martial: Cooper's Secret Correspon-
dence with William H. Norris," pp. 149-158. 
222 Rose, "Anatomy of Mutiny," p. 572. 
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those who condemned MacKenzie. In order to understand these 
responses, they must be regarded in terms of the moral panic that 
accompanied the brig's return to the United States. As the mutiny entered 
the collective consciousness of the nation, it triggered existing societal 
concerns, and became a vehicle for their expression. 
The inaccurate newspaper accounts which comprised the first 
public report of the mutiny are crucial to understanding this perception 
and appropriation of the Somers. In the immediate aftermath of any 
catastrophic event, the initial unorganised response gives way to an 
inventory phase in which people analyse their own condition.223 During 
this phase, the media has a fundamental role in shaping popular 
reaction.224 In a moral panic, the media inventory of the event consists of 
three parts: exaggeration and distortion, prediction, and symbolisation. 225 
The initial reports of the Somers mutiny had the effect of amplifying the 
deviance associated with the event. A problem that might have existed 
only for the Navy became, instead, a determined threat to the safety of the 
nation. 
It was the search for causation, and the prediction that it produced, 
however, that ensured the moral panic. The fear was not that the Navy 
would be swamped by mutinies, but that urban delinquents would erupt in 
an epidemic of violence. The mutiny on board the Somers was the 
223 S. Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods 
and Rockers (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1972), p. 29. Cohen's 
influential theory of moral panics relates to societal responses to deviance 
and its putative threat to social norms and values. In particular, it assesses 
how such threats are identified, and then amplified by stereotyping 
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224 Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics, pp. 30-31. 
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harbinger of wider social unrest. While mutiny might be a direct threat 
only to an individual vessel, any act that challenged the state's control 
over its armed forces implicitly challenged the existence of the state 
itself.226 This was exactly the societal collapse that the reformers feared. 
Indeed, what better folk-devil was there than Philip Spencer, the "base son 
of an honoured father." The circumstances of his life and death illustrated 
better than any tract the collapse in the nation's moral fibre. 
Notwithstanding the fact that their guilt had never been properly 
established, the pro-MacKenzie press insisted on referring to the prisoners 
on board the North Carolina as mutineers. This was the first of two 
spurious attributions, which facilitated the prediction of wider societal 
unrest. The second associated the mutineers with apprenticeship in 
general. Indeed, the mutiny reflected the mutineers. It was simple 
enough to do so since apprenticeship was already connected with 
delinquency, and the crew of the Somers were known to be minors. That 
commentators looked to make a wider sense of the mutiny is unsurprising, 
given that people faced with a moral panic talk less about the event itself 
and more about its implications.,,227 No longer symbols of successful 
reform, the apprentices had become representative of the threat that their 
unchecked delinquency represented to the nation. Robert Taylor's letter to 
MacKenzie had reflected this sentiment: 
With me [the Somers] ... has had a different effect by 
convincing me of the necessity of being more strict with the Boys in the 
observance of the Rules for the maintenance of discipline than with the 
old seamen, even to the frequent use of the Cat, they being placed in 
the Navy as incorrigible for their viciousness on shore ... 228 
226 Rose, "The Anatomy of Mutiny," p. 562. 
227 Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics, p. 49. 
228 Taylor to MacKenzie, January 16, 1843, NA RG 273. 
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Like all stereotypes, this belief ignored its self-contradictions. 
Apprenticeship did recruit from those classes of society that the reformers 
sought to control, but not exclusively. Many apprentices were recruited 
from middle-class families that had fallen foul of the 1837 Panic. Indeed, 
several such boys were actually imprisoned as Somers mutineers. George 
Warner's father, Samuel Warner, was the Collector of Customs for New 
York.229 George Kneavels' father was involved with the bank of New 
Haven.23o Charles Van Velsor's father was a friend of Captain Gregory. 
Charles Wilson, while not an apprentice, had only joined the Navy when 
he could not find work ashore.231 His own father was a copyist, who had 
been in the employ of James J. Roosevelt for twenty-five years.232 In 
truth, at least one third of the mutineers did not match the vision of 
apprentices as urban delinquents. 
At any rate, the moral panic had its final symbolisation in this 
stereotyping. This symbolisation has three processes: First, a word 
(apprentice) becomes symbolic of a certain status (delinquent or deviant), 
whereupon objects attached to the word (the Somers) become symbolic of 
that status (and the emotions attached to it).233 All apprentices were seen 
in light of the Somers, and all apprentices were seen in light of the 
supposed delinquency of her crew. What had previously been a positive 
label now had negative connotations. 
229 Warner, signed affidavit, January 21, 1843, NA RG 273. 
230 Henry Eld to Henry Eld, Senior, December 16, 1842, Henry BId Papers, 
Library of Congress. 
231 Wilson to Upshur, February 4, 1843, NA RG 273. 
232 Roosevelt to Upshur, February 6, 1843, NA RG 273. 
233 Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics, p. 40. 
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Thus, reformers adopted the Somers mutineers as proof of the 
dangers of intemperance and irreligiosity. The Sailor's Magazine printed 
an article demonstrating the failures of Elisha Small's life, and their 
part in his ultimate execution: 
Youthful readers! let [sic] the life and the melancholy death of 
this wretched young man be a warning to you. Beware how you trifle 
with the instructions of those who seek to do you good, lest you wrong 
your own souls. The Sabbath-school in order to be a safeguard, against 
vice and crime, as it usually is, must be loved, not trifled with. In the 
language of Commander MacKenzie's exhortation to the youthful 
sailors, after the execution, "Cherish your Bibles with a more entire 
love than Small did." Beware of taking the awful name, and the holy 
sabbath [sic] of the Lord, for he is a jealous God and will not hold you 
guiltless. A void, as you would the gate of death and the very pit of 
perdition, all those places, however beautiful and fascinating in their 
outward appearances, where is mingled the intoxicating cup. "When 
sinners entice thee, consent thou not." And beware of dishonouring 
your father and mother, lest you be cut down ere you have lived out 
your days?14 
It was a sad irony that Small, who had poems from The Sailor's Magazine 
with him on the Somers, would be so used by the same publication.235 Not 
all reformers, however, adopted the mutiny. Indeed, William Lloyd 
Garrison's Liberator published an article that condemned MacKenzie for 
his "anti-Christian" resort to capital punishment.236 The Liberator article 
was actually quite hostile to the commander and reflected more the 
concerns of an alternative reaction to the initial moral panic 
Whereas the reformers saw in the Somers a threat to the Republic 
from below, Jacksonian egalitarians regarded it as threat from above. For 
them, improper exercise of power by the military was at the heart of 
American antimilitarism, and the executions on board the Somers 
234 Anon., "A Warning to Youth - Small the Mutineer," The Sailor's 
Magazine, (Vol. 15, No. 11, July 1843), p. 336. 
235 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 209. 
236 Anon., "Non-Resistance. Case of the Somers ... " The Liberator, 
January 27, 1843, quoted in Hayford, The Somers Mutiny Affair, p. 118. 
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triggered a reaction based on their concerns about the Navy's character 
and expansion. For the egalitarians, the folk-devil was MacKenzie, who 
embodied the aristocratic anti-Republicanism of the armed forces. 
Although Spencer represented the unfair advantages of aristocratic 
family, his status was neither consonant with his actions or experience. In 
the first place, piracy was associated with disorder, not oligarchy.237 More 
importantly, when MacKenzie denied Spencer protection on the grounds 
of class fairness he made the midshipman the victim of military injustice. 
For the egalitarians, the question of aristocratic nepotism and privilege 
paled in comparison to the abrogation of human rights by the commander. 
MacKenzie had violated the fundamental laws of the Republic, a belief 
echoed in Norris' concluding arguments: "The flag of the navy a higher 
power than that of the constitution!!! That flag had better be lowered for 
ever, than permitted to float from so lofty a peak!" 238 
Although MacKenzie was solely responsible for the events on 
board the brig, his actions and person aroused the broader hostility of the 
lacksonians towards the Navy. Indeed, the individual became 
representative of his profession's worst characteristics. The stereotype 
was an easy one to make. MacKenzie's reliance on corporal punishment 
invited condemnation. Furthermore, the commander's familial 
connections evoked fears about the larger naval aristocracy. The Somers 
demonstrated that the expressed concerns of the antimilitarists were real, 
thereby legitimising their hostility to the Navy. 
The focus of the reaction remained, however, the arbitrary exercise 
of absolute power. The egalitarian nightmare envisioned a military that 
237 Rediker, Between the devil and the Deep Blue Sea, p. 261. 
238 Norris, CMP, p. 256. 
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disregarded civil authority, acting in its own interests rather than those of 
the society which it was sworn to protect. At the crux of the problem was 
the question of divided loyalties. The Navy had to represent the will of 
the people, and its officers could not have any interests competing with 
their obligation to serve the national government. Already, concerns had 
been raised about sectional affinities in the Navy. In the case of the 
Somers, the naval aristocracy became identified as a distinct class within 
the service, possessed of its own ulterior agenda, notably the protection of 
one of their own. 
Thus, the conduct of MacKenzie's defense, and the entire judicial 
process were seen in terms of aristocratic disregard for the nation's will. 
"The Union of Tuesday ... said with a bitter and undeserved sneer, that of 
course "he would be acquitted and highly commended by a Naval Court 
Martial as this is the aristocratic branch of the service. ,,239 For the 
J acksonians, the Somers represented a closed cycle of tyranny and 
corruption. MacKenzie's behaviour had triggered pre-existing fears, and 
the conduct of the Navy during his court-martial had confirmed them. 
Regardless of the societal concerns aroused by the mutiny, the 
moral panics associated with it faded rather quickly. This was the result of 
several factors, not least of which were the Navy's actions subsequent to 
the court-martial. Afterwards, the service made a concerted effort to 
forget about the mutiny, to banish it from its collective memory. This was 
facilitated by the ultimate decision not to prosecute any of the convicted 
mutineers. However MacKenzie might have wanted to further exonerate 
himself at their expense, it was not in the interest of the Navy to prolong 
239 New York Weekly Tribune, December 22, 1842, quoted in Hayford, The 
Somers Mutiny Affair, p. 12. 
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the Affair. Further trials would have kept the matter in the public eye, and 
given the prisoners an opportunity to refute MacKenzie's claims. Indeed, 
the Navy's efforts to forget the mutiny were such that for many years 
officers would refuse to comment upon it in public.24O 
This is not to say that the Navy did not learn any lessons from the 
Somers. Apprenticeship was quickly and quietly scrapped. Nor was the 
cruise a complete failure. At least one apprentice fulfilled the vision of a 
new class of sailors: "one of those very boys is now the first officer of one 
of the very best packets out [New York].,,241 Nevertheless, in the 
aftermath of the mutiny, the programme was simply no longer viable. 
Apprentices had become indelibly associated with deviance and 
criminality, while the myriad problems of indenturing 'delinquents' into 
the service were now seen to outweigh the projected benefits. The failure 
of the cruise had also shown the necessity of reforming the appointment 
process for midshipmen. Since apprenticeship had been abolished, it was 
clear that any such reform would not come from below. Indeed, the 
experience of James Matthew Turner revealed that reform could not come 
from below. 
Philip Spencer's career had demonstrated that the Navy had to 
assume greater control over the character and conduct of its midshipmen. 
In 1845, through a feat of administrative legerdemain, the Secretary of the 
Navy, George Bancroft, succeeded in establishing a naval academy on the 
site of Fort Severn in Annapolis, Maryland. By the time Congress was 
presented with its next naval appropriations bill, the Academy was a fait 
240 Parker, Recollections of a Naval Officer, p. 8. 
241 T. Goin, Remarks on the Scarcity of American Seamen; and the 
Remedy; The Naval Apprenticeship System (New York: Herald Office, 
1845), p. 20. 
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accompli. After decades of congressional opposition, the Navy had 
emerged from the Somers Affair with the foundation of a more 
professional and powerful officer corps. Although politics continued to 
playa substantial part in the appointment process, the service had a more 
complete control over the process and progress of a midshipman's 
education. 
Finally, the events of the following years ensured that the Somers 
Mutiny Affair simply fell out of the public mind. Within six years the 
principal characters had died or retired from public life. Abel Parker 
Upshur and John Canfield Spencer had both been promoted during 
MacKenzie's court-martial. Upshur became Secretary of State, and 
Spencer the Secretary of the Treasury. Their careers, were short-lived 
however. Upshur was killed in the 'Peacemaker' explosion on board the 
U.S.S. Princeton on February 20, 1844.242 Spencer's career was poised to 
advance, but his decision to join Tyler's cabinet cost him in 1844, when 
vengeful Whigs rejected his nomination to the Supreme Court.243 Four 
months later, in May, Spencer resigned his Cabinet post in protest over 
Tyler's position on the annexation of Texas. He then retired from public 
service, and practiced law in New York until his death in 1854.244 
Matthew Calbraith Perry was reassigned to command of the Africa 
station, perhaps in punishment, but just as likely to remove him from 
public attention.245 Commander MacKenzie remained ashore in enforced 
retirement. When the Mexican-American War broke out in 1846, he was 
242 Hall, Abel Parker Upshur, p. 210. 
243 Peterson, The Presidencies of William Henry Harrison and John Tyler, 
p.21O. 
244 Butler, The Revision of the Statutes of the State of New York, p. 70. 
245 Morison, Old Bruin, p. 164. 
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returned to sea duty. Indeed, he served under Perry, who commanded the 
Gulf Squadron during the conflict. At war's end, MacKenzie returned to 
Tarrytown, New York, to await further orders. He died there of a heart 
attack in September 1848.246 
But the Commander had out-lived his first command. The Somers 
had been transferred to the Gulf Squadron during the Mexican-American 
War, and assigned to the blockade of Vera Cruz. Two days before she 
was to be detached from the station, whilst in pursuit of a Mexican ship, 
the brig was struck by a bad squall. She capsized and sank within ten 
minutes, losing over half of her crew.247 According to a later report, 
seamen commonly believed that the ghosts of the hanged men had pulled 
the brig under the waves.248 When the Somers sank, three members of her 
original crew remained on board: Manuel Howard, Henry Stremmels, and 
Edward Storms.249 Howard did not survive. With the brig's loss, the 
Somers began her passage into obscurity, and then, much later, historical 
debate. 
246 McFarland, Sea Dangers, p. 260. 
247 R. Semmes, Adventures Ashore and Afloat During the Mexican 
War (Cincinnati: William H. Moore, 1851), p. 93. Raphael Semmes, later 
captain of the famed C.S.S. Alabama, was the brig's commander at the 
time. 
248 Rogers, "Reminiscences of Philip Spencer and the Brig Somers, " p. 35. 
249 "Survivors and Casualties List of the Brig of War Somers," NA RG 
217, MPR, Book 137, letter 118. 
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Conclusion 
There remains to be addressed the fundamental question raised by 
these events on board the Somers, whether or not there actually was a 
mutinous conspiracy. In an absolute sense, it is an impossible question to 
answer. The circumstances of the mutiny preclude certainty. The better 
part of the evidence was presented under duress, or with the intent of 
incriminating the executed men. Indeed, it is so subjective that it is hard 
to draw any objective conclusions from it. With this in mind, these 
documents must only be used with the utmost care. 
The accused had no opportunity to defend themselves before their 
executions. Throughout their confinement, they had been kept silent on 
pain of death. What statements they did make were brief and, at first 
glance, cannot be verified. Most critically, from Spencer himself, there is 
only one sentence: "Yes sir [I spoke of mutiny], but injest.") Is there any 
reason not to accept the truth of these words? An historical leap of faith 
may be required, but it need not be blind faith. 
Ironically, it is one of the brig's own officers who gives us cause to 
accept the statement as truth. During his testimony regarding the council 
of officers, Matthew Calbraith Perry was questioned as follows: 
Q. Does not Van Veltzor give it to be understood that he knew nothing 
of the mutiny till the commander addressed the crew? 
A. Yes, Sir. 
Q. How, then, could you continue to infer that he had promised Mr. 
Spencer to join him? 
) MacKenzie, CMP, p. 197. 
A. From the man's character, and from a person that I supposed guilty 
of mutiny; his oath as to himself being guilty has very little effect, if 
any.2 
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Unintentionally, Perry had impeached his own judgement. If 
Spencer actually had been planning· a mutiny, the last thing he would have 
done was to admit the fact. When confronted by MacKenzie, he would 
have lied. If he had denied the mutiny, it would have been Spencer's 
word against that of an enlisted man. In such an instance, MacKenzie 
would probably have accepted Spencer's denial. Whatever suspicions 
might have then persisted against the midshipman, it hardly seems likely 
that he would have immediately been put in irons. 
Furthermore, the ridiculousness of the planned mutiny belies the 
accusation. No mention is made of Matthew Calbraith Perry, Jr., who 
would probably have been sleeping in the cutter. 3 Any attack on Rodgers 
would have caused some commotion, and risked Perry's intervention. The 
same is true for the remainder of the watch. Norris was right to press this 
point during his cross-examination of Wales.4 In fact, it is the man who 
uncovered the 'conspiracy' that provides the best proof of its fiction. 
According to his testimony, Spencer proposed to make Wales his third 
mate, behind Cromwell and Small.5 Yet Wales knew absolutely nothing 
about navigation or seamanship. Never mind that Charles Wilson was a 
sailmaker's mate. Never mind that he would have brought invaluable 
skills to a renegade vessel. We are meant are to believe that he was less 
valuable to the mutineers than Wales. It staggers the imagination that the 
2 Norris to Perry, CMP, p. 7l. 
3 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 196. 
4 Norris to Wales, CMP, pp. 20-2l. 
5 Wales, CMP, p. 30. 
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sailmaker's mate would have been subordinate to the purser's steward; 
only on a ship of fools would such an arrangement have existed. 
Moreover, it makes sense that the mutiny had just been a joke. 
Notwithstanding a statement that he did not tease his friends,6 one of 
Spencer's traits that emerges from the evidence is his satirical mind. It 
appeared during his college days: 
... On the occasion of a commencement procession of the 
college, Spencer brought up the rear wearing a lofty conical hat 
elaborately decorated with a streamer showing the legend, "Patriarch of 
the Freshman Class!" The President and faculty were walking at the 
head quite unaware of this characteristic demonstration in their rear.? 
On board the Somers, he persisted in making fun of MacKenzie's name. 
There is also an oblique reference to Spencer's sense of humour in one of 
MacKenzie's letters: "I would call your attention to the letter addressed to 
the Duke of Dingbatt; to the poetical tribute offered by Act. Mid. J. T. 
McCollum to the genius of his friend."g It was in Spencer's character to 
tease Wales with a piratical story of mutiny. 
Finally, the one piece of physical evidence against Spencer, the 
Greek lists, can actually be used in his defence. The lists themselves are 
problematic. On their face, they are damning, and in truth, they are 
difficult to explain away. The alternative explanation seems 
unsatisfactory, that they were merely an idle, and misjudged exercise. But 
Spencer is meant to have enjoyed compiling lists of names in transliterated 
6 Inglis, CMP, p. 109. 
7 Gay, "Recollections of Philip Spencer," p. 76. 
g MacKenzie to Upshur, December 26, 1842, NA RG 273. McCollum had 
served with Spencer on board of the John Adams. It is important to note 
that Spencer had friends in the Brazilian Squadron. After his dismissal 
from the squadron, he had been parted from them, which perhaps, 
accounts for his behaviour towards the steerage officers on the Somers. 
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Greek while he was a student. Even so, the lists themselves, if they were a 
plan for mutiny, are not consonant with their author. Spencer loved codes. 
He is credited with designing the secret signs, grips, and passwords of Chi 
Psi Fraternity.9 A year before the Somers departed from New York, 
Spencer had visited a gentleman named William S. Johnson: "He showed 
me several keys [to codes], one of which I think was Aaron Burr's cypher 
[sic], and requested me to give him the key I had, which I did.,,10 If it was 
Aaron Burr's cipher, then Spencer was certainly capable of sophisticated 
cryptography. "Preparing the Burr original dispatch in code and cipher 
required the accuracy of a certified accountant and the patience of a 
medieval monk.,,11 Finally, Spencer was meant to have been a gifted 
student of Greek and Latin.12 His ready knowledge of Spanish does 
indicate an affinity for language. It seems inconceivable that such a mind 
would have hidden a mutinous plot behind something as simple as 
transliterated Greek. 
The damning statements that Spencer is reported to have uttered 
also require explanation. Among other things, he was heard to say "the 
die will soon be cast," presumably in reference to the mutiny.13 On 
another occasion, he was heard to remark that "he would try his plan, if he 
succeeded well and good, if not he'd burst.,,14 It may be that these words 
9 Gay, "Recollections of Philip Spencer," p. 79. 
10 Johnson, COl, p. 43. 
11 R.E. Weber, Masked Dispatches: Cryptograms and Cryptology in 
American History, 1775-1900 (Fort Meade, MD: National Security 
Agency Center for Cryptologic History, 1993), p. 94. The Burr cipher 
consisted of a mixed pictographic and numerical script. 
121. Chaile, "Philip Spencer," H.S. Slifer, and H.L. Kennicott, eds., The 
Chi Psi Story (Ann Arbor, MI: Chi Psi Fraternity, 1951), p. 74-75 
13 Conger, CMP, p. 126. 
14 Tyson, COl, p. 38. 
335 
were merely fabrications. If, however, they were not, the remarks may 
provide an alternative reading of what was intended on board the Somers. 
It is an explanation that has its basis in Spencer's own words as reported 
by MacKenzie: "I will tell you frankly ... what I intended to do had I got 
home - I should have attempted to escape ... " It may be that Spencer 
intended to desert upon arrival at St. Thomas. It was alleged that Daniel 
McKinley intended to do so, and for the express purpose of signing onto a 
slaver. 15 On another occasion, Spencer was said to have approached 
members of the crew with the intimation that he knew they were planning 
to jump ship at St. Thomas. 16 If this was his intention, it was certainly in 
character. Spencer had run away before, and would have been doing so 
again. He may even have intended to rob MacKenzie in order to finance a 
new life. He certainly believed that the commander had taken on board a 
cache of money at Liberia. 17 Perhaps he hoped to charter his own vessel, 
which would explain his questions on the subject. 18 It would also provide 
substance to Spencer's musings that he would soon have his own 
command. 19 Spencer had been willing to steal from his father in order to 
escape his influence; to steal from MacKenzie, whom he certainly 
despised, would have been easier still. Whatever were his intentions, it is 
most unlikely that they entailed mutiny and murder, and in that case, he 
and two other men were slain without trial for an act that they had not, and 
would not have committed. Upshur's 1841 report had commented on the 
need for a new naval code: 
15 Tyson, CMP, p. 112. 
16 McKinley, CMP, p. 181. 
17 MacKenzie, CMP, p. 195. 
18 Sibley, CMP, p. 171. 
19 Conger, CMP, p. 126. 
The evils resulting from the want of a proper naval code are of 
the most serious character, and will, if not remedied, ultimately ruin the 
naval service of our country. What can be expected of a community of 
men, living together under circumstances tending to constant 
excitement and collisions, with no fixed law to govern them, and where 
even rank and station are imperfectly defined? The necessary 
consequence of such a state of things must be disputes, contests, 
disorder, and confusion. Sometimes unauthorized power will be 
assumed, and at other times lawful authority will be disobeyed. It is 
impossible that a wholesome discipline can prevail in this uncertain 
condition of official rank and authority. The same uncertainty prevails 
in regards to punishments. The unbounded latitude of discretion 
allowed to courts-martial in this respect is of most evil consequence, 
and calls loudly for correction. It invites to the indulgence of prejudice 
and favoritism - subjecting light offences to undue punishment and 
suffering great offenders to escape with light punishments.2o 
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Events on board the Somers showed these words to be eerily prophetic. 
20 SNR 1841, p. 377. 
Figures 
Figure 1. Alexander Slidell MacKenzie. This sketch was produced at 
the time of MacKenzie's court-martial. Although it valuable as a 
contemporary rendering of the commander, it does not seem a fair 
likeness. The profile is unsettling, even disturbing, and perhaps 
reflects the artist's bias against MacKenzie. 
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Figure 2. Alexander Slidell MacKenzie. Notwithstanding the 'heroic' 
nature of this portrait, it is certainly a more accurate depiction of the 
commander. This assertion is based on the similarities between this 
portrait and the following illustration, which depicts MacKenzie's 
brother, John Slidell. 
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Figure 3. John Slidell. In this portrait, a strong familial resemblance 
between Slidell and MacKenzie is revealed. Besides the receding 
hairline, the cast of the eyes is similar, as well as the long chin. At the 
same time, the shape of Slidell's nose evokes the profile of Mackenzie 
in Figure 1. 
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Figure 4. Inboard Profile of the Brig-of-War Somers. 
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Figure 5. Currier & Ives Print of the U.S. Brig-of-War Somers. Apart 
from the position of the boat-hooks, note the great length of the jib and 
the exaggerated rake of the masts. 
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Figure 6. Spar Deck Profile. This depiction of the spar deck gives 
some view of the obstructions caused by the presence of the 
carronades, spars, and cutters. Furthermore, it demonstrates the 
gradual forward encroachment of the prisoners as they were arrested 
and confined. 
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Figure 7. Philip Spencer. Although there is no contemporary likeness 
of Spencer, this posthumous portrait is generally considered to be the 
most accurate. In fact, it was commissioned to redress errors made in 
a previous portrait, and was only begun after consultation with several 
persons who had known the midshipman in college. 
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Figure 8. John Canfield Spencer. Although this portrait captures 
Spencer's renowned temper and stern countenance, it is difficult to see 
any of his son in the father's features. In conjunction with Figure 9, 
however, the high forehead and chin button shared by the two is 
readily apparent. 
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Figure 9. John Canfield Spencer. This image of Spencer, taken from a 
contemporary political cartoon, depicts him in profile en route to his 
new cabinet position in Washington, D.C. It has been flipped so that a 
ready comparison can be made between the image of the father and his 
son. When so compared, shared features such as the high forehead, 
strong chin button, and bent nose are immediately apparent. 
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Figure 10. The Greek Lists. On the left is a facsimile set of Spencer's 
lists. The handwritten scrawl near the center of the page is presumably 
in Spencer's private code, and has never been deciphered. On the right 
is a translation of the original lists. 
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Figure 11. Currier & Ives Print ofthe U.S. Brig-of-War Somers. In 
this re-issue of the print depicted in Figure 5, the lithograph has been 
altered in order to include the silhouttes of Cromwell and Small as 
they hang from the yard-arm. 
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Figure 4: H. Chapelle, The History of the American Sailing Navy - The 
Ships and Their Development, New York: W.W. Norton, 1949. 
Figures 5, 7, 8, 10: P. McFarland, Sea Dangers - The Affair of the 
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